Revision summary
• The Tenth Schedule makes the Speaker a tribunal that can decide the survival of governments. • Kihoto Hollohan (1992) upheld this role but allowed limited judicial review. • Delay, selective speed and unequal handling of debate show partisan pressure. • Nabam Rebia, Subhash Desai and Keisham Meghachandra show courts stepping in on conflicts and timelines. • Articles 94, 96 and 112(3) protect the office from removal but not from partisan decisions. • A permanent tribunal and a binding timeline of about three months are the most-supported reforms. • Consensus election, party distance and an opposition Deputy Speaker would raise trust.
Model answer
Copper italics in this answer — like this — are the key facts. Each one is unpacked in the Facts & figures rail.
Introduction
The Lok Sabha Speaker is expected to be the House's umpire, yet the Speaker is elected by a majority, usually belongs to a party and, under the Tenth Schedule, decides whether a member should lose a seat. This mix creates real vulnerability when the House is polarised. The anti-defection law was meant to stop horse-trading, but it also put the fate of governments in the Speaker's hands. Reform must protect both the party discipline and the neutrality of the chair.
Body
How the Anti-Defection Regime Burdens the Speaker
The Tenth Schedule and the Speaker's role: The 52nd Amendment of 1985 added the Tenth Schedule to stop members from changing sides for office or money. A member is disqualified for voluntarily giving up party membership or for voting against the party whip without permission. Paragraph 6 says the Speaker or Chairman decides the question, and the decision was first made final. This gave the presiding officer a judicial function inside a political body. The person who must be fair to every side also decides cases that can topple a ministry.
- Eg: Under Paragraphs 2 and 6 of the Tenth Schedule, the Speaker decides disqualification petitions against Lok Sabha members, and the 91st Amendment of 2003 removed the 'split' exception and kept only the two-thirds merger rule.
The Speaker as a tribunal under judicial review: In Kihoto Hollohan (1992) the Supreme Court upheld the Tenth Schedule and held that the Speaker acts as a tribunal when deciding disqualification. It struck down Paragraph 7, which barred the courts, because it needed ratification by half of the States. The Court allowed review only for jurisdictional errors such as mala fides, perversity or violation of constitutional mandate, and not before the final decision. This limited review became a problem when the Speaker simply sat on a petition, since courts could not easily act before a decision.
- Eg: Kihoto Hollohan v. Zachillhu (1992) held Paragraph 7 invalid but upheld the rest, treating the Speaker's decision as that of a tribunal open to limited judicial review.
Party membership and the conflict of interest: A Speaker usually comes from the ruling party or coalition and owes the post to its majority. That link is natural in a parliamentary system, but the conflict is sharp when a petition is filed against members whose votes keep the government alive. The Speaker may be tempted to delay disqualification of defectors who help the ruling side and to move quickly against those who oppose it. This is not a theory. It has been seen in Assemblies repeatedly and has damaged trust in the office.
- Eg: In 2019 the Karnataka Speaker disqualified 17 members for the rest of the Assembly's term, and the Court in Shrimanth Balasaheb Patil v. Speaker (2019) upheld disqualification but allowed them to contest by-elections.
Evidence of Vulnerability to Partisan Politics
Delay as a political weapon: The most common form of partisanship is not a wrong decision but no decision. A petition against defectors may remain pending for the full term, so the defector enjoys office while the rule is defeated. The Court has noticed this repeatedly. In Keisham Meghachandra (2020) it said that Parliament should consider giving the power to a permanent independent tribunal, and that Speakers should decide in a reasonable period, which it fixed at three months in normal cases. Delay therefore changes the result without any formal ruling.
- Eg: Keisham Meghachandra Singh v. Speaker, Manipur Assembly (2020) held that disqualification petitions should be decided within three months and suggested a tribunal headed by a retired Supreme Court or High Court judge.
