Revision summary
Article 368 uses Parliament’s Houses, not a standing constituent assembly, with special majority and no joint sitting. Federal provisions need ratification by at least half the States. Ordinary Acts cannot amend the Constitution. Kesavananda, Minerva Mills, Indira Gandhi and I.R. Coelho set substantive basic-structure limits, including judicial review and rights-DPSPs balance. NJAC 2015 shows the doctrine applying to institutional design, not only to rights texts.
Model answer
Copper italics in this answer — like this — are the key facts. Each one is unpacked in the Facts & figures rail.
Introduction
The Indian Constitution adopts a balance between flexibility and rigidity. Under Article 368, Parliament exercises the constituent power to amend the Constitution through the ordinary legislative Houses, but subject to enhanced procedural requirements. However, this power is not unlimited: procedural safeguards regulate how an amendment is made, while the Basic Structure Doctrine limits what Parliament can alter.
Body
Procedural limitations
- Special majority: Each House must pass the Bill separately by:
- Majority of the total membership of that House, and
- Two-thirds of members present and voting.
- No joint sitting: Unlike ordinary legislation under Article 108, a Constitutional Amendment Bill cannot be resolved through a joint sitting. If either House rejects it, the amendment fails.
- State ratification for federal provisions: Amendments affecting specified federal provisions require ratification by at least half of the State legislatures by a simple majority.
- These include provisions concerning the election of the President, Union-State executive powers, Supreme Court and High Courts, distribution of legislative powers, representation of States in Parliament, and Article 368 itself.
- No ordinary legislative route: An ordinary law passed by simple majority cannot be used to amend provisions requiring the Article 368 procedure.
- Procedural limitations are therefore a safeguard against: hasty amendments, unilateral action by one House and excessive centralisation in amendments affecting the federal structure.
Substantive limitations
- Basic Structure Doctrine: Parliament can amend the Constitution, including Fundamental Rights, but cannot alter, destroy or emasculate its basic structure.
- Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala (1973): Established that Parliament's amending power is subject to the Basic Structure Doctrine.
- Minerva Mills v. Union of India (1980): Struck down provisions of the 42nd Amendment that attempted to make Parliament's amending power unlimited. It affirmed that a limited amending power cannot be converted into an unlimited power.
- Constitutional identity: The basic structure includes features such as democracy, rule of law, judicial review, separation of powers, federalism, secularism and the balance between Fundamental Rights and Directive Principles.
- Judicial review: Constitutional amendments are subject to judicial scrutiny when they damage the basic structure.
- I.R. Coelho v. State of Tamil Nadu (2007): Held that laws placed in the Ninth Schedule after 24 April 1973 can be judicially reviewed if they damage the basic structure.
- Judicial independence: Parliament cannot use its amending power to undermine the independence of the judiciary.
- NJAC Case (2015): The Supreme Court struck down the 99th Constitutional Amendment and NJAC Act, holding that judicial independence is part of the basic structure.
- Thus, substantive limitation acts as the ultimate constitutional boundary: Even a constitutionally valid amendment passed with the required majority can be invalidated if it damages the Constitution's basic structure.
How the two limitations operate together
- Procedure controls the process: It prevents a constitutional change through a simple or fleeting majority and protects the federal principle through State ratification.
- Substance controls the destination: It prevents Parliament from using even a constitutionally valid procedure to destroy the Constitution's essential identity.
- Hence, Parliament has wide amending power, but not constituent sovereignty. It can reform the Constitution, but cannot replace its fundamental constitutional character.
Flow diagram
Conclusion
Article 368 makes the Constitution adaptable without making it disposable. The procedural hurdles ensure deliberation, bicameral consent and, where required, federal participation, while the Basic Structure Doctrine prevents Parliament from using its constituent power to destroy the Constitution's core identity. Thus, Indian constitutionalism balances constitutional flexibility with constitutional continuity.
Quick related
Students also ask
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"The growth of cabinet system has practkally resulted in the marginalisation of the parliamentary supremacy." Elucidate.
Next question on this syllabus topic (2024 · Q3). View answer →
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Can a joint sitting pass a constitutional amendment?
No. Article 108 joint sittings are for ordinary Bills. Amendments must pass each House separately with special majority.
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Is basic structure written in Article 368?
No. It is judicial doctrine inferred from the Constitution’s identity after Kesavananda.
Same topic · past papers
UPSC has asked this before
These previous-year questions sit on the same topic. Open one to practise the earlier ask.
More from this topic
Q3 · UPSC Mains 2026 · GS II · 10 marks · Solution
Examine whether the constitutional office of the Lok Sabha Speaker has become vulnerable to partisan politics under the current anti-defection regime. What institutional changes are required to ensure the neutrality of the Lok Sabha Speaker in managing a polarised House?
Parliament and State Legislatures
• The Lok Sabha Speaker faces a conflict of interest because they remain in a political party while deciding disqualification cases under the Tenth Schedule. • Key vulnerabilities include dual political allegiance, weaponization of the anti-defection whip for government stability, and tactical delays in rulings. • The Supreme Court (*Keisham Meghachandra Singh*, 2020) criticized these delays and suggested moving to an independent tribunal. • Reform idea 1: Adopt the British convention where the Speaker cuts all party ties and runs unopposed in elections. • Reform idea 2: Shift defection adjudication entirely away from the Speaker to an outside body like the Election Commission. • Reform idea 3: Enforce strict statutory time limits to prevent politicians from stalling defection cases during crises.
Q2 · UPSC Mains 2026 · GS II · 10 marks · Solution
"Women as a class neither belong to a minority group nor are they regarded as forming a backward class." In the light of this statement, discuss the evolution of women's reservation from local bodies to Parliament.
Parliament and State Legislatures
• Women form a cross-cutting demographic, not a traditional minority or caste-based backward class.
Q3 · UPSC Mains 2024 · GS II · 10 marks · Solution
"The growth of cabinet system has practkally resulted in the marginalisation of the parliamentary supremacy." Elucidate.
Parliament and State Legislatures
Articles 74–75 keep the Cabinet responsible to the Lok Sabha; that is the legal core of parliamentary government. Whips and the Tenth Schedule, ordinances and money-bill classification have moved real initiation to the Cabinet. This is practical marginalisation of the floor, not a legal repeal of Parliament. PAC, standing committees, Rajya Sabha and the floor test still bite. Keisham Meghachandra pressed Speakers to decide disqualification on a clock. A narrower anti-defection law would restore some of the supremacy the quote says is lost. The examiner’s misspelling does not change the demand: show practice squeezing text, not text dying.