Revision summary
• Origins: BRICS evolved from a 2001 investment label to a summit-level grouping from 2009, with South Africa joining in 2010. • Expansion: Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, UAE and Indonesia joined, and Kazan 2024 added partner countries. • Institutions: the NDB, based in Shanghai, and the roughly 100 billion dollar CRA offer alternatives to IMF and World Bank financing. • Payments: local currency trade is discussed, but India rejects de-dollarisation and no common currency exists. • Voice: BRICS pushes for UNSC, IMF and World Bank reform and raises climate finance and debt concerns. • Comparison: broader and more development-focused than G7 or Quad, but without their enforcement power. • Limits: India-China tension, Russia's sanctions, slow consensus and members who hedge. • Verdict: BRICS is an alternative platform and pressure group, not a replacement order.
Model answer
Copper italics in this answer — like this — are the key facts. Each one is unpacked in the Facts & figures rail.
Introduction
BRICS began in 2006 as a label for four large emerging economies and grew into a formal grouping with its own bank, a reserve arrangement and a growing membership after the 2023 Johannesburg summit. It presents itself as a platform where the Global South sets its own agenda on finance, trade and institutional reform, in contrast to the G7 and Bretton Woods bodies. Yet differences between India, China and Russia limit it to being a complement rather than a replacement for the existing order.
Body
How BRICS Projects Itself as an Alternative
Origins and identity: The term BRIC was coined by an investment analyst in 2001, and Brazil, Russia, India and China held their first foreign ministers' meeting in 2006 and first summit in 2009. South Africa joined in 2010, making it BRICS. The group's identity rests on a shared complaint: global institutions set up in 1944 and 1945 reflect the power of that period and not the weight of today's emerging economies. BRICS has no secretariat or charter, and works by consensus through annual summits, a presidency rotating among members and sherpa-level meetings.
- Eg: The original five members account for over forty per cent of world population and a rising share of world output, which gives them a claim to a larger voice.
Expansion as a signal: At Johannesburg in 2023 BRICS invited six countries, and Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran and the UAE joined in January 2024, with Indonesia following in 2025. At Kazan in 2024 a partner country category was created for states such as Belarus, Kazakhstan, Malaysia, Thailand and Uganda. Expansion shows that many countries see value in a grouping that is not led by Western capitals and spreads membership across Asia, Africa, the Middle East and Latin America.
- Eg: Argentina declined its invitation after a change of government in 2023 and Saudi Arabia has not formally confirmed, which shows that the pull of expansion is real but not uniform.
Institutions That Back the Claim
New Development Bank and Contingent Reserve Arrangement: The NDB, set up in Shanghai after the 2014 Fortaleza summit and operational from 2015, finances infrastructure and sustainable development in emerging economies with equal voting shares for founding members, unlike the weighted voting of the IMF and World Bank. The Contingent Reserve Arrangement, with a pool of about 100 billion dollars, is meant as a liquidity backstop during balance-of-payments stress. The NDB has also tried to lend in local currencies and added members such as Bangladesh, the UAE, Egypt and Algeria.
- Eg: NDB-financed projects like Mumbai Metro lines, Madhya Pradesh roads and Brazilian sanitation schemes show it working alongside, not against, the World Bank. The CRA has never been drawn upon in a crisis, which shows the gap between design and credibility.
Payments and the dollar question: Several BRICS members, especially Russia after sanctions, discuss trade settlement in national currencies and alternative payment channels such as BRICS Pay. The attraction is lower dependence on the dollar and reduced exposure to sanctions. India has said clearly that it has no policy to de-dollarise and sees local currency trade as a matter of convenience and cost. The United States warned of heavy tariffs if BRICS pursued a common currency, though no such currency is planned.
- Eg: India and Russia have settled part of their oil and fertiliser trade in rupees and dirhams, and India has rupee settlement arrangements with the UAE and several others, but a BRICS currency remains talk.
Voice of the Global South
Reform of global governance: BRICS leaders repeatedly call for reform of the UN Security Council, IMF and World Bank. IMF quotas still give a few advanced economies outsized power, and the United States holds an effective veto because major decisions need 85 per cent of votes. The 16th quota review in 2023 raised quotas but did not shift shares. On the Security Council, BRICS statements back greater representation of Africa, Asia and Latin America, and in recent declarations have supported the aspirations of Brazil and India while stopping short of naming the permanent seat.
- Eg: At the Rio summit in July 2025 the BRICS declaration again pressed for governance reform of the UN and IMF, with India taking over the chair in 2026.
Amplifying Global South concerns: The group takes up issues such as climate finance, debt distress, trade rules, technology access and health equity from a developing country perspective. India links BRICS with its own Global South outreach, including the Voice of Global South Summits and the African Union becoming a permanent G20 member during India's presidency in 2023. BRICS and G20 therefore reinforce each other rather than compete.