The crisis of the Nabam Rebia kind: Another problem arises when the Speaker himself faces a notice for removal. In Nabam Rebia (2016) the Court held that a Speaker cannot decide disqualification petitions while a resolution for his removal is pending, since that would let him judge his own survival. In 2023, in Subhash Desai, the Court referred the Nabam Rebia point to a larger bench but also made it clear that the whip is appointed by the political party and not by the legislature party, and that Speakers must act on petitions without delay. These cases show how thin the line between umpire and player has become.
- Eg: Nabam Rebia v. Deputy Speaker (2016) in Arunachal Pradesh and Subhash Desai v. Principal Secretary, Governor of Maharashtra (2023) arose from split-party crises in which presiding officers and Governors were accused of taking sides.
The Speaker's conduct in the House: A neutral Speaker is also judged by daily decisions: who is allowed to speak, whether adjournment motions are admitted, how suspensions are used and whether the Deputy Speaker is chosen. In 2023 a record number of opposition members were suspended in one session. The post of Deputy Speaker, which Article 93 requires to be filled as soon as may be, was not filled during the whole 17th Lok Sabha. When the opposition feels that the chair shuts down debate, party conflict spills into the very office that should contain it.
- Eg: In December 2023 around 146 opposition MPs from both Houses were suspended in a single session over protests about the Parliament security breach.
Strengths and Safeguards Already in the System
Constitutional protection of the Speaker's office: The Constitution does give some protection. The Speaker's salary is charged to the Consolidated Fund under Article 112(3), so Parliament does not vote on it. Removal needs a resolution by a majority of all members of the House after fourteen days' notice under Article 94. The Speaker has only a casting vote under Article 100, and cannot preside over a motion for removal under Article 96. These guards are real, but they protect the office from removal, not from partisanship in decisions.
- Eg: Article 94 requires an effective majority of all then members to remove a Speaker, and Article 96 bars the Speaker from presiding while a removal resolution is under consideration.
Conventions of the Westminster model and Indian practice: The British Speaker gives up party ties and is usually returned unopposed in the constituency. India borrowed some conventions but not all. G. V. Mavalankar, the first Lok Sabha Speaker, set the tone of independence from the government. Neelam Sanjiva Reddy resigned from his party when he became Speaker in 1967. On the other side, Somnath Chatterjee refused to resign as Speaker in 2008 when his party withdrew support from the government, and the party expelled him. These contrasting stories show that tradition works only when persons honour it.
- Eg: G. V. Mavalankar (1952 to 1956) and Neelam Sanjiva Reddy (1967 to 1969) are cited as examples of Speakers who put the chair above their party.
Institutional Changes for a Neutral Chair
A permanent tribunal for disqualification: The most widely supported reform is to move the decision from the Speaker to an independent body. The Dinesh Goswami Committee (1990), the Law Commission and the Election Commission have suggested that the President or Governor decide on the Election Commission's advice, and the Court in Keisham Meghachandra suggested a tribunal under a retired judge. Such a body would decide on facts, give reasons and be bound by timelines. This keeps the party discipline rule but removes the person who is a party man from the final decision.
- Eg: The Election Commission and the Law Commission's 170th Report (1999) recommended that the President or Governor decide disqualification on the advice of the Election Commission.
Fixed timelines and clear review: Whatever the forum, the law should state a time limit, such as ninety days, and treat unexplained delay as a ground for the High Court to step in. It should say clearly when a court can examine an interim question and when the petition is deemed allowed by lapse of time. This ends the habit of waiting for the term to expire. The Court in Padi Kaushik Reddy v. State of Telangana (2025) reaffirmed that Speakers must decide petitions within a reasonable period, normally three months.
- Eg: In 2025 the Supreme Court in the Telangana defection cases directed the Speaker to decide pending petitions within a fixed period and warned against making the Tenth Schedule meaningless by delay.
Neutral election and conduct norms: The choice of Speaker must itself be consensual. A convention that the Speaker is elected unopposed, that the Deputy Speaker is chosen from the opposition and that the Speaker steps back from party work would help. A written code of conduct, a Rules Committee that includes the opposition and live and complete telecast of House proceedings would add to trust. Some also suggest that the Speaker resign from the party for the term, as in the United Kingdom, and not contest on a party ticket against a rival Speaker candidate.
