Q6(a) · UPSC Civil Services Mains 2025 · PSIR GS 2 · 20 marks · 2 min read

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Critically analyze the different phases of India's foreign policy since independence. How justified, do you think, is S. Jaishankar's classification of the current phase as the phase of 'energetic diplomacy'? 15+5=

Topic: India’s Contribution to the Non-Alignment Movement. Syllabus: India’s Contribution to the Non-Alignment Movement: Different phases; current role. Same official PYQ from year-wise 2025 and India’s Contribution to the Non-Alignment Movement.

Revision summary

Phases: Nehruvian NAM, post-1962/1971 realism, 1991 economic opening, 1998 nuclear break, U.S. civil nuclear bargain, then Modi-era multi-alignment. The core across phases is strategic autonomy, not a simple Nehru-to-neoliberal conversion. Jaishankar’s energetic diplomacy fairly describes tempo: G20, minilaterals, argumentative Global South voice. It is weaker as a claim of structural success: LAC, Bangladesh and industrial depth still bind. Treat ‘energetic’ as method, not as a new telos.

Model answer

Copper italics in this answer — like this — are the key facts. Each one is unpacked in the Facts & figures rail.

Introduction

Indian foreign policy since independence is best read as phases of autonomy, not as a conversion from innocence to cunning. Each phase kept a core — strategic space for a poor, then rising, civilisational state — and changed the mix of moral language, force, and markets. S. Jaishankar’s claim that the present phase is energetic diplomacy is a 5-mark rider on that history, not a replacement for it.

Body

Phases since 1947

Nehruvian years combined NAM, Panchsheel, Commonwealth membership and UN activism with a weak hard-power base. 1962 was the crash. Shastri and Indira Gandhi moved toward a harder realism: 1965, the 1971 treaty with the Soviet Union, the Bangladesh war, and the 1974 PNE. The 1980s mixed regional assertion (Sri Lanka, Maldives) with a still-closed economy.

1991 is the true hinge: Look East, a search for capital and technology, and the slow death of autoarkic diplomacy. 1998 Pokhran-II ended the multilateral-default nuclear path (Q8(a)) and forced a new bargain with the United States. The 2005–08 civil nuclear path under Singh, and economic globalisation, made Washington a partner without a treaty. Neighbourhood First, Act East, and the Quad’s revival after 2017 mark the Modi years: more public alignment with FOIP, more religious-civilisational language, and a still-careful Russia account.

Energetic diplomacy (the +5)

  • Jaishankar, in The India Way and in office, means tempo and theatre: G20 presidency, Voice of Global South, IMEC, I2U2, a flood of 2+2s, vaccine and diaspora diplomacy, and an argumentative refusal of lectures on Ukraine and Kashmir. Energy is measurable in miles flown and in coalitions assembled. It is justified as a label for style and for coalition-craft in a fluid 2020s.

It is less justified as a miracle phase. The LAC after Galwan is not a diplomatic triumph. Bangladesh 2024 showed neighbourhood leakage. Energy does not erase dependency on Russian platforms or on imported energy. Hyper-activity can be a substitute for manufacturing depth. Compared with Nehru’s doctrinal clarity or 1991’s structural break, ‘energetic’ describes method more than a new end. The end remains autonomy in a multipolar Asia. The method is busier, more minilateral, and more unapologetic. That, fairly, is a phase. It is not the end of history.

Flow diagram

Flow diagram

Conclusion

India moved from NAM moralism through Indira’s Soviet-leaning realism and the 1991–98 market-and-nuclear turn to a multi-aligned present. Jaishankar’s energetic diplomacy names the tempo of that present with justice. It should not be mistaken for unbounded power.

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  1. 2025 · Q8(c) · PSIR GS 2 · 15 marks

    Discuss the potential role India can play in initiating a possible phase of trilateral economic engagement among India, China and Nepal

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Q5(a) · UPSC Mains 2026 · PSIR GS 2 · 10 marks · Solution

Describe India's objections to agricultural negotiations at the World Trade Organisation.

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Q8(c) · UPSC Mains 2025 · PSIR GS 2 · 15 marks · Solution

Discuss the potential role India can play in initiating a possible phase of trilateral economic engagement among India, China and Nepal

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"India has of late, chosen to debunk non-alignment in its pursuit of multi-alignment." Comment.

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