Q20 · UPSC Civil Services Mains 2026 · GS II · 15 marks · 8 min read

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"China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has transformed South Asia from a regional space into a theatre of great power competition." Analyse the strategic implications of the BRI for India's security and regional influence in South Asia.

Page facts
Exam
Union Public Service Commission — Civil Services Examination (UPSC)
Board
UPSC
Stage
Mains
Year
2026
Paper
UPSC Mains — General Studies Paper II (GS II)
Question
Q20
Marks
15
Topic
India and its Neighbourhood
Syllabus
India and its neighborhood — relations.

Topic: India and its Neighbourhood. Syllabus: India and its neighborhood — relations. Same official PYQ from year-wise 2026 and India and its Neighbourhood.

Revision summary

The BRI has added Chinese finance, ports and strategic presence to South Asia, raising concerns for India on CPEC sovereignty, the Indian Ocean and neighbourhood influence. Debt problems and local resistance limit China, and India's answer lies in faster delivery, maritime cooperation and managed engagement.

Model answer

Copper italics in this answer — like this — are the key facts. Each one is unpacked in the Facts & figures rail.

Introduction

China's Belt and Road Initiative, announced in 2013, brought Chinese ports, roads, rail links and loans to almost every South Asian neighbour of India. The statement is largely valid, since the region now draws the United States, Japan, Australia, the Gulf and India into competing projects and security partnerships. For India, the BRI affects sovereignty through CPEC, maritime security in the Indian Ocean and its standing among neighbours, but the picture is not one of simple encirclement.

Body

How the BRI changed South Asia

Infrastructure finance for small and mid-sized economies: South Asian countries need roads, ports, power plants and railways, and Chinese state banks have offered large loans and quick construction at a time when Western and multilateral finance moved slowly. This has given Beijing a presence in every neighbour of India except Bhutan and India itself. The benefits are real in terms of capacity, but projects often carry commercial interest rates and opaque terms. Connectivity thus comes bundled with strategic dependence.

  • Eg: The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, announced at about $46 billion in 2015 and later quoted at about $62 billion, links Kashgar to Gwadar port, and Chinese firms built ports, power plants and roads in Sri Lanka, Bangladesh and Nepal.

From regional space to great power competition: South Asia was long seen as an Indian sphere of influence, with some Pakistani counterweight. The BRI added a resourceful external power, and the United States, Japan and Australia responded through the Quad, the Indo-Pacific strategy and their own aid. Neighbours can now seek bids from several powers, which raises their bargaining ability but also places them between rivals. The region thus becomes a place where major powers test their ties.

  • Eg: The Millennium Challenge Corporation compact of the US with Nepal, ratified in 2022 after a long political dispute, was debated alongside Nepal's BRI framework agreement signed with China in 2017.

Hedging by smaller states: Smaller states have used the competition to get more from every partner, balancing India, China and others. This is a rational response, and it should not be read as a simple tilt to China. Yet when loans fail or politics change, choices made by one government bind the next. The rivalry therefore creates both opportunity and instability for neighbours.

  • Eg: Bangladesh built the Padma Bridge with its own funds after the World Bank withdrew, while still seeking Chinese and Indian finance, and Maldives under President Muizzu moved closer to China after an India Out campaign in 2023.

Strategic implications for India's security

Sovereignty and the CPEC through Pakistan-occupied Kashmir: CPEC passes through Gilgit-Baltistan, which India considers part of its territory. Participation in the project would imply acceptance of the Chinese and Pakistani positions on the area. India has therefore stayed away from the Belt and Road Forum and issued statements that connectivity must respect sovereignty and territorial integrity. The corridor also deepens the China-Pakistan military partnership and gives China a route to the Arabian Sea.

  • Eg: India boycotted the Belt and Road Forum in 2017 and 2019, and its Ministry of External Affairs has repeatedly objected to CPEC projects in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir.

Maritime presence and the Indian Ocean: Chinese ports and logistic facilities across the Indian Ocean raise concerns of dual use, in which a commercial berth can host naval or research vessels. India's security planners speak of a string of pearls from Gwadar to Hambantota to Kyaukpyu and Djibouti. A permanent Chinese naval presence close to Indian sea lanes would complicate monitoring and energy security. The concern is stronger because most of India's oil and trade moves through these waters.

  • Eg: Sri Lanka leased Hambantota Port to China Merchants Port for 99 years in 2017, and the Chinese research vessel Yuan Wang 5 docked there in August 2022 despite Indian concerns.

Land border and the Himalayan neighbourhood: Chinese connectivity in Nepal and Bhutan's border talks with China bring pressure close to India's northern frontier. Roads and railways that benefit Nepal's trade can also improve China's access to the plains near India's borders. Border tension in Doklam in 2017 and Galwan in 2020 showed how infrastructure and military posture are linked. India must therefore plan for a two-front concern and tighten border infrastructure.