- Eg: The 2024 Speaker election, the first contested vote for the post since 1976, showed what happens when the opposition and the government do not agree on the name and the Deputy Speaker's post.
Flow diagram
Conclusion
The Speaker's office has become vulnerable because the same person is both an elected partisan and a judge of defection. Delay, selective speed and unequal handling of debate have weakened trust. A permanent tribunal, binding time limits, consensus in electing the Speaker and a real Deputy Speaker from the opposition would protect both party discipline and the dignity of the chair.
Quick related
Students also ask
-
Indian Constitution has conferred the amending power on the ordinary legislative institutions with a few procedural hurdles. In view of this statement, examine the procedural and substantive limitations on the amending power of the Parliament to change the Constitution.
Next question on this syllabus topic (2025 · Q12). View answer →
-
Why is the Speaker vulnerable under the anti-defection law?
The Speaker usually belongs to the ruling side and under the Tenth Schedule decides whether members lose their seats. This creates a conflict of interest, especially when the votes of the affected members decide whether a government survives.
-
What did Keisham Meghachandra (2020) recommend?
The Supreme Court asked Parliament to consider replacing the Speaker's role with a permanent tribunal headed by a retired judge. It also said petitions should normally be decided within three months to avoid defeating the law through delay.
-
Which reforms can protect the Speaker's neutrality?
An independent tribunal or decision on the Election Commission's advice, a binding timeline, consensus election of the Speaker, an opposition Deputy Speaker, a code of conduct and full telecast of proceedings would all raise confidence in the chair.
Same topic · past papers
UPSC has asked this before
These previous-year questions sit on the same topic. Open one to practise the earlier ask.
More from this topic
Q2 · UPSC Mains 2026 · GS II · 10 marks · Solution
"Women as a class neither belong to a minority group nor are they regarded as forming a backward class." In the light of this statement, discuss the evolution of women's reservation from local bodies to Parliament.
Parliament and State Legislatures
• Women are about half of India, so they are not a minority, and they cut across castes, so they are not a backward class in the Mandal sense. • Article 15(3) and horizontal reservation under Indra Sawhney give the legal base. • The Constituent Assembly rejected reserved seats, but low representation changed opinion. • The 73rd and 74th Amendments (1993) reserved one-third seats and posts in local bodies, and many States raised it to half. • Bills from 1996 to 2010 failed over the OBC sub-quota and political resistance. • The 106th Amendment (2023) gives one-third seats in Lok Sabha and Assemblies after Census and delimitation. • Real change needs party tickets, rotation fairness and an end to proxy rule.
Q12 · UPSC Mains 2025 · GS II · 15 marks · Solution
Indian Constitution has conferred the amending power on the ordinary legislative institutions with a few procedural hurdles. In view of this statement, examine the procedural and substantive limitations on the amending power of the Parliament to change the Constitution.
Parliament and State Legislatures
Article 368 uses Parliament’s Houses, not a standing constituent assembly, with special majority and no joint sitting. Federal provisions need ratification by at least half the States. Ordinary Acts cannot amend the Constitution. Kesavananda, Minerva Mills, Indira Gandhi and I.R. Coelho set substantive basic-structure limits, including judicial review and rights-DPSPs balance. NJAC 2015 shows the doctrine applying to institutional design, not only to rights texts.
Q3 · UPSC Mains 2024 · GS II · 10 marks · Solution
"The growth of cabinet system has practkally resulted in the marginalisation of the parliamentary supremacy." Elucidate.
Parliament and State Legislatures
Articles 74–75 keep the Cabinet responsible to the Lok Sabha; that is the legal core of parliamentary government. Whips and the Tenth Schedule, ordinances and money-bill classification have moved real initiation to the Cabinet. This is practical marginalisation of the floor, not a legal repeal of Parliament. PAC, standing committees, Rajya Sabha and the floor test still bite. Keisham Meghachandra pressed Speakers to decide disqualification on a clock. A narrower anti-defection law would restore some of the supremacy the quote says is lost. The examiner’s misspelling does not change the demand: show practice squeezing text, not text dying.