Revision summary
NAM, G77 and South–South programmes built India’s image as a leader of colonised and developing nations. Post-1991 weight, nuclear diplomacy and Indo-Pacific partnerships created a major-power role. The old image has thinned where India looks like a US-leaning security player and a market competitor. ITEC, WTO developing-country coalitions and strategic autonomy show continuity. Elaborate as layering and tension, not as a clean disappearance.
Model answer
Copper italics in this answer — like this — are the key facts. Each one is unpacked in the Facts & figures rail.
Introduction
From Bandung and the Non-Aligned Movement through the G77 and the demand for a New International Economic Order, India spoke as a large poor country that claimed to lead the colonised and the developing world. In the emerging order after the Cold War — and more sharply in the 2000s — India also seeks a permanent UN Security Council seat, a nuclear-normal identity, and a place among major powers. The old image has thinned; it has not cleanly disappeared.
Body
The long-sustained image
- Anti-colonial solidarity, NAM under Nehru, and later South–South rhetoric (ITEC, concessional lines of credit, UN peacekeeping) built the picture of India as a voice of the oppressed nations, not a camp follower of Washington or Moscow.
- India used that identity in WTO coalitions (G20 developing countries in agriculture, G33), in climate talks as a developing-country leader with China in BASIC, and in the Commonwealth and African forums.
- Moral language — decolonisation, anti-apartheid, disarmament — was the public face, even when realpolitik with neighbours was harder.
The emerging global order and the new role
- Economic weight after 1991, the India–US civil nuclear path (2008 NSG waiver politics), and later the Quad, 2+2 dialogues, and Indo-Pacific language placed India closer to a major-power table.
- Aspirations: permanent UNSC membership, NSG membership, a larger IMF–World Bank voice, and a role in setting digital and maritime rules.
- Multi-alignment (BRICS, SCO, RIC, Quad at once) is the method: India wants options, not a single camp. That is a different image from NAM chair of the weak.
Why the old image appears to have disappeared
- Voting and language at the United Nations on some Western-led resolutions, and a tighter US and Quad security conversation, are read in parts of the Global South as a shift away from automatic third-world solidarity.
- India’s own rise makes it a competitor for African and Asian markets, not only a brother of the marginalised; lines of credit come with project politics.
- Climate and trade: as emissions and services exports grow, India is asked to take “major economy” burdens that poor island states do not see as leadership of the oppressed.
- Domestic development success stories sit beside inequality; partners may see a would-be great power, not a fellow victim of the old order.
Why “disappeared” is too strong
- India still runs a large ITEC and development-partnership programme; it still argues special and differential treatment in the WTO; it still speaks for African representation in global governance in BRICS and IBSA language.
- Vaccine diplomacy (later than this 2019 paper’s core years, but in the same trajectory of South–South health) and peacekeeping continuity show the old register is usable.
- Strategic autonomy remains official doctrine: refusal of alliance, and continued Russia defence and energy ties, are not the behaviour of a country that has fully joined the established West.
- The emerging order is itself multi-polar; leadership of the marginalised and a seat among major powers are both Indian claims, in tension, not a completed substitution.
Elaboration
- The statement captures a real rebranding: from NAM tribune to multi-aligned major power.
- It overstates erasure. The image has been layered, not deleted. Friction appears when a Quad speech and a G77 speech must be given in the same week.
Flow diagram
Conclusion
India’s long image as leader of oppressed nations has faded because the emerging order rewards major-power behaviour — UNSC bid, nuclear normalcy, Indo-Pacific partnerships. It has not disappeared: South–South cooperation, WTO developing-country coalitions, and strategic autonomy still use the older language. The new role sits on top of the old image and sometimes contradicts it.
Quick related
Students also ask
-
"What introduces friction into the ties between India and the United States is that Washington is still unable to find for India a position in its global strategy, which would satisfy India's National self- esteem and ambitions" Explain with suitable examples.(15).
Next question on this syllabus topic (2019 · Q20). View answer →
-
Has India left the Global South?
No. It still claims developing-country status in many talks. It also claims major-power privileges. That double claim is the elaboration of the quote.
-
Is Quad proof that the NAM image is dead?
Quad is a security and technology conversation, not a treaty alliance. NAM as a movement has itself faded globally. India’s autonomy claim continues in other forums.
Same topic · past papers
UPSC has asked this before
These previous-year questions sit on the same topic. Open one to practise the earlier ask.
More from this topic
Q15 · UPSC Mains 2026 · GS II · 15 marks · Solution
To what extent do pressure groups, social movements and corporate lobbies deepen pluralistic democracy in India by representing excluded interests? Analyse whether the growing convergence of corporate wealth and political power poses a threat to the autonomy of formal democratic institutions.
Governance and Policy
• Pluralism needs many competing groups so that no single interest dominates policy • Trade unions, farmer bodies and movements such as Chipko and Narmada Bachao Andolan have brought excluded voices into public debate • Movements delivered RTI, Forest Rights and Lokpal laws that give citizens lasting tools • Weak resources and FCRA and protest restrictions limit civil society reach • Corporate influence runs through party funding, lobbying, regulators and media ownership • The electoral bonds scheme was struck down in 2024 for violating citizens' right to information • Institutions such as the Supreme Court, CAG and the Election Commission still check capture, but risks remain • Reforms include funding transparency, a lobbying law, cooling-off periods and protection of dissent
Q12 · UPSC Mains 2026 · GS II · 15 marks · Solution
What is meant by judicial legislation? In this context, discuss the verdicts of the apex court allowing "passive euthanasia" and a "living will".
Governance and Policy
• Judicial legislation is court-made law that fills a legislative vacuum, using Articles 32, 141 and 142 • Vishaka, Prakash Singh and NALSA are common examples, and each invited later legislation • Gian Kaur (1996) denied a right to die but spoke of dying with dignity when death is imminent • Aruna Shanbaug (2011) permitted passive euthanasia with High Court supervision • Common Cause (2018) held the right to die with dignity to be part of Article 21 and recognised living wills • The 2023 modification simplified attestation, board composition and timelines • The tension is between dignity under Article 21 and the legislature's domain on a sensitive moral issue • A national statute on terminal illness would replace interim court guidelines
Q6 · UPSC Mains 2026 · GS II · 10 marks · Solution
Does India's tribal development policy reflect the aspirations for a socially grounded and equity-based governance? Justify your answer.
Governance and Policy
• Constitution: Fifth and Sixth Schedules create tribal self-rule, with Tribes Advisory Councils and autonomous district councils. • Law: PESA 1996 makes the Gram Sabha central and FRA 2006 recognises individual and community forest rights. • Welfare: DAPST, Article 275(1) grants, Eklavya schools, PM JANMAN and the sickle cell mission target the gap. • Weakness: mining, dams and forest clearance rules often override Gram Sabha consent. • Weakness: delayed PESA rules, FRA claim rejections and diverted funds blunt equity. • Security: LWE districts show the cost of land alienation and weak service delivery. • Verdict: strong legal design, uneven delivery, so equity is partial and conditional. • Way ahead: enforce consent, social audit, benefit-sharing through District Mineral Foundations.