Revision summary
The UK Speaker leaves party combat; India elects a majority Speaker who remains in the party stream. Tenth Schedule adjudication and Money Bill certification are where a partisan Chair most hurts the House. A neutrality convention plus no post-Chair ministry would aid objectivity. Defection petitions should leave the Speaker if the office is to be believed. Robust parliamentary business needs a trusted referee, not only a new slogan.
Model answer
Introduction
The British convention that a Speaker, once elected, leaves party combat and is often returned unopposed is a device for chair neutrality. India’s Lok Sabha Speaker is elected under Article 93 from the ruling majority and returns to party life after the Chair. Adopting ‘once a Speaker, always a Speaker’ would help objectivity, but it would not by itself fix anti-defection and House-management problems.
Body
Why the UK practice looks attractive
- A Speaker who will not seek a ministerial future from the same party has less incentive to tilt Question Hour, gag debates, or rush money bills.
- Unopposed return in the constituency, where it holds, reduces the need to please the party machine at the next election.
- Objectivity of the Chair is a condition of robust parliamentary business: opposition time, adjournment motions, and committee referrals only work if the referee is believed.
Indian constraints
- The Tenth Schedule makes the Speaker the first tribunal on defection; Kihoto Hollohan (1992) left that with judicial review only at the end. A party Speaker judging party splits is the structural wound, as Karnataka 2019 and earlier Assembly crises showed.
- Money Bill certification (Aadhaar in Lok Sabha, later scrutinised in K.S. Puttaswamy / Roger Mathew debates) showed how a partisan Chair can shrink Rajya Sabha.
- Coalition arithmetic and a hung House make a permanently non-party Speaker harder to elect without a cross-party deal that India has rarely institutionalised.
Should India adopt it — and implications
- Yes, as a parliamentary convention plus a statute or rules amendment: Speaker resigns party membership; no ministerial office afterwards; defection petitions go to an independent tribunal.
- Implications for robust business: more credible Question Hour, fewer walkouts over ‘bias’, and a cleaner separation of the Chair from the whip.
- Risks: a lifetime-style Speaker in a young democracy could freeze a House culture; constituency unopposed returns need all-party honour, not a one-sided diktat.
- Recommendation: import the neutrality ethic and remove defection adjudication from the Speaker; do not expect British social convention to transplant without rules.
Flow diagram
flowchart TD UK[UK Speaker convention] --> N[Party-neutral Chair] IN[Art 93 plus Tenth Schedule] --> P[Party Speaker] P --> D[Defection and Money Bill tilt] N --> R[Robust House business]
Conclusion
‘Once a Speaker, always a Speaker’ should be adopted in spirit because objectivity of the Lok Sabha Chair is a public good. Its implication for robust business is a trusted referee. Without taking defection cases off the Speaker’s table, the slogan alone will not de-party the office.
Quick related
Students also ask
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"Parliament's power to amend the Constitution is a limited power and it cannot be enlarged into absolute power." In the light of this statement explain whether Parliament under Article 368 of the Constitution can destroy the Basic Structure of the Constitution by expanding its amending power?(15).
Next question on this syllabus topic (2019 · Q12). View answer →
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Does the Constitution forbid a non-party Speaker?
No. Practice and the party system do. A convention or a Rules/statute change can still be adopted.
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Would this stop defection?
Not by itself. It would stop the same person being both party beneficiary and defection judge, which is the immediate conflict.
PYQ trend
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