- Eg: Debt restructuring demands from African and South Asian states, and the push for adequate climate finance at the COP summits, were echoed in BRICS and G20 declarations in 2023 and 2024.
Against Other Groupings
Versus G7, Bretton Woods and Quad: The G7 is a club of advanced economies that sets norms in finance and security, the IMF and World Bank are weighted by capital, and the Quad is a four-nation grouping with security aims. BRICS presents itself as a body that is broader, consensus-based and focused on development and reform, not on security alliances or ideology. It lacks the binding rules and enforcement power of the G7-led system, but offers choice to states who do not want to align with any camp.
- Eg: Countries such as Egypt, Indonesia and the UAE join BRICS while also keeping ties with the United States and Europe, which shows hedging rather than a choice of side.
Versus G20 and SCO: The G20 includes both advanced and emerging economies and is the main forum for economic coordination, while the SCO focuses on security and connectivity in Eurasia. BRICS sits between them, with an economic and political agenda but without the G20's legitimacy or the SCO's security focus. India is active in all three and in the Quad, using each for different goals.
- Eg: India's G20 presidency in 2023 produced the New Delhi Leaders' Declaration, with consensus language on Ukraine, which BRICS might have found harder to agree.
Limits and Internal Contradictions
Divergent interests: India and China have unresolved border disputes after the Galwan clash of 2020, and India does not support the Belt and Road Initiative. China dominates BRICS economically and the NDB's capital, which makes others cautious about a China-led bloc. Russia seeks a political counterweight to the West after the Ukraine war, while India, Brazil and South Africa value ties with the West. Putin avoided travelling to Johannesburg in 2023 because South Africa is bound by the ICC warrant.
- Eg: The Modi-Xi meeting at Kazan in October 2024 after a patrolling arrangement on the border eased tension, but trust is still limited.
Slow consensus and limited delivery: Decisions require consensus across very different political systems, so declarations are broad and implementation slow. Expansion also dilutes the group's focus, since new members like Iran and the UAE bring regional rivalries inside. The NDB has been constrained by sanctions on Russia and lending remains small compared with the World Bank. BRICS therefore works more as a platform for voice and coordination than as a rival system.
- Eg: The inclusion of Iran and Egypt alongside Ethiopia, which has a dispute with Egypt over the Nile dam, shows how internal rivalries enter the group.
Alternative, not replacement: India's approach is to use BRICS to push for reform, not to confront the West. It calls the grouping a non-Western but not anti-Western body, and sees value in both BRICS and Quad-type partnerships. This multi-alignment suits India's strategic autonomy and explains why BRICS is more an alternative platform than an alternative order.
- Eg: Foreign Minister Jaishankar's remarks that India does not want to weaken the dollar and views BRICS as a means for fairer governance reflect this stance.
Flow diagram
Conclusion
BRICS gives the Global South an organised forum, a development bank, a reserve backstop and a louder demand for UN and IMF reform, which is why it can credibly present itself as an alternative to the G7-led order. But India-China rivalry, Russian sanctions, slow consensus and hedging by members keep it from replacing existing institutions. Its real value is as a complement and pressure group that widens choices for developing countries, not a counterweight in the full sense.
Quick related
Students also ask
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'Virus of Conflict is affecting the functioning of the SCO'. In the light of the above statement point out the role of India in mitigating problems.
Next question on this syllabus topic (2023 · Q9). View answer →
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How does BRICS present itself as an alternative to Western groupings?
Through the New Development Bank and Contingent Reserve Arrangement, an expanding membership across the Global South, consensus-based decision-making and constant demands to reform the UN Security Council, IMF and World Bank.
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Does BRICS aim to replace the dollar?
Some members discuss local currency trade and alternative payment systems, but there is no common BRICS currency, and India has stated that it has no policy to de-dollarise.
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What are the main limits on BRICS as a counterweight?
India-China rivalry, Russia's sanctions and the Ukraine war, slow consensus among diverse members, China's dominance and members' continuing ties with the West limit BRICS from replacing existing institutions.
Same topic · past papers
UPSC has asked this before
These previous-year questions sit on the same topic. Open one to practise the earlier ask.
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2024 · Q9 · GS II · 10 marks
'The West is fostering India as an alternative to reduce dependence on China's supply chain and as a strategic ally to counter China's political and economic dominance.' Explain this statement with examples. -
2021 · Q18 · GS II · 15 marks
Can Civil Society and Non-Governmental Organizations present an alternative model of public service delivery to benefit the common citizen. Discuss the challenges of this alternative model.
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Q9 · UPSC Mains 2023 · GS II · 10 marks · Solution
'Virus of Conflict is affecting the functioning of the SCO'. In the light of the above statement point out the role of India in mitigating problems.
Bilateral and Regional Groupings
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Q10 · UPSC Mains 2022 · GS II · 10 marks · Solution
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