Revision summary
Terror groups and riot organisers use social media to recruit, instruct, raise funds, and spread rumour. The 2012 North-East exodus rumours and ISIS-style online radicalisation are clear recent misuses. Lawful blocking, UAPA, and IT Act intercept powers must stay narrow after the 66A judgment. Platforms need log preservation and fast removal of unlawful content on a legal order. Literacy, counter-speech, and financial tracking beat a long blanket internet shutdown.
Model answer
Copper italics in this answer — like this — are the key facts. Each one is unpacked in the Facts & figures rail.
Introduction
Phones and social platforms let a non-State actor — a terror group, a riot organiser, a hostile intelligence proxy, or a criminal gang — reach millions without a radio station. Recruitment, rumour, and live attack coordination now travel on the same apps as family chat. That is a major internal-security concern. The answer must name how the tools were misused and then offer guidelines that target crime, not the ordinary political speech the Supreme Court protected when it struck down Section 66A in 2015.
Body
How the tools are misused
- Recruitment and radicalisation: polished videos and private chat pull a youth from grievance to a module; ISIS and other groups industrialised this after 2014.
- Instruction and operational security: bomb-making notes, encryption, and dead-drop accounts replace a physical handler.
- Rumour as a weapon: fake images of violence can start a riot or a flight of people, as in the 2012 North-East exodus rumours on SMS and social media.
- Communal incitement: forwarded clips, often old or foreign, timed for a procession or an election.
- Fundraising: online wallets, charities that are fronts, and publicity for kidnappings.
- Live terror: attackers on the move using phones for media and for handlers, as seen in several urban assaults worldwide and in Indian investigations after 26/11-era plots.
- Cyber crime overlap: phishing and malware to fund or to steal data from officials.
- Separatist and insurgent propaganda aimed at the diaspora and at local youth in Kashmir and the North-East.
Recent-past illustrations
- Global jihadist use of Twitter, YouTube, and Telegram-style channels for brand and for lone-wolf calls.
- Indian cases of modules busted with Facebook and WhatsApp trails; police often find the handler abroad.
- Mass rumour moving faster than a district’s public-address system.
- Use of virtual private networks and foreign servers to sit outside easy summons.
Effective guidelines to curb the threat
- Law with a narrow aim: use Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, Information Technology Act blocking and interception powers (sections 69 and 69A), and ordinary IPC offences against incitement — with judicial or high-level executive oversight so the 66A-era vagueness does not return.
- Intermediary rules: time-bound removal of unlawful content on a lawful order; a local office and a compliance officer for large platforms; preservation of logs for investigation. Do not demand a general pre-censorship of all speech.
- CERT-In, NTRO, and State cyber cells that share indicators of compromise and of terror handles in hours, not months.
- Open-source and undercover capability in police, with language skills, instead of only a blocking request.
- Financial trails: freeze wallets and hawala that sit behind the page; involve the Financial Intelligence Unit.
- Counter-speech: official fact pages during a rumour spike; community voices that are trusted in that town, not only a Delhi press release.
- Digital literacy in schools and madrasas and through the police beat: how to spot a fake video, whom to call.
- Crisis protocol: when a riot clip spreads, district magistrate, police, and platforms on one call; targeted restriction if a court or statute allows, rather than a long, blanket shutdown that also blinds the honest citizen and the police.
- International cooperation: Budapest Convention-type mutual assistance, and requests to firms that store data abroad.
- Prison and probation: monitor known radicalisers’ accounts; deradicalisation that is more than a locked SIM.
- Protect encryption for the honest user while using targeted lawful intercept on identified suspects — a mass backdoor is itself a security hole.
Flow diagram
Conclusion
Non-State actors have used the internet to recruit, to riot through rumour, to raise money, and to run operations. Indian rumour panics and global jihadist media are the recent proof. Guidelines that work are precise law, platform compliance, cyber fusion, money trails, counter-speech, and literacy — not a return to vague speech crimes or a permanent blackout. Curb the handler and the lie; keep the citizen online.
