Exercise of CAG's powers in relation to the accounts of the Union and the States is derived from Article 149 of the Indian Constitution. Discuss whether audit of the Government's policy implementation could amount to overstepping its own (CAG) jurisdiction.

Constitutional and statutory jurisdiction

• Article 149 is the source of audit power over Union and State accounts; Article 151 requires CAG reports to be laid in Parliament or the State legislature, which makes audit a legislative aid, not an executive veto.
• Article 150 requires accounts to be kept in the form the President prescribes on the CAG’s advice, so the auditor also shapes the books that will later be audited.
• The DPC Act, 1971, especially Sections 13, 16 and 17, covers expenditure from the Consolidated Fund, receipts, stores, and bodies substantially financed by government, which is the legal base for going beyond a mere arithmetical check of vouchers.
• Audit Boards and performance-audit manuals of the Indian Audit and Accounts Department follow INTOSAI-type standards: regularity (compliance) and performance (value for money).
• The Public Accounts Committee of Parliament examines CAG reports; the CAG does not punish a minister. Jurisdiction is to report, not to replace the government.

Policy versus implementation

• Choosing a policy — a spectrum auction design, a coal-block allocation method, or a games-village contract — is the executive’s domain under Articles 73 and 74, and the legislature’s domain when a law or a demand for grant is voted.
• Implementation is whether rules were followed, whether competitive bidding happened as notified, whether delays inflated cost, and whether stated scheme objectives were met. That is classic audit of implementation, not a substitute manifesto.
• Reports on 2G spectrum, coal block allocation, and the Commonwealth Games were attacked as policy trespass; they were, in substance, audits of process, loss of revenue, and contract management, which Article 149 read with the 1971 Act allows.
• Where a report uses a hypothetical “presumptive loss” figure, the political storm is larger, but the constitutional question remains whether the CAG had material from government accounts and files, not whether the opposition liked the number.
• Overstepping would occur if the CAG directed that a policy must be reversed, or if it audited a purely political question with no expenditure, receipt, or store trail — for example, a foreign-policy speech with no money vote.

Why implementation audit is intra vires

• A government that spends public money always implements a policy; to ban implementation audit would reduce Article 149 to a clerk’s tick on totals, which the 1971 Act never intended.
• Federal accounts of the States are equally under the CAG; the same line applies, so a State scheme’s delivery, not its political colour, is the audit object.
• Courts have treated CAG reports as expert material that legislatures and investigating agencies may use; they have not held performance audit unconstitutional.
• Safeguards against overreach are the PAC hearing, the executive’s reply, and the CAG’s own need to stay evidence-based. Those are political and professional checks, not a constitutional gag on implementation audit.