Q7(b) · UPSC Civil Services Mains 2023 · PSIR GS 2 · 15 marks · 2 min read

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What steps has India taken to regain its foothold in Afghanistan since the Taliban has taken over the country in August 2021?

Topic: Recent developments in Indian Foreign policy. Syllabus: Recent developments in Indian Foreign policy: India’s position on the recent crisis in Afghanistan, Iraq and West Asia, growing relations with US and Israel; vision of a new world order. Same official PYQ from year-wise 2023 and Recent developments in Indian Foreign policy.

Revision summary

August 2021 ended India’s Republic-era development partnership as it stood. Foothold now is aid, a technical presence, and counter-terror diplomacy. Chabahar remains the land-sea work-around to Pakistan. Recognition of the Taliban is still withheld. Success is measured by access and by security, not by a return to 2019 politics.

Model answer

Introduction

The Taliban entered Kabul in August 2021 as US and allied forces left. India’s embassy closed. Foothold now means humanitarian access, political contact without full legal recognition, connectivity options, and limits on anti-India terrorism. It does not mean the pre-2021 development-and-democracy partnership restored as it was.

Body

What was lost

  • India had built the Afghan parliament building, the Salma Dam, power lines, and training for civilians and some security personnel under the Republic.
  • Direct air and political access collapsed. Pakistan’s geography again sat across the land route.

What foothold can still mean

  • Humanitarian food, medicine, and earthquake or winter aid keep an Indian name among Afghans and a channel to de facto authorities.
  • A technical mission in Kabul, opened after 2021, is a thin diplomatic presence short of ambassadorial recognition of the Taliban government.
  • Intelligence and regional tables with Russia, Iran, and Central Asian States aim at ISKP and at any use of Afghan soil against India.
  • Chabahar and the INSTC idea remain a way to reach Afghanistan and Central Asia without Pakistan, if Iran sanctions and Afghan security allow cargo.

Constraints

  • The Taliban’s ideology, treatment of women, and intra-Afghan war limit any values partnership.
  • Pakistan’s influence is real though not total. China talks economic access. India is not first in either queue.
  • Full recognition would clash with India’s own line on terrorism and with Western sanctions maps. Non-recognition without contact would mean zero foothold.

Policy mix

  • Pragmatism: talk to the authority that holds Kabul. Culture and past investment: stay on the Afghan people’s side with aid.
  • Do not outsource the file only to the Quad or only to Russia. It is a regional security file first.

Flow diagram

flowchart TD
  T[Taliban Aug 2021] --> L[Republic projects paused]
  L --> H[Humanitarian technical mission]
  H --> F[Limited foothold]
  C[Chabahar regional talks] --> F

Conclusion

India retains a foothold after August 2021 through aid, a limited mission, regional security talks, and the Chabahar option. It cannot restore the Republic-era political project. The test is whether Afghan soil is used against India and whether a civilian channel survives.

Quick related

Students also ask

  • Discuss the significance of "West Asia Quad" in the light of India's 'Look West' policy

    Next question on this syllabus topic (2023 · Q8(b)). View answer →

  • Does a technical mission equal recognition?

    No. Recognition is a legal-political act toward a government. A mission can be a contact point for aid and visas without that act.

  • Can India ignore the Taliban?

    Ignoring them cedes the ground to Pakistan, China, and others. Contact without endorsement is the remaining middle.

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