Revision summary
The party system moved from Congress dominance to coalitions and then to a new national majority, without erasing State-level regional parties. Presidential campaign style collides with parliamentary collective responsibility. The Tenth and 91st Amendments curb defection and cabinet size but strengthen high commands. National and state party labels under the Symbols Order do not match the mixed federal reality. The transition is therefore full of legal and political paradoxes, not a clean model change.
Model answer
Introduction
India’s party system has moved from one-party Congress dominance after 1952, through a long coalition age after 1989, to a new national pole after 2014, while regional parties, the Tenth Schedule, and internal party autocracy all remain. The transition is real; so are the contradictions, because parliamentary rules, federal society, and presidential-style campaigns do not move in one line.
Body
The transition
- The first two decades after the Constitution were a Congress system in Rajni Kothari’s sense: a dominant party with factions, not a rigid two-party model.
- 1967, 1977 and 1989 broke that monopoly; hung Houses, National Front and United Front experiments, and then NDA and UPA coalitions made coalition federalism the working form of Article 75 government.
- 2014 and 2019 produced a single-party majority in the Lok Sabha again, yet regional parties still decide many State Assemblies and several Rajya Sabha arithmetic problems, so the system is not a simple return to 1952.
- The Election Commission’s recognition rules under the Election Symbols (Reservation and Allotment) Order, 1968, and the Representation of the People Act, 1951, still sort “national” and “state” parties by vote and seat tests that lag behind political reality.
Contradictions and paradoxes
- Parliamentary government needs collective responsibility and a working majority; campaigns have become leader-centred and presidential in style, which sits oddly with Articles 75 and 164.
- The Tenth Schedule, added by the 52nd Amendment, 1985, and tightened by the 91st Amendment, 2003, punishes defection but also freezes dissent inside the legislature, so party bosses gain while inner-party democracy stays weak.
- Anti-defection does not regulate the high command’s power to issue a whip on every ordinary vote, which turns MPs into numbers rather than representatives, even as voters are told they chose a person.
- Regional parties demand federal autonomy in the States and then bargain for Union ministries in Delhi; they are both defenders of State rights and players in central coalition rent.
- A national party can dominate the Lok Sabha and still lose a string of States, which is a federal paradox, not a failure of the Election Commission.
- Social cleavage parties (caste, region, language) coexist with a catch-all national appeal on development and security; the same voter may split a Lok Sabha choice from an Assembly choice.
- The 91st Amendment capped Council of Ministers at 15 per cent of the House, which cut oversized coalition cabinets, but it did not end the use of extra-constitutional posts, parliamentary secretaries, or outside props to reward allies.
- Inner-party elections under the Election Commission’s guidelines and under Section 29A registration are often formal; dynastic succession in several parties contradicts the language of political equality in the Preamble.
What the paradoxes mean
- The system is transitional because no stable two-party Westminster pattern has arrived, and because federal society keeps producing State-level systems that do not mirror the national result.
- Law can police symbols, splits and minister numbers; it cannot by itself create programmatic parties. That gap is the deepest paradox of the Indian party system.
Flow diagram
flowchart TD C[Congress dominance] --> K[Coalition age after 1989] K --> N[New national pole after 2014] N --> R[Regional parties in States] T[Tenth Schedule] --> P[Whip over dissent] R --> X[Federal paradox] P --> X
Conclusion
India is leaving a long coalition interval without becoming a classic two-party system. Majority at the Centre, regional strength in the States, anti-defection without inner democracy, and presidential campaigns inside a parliamentary Constitution are the live contradictions. The transition will look paradoxical until parties themselves become more internally democratic and more programmatically federal.
Quick related
Students also ask
-
Exercise of CAG's powers in relation to the accounts of the Union and the States is derived from Article 149 of the Indian Constitution. Discuss whether audit of the Government's policy implementation could amount to overstepping its own (CAG) jurisdiction.
Next question in the 2016 paper (Q4). View answer →
-
Did 2014 end the coalition era in the States as well?
No. A Lok Sabha majority can coexist with coalition or opposition governments in many States. That split is the federal paradox in the question.
