Q5(c) · UPSC Civil Services Mains 2025 · PSIR GS 2 · 10 marks · 2 min read

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For India, a multipolar world order would also mean a multipolar Asia. Comment.

Topic: Recent developments in Indian Foreign policy. Syllabus: Recent developments in Indian Foreign policy: India’s position on the recent crisis in Afghanistan, Iraq and West Asia, growing relations with US and Israel; vision of a new world order. Same official PYQ from year-wise 2025 and Recent developments in Indian Foreign policy.

Revision summary

A multipolar world is several great-power centres; it is hollow for India if Asia is Sino-centric. India’s threats, trade and waters are Asian, so Asian power-sharing is the real test of the slogan. Japan, ASEAN centrality, Korea, Australia and India beside China and the U.S. are the intended map. Quad and FOIP are instruments of pluralism, not a finished concert. The claim is right as strategy and still aspirational as fact.

Model answer

Copper italics in this answer — like this — are the key facts. Each one is unpacked in the Facts & figures rail.

Introduction

  • A multipolar world means more than two centres of relevant power: military, economic and institutional. For India, that slogan is empty if Asia itself is a Chinese unipolar system with everyone else as spokes. S. Jaishankar has put the point bluntly in public: a multipolar world requires a multipolar Asia. The comment is a demand, not a description already achieved.

Body

Why the link is logical

If the United States, China, the EU, Russia and India are named as world poles, but East, South and Southeast Asia take their security orders from Beijing, then India is a pole only on paper. Geography is Asian. Trade is Asian. The LAC, the Indian Ocean and the Himalayan water tower are Asian. A Sino-centric Asia would squeeze India’s strategic autonomy into a continental corner while the ‘world’ applauded multipolarity. Kissinger’s old triangular diplomacy assumed more than one Asian heavy. So did Nehru’s Asian Relations imagination, in a different moral key.

What multipolar Asia looks like

It looks like Japan as a normal security actor, ASEAN centrality that is not a Chinese waiting room, a Korea that is more than a U.S. base or a Chinese market, Australia in the Indian Ocean, and India able to refuse both tributary status and a formal U.S. alliance. The Quad, FOIP, Malabar, and supply-chain hedges on semiconductors are instruments. They are not a NATO. Multipolarity here is balanced pluralism, not anti-China theology: China remains a pole. It must not be the only Asian pole.

Obstacles

The Belt and Road, the South China Sea, and Bangladesh–Sri Lanka–Nepal courtship (Q5(a), Q8(c)) are how unipolarity is attempted by chequebook. The U.S. hub-and-spokes alliance system is another hierarchy, friendlier to Delhi than Beijing’s but still not Indian-designed. India’s own capacity — navy, manufacturing, neighbourhood delivery — is the binding constraint. A slogan without a shipyard is a toast.

  • The comment is right as strategy: use world-multipolarity language to legitimise Asian power-sharing, including India’s. It is aspirational as fact. The 2020s contest which Asia the world will get.

Flow diagram

Flow diagram

Conclusion

For India, a multipolar world that rested on a unipolar Asia would be a trap. Multipolar Asia — Japan, ASEAN, India, middle powers beside China and the U.S. — is the only version of the slogan that matches the map.

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    Bipolar structure of the world is more stable than the multipolar one. Comment.

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