Revision summary
Nehruvianism meant NAM, UN moralism and refusal of blocs; neoliberalism in this debate means markets, U.S. partnership and globalisation. 1991, Act East, the U.S. nuclear bargain and the Quad are the visible transition. India still refuses formal alliance, keeps Russia, defends WTO policy space and talks Global South — Nehruvian residues. Concur partly: instruments have shifted; doctrine of autonomy has not been abolished. Multi-alignment is the mix, not a clean replacement of one school by the other.
Model answer
Introduction
Nehruvianism in foreign policy meant non-alignment, Afro-Asian solidarity, UN moral language, and suspicion of military blocs, with a weak material base. Neoliberalism here does not mean only domestic market reform. In the foreign-policy debate it means engagement with global capital, closer ties to the United States, and comfort with economic globalisation. The view that India has been in transition from Nehruvianism to neoliberalism is partly right. It is wrong as a completed story.
Body
Where the transition is visible
1991 opened the economy and forced diplomacy to seek capital, oil and technology. Look East / Act East replaced a purely continental NAM map with ASEAN and later the Indo-Pacific. The civil nuclear path with the United States, the 2+2s, LEMOA, COMCASA and BECA, and revival of the Quad are not Nehru’s instruments. India signs trade talks, courts supply chains, and speaks the language of ease of capital. C. Raja Mohan and others have described this as a turn from idealism to a more interest-based, market-compatible diplomacy. Examples are concrete: India as a lower-cost manufacturing hedge in China-plus-one; ITEC plus digital public infrastructure as exports; a G20 presidency that sold investment as much as NAM memory.
Where Nehruvianism has not died
India still refuses a NATO-like alliance, which is the point of 7(c). It still buys oil and platforms with Russia. It still uses strategic autonomy and Global South voice — a Nehruvian habit in a new accent. It did not join a condemnation camp on Ukraine in the way neoliberal Atlanticism demanded. At the WTO, India defends food stocks and policy space rather than a pure open-market catechism. Neighbourhood policy still uses civilisational and security language that is not reducible to FDI.
So the transition is in the economic and U.S.-facing layers. It is not a conversion of the whole doctrine. NonAlignment 2.0 already tried to name autonomy after NAM’s bipolar script died. Multi-alignment, treated in 8(c), is the current mix: Nehruvian refusal of a camp, neoliberal use of markets and minilaterals.
Comment
Concur in part. Late Indian foreign policy has moved toward markets, the United States and issue-based coalitions. Do not concur that Nehruvianism has been replaced. The state still wants autonomy in a hierarchical world-economy that Wallerstein would recognise. Neoliberal tools serve that autonomy. They have not abolished it.
Flow diagram
flowchart TD N[Nehruvian NAM UN] --> T[1991 Act East US nuclear] T --> Q[Quad markets] N --> A[Autonomy Russia WTO food] T --> MIX[Partial transition]
Conclusion
India has used neoliberal economic diplomacy and U.S. minilaterals that Nehru would not have signed. It has not become a camp follower or a free-trade fundamentalist. The transition is real in instruments. The end remains autonomy. That is a partial, not a total, shift.
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