Revision summary
The 73rd and 74th Amendments created a third tier with elections, reservations and two Schedules of functions. Articles 243G and 243W still leave funds, functions and functionaries to State law, so devolution is uneven. Parastatals, late State Finance Commissions and administrator rule keep real governance above the ward. PESA, Finance Commission grants and a few State activity maps show what works when power is actually transferred. Improvement needs exclusive functions, notified SFC awards, and elected control of the staff who deliver services.
Model answer
Copper italics in this answer — like this — are the key facts. Each one is unpacked in the Facts & figures rail.
Introduction
The Constitution (Seventy-third Amendment) Act, 1992, and the Constitution (Seventy-fourth Amendment) Act, 1992, made panchayats and municipalities a third tier of government. After twenty-five years the form is constitutional, but day-to-day governance in many States still sits with the collector, the parastatal and the line department. A critical examination must admit both the gains and that unfinished devolution.
Body
Gains that the statement underplays
- Part IX and Part IXA, with Articles 243 to 243ZG, created regular elections, reservations for women, Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes, and a State Election Commission, so local bodies are no longer a gift of the State government.
- The Eleventh Schedule lists 29 panchayat subjects and the Twelfth Schedule lists 18 municipal functions; Gram Sabhas and ward committees give a legal forum for the voter below the Assembly.
- The Panchayats (Extension to Scheduled Areas) Act, 1996, extends village self-rule in Fifth Schedule areas, and the Fourteenth Finance Commission raised the share of grants that go straight to local bodies.
- Where States have transferred activity mapping, as in Kerala’s people’s plan and in some West Bengal and Karnataka phases, local bodies have run schools, anganwadis and roads with visible results.
Why the instrument is still weak
- Article 243G and Article 243W leave devolution to the State legislature; most States have not transferred the three Fs of funds, functions and functionaries in a matching set.
- Parallel bodies — DRDAs, water boards, development authorities and centrally sponsored missions — spend the money that the Schedules name as local, so the elected council plans on paper and the department executes on the ground.
- State Finance Commissions under Articles 243I and 243Y are often late; their awards are partly accepted; property tax, profession tax and user charges remain capped; GST later removed octroi without a city share.
- Prolonged administrator rule, delayed polls, and a State-appointed commissioner or CEO split political authority from the file.
- Capacity is thin: accounts are not audited on time, Gram Sabhas are poorly attended, and the Second Administrative Reforms Commission noted that activity mapping and social audit are still incomplete.
Views to improve the situation
- Make a minimum list of exclusive local functions and a predictable share of State tax a constitutional or statutory floor, so devolution is not only a State choice.
- Time-bind State Finance Commission reports and their notification, on the model of the Union Finance Commission, and publish activity mapping for every Eleventh and Twelfth Schedule head.
- Merge or subordinate parastatals to the elected council for water, sanitation and town planning, and place the municipal commissioner under a mayor-in-council where the city is large.
- Follow the Balwant Rai Mehta, Ashok Mehta, G.V.K. Rao and L.M. Singhvi line of thought: the village and the ward must control the functionary who delivers the service, not only pass a resolution.
- Tie Union local-body grants to audited accounts, online budgets and completed elections, which the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Finance Commissions already began to do.
Flow diagram
flowchart TD A[73rd and 74th Amendments] --> B[Elections and reservations] A --> C[11th and 12th Schedules] C --> S[State legislature devolution] S --> W[Weak three Fs] W --> P[Parastatals and departments] F[SFC and FC grants] --> L[Effective local government]
Conclusion
Local self-government has not yet become an effective daily instrument because the 73rd and 74th Amendments constitutionalised elections more firmly than they constitutionalised money and staff. The statement is largely right. It will become wrong only when exclusive functions, State Finance Commission awards and control of parastatals actually reach the Gram Panchayat and the municipality.
Quick related
Students also ask
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How do pressure groups influence Indian political process? Do you agree with this view that informal pressure groups have emerged as powerful than formal pressure groups in recent years?
Next question on this syllabus topic (2017 · Q4). View answer →
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Did the 73rd Amendment fail completely?
No. Regular elections, women’s reservation and Finance Commission grants are real. What failed in many States is matching transfer of money, staff and exclusive functions.
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Can the Union force a State to devolve Eleventh Schedule subjects?
Not by a simple executive order. Articles 243G and 243W address the State legislature. Union grants can only incentivise devolution.
Same topic · past papers
UPSC has asked this before
These previous-year questions sit on the same topic. Open one to practise the earlier ask.
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2018 · Q20 · GS II · 15 marks
In what ways would the ongoing US-Iran Nuclear Pact Controversy affect the national interest of India? How should India respond to its situation? (15). -
2015 · Q3 · GS II · 12 marks
In the absence of well - educated and organised local level government system, Panchayats and Samitis have remained mainly political institutions and not effective instrument of governance. Critically Discuss.
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