Revision summary
India’s federal text is Union-heavy: lists, Article 356, All-India Services and tied schemes. Vertical fiscal imbalance and a weak Inter-State Council were core drawbacks of the old structure. NITI Aayog, 42 per cent devolution and a GST Council are the main cooperative answers of recent years. Cooperation eases planning and tax-sharing; it does not rewrite emergency power or the Governor. Forums need money and convention, or cooperative federalism stays a slogan.
Model answer
Copper italics in this answer — like this — are the key facts. Each one is unpacked in the Facts & figures rail.
Introduction
- India is a Union of States with a strong Centre: a long Union List, All-India Services, and Article 356. In recent years the Union has named cooperative federalism as the method for GST, the Fourteenth Finance Commission, and NITI Aayog. Drawbacks in the old structure are real; cooperation answers some of them and leaves others in the text of the Constitution.
Body
Drawbacks in the existing structure
- The Union List and the Concurrent List, with Union override under Article 254, let New Delhi occupy fields that States treat as their daily work: education, forests, and labour being the usual examples.
- Centrally sponsored schemes, until recently designed in the Planning Commission, tied State budgets to Union guidelines and matching shares, so States spent on Union priorities rather than on their own Assembly mandate.
- Article 356, even after S.R. Bommai v. Union of India (1994), remains a political weapon; fiscal dominance through the Finance Commission grant conditions and GST architecture can also squeeze State autonomy without a formal emergency.
- All-India Services, the Governor, and Union agencies in policing and investigation create a permanent Centre footprint inside the State executive.
- Inter-State Council under Article 263 has met too rarely to be a working federal cabinet; disputes on rivers, migration and tax still go to politics or to the Supreme Court rather than to a standing cooperative forum.
- Vertical fiscal imbalance is structural: States spend on health, education and law and order, while the most buoyant taxes were, until GST, designed and collected more easily at the Union level.
What cooperative federalism has begun to answer
- Cooperative federalism means the Union and the States set shared goals and share money and data, instead of the Union commanding and the State complying.
- Replacement of the Planning Commission by NITI Aayog (2015) was sold as a shift from plan-allocation hierarchy to a think-tank and a Chief Ministers’ forum; it can ease one-size plans if States actually sit in the Governing Council as equals.
- The Fourteenth Finance Commission raised States’ share in the divisible pool to 42 per cent, which is a structural answer to vertical imbalance and gives Assemblies more untied money.
- A dual GST with a GST Council is cooperative in design: States vote on rates and the Union cannot lightly ignore the Council if the constitutional amendment holds that bargain.
- Inter-State Council revival, NITI working groups, and Disaster Management structures show that some Union–State work is now done in committees rather than only by ministry letters.
How far cooperation still falls short
- NITI Aayog does not allocate plan funds as the Planning Commission did; without money, a forum can become a seminar, and States still face Union ministries on centrally sponsored schemes.
- GST cooperation can freeze State tax experiments; compensation politics can recreate dependence in a new form.
- Article 356, Governors, and All-India Services are not rewritten by a slogan of cooperation; they need convention and, where needed, statute.
- River boards, police modernisation, and language issues still show competitive and even coercive federalism when party colours differ between Raisina Hill and the State capital.
- Cooperative federalism therefore answers a good part of planning and tax-sharing drawbacks, and it does not by itself cure emergency powers, gubernatorial discretion, or Concurrent List occupancy.
What would make the answer fuller
- Regular Inter-State Council meetings with published minutes, a permanent GST Council bargain that States trust, and fewer CSS strings on the 42 per cent devolution would match the rhetoric.
- Punchhi and Sarkaria recommendations on the Governor and on Article 356 remain the unfinished federal homework.
Flow diagram
flowchart TD D[Drawbacks lists money Art 356] --> O[Old Planning CSS hierarchy] C[Cooperative federalism] --> N[NITI Aayog] C --> F[14th FC 42 percent] C --> G[GST Council] N --> P[Partial answer] F[F] --> P[P] G[G] --> P[P] D --> L[Lists Governor 356 remain]
Conclusion
The existing structure is centralised in lists, money, services and emergency power. Cooperative federalism through NITI Aayog, higher Finance Commission devolution and a GST Council answers the planning and tax-share problems in part. It will answer the rest only when forums have money, the Governor is a constitutional figure, and Article 356 stays a last resort.
Quick related
Students also ask
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Khap panchayats have been in the news for functioning as extra - constitutional authorities, often delivering pronouncements amounting to human right violations. Discuss critically the actions taken by the legislative, executive and judiciary to set the things right in this regard.
Next question on this syllabus topic (2015 · Q4). View answer →
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Does cooperative federalism require a constitutional amendment?
Not for NITI Aayog or Finance Commission shares. GST did need a constitutional amendment because it changed the tax lists. Article 356 would need amendment or firm convention to shrink.
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Is NITI Aayog a full answer to Planning Commission centralism?
Only in part. It can coordinate, but it does not give States plan money. Union ministries still run large centrally sponsored schemes.
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