Q6(b) · UPSC Civil Services Mains 2021 · PSIR GS 2 · 15 marks · 1 min read

← Q6(a)

Examine the Geo-strategic points of contention in the bilateral relationship between India and China

Topic: India and the Global Centres of Power. Syllabus: India and the Global Centres of Power: USA, EU, Japan, China and Russia. Same official PYQ from year-wise 2021 and India and the Global Centres of Power.

Revision summary

The core file is an unsettled Himalayan boundary. Doklam 2017 and Galwan 2020 are the named recent crises. CPEC through Pakistan-occupied Kashmir is a sovereignty and two-front issue. The Indian Ocean and South Asian projects extend the contest beyond the ridge. Status in the UN and Asian clubs is the diplomatic layer of the same rivalry.

Model answer

Copper italics in this answer — like this — are the key facts. Each one is unpacked in the Facts & figures rail.

Introduction

India and China share a long disputed Himalayan frontier and a crowded Asian order. Geostrategic contention is territorial, maritime, and institutional. Doklam and Galwan are named shocks on a deeper map.

Body

The land frontier

  • Unresolved boundary: Aksai Chin, the McMahon Line, and the status of the so-called LAC.
  • 1962 war memory structures military planning.
  • Doklam 2017: a stand-off at the Bhutan–China–India trijunction, about a road and the Siliguri corridor’s depth.
  • Galwan 2020: lethal clash in eastern Ladakh that ended a long political pretence of managed peace.

The Pakistan and Himalayan wedge

  • China–Pakistan strategic tie and the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor through Pakistan-occupied Kashmir.
  • India reads CPEC as a sovereignty and two-front problem, not only a trade road.

The maritime and neighbourhood ring

  • Indian Ocean dual-use ports, submarine visits, and a growing PLA Navy.
  • Influence in Nepal, Sri Lanka, Myanmar, and Bangladesh through finance and projects.
  • Tibet and the Dalai Lama remain a political-security residue of 1950s incorporation.

Order and status

  • China’s rise, as Waltz would count capability, shrinks India’s room in Asia.
  • UN Security Council permanent membership, NSG, and Asian institutions are status contests.
  • The Quad and Act East are Indian replies, not the cause of the border file.

What is not the whole story

  • Trade remains large. Contention is geostrategic even when shops are full.

Flow diagram

flowchart TD
  B[Boundary LAC] --> D[Doklam 2017]
  B --> G[Galwan 2020]
  CPEC[CPEC PoK] --> T[Two-front fear]
  IOR[Indian Ocean] --> T
  D --> GS[Geostrategic contention]
  G[G] --> GS[GS]
  T[T] --> GS[GS]

Conclusion

Points of contention are the boundary (Doklam, Galwan, Aksai Chin, Arunachal), the China–Pakistan corridor, the Indian Ocean, and status in Asian and UN order. Interdependence in trade has not dissolved the security dilemma.

Quick related

Students also ask

  • Is trade a cushion against war?

    It raises the cost of rupture. Galwan showed that it does not prevent force on the LAC.

  • Is Tibet still a live contention?

    India accepts the Tibet Autonomous Region as part of the PRC in formal notes, yet the refugee community and Himalayan military geography keep it politically sensitive.

Same topic · past papers

UPSC has asked this before

These previous-year questions sit on the same topic. Open one to practise the earlier ask.

  1. 2023 · Q6(a) · PSIR GS 2 · 20 marks

    Arms trade, economic ties and congruent geo-political interests are no longer the three pillars of India - Russia relationship in the emerging strategic context. Comment

    View answer →

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