-
Does the Tenth Schedule create inner-party democracy?
No. It punishes legislators who leave or defy the party. It does not force parties to hold real internal elections or to limit the whip to confidence and money bills.
PYQ trend
When UPSC asked this
Related PYQs from other years, newest first. Open a question to read it.
-
2016 · Q5 · GS II · 12 marks
Discuss each adjective attached to the word 'Republic' in the 'Preamble'. Are they defendable in the present circumstances? -
2016 · Q8 · GS II · 12 marks
What is quasi judicial body? Explain with the help of concrete examples. -
2016 · Q10 · GS II · 12 marks
"In the Indian governance system, the role of non-state actors has been only marginal." Critically examine this statement. -
2016 · Q11 · GS II · 12 marks
"Effectiveness of the government system at various levels and people's participation in the governance system are inter-dependent" Discuss their relationship in the context of India. -
2016 · Q13 · GS II · 12 marks
Has the Indian governmental system responded adequately to the demands of Liberalization, Privatization and Globalization started in 1991? What can the government do to be responsive to this important change? -
2016 · Q14 · GS II · 12 marks
"Traditional bureaucratic structure and culture have hampered the process of socio-economic development in India." Comment. -
2016 · Q15 · GS II · 12 marks
Examine the main provisions of the National Child Policy and throw light on the status of its implementation. -
2016 · Q16 · GS II · 12 marks
"Demographic Dividend in India will remain only theoretical unless our manpower becomes more educated, aware, skilled and creative." What measures have been taken by the government to enhance the capacity of our population to be more productive and employable?
More from this paper
Q1 · UPSC Mains 2016 · GS II · 12 marks
Discuss the essentials of the 69th Constitutional Amendment Act and anomalies, if any, that have led to recent reported conflicts between the elected representatives and the institution of the Lieutenant Governor in the administration of Delhi. Do you think that this will give rise to a new trend in the functioning of the Indian federal politics?
Federal Structure and Devolution
The 69th Amendment inserted Article 239AA and created Delhi’s Assembly and Council of Ministers, excluding police, public order and land. Ministers aid and advise the Lieutenant Governor, but a difference may be sent to the President, which became the legal hook for file delays. The GNCTD Act, 1991, and control over services widened the gap between the voters’ government and the Administrator. The clash is structural to a national-capital Union Territory, not a new model for the States. Court cases and the 2021 Amendment show competitive, litigated federalism in Delhi rather than a nationwide federal mutation.
Q2 · UPSC Mains 2016 · GS II · 12 marks
To what extent is Article 370 of the Indian Constitution, bearing marginal note "temporary provision with respect to the State of Jammu and Kashmir", temporary? Discuss the future prospects of this provision in the context of Indian polity.
Indian Constitution
Article 370 is labelled temporary in Part XXI and can cease under clause (3), but the State Constituent Assembly never recommended that before it dissolved in 1957. Presidential orders, especially 1954, extended the Union Constitution while keeping the special gateway. Court practice treated the article as continuing, so it was temporary in name and durable in fact until 2019. C.O. 272, C.O. 273 and the J&K Reorganisation Act, 2019, made it inoperative; the 2023 judgment upheld that path and spoke of restoring statehood. Prospects in polity are now about statehood and ordinary federalism, not about reviving the old Article 370 as a living special status.
Q4 · UPSC Mains 2016 · GS II · 12 marks
Exercise of CAG's powers in relation to the accounts of the Union and the States is derived from Article 149 of the Indian Constitution. Discuss whether audit of the Government's policy implementation could amount to overstepping its own (CAG) jurisdiction.
Constitutional Bodies
Article 149 and the DPC Act, 1971, give the CAG power over Union and State accounts, including value-for-money examination. Policy choice belongs to the executive and the legislature; implementation of that policy with public funds is auditable. 2G, coal and CWG-type reports sit on process and loss, not on a right to rewrite the manifesto. Overstepping would be a binding policy direction or an audit with no accounts trail. PAC scrutiny, not a narrower reading of Article 149, is the proper check on a bold CAG report.
Toppers' copies
Toppers' copies for this question will be uploaded soon.