Q13 · UPSC Civil Services Mains 2022 · GS II · 15 marks · 3 min read

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While the national political parties in India favour centralisation, the regional parties are in favour of State autonomy." Comment.

Page facts
Exam
Union Public Service Commission — Civil Services Examination (UPSC)
Board
UPSC
Stage
Mains
Year
2022
Paper
UPSC Mains — General Studies Paper II (GS II)
Question
Q13
Marks
15
Topic
Governance and Policy
Syllabus
Government policies and interventions for development in various sectors and issues arising out of their design and implementation.

Topic: Governance and Policy. Syllabus: Government policies and interventions for development in various sectors and issues arising out of their design and implementation. Same official PYQ from year-wise 2022 and Governance and Policy.

Revision summary

National parties have an organisational bias toward a strong Centre, concurrent legislation and nationwide schemes. Regional parties have an organisational bias toward State autonomy, language and control of local patronage. Coalition years showed regional parties making Union policy, which softens the contrast. The same party talks autonomy in Opposition and accepts Union instruments in office. The statement is a useful tendency, not a law. Impersonal federal institutions matter more than assuming party type will protect the State List.

Model answer

Copper italics in this answer — like this — are the key facts. Each one is unpacked in the Facts & figures rail.

Introduction

National parties recruit, fund, and campaign across the Union, so they often prefer a strong Centre, common markets, and All-India services. Regional parties live off a State’s language, caste coalition, and fiscal grievance, so they demand autonomy. The comment is a useful first cut, not a law of Indian federalism, because coalitions and centrally sponsored schemes pull both types of party toward the same purse.

Body

Why national parties lean to centralisation

  • A national party seeks a single message, a single campaign machine, and interchangeable ministers; concurrent-list legislation, the IAS/IPS, and the Election Commission’s nationwide writ serve that machine.
  • Goods and Services Tax, a national security narrative, and centrally sponsored schemes let a ruling national party claim delivery in every district, which is politically cheaper than negotiating twenty different State models.
  • Article 356, the Governor, and residual power in Article 248 have historically been more congenial to parties that expect to occupy Raisina Hill than to those that never do.
  • National parties also contain State units that bargain internally; centralisation is often intra-party as much as Centre-versus-State.

Why regional parties lean to State autonomy

  • Regional parties are organised to win a Legislative Assembly first; control of land, police, education, and local recruitment is their patronage core, which they defend as federalism.
  • They use the Rajya Sabha, inter-State councils, and special-category or package politics to extract Union money while resisting Union conditions on language, recruitment, and farm or education reform.
  • Sarkaria and Punchhi Commission themes — consultation before Article 356, restraint on the Governor, and respect for the State List — are easier for a regional party to champion because it does not expect to wield 356 itself next year.
  • Subnational identity (language, tribe, region) is their electoral brand; autonomy is that brand in constitutional vocabulary.

Why the dichotomy overstates the case

  • From 1989 to 2014, regional parties at the Centre in coalitions actually wrote national policy; they were not secessionists, they were bargainers for portfolios and packages.
  • National parties in Opposition in a State discover State rights overnight; regional parties in a Union coalition accept GST, CBI, and central schemes that they denounce when out of that coalition.
  • Some regional parties prefer a strong Centre against a neighbouring State (river disputes, border, migrants); autonomy is then selective.
  • The 1990s economic reforms were midwifed by a minority national government with regional support; centralisation of markets can coexist with political regionalisation.

A fair comment

  • As a tendency, the statement holds: national parties have an organisational interest in a thick Union, regional parties in a thick State.
  • As an iron rule it fails: money, security, and office pull both toward opportunistic federalism.
  • Healthy federalism needs the Election Commission, Finance Commission, and GST Council to bind whoever is in office, not a hope that party type will reliably defend the State List.

Flow diagram

Flow diagram

Conclusion

National parties do favour centralisation and regional parties do favour State autonomy, because that is how each wins elections. Coalitions, GST, and centrally sponsored schemes blur the line, so the comment is a tendency, not a constitutional destiny.

