Revision summary
Articles 74–75 keep the Cabinet responsible to the Lok Sabha; that is the legal core of parliamentary government. Whips and the Tenth Schedule, ordinances and money-bill classification have moved real initiation to the Cabinet. This is practical marginalisation of the floor, not a legal repeal of Parliament. PAC, standing committees, Rajya Sabha and the floor test still bite. Keisham Meghachandra pressed Speakers to decide disqualification on a clock. A narrower anti-defection law would restore some of the supremacy the quote says is lost. The examiner’s misspelling does not change the demand: show practice squeezing text, not text dying.
Model answer
Copper italics in this answer — like this — are the key facts. Each one is unpacked in the Facts & figures rail.
Introduction
- India copied the Westminster bargain: the Cabinet lives only while the Lok Sabha suffers it. Articles 74 and 75 make ministers collectively responsible to that House. In daily fact a majority machine — whip, Tenth Schedule, ordinance, delegated legislation — has made the floor a place of registration more than of origination. That is practical marginalisation of parliamentary supremacy, not a repeal of the text.
Body
What supremacy still means
Dicey’s idea that Parliament can do anything never fitted a written Constitution with judicial review.
- Peg: The supremacy that still matters is this: the Council of Ministers lives only while the Lok Sabha is prepared to suffer it, the House votes tax and supply, and members may debate.
- Peg: Shamsher Singh v. State of Punjab held that the President and the Governor normally act on aid and advice, not as a rival executive.
- Peg: S.R. Bommai v. Union of India made the floor test the solvent of majority; those holdings are still good law.
How the cabinet ate the floor
A stable majority turns the Cabinet into a committee of the ruling party and the House into its register.
- Peg: The Tenth Schedule punishes a member who votes against a party whip even on an ordinary Bill, so independent judgment is legally dangerous.
- Peg: Classification of a Bill as a Money Bill under Article 110 can shrink the Rajya Sabha’s role; the Aadhaar litigation put that classification under a cloud.
- Peg: Article 123 ordinances legislate when the House is not sitting; delegated legislation moves detail off the floor; Question Hour is frequently lost.
- Peg: Bagehot’s picture is inverted: the Cabinet was meant to be a creature of the House; in daily fact the House is a creature of the Cabinet’s majority.
What is not dead
Elucidation is not a funeral oration for Articles 107–117.
- Peg: A government can still fall; every Budget must still pass; the Rajya Sabha can stall non-money legislation.
- Peg: The Public Accounts Committee, reading the CAG, can embarrass a ministry; privilege motions remain.
- Peg: In Keisham Meghachandra Singh the Court reminded Speakers that the Tenth Schedule is not a private party tool without a clock.
- Peg: Recovering the floor means a narrower anti-defection law (confidence and money Bills only, as older committee reports suggested) and a Speaker who is not a party manager.
Flow diagram
Conclusion
The cabinet system has practically sidelined the floor as a deliberative sovereign. Legally, Parliament still makes and unmakes governments and statutes. Recovering supremacy means recovering the backbencher’s vote, not rewriting Article 75.
Quick related
Students also ask
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Compare and contrast the British and Indian approaches to Parliamentary sovereignty.
Next question on this syllabus topic (2023 · Q4). View answer →
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Is India now a prime-ministerial system?
In stable majorities, yes in style. The moment the majority cracks, it is still a parliamentary system.
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Did the Constitution ever give Diceyan supremacy to Parliament?
No. Judicial review and a written text were always limits. The quote is about the House versus the Cabinet, not about the Court.
Same topic · past papers
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Q3 · UPSC Mains 2026 · GS II · 10 marks · Solution
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