Revision summary
Article 148 makes the CAG a presidential appointee removable only like a Supreme Court judge. The 1971 Act sets a six-year or age-65 term, charged salary, and a bar on further government office. Articles 149–151 and the 1971 Act give audit of Union and State funds, a role in the form of accounts, and public reports. The PAC converts those reports into legislative accountability. Independence of appointment process and PPP audit remain the unfinished parts of that vital role.
Model answer
Copper italics in this answer — like this — are the key facts. Each one is unpacked in the Facts & figures rail.
Introduction
Public money is voted by Parliament, spent by the executive, and checked by the Comptroller and Auditor General. The Constitution therefore treats the CAG as an independent constitutional authority, not as a ministry accountant. That vital role is written into how the CAG is appointed and removed, how long the CAG serves, and how wide the audit can run.
Body
Method and terms of appointment
- Article 148(1) says the CAG is appointed by the President by warrant under his hand and seal, which places the office above ordinary Union employment.
- The CAG can be removed only in the like manner and on the like grounds as a judge of the Supreme Court: a parliamentary address on proved misbehaviour or incapacity, which is the same high wall as Article 124.
- Salary and other conditions are charged on the Consolidated Fund of India and cannot be varied to the CAG’s disadvantage after appointment; the Comptroller and Auditor-General’s (Duties, Powers and Conditions of Service) Act, 1971, fixes a term of six years or until sixty-five, whichever is earlier.
- The CAG is not eligible for further office under the Union or a State after leaving the post, which is meant to cut the hope of a post-retirement executive reward.
- An oath under Article 148 to uphold the Constitution completes the design: the CAG serves the law of public accounts, not the government of the day.
Range of powers
- Article 149 lets Parliament define powers; the 1971 Act is that definition. The CAG audits all expenditure from the Consolidated Fund of India and of each State and Union territory with a legislature, and receipts that flow into those funds.
- The CAG audits government companies and other bodies as the 1971 Act and company law provide, and may audit bodies substantially financed from public funds, which is how universities, societies and many schemes enter the audit net.
- Article 150 requires that Union and State accounts be kept in such form as the President may prescribe on the advice of the CAG, so the auditor shapes the books, not only the criticism after the year ends.
- Article 151 sends audit reports to the President or the Governor, to be laid in Parliament or the State legislature; the Public Accounts Committee then examines them, which is how a technical audit becomes political accountability.
- In India the CAG is in practice more Auditor General than Comptroller: the office does not pre-control every withdrawal as in the classic British Comptroller model, but it does performance, compliance and financial audit, including reports that have shaped debates on spectrum, coal, defence and infrastructure.
- Local bodies and panchayats are a growing edge: CAG technical guidance and supervision, and State AG audits, support the 73rd and 74th Amendment fiscal story when States allow it.
Why this design shows a vital role
- Without removal protection and a charged salary, an auditor who finds waste in a ruling party’s scheme would be an easy target.
- Without Article 151 and the PAC, a report would remain an internal file; the vital role is public laying, not a confidential memo to the finance ministry.
- Limits remain: appointment is still a Union executive choice without a statutory collegium, and some off-budget and PPP structures strain the 1971 map.
Way forward
- A transparent appointment panel, stronger audit of public–private partnerships and GST settlement, and time-bound PAC discussion would match the independence already written in Articles 148–151.
Flow diagram
flowchart TD PR[President appoints Art 148] --> CAG[CAG independent term] CAG --> A[Audit Union and State funds] CAG --> F[Form of accounts Art 150] A --> R[Reports Art 151] R --> PAC[PAC and legislature]
Conclusion
The CAG’s vital role is visible in Presidential appointment, Supreme Court-like removal, a fixed non-renewable-style term, and a salary that Parliament cannot chip after appointment. The same role is visible in Articles 149–151 and the 1971 Act, which take audit from Union funds to State books, public bodies and the floor of the House through the PAC.
Quick related
Students also ask
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To enhance the quality of democracy in India the Election Commission of India has proposed electoral reforms in 2016. What are the suggested reforms and how far are they significant to make democracy successful? (250 words).
Next question on this syllabus topic (2017 · Q14). View answer →
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Is the Indian CAG a comptroller who blocks payments in advance?
In day-to-day Union finance, no. The Indian office is centred on audit after and during spend, with reports to the legislature, not on a British-style prior warrant for every issue of money.
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Can the CAG be given another government job after the term?
Article 148 bars the CAG from further office under the Government of India or a State after ceasing to hold office.
Same topic · past papers
UPSC has asked this before
These previous-year questions sit on the same topic. Open one to practise the earlier ask.
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2024 · Q4 · GS II · 10 marks
"The duty of the Comptroller and Auditor General is not merely to ensure the legality of expenditure but also its propriety." Comment. -
2016 · Q4 · GS II · 12 marks
Exercise of CAG's powers in relation to the accounts of the Union and the States is derived from Article 149 of the Indian Constitution. Discuss whether audit of the Government's policy implementation could amount to overstepping its own (CAG) jurisdiction.
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