Quick related

Students also ask

  • How will 12U2 (India, Israel, UAE and USA) grouping transform India's position in global politics?

    Next question on this syllabus topic (2022 · Q19). View answer →

  • Do regional parties want a weak India?

    Not as a programme. They want a Union that funds the State and leaves State-list power with the Assembly. That is autonomy, not exit.

  • Is GST proof that national parties always centralise?

    GST needed State ratification of a constitutional amendment and a Council with State votes. It is pooled sovereignty, not a simple one-party diktat.

Same topic · past papers

UPSC has asked this before

These previous-year questions sit on the same topic. Open one to practise the earlier ask.

  1. 2026 · Q15 · GS II · 15 marks

    To what extent do pressure groups, social movements and corporate lobbies deepen pluralistic democracy in India by representing excluded interests? Analyse whether the growing convergence of corporate wealth and political power poses a threat to the autonomy of formal democratic institutions.

    View answer →

  2. 2020 · Q2 · GS II · 10 marks

    "Recent amendments to the Right to information Act will have profound impact on the autonomy and independence of the Information Commission". Discuss.

    View answer →

More from this topic

Q15 · UPSC Mains 2026 · GS II · 15 marks · Solution

To what extent do pressure groups, social movements and corporate lobbies deepen pluralistic democracy in India by representing excluded interests? Analyse whether the growing convergence of corporate wealth and political power poses a threat to the autonomy of formal democratic institutions.

Governance and Policy

• Pluralism needs many competing groups so that no single interest dominates policy • Trade unions, farmer bodies and movements such as Chipko and Narmada Bachao Andolan have brought excluded voices into public debate • Movements delivered RTI, Forest Rights and Lokpal laws that give citizens lasting tools • Weak resources and FCRA and protest restrictions limit civil society reach • Corporate influence runs through party funding, lobbying, regulators and media ownership • The electoral bonds scheme was struck down in 2024 for violating citizens' right to information • Institutions such as the Supreme Court, CAG and the Election Commission still check capture, but risks remain • Reforms include funding transparency, a lobbying law, cooling-off periods and protection of dissent

Q12 · UPSC Mains 2026 · GS II · 15 marks · Solution

What is meant by judicial legislation? In this context, discuss the verdicts of the apex court allowing "passive euthanasia" and a "living will".

Governance and Policy

• Judicial legislation is court-made law that fills a legislative vacuum, using Articles 32, 141 and 142 • Vishaka, Prakash Singh and NALSA are common examples, and each invited later legislation • Gian Kaur (1996) denied a right to die but spoke of dying with dignity when death is imminent • Aruna Shanbaug (2011) permitted passive euthanasia with High Court supervision • Common Cause (2018) held the right to die with dignity to be part of Article 21 and recognised living wills • The 2023 modification simplified attestation, board composition and timelines • The tension is between dignity under Article 21 and the legislature's domain on a sensitive moral issue • A national statute on terminal illness would replace interim court guidelines

Q6 · UPSC Mains 2026 · GS II · 10 marks · Solution

Does India's tribal development policy reflect the aspirations for a socially grounded and equity-based governance? Justify your answer.

Governance and Policy

• Constitution: Fifth and Sixth Schedules create tribal self-rule, with Tribes Advisory Councils and autonomous district councils. • Law: PESA 1996 makes the Gram Sabha central and FRA 2006 recognises individual and community forest rights. • Welfare: DAPST, Article 275(1) grants, Eklavya schools, PM JANMAN and the sickle cell mission target the gap. • Weakness: mining, dams and forest clearance rules often override Gram Sabha consent. • Weakness: delayed PESA rules, FRA claim rejections and diverted funds blunt equity. • Security: LWE districts show the cost of land alienation and weak service delivery. • Verdict: strong legal design, uneven delivery, so equity is partial and conditional. • Way ahead: enforce consent, social audit, benefit-sharing through District Mineral Foundations.

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