  • Eg: Nepal signed a BRI framework with China in 2017 and has discussed a Kerung-Kathmandu rail link, while Chinese-built Pokhara International Airport opened in 2023.

Implications for India's regional influence

Debt, dependence and the debt-trap debate: Large loans to economies with weak revenue can leave governments short of choices. Sri Lanka's default in 2022, Pakistan's reliance on rollovers and IMF programmes, and Maldives' growing debt make the point. Some scholars argue that the debt-trap label is exaggerated, since Sri Lanka's debt was mostly to market lenders and Chinese loans were only one part. Even so, dependence on a single large creditor can limit a state's room to refuse requests.

  • Eg: Sri Lanka's external debt crisis in 2022 involved Chinese lenders with a share close to a tenth of external debt, and India extended about $4 billion in credit lines, swaps and fuel support to help it.

Pressure on Neighbourhood First: India's pull over neighbours rests on geography, trade, culture and quick crisis help, yet it competes with a rival whose capital is much larger. When neighbours get an alternative, India has less room for bargaining and more reason to improve delivery. India's own project delays and sometimes domestic politics have hurt its credibility in some capitals. Influence now depends on speed, reliability and respect for local politics.

  • Eg: India's Kaladan Multimodal Project in Myanmar and several Nepal hydropower and rail projects have run late, while China's offers appear faster to some neighbours.

Limits of Chinese reach: China faces its own limits in the region. Projects have run into local protests, security attacks, cost overruns and environmental concerns, and China itself has become more cautious in lending after 2020. Attacks on Chinese engineers in Pakistan have slowed work on CPEC. Neighbours also remain wary of dependence, so they prefer to keep ties with India. The BRI has not turned all of South Asia into a Chinese zone.

  • Eg: Attacks on Chinese nationals near Dasu in 2024 and in Karachi in 2024 drew Beijing's anger at Pakistan's security, and CPEC's second phase has moved slower than planned.

India's responses and a balanced assessment

Maritime and security architecture: India has used a mix of naval presence, partnerships and information sharing in the Indian Ocean. SAGAR, Security and Growth for All in the Region, announced in 2015, set an approach of cooperation with maritime neighbours, later widened as MAHASAGAR. The Quad's Indo-Pacific Partnership for Maritime Domain Awareness shares satellite and shipping data. India also builds bases and facilities in Andaman and Nicobar, Agalega in Mauritius and Lakshadweep.

  • Eg: The Quad launched the Indo-Pacific Partnership for Maritime Domain Awareness in May 2022, and India signed logistics agreements with the US, Japan, Australia and France for naval access.

Development partnerships and alternative connectivity: India answers the BRI by offering projects that match local demand with fewer strings, through lines of credit, grants and capacity building. It also promotes corridors with partners, which spreads risk. Such projects must be transparent, on time and sensitive to local concerns if they are to compete. Collaboration with Japan, the US and the EU adds finance and technology.

  • Eg: India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor was announced at the 2023 G20 summit in Delhi, and the Colombo Western Container Terminal is being developed by India's Adani group with Sri Lankan partners, with Japanese interest in the wider area.

Is it encirclement? A balanced view: The strategic encirclement argument has force in ports, the Pakistan link and border infrastructure, but it should not be taken as proof of a single Chinese plan. China has its own energy and trade interests, and many neighbours deal with it for ordinary economic reasons. India should avoid overstating the threat, because that can push neighbours away, and should avoid ignoring it. The task is to stay engaged with China on trade and borders while building its own capacity, partnerships and neighbourhood trust.

  • Eg: After the October 2024 patrolling agreement for Depsang and Demchok, India and China resumed high-level talks, showing that competition and engagement can run together.

Flow diagram

Flow diagram

Conclusion

The BRI has changed South Asia by adding a financier and strategic competitor close to India's borders and sea lanes, with real implications for sovereignty, maritime security and neighbourhood influence. Yet debt stress, local protests and security attacks limit China's reach, and neighbours continue to hedge. India's best response is balanced: faster and transparent development partnerships, maritime cooperation through SAGAR and the Quad, and managed engagement with China. Influence will rest on delivery and trust more than on rivalry.

Quick related

Students also ask

  • India-Africa digital partnership is achieving mutual respect, co-development and long-term institutional partnerships. Elaborate.

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  • Why does India oppose CPEC?

    CPEC passes through Pakistan-occupied Kashmir, which India claims as its territory, so joining it would compromise its sovereignty position.

  • Is the Chinese debt trap real in South Asia?

    Debt stress is real in Sri Lanka, Pakistan and Maldives, but scholars note market lenders also held much of the debt, so the term is contested.

  • How is India responding to the BRI?

    Through SAGAR and maritime partnerships, the Quad, IMEC, lines of credit, Neighbourhood First projects and managed engagement with China.

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  4. 2016 · Q12 · GS II · 12 marks

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  5. 2016 · Q20 · GS II · 12 marks

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