Q4 · UPSC Civil Services Mains 2021 · GS II · 10 marks · 2 min read

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To what extent, in your view, the Parliament is able to ensure accountability of the executive in India?

Page facts
Exam
Union Public Service Commission — Civil Services Examination (UPSC)
Board
UPSC
Stage
Mains
Year
2021
Paper
UPSC Mains — General Studies Paper II (GS II)
Question
Q4
Marks
10
Topic
Parliament and State Legislatures
Syllabus
Parliament and State legislatures — structure, functioning, conduct of business, powers and privileges and issues arising out of these.

Topic: Parliament and State Legislatures. Syllabus: Parliament and State legislatures — structure, functioning, conduct of business, powers and privileges and issues arising out of these. Same official PYQ from year-wise 2021 and Parliament and State Legislatures.

Revision summary

Collective responsibility, questions, money votes, CAG audit and the PAC are the core accountability tools. PAC, usually Opposition-chaired, is the sharpest regular fiscal check on the executive. Disruptions, the Tenth Schedule whip, ordinances and thin committee reference reduce daily control. Parliament can still unseat a government and expose waste; it is not a rubber stamp, and it is not a full-time scrutineer either. Protecting Question Hour and default committee scrutiny would widen the extent without rewriting the Constitution.

Model answer

Copper italics in this answer — like this — are the key facts. Each one is unpacked in the Facts & figures rail.

Introduction

  • Parliamentary accountability of the executive is written into the Constitution: collective responsibility, questions, money votes, and audit. In practice the tools still work, but disruptions, a tight whip, and ordinance politics have narrowed the extent to which the House actually holds the government to account.

Body

Formal tools that still bite

  • Article 75 makes the Council of Ministers collectively responsible to the Lok Sabha; a confidence vote remains the ultimate sanction.
  • Question Hour, Zero Hour, calling attention, and adjournment motions force ministers onto the record; departmental standing committees examine Demands for Grants and bills when the House itself is short of time.
  • The Comptroller and Auditor General under Article 148 audits Union accounts; the Public Accounts Committee, traditionally chaired by an Opposition member, examines CAG reports and can summon officials, which is the hardest regular fiscal check.
  • The Estimates Committee and the Committee on Public Undertakings complete the financial triad; budget cut motions and the need for appropriation still legally bind the executive.

Where the extent falls short

  • Frequent adjournments and walkouts shrink Question Hour, which is the daily accountability device the citizen actually sees.
  • The anti-defection Tenth Schedule whip reduces intra-party dissent, so the House often debates as two blocs rather than as a scrutineer of departments.
  • Ordinances under Article 123, delayed laying of reports, and a packed legislative calendar mean many statutes pass with thin clause-by-clause debate.
  • Money bills and hybrid finance bills have been used in ways that limit Rajya Sabha’s role, which weakens bicameral check even when the Lok Sabha majority is firm.

A balanced extent

  • Parliament can still unseat a government, stall a bill, and shame a ministry through PAC and CAG; that is more than a rubber stamp.
  • Recommendation: protect Question Hour in the rule book, time-bind PAC action-taken reports, and refer more bills to committees as the default, not as a favour.

Flow diagram

Flow diagram

Conclusion

  • Parliament is able to ensure executive accountability to a real but incomplete extent: CAG and PAC, confidence votes, and the budget still constrain the government, while disruptions, the whip, and ordinance practice blunt daily control. The design is strong; the working year of the House decides how much of that design the citizen gets.

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  1. 2020 · Q12 · GS II · 15 marks

    Judicial Legislation is antithetical to the doctrine of separation of powers as envisaged in the Indian Constitution. In this context justify the filing of large number of public interest petitions praying for issuing guidelines to executive authorities.

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  2. 2015 · Q4 · GS II · 12 marks

    Khap panchayats have been in the news for functioning as extra - constitutional authorities, often delivering pronouncements amounting to human right violations. Discuss critically the actions taken by the legislative, executive and judiciary to set the things right in this regard.

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More from this topic

Q3 · UPSC Mains 2026 · GS II · 10 marks · Solution

Examine whether the constitutional office of the Lok Sabha Speaker has become vulnerable to partisan politics under the current anti-defection regime. What institutional changes are required to ensure the neutrality of the Lok Sabha Speaker in managing a polarised House?

Parliament and State Legislatures

• The Tenth Schedule makes the Speaker a tribunal that can decide the survival of governments. • Kihoto Hollohan (1992) upheld this role but allowed limited judicial review. • Delay, selective speed and unequal handling of debate show partisan pressure. • Nabam Rebia, Subhash Desai and Keisham Meghachandra show courts stepping in on conflicts and timelines. • Articles 94, 96 and 112(3) protect the office from removal but not from partisan decisions. • A permanent tribunal and a binding timeline of about three months are the most-supported reforms. • Consensus election, party distance and an opposition Deputy Speaker would raise trust.

Q2 · UPSC Mains 2026 · GS II · 10 marks · Solution

"Women as a class neither belong to a minority group nor are they regarded as forming a backward class." In the light of this statement, discuss the evolution of women's reservation from local bodies to Parliament.

Parliament and State Legislatures

• Women are about half of India, so they are not a minority, and they cut across castes, so they are not a backward class in the Mandal sense. • Article 15(3) and horizontal reservation under Indra Sawhney give the legal base. • The Constituent Assembly rejected reserved seats, but low representation changed opinion. • The 73rd and 74th Amendments (1993) reserved one-third seats and posts in local bodies, and many States raised it to half. • Bills from 1996 to 2010 failed over the OBC sub-quota and political resistance. • The 106th Amendment (2023) gives one-third seats in Lok Sabha and Assemblies after Census and delimitation. • Real change needs party tickets, rotation fairness and an end to proxy rule.

Q12 · UPSC Mains 2025 · GS II · 15 marks · Solution

Indian Constitution has conferred the amending power on the ordinary legislative institutions with a few procedural hurdles. In view of this statement, examine the procedural and substantive limitations on the amending power of the Parliament to change the Constitution.

Parliament and State Legislatures

Article 368 uses Parliament’s Houses, not a standing constituent assembly, with special majority and no joint sitting. Federal provisions need ratification by at least half the States. Ordinary Acts cannot amend the Constitution. Kesavananda, Minerva Mills, Indira Gandhi and I.R. Coelho set substantive basic-structure limits, including judicial review and rights-DPSPs balance. NJAC 2015 shows the doctrine applying to institutional design, not only to rights texts.

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