Revision summary
Article 324 gives the ECI superintendence of elections, but appointment remains executive. The MCC is weak against machinery, money, crime, and social media. EVM–VVPAT politics and borrowed State staff drain institutional trust. Solutions: collegial appointment, MCC as offence, audited spend, more VVPAT, State secretariat. The ballot is not the problem; the Commission’s statutory armour is.
Model answer
Introduction
The Election Commission is a constitutional body under Article 324, trusted to run free and fair polls. As an institution it now faces appointment politics, a soft Model Code, money and crime in nominations, digital campaigning, and dependence on a borrowed bureaucracy.
Body
Present problems
- The Chief Election Commissioner and Election Commissioners are appointed by the executive; the gap vis-à-vis a multi-member independent collegium weakens the look of neutrality, even when officers are personally upright.
- The Model Code of Conduct is largely moral suasion; star-campaigner abuse, official machinery, and last-week transfers are hard to punish in time.
- Criminalisation and money power: affidavits disclose cases, yet voters still face a costly, candidate-centred contest with weak inner-party democracy.
- Social media, paid news, and deep-fake rumours outrun the forty-eight-hour silence and the Commission’s takedown capacity.
- EVM–VVPAT trust is a political controversy even after the Supreme Court’s limited verification order; the institution spends credibility defending machines rather than only running the roll.
- The Commission has no separate field cadre; it borrows the State’s collectors, police, and teachers, so incumbency and local bias remain a structural risk.
- Frequent elections and a freeze on delimitation until after the next census keep the institution in a permanent campaign and an outdated seat map.
Solutions
- A statutory, multi-member appointment committee for CEC and ECs, with Leader of Opposition and a judicial member, would harden independence without amending Article 324’s core.
- Give selected MCC breaches the status of corrupt practices or specific offences with fast-track benches, and cap official advertisements in the pre-poll window.
- Enforce expenditure ceilings with digital trail, audit of parties, and a measured public funding or free airtime experiment.
- A statutory social-media cell with platform liability in the campaign window, plus more randomised VVPAT counts, would rebuild trust.
- A small permanent election secretariat in every State and a common electoral roll with local bodies would cut dependence on the sitting government.
- Simultaneous elections are a political choice; institutionally, staggered polls need a stronger, not a weaker, Commission.
Flow diagram
flowchart TD A[Art 324 ECI] --> P[Appointment MCC money digital staff] P --> S[Collegium MCC offence audit VVPAT cadre] S --> F[Freer fairer polls]
Conclusion
The Commission’s problems are independence of appointment, a soft code, money-crime, digital speed, and borrowed staff. Solutions lie in a collegial appointment law, teeth for the MCC, audited finance, technology transparency, and a dedicated field arm—not in distrusting the ballot itself.
Quick related
Students also ask
-
What are the functions of Finance Commission? Examine its emerging role in Fiscal Federalism.
Next question in the 2020 paper (Q13). View answer →
-
Is the Election Commission a court?
No. It is a constitutional authority that can pass directions for free polls. Disputes on election results still go in election petitions to the High Court or Supreme Court as the law provides.
-
Would simultaneous elections solve the Commission’s problems?
They may cut cost and MCC fatigue. They do not by themselves fix appointment, criminal candidates, or social-media lies.
PYQ trend
When UPSC asked this
Related PYQs from other years, newest first. Open a question to read it.
-
2024 · Q12 · UPGS2 · 12 marks
What are the implications of the revised appointment process of Election Commission for ensuring its independence? -
2022 · Q16 · UPGS2 · 12 marks
The concept of “One nation one election” has its own prospects and limitations in India. Examine. -
2020 · Q16 · UPGS2 · 12 marks
"Right to Information Act has forced civil servants to come out of steel frame and serve people sincerely." Explain. -
2019 · Q8 · UPGS2 · 8 marks
Critically examine the main elements of the Representation of People’s Act. -
2018 · Q9 · UPGS2 · 8 marks
Evaluate the use of Voter Verifiable Paper Audit Trail (VVPAT) in the General Election of India.
More from this paper
Q1 · UPSC Mains 2020 · UPGS2 · 8 marks
Explain the concept of Judicial Activism and evaluate its impact on the relationship of Executive and Judiciary in India.
Executive and Judiciary
Judicial activism is gap-filling rights enforcement through PIL and Articles 32, 226 and 142. Cases such as Maneka Gandhi and Vishaka show courts acting where the Executive lagged. The impact is dual: more accountability and more friction over policy and appointments. NJAC (2015) and scheme-monitoring illustrate the strain on separation of powers. The relationship works when decrees are exceptional and the Executive then legislates.
Q2 · UPSC Mains 2020 · UPGS2 · 8 marks
"The President of India cannot become a dictator." Explain.
Indian Constitution
Article 74 after the Forty-fourth Amendment binds the President to ministerial aid and advice. Shamsher Singh treats the President as a formal head of a parliamentary executive. Ordinance and emergency powers are not personal; they ride on the Council. Five-year tenure, electoral college, and Article 61 impeachment block self-perpetuation. Courts can test whether an act was truly on advice, so dictatorship has no constitutional door.
Q3 · UPSC Mains 2020 · UPGS2 · 8 marks
Critically analyse the role of the Inter-State Council in promoting Co-operative Federalism in India.
Union and the States
Article 263 and the 1990 Presidential Order created the Inter-State Council after Sarkaria. It is a political forum for Centre–State and inter-State coordination, not a court. It can record disputes and recommend; it cannot bind the Union like a statute. Infrequent meetings and a PM-chaired, recommendatory design weaken its role. GST Council and fiscal bodies now often bargain harder than this Council.
Toppers' copies
Toppers' copies for this question will be uploaded soon.