Quick related
Students also ask
-
The nature of economic growth in India in recent times is often described as a jobless growth. Do you agree with this view? Give arguments in favour of your answer.
Next question on this syllabus topic (2015 · Q1). View answer →
-
Should India ban encrypted apps?
A total ban also blinds business and honest users and pushes handlers to new tools. Targeted intercept on a warrant and platform cooperation are the better guideline.
-
Is an internet shutdown the best riot tool?
A short, lawful, local restriction can slow a rumour spike. A long Statewide shutdown also stops police coordination and livelihood, and it should be a last step, not the first.
Same topic · past papers
UPSC has asked this before
These previous-year questions sit on the same topic. Open one to practise the earlier ask.
-
2019 · Q10 · GS III · 10 marks
What is CyberDome Project? Explain how it can be useful in controlling internet crimes in India. -
2024 · Q20 · GS III · 15 marks
Social media and encrypting messaging services pose a serious security challenge. What measures have been adopted at various levels to address the security implications of social media? Also suggest any other remedies to address the problem. -
2015 · Q18 · GS III · 12 marks
Religious indoctrination via social media has resulted in Indian youth joining the ISIS. What is ISIS and its mission? How can ISIS be dangerous to the internal security of our country.
More from this topic
Q17 · UPSC Mains 2026 · GS III · 15 marks · Solution
What are the challenges to solid waste management in India? Discuss the governmental policy framework on solid waste management. Discuss the success/failure cases of Delhi and Indore cities highlighting the salient features of their solid waste management initiatives.
Indian Economy
• Challenges: volume growth, mixed waste, land, informal exclusion, weak finance. • SWM Rules 2016 mandate segregation, collection, processing, user fees. • Plastic/C&D/e-waste rules and SBM Urban complete the framework. • Swachh Survekshan creates competitive accountability. • Indore: strong segregation, collection, processing, enforcement. • Delhi: huge volumes, legacy dumps, fires, fragmented stress. • Lesson: behaviour + processing beat trucks-only strategies. • Biomining and bulk-generator compliance are essential for metros.
Q16 · UPSC Mains 2026 · GS III · 15 marks · Solution
What is Agentic Artificial Intelligence (AI)? Explain its working. Describe its applications with suitable examples. Discuss the advantages, risks and challenges associated with agentic AI systems.
Indian Economy
• Agentic AI pursues goals via plan–act–observe loops, not one-shot replies. • Working parts: planning, tools, memory, guardrails, stop conditions. • Uses: grievance assist, compliance, agri/disaster fusion, cyber SOCs, tutoring. • Advantages: speed, consistency, expert leverage, continuous monitoring. • Risks: harmful actions from hallucinations, injection attacks, privacy leaks. • India challenges: languages, liability, data law, compute cost, evaluation. • Govern with human approval for high stakes, logs and allow-listed tools. • Sandboxes beat unsupervised autonomy over money and rights.
Q15 · UPSC Mains 2026 · GS III · 15 marks · Solution
Mention salient features of 'Mission Drishti'. Discuss the imaging techniques used in the satellite launched on 3rd May 2026. Why is it being considered world's first satellite of its kind?
Indian Economy
• Mission Drishti is GalaxEye's EO satellite launched 3 May 2026. • Marketed as world's first OptoSAR combining optical + all-weather radar. • Described as India's largest privately built satellite in that category. • Imaging: X-band SAR (Stripmap/Spotlight) plus 7-band MSI. • Fusion on one platform avoids two-satellite parallax/time errors. • Fused resolution marketed near 1.8 m; SAR spotlight finer (~0.9 m claimed). • Orbit: sun-synchronous LEO ~500 km class; revisit ~4 days (company). • Novelty is integrated commercial OptoSAR—not inventing SAR/optical physics.