Indian Constitution has conferred the amending power on the ordinary legislative institutions with a few procedural hurdles. In view of this statement, examine the procedural and substantive limitations on the amending power of the Parliament to change the Constitution.

Ordinary institutions, special path

An amendment begins as a Bill in either House (money-bill tricks do not apply). It needs special majority: a majority of the total membership of each House and a two-thirds majority of members present and voting (Article 368(2)). There is no joint sitting to break a deadlock — unlike ordinary legislation under Article 108. Some provisions, listed in the proviso to 368(2), also need ratification by not less than half of the State legislatures before the President’s assent. Those are the federal clauses: election of the President, extent of executive power, judiciary, distribution of legislative competence, representation of States in Parliament, Article 368 itself.

• So the “ordinary legislative institutions” are real: same MPs, same buildings. The hurdles are quorum of will, no joint sitting, State ratification for the federal core, and Presidential assent (now generally bound once the Houses have validly passed the Bill, after the 24th Amendment’s logic).

Ordinary law cannot amend the Constitution. Article 13 and the distinction in I.C. Golaknath (later undone in part) still teach students that a simple majority Act is not 368. Minerva Mills restored the primacy of 368’s own limits against a Parliament that tried to use amendment to immunise all amendments.

Substantive limitations

Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala (1973) held that Parliament cannot abrogate the basic structure. Later cases filled the catalogue: supremacy of the Constitution, rule of law, separation of powers, judicial review, federalism, secularism, free and fair elections, dignity, and the harmony of fundamental rights and directive principles — not a closed list. Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Raj Narain struck a clause that sought to place a Prime Minister’s election beyond judicial review. Minerva Mills struck the attempt to give Directive Principles a blank cheque over rights and to make 368 unlimited. I.R. Coelho held that even Ninth Schedule laws after 24 April 1973 can be tested if they damage basic structure. NJAC (2015) applied the doctrine to appointments.

• Emergency and 42nd Amendment history show why the doctrine exists: a numerically ordinary Parliament had tried to become a perpetual constituent assembly.

How the fences work together

Procedure stops a thin majority and protects States. Basic structure stops a thick majority from emptying the document. Courts do not sit as a third House on every comma; they sit as a boundary rider. Critics (parliamentary sovereignty school) call this a veto. The Indian reply, after 1975–77, is that unlimited amendment is not democracy, it is self-coronation.

• Federal ratification plus basic structure together mean: Parliament can modernise GST (101st), reservations (103rd, 106th), and local government (73rd, 74th), and cannot lawfully convert the Republic into a one-person instrument.