Human right activists constantly highlight the fact that the Armed forces (Special Powers) Act, 1958 (AFSPA) is a draconian act leading to cases of human right abuses by security forces. What sections of AFSPA are opposed by the activists. Critically evaluate the requirement with reference to the view held by Apex Court.

Sections activists oppose

• Section 3: the power to declare an area disturbed on a satisfaction that is often open-ended and renewed for years, which activists say becomes a permanent emergency without a proper legislative debate each time.
• Section 4(a): power to fire even to the causing of death if a person is acting in contravention of law and order, after due warning as the section states — critics say this is a licence for excessive force in crowded civilian space.
• Section 4(b): power to destroy shelters or positions from which armed attacks are made or believed to be made, which can hit homes and villages.
• Section 4(c): arrest without warrant, with the use of force necessary to effect the arrest.
• Section 4(d): enter and search without warrant and seize, which activists say guts ordinary criminal-procedure safeguards.
• Section 6: no prosecution, suit, or legal proceeding against a person in respect of acts done under the Act without previous sanction of the Central Government. This is the core impunity clause in almost every rights petition.
• Together, activists argue that 4 and 6 invert the normal rule that the soldier is under criminal law unless a rare necessity is proved in court first.

Apex Court’s view

• In Naga People’s Movement of Human Rights v. Union of India (1997) the Court held AFSPA constitutionally valid, but not a blank cheque.
• Declaration of a disturbed area is open to judicial review; it cannot be mala fide or eternal without application of mind.
• Use of force must be minimum, not punitive; a person arrested must be handed to the local police with least possible delay.
• The army remains bound by do’s and don’ts and by ordinary criminal law if it abuses the power; Section 6 is not a pardon in advance for murder or rape.
• Later monitoring of alleged extra-judicial killings (including in Manipur) shows the Court will order inquiries when a pattern of fake encounters is alleged; that is a check, not a repeal.
• The Court thus says: the Act can exist in a real insurgency, but every bullet is still justiciable in principle.

Critical evaluation of requirement

• Case for retention in some theatres: where an organised insurgency uses jungle and ambush, ordinary CrPC arrest may get a patrol killed; a special power to search and to fire under command can be an operational need, as the Court accepted.
• Case against a thick, permanent AFSPA: decades of disturbed-area status, delayed sanctions under Section 6, and civilian deaths destroy legitimacy, which is itself a security asset; Jeevan Reddy (2005) even recommended repeal and a more calibrated law.
• Requirement is therefore conditional: time-bound notification, published reasons, civilian casualty audit, and time-bound sanction decisions (grant or refuse) so Section 6 cannot bury a case by silence.
• Where the State police and magistracy can function, AFSPA should shrink geographically; keeping it for political signalling is not the Court’s test of necessity.
• Human-rights abuse is real where command fails; denying every allegation is as unwise as claiming every use of Section 4 is a war crime.

Way forward

• Follow the 1997 guidelines in the field, not only in affidavits.
• Independent investigation of encounter deaths; fast yes-or-no on prosecution sanction.
• Review disturbed-area maps every six months in Parliament’s sight.
• Train troops in minimum force and in recording warnings, so Section 4(a) is not a street-execution clause in practice.