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UPSC Mains 2025 Sociology Paper 2

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<https://wrapexams.com/upsc/mains/sociology/gs-2/2025/>

Q1(a) · 10 marks

'Textual perspective is important in understanding of Indian Social System.' Discuss.

Sociology GS 2 · 2025 · Rural and Agrarian Social Structure

Revision summary

The textual perspective explains Indian society through Dharmashastra, epics and related canons.

Ghurye and Dumont used that archive to theorise caste as a hierarchical whole.

The approach is strong on civilisational categories and weak on labour, gender and local power.

Srinivas's field view and Desai's Marxism correct the book without discarding it.

Texts remain part of the social system because groups still quote them in law and ritual.

Introduction

- **The textual perspective reads Indian society through its** authoritative books: Dharmashastra, epics, Puranas, Buddhist and Jain canons, and later commentaries. It treats those books as a map of the social system, not as optional literature. **G. S. Ghurye, Louis Dumont**, and the older Indologists made this the first professional grammar of Indian sociology. The living village does not vanish; it is interpreted against a civilisational text.

Body

What the texts give

Ghurye's Caste and Race in India and his work on gotra, sadhus and Indian costume used Sanskrit sources to fix the **features of caste**: segmental division, hierarchy, restrictions on feeding and marriage, civil and religious disabilities, and lack of unrestricted choice of occupation. Dumont's Homo Hierarchicus went further. He argued that the **ideology of purity and pollution**, drawn from Brahmanical texts, is the encompassing principle of the caste system. Status, not power, is the key. The king is encompassed by the priest. **McKim Marriott** and **Dumont-Pocock's "For a Sociology of India"** insisted that Indian facts must be thought with Indian categories, not only with Western class.

- **The textual view is strong on** long continuities: varna as a scheme, ashrama, purushartha, joint-family duties, and the idea of a ranked cosmos. It explains why reformers themselves

quoted shastra, and why law courts still meet personal law that grew from text.

Limits of the book view

M. N. Srinivas warned against the **book view** replacing the **field view**. Texts over-represent Brahmanical order. They under-represent women, Adivasis, artisans, and the everyday bargaining of jati. **A. R. Desai** and Marxist historians treated the texts as ideology of a class order, not as a full description. **André Beteille** showed in Tanjore that land, office and caste do not always coincide as the shastra would like. **M. N. Srinivas**'s sanskritization is itself a comment on texts: lower groups use the book, they are not frozen inside it.

Colonial ethnography often fused the textual perspective with the census, turning fluid jati into a rigid schedule. That was a political use of text, not a neutral reading.

Flow diagram

Shastra and epics -> Indology / Ghurye / Dumont

Indology / Ghurye / Dumont -> Hierarchy and varna-jati

Field view / Srinivas -> Practice and mobility

Hierarchy and varna-jati -.incomplete without. -> Practice and mobility

Conclusion

The textual perspective is indispensable for the idea of the Indian social system-hierarchy, duty, and civilisational self-description. It is not a photograph of practice. A sociological answer holds Ghurye and Dumont together with Srinivas's field and Desai's political economy.

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Q1(b) · 10 marks

Justify that the Indian traditions are modernizing. Also discuss its contributing factors.

Sociology GS 2 · 2025 · Perspectives on the study of Indian society

Revision summary

Yogendra Singh treats modernization of Indian tradition as internal and external change together.

Sanskritization, westernization and the Rudolphs' modernity of tradition describe recasting, not simple death.

Law, education, media, the developmental state and the post-1991 market are the main levers.

Caste, household and religion persist in new organisational forms.

- **Unevenness remains:** mobility in class can coexist with control in marriage.

Introduction

Indian traditions are **modernizing**, not evaporating. **Yogendra Singh** argued that change comes from inside the civilisation (**orthogenetic**) and from contact with Islam, the West and the colonial state (**heterogenetic**). The outcome is a reconstituted tradition: caste associations, temple trusts, and arranged love marriages sit beside the Constitution and the market.

Body

Continuity through change

M. N. Srinivas named **sanskritization** and **westernization** as twin processes. A jati copies the diet, ritual and education of a locally higher group, and also takes English, office and the vote. **Lloyd and Susanne Rudolph** called this the **modernity of tradition**: caste sabhas become interest groups; panchayats become statutory bodies. **Milton Singer** saw the "great tradition" travelling into Madras industry through ritual and kinship.

Contributing factors are stacked. Colonial law and the census objectified community. Missionary and state **education** created a bilingual elite. Railways, print and now the smartphone spread both katha and coaching. The post-colonial **state**-reservation, Hindu Code, NEP 2020-rewrites who may enter school and office. The **market** after 1991 sells lifestyle while matrimonial sites sell gotra filters. Internal reformers-Bhakti, **Phule**, **Gandhi**, **Ambedkar**-gave tradition a language of equality without always abandoning religious idiom.

Where we see it

Caste does not vanish; it **differentiates**. Endogamy remains high; occupation and politics open. The joint household may split residually while remaining a **property and ritual unit** (I. P. Desai, A. M. Shah). Festivals become televised public culture. Yoga and Ayurveda are packaged as global wellness, which is a modern career for an old repertoire.

The risk is to call every change "modernization." **Dipankar Gupta** notes that inter-caste violence and khap diktats are also contemporary. Tradition modernizes unevenly: a software engineer may still police a sister's marriage.

Flow diagram

Orthogenetic reform -> Modernizing tradition
Heterogenetic contact -> Modernizing tradition
Modernizing tradition -> Caste as association
Modernizing tradition -> Family as flexible jointness
Modernizing tradition -> State and market

Conclusion

Indian traditions modernize by differentiation and by borrowing. The contributing factors are law, school, market, media and indigenous critique. The result is not Western replica but a layered social system that still speaks in caste, kinship and dharma while using the vote, the court and the firm.

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Q1(c) · 10 marks

According to you, which social reform movement has played the most effective role in uplifting the status of women? Explain.

Sociology GS 2 · 2025 · Social Movements in Modern India

Revision summary

The most effective women's social reform is the **Phule-Ambedkar** anti-caste line, not only bhadralok campaigns.

It tied girls' education, a critique of endogamy, and constitutional legal personhood.

Sati abolition and widow remarriage opened the public question but had a narrower class-caste base.

Hindu Code, later feminist litigation and Shah Bano debates inherit that citizenship frame.

Patriarchy continues; effectiveness means a changed legal and educational grammar, not a finished utopia.

Introduction

- **Many campaigns touched women's lives:** Brahmo reform, widow remarriage, temple entry, the Hindu Code, and post-1970s feminism. The **most effective** single movement, in structural reach, is the **anti-caste educational and legal reform begun by Jotirao and Savitribai Phule and carried into the Constitution by B. R. Ambedkar**. It treated women's uplift as inseparable from caste, labour and the right to learn, not as a polite correction of custom.

Body

Why this line, not only bhadralok reform

Nineteenth-century elite reform-Rammohan on sati (1829), Vidyasagar on widow remarriage (1856), the Age of Consent debate (1891)-mattered. It made the "women's question" public. Its social base was often upper-caste and urban. **Savitribai Phule's** school (1848) and the **Satyashodhak** attack on Brahmanical marriage rules reached labouring and Dalit-Bahujan women whom the Brahmo salon did not organise. **Ambedkar** made that programme constitutional: **Article 15**, the Hindu Code Bills (1955-56) on marriage, succession and adoption, and a politics that named endogamy as the engine of caste (Castes in India, 1916).

Effectiveness is measured by **durable rights and institutions**. Girls' schooling as a public duty, legal personhood in marriage and property, and the idea that the state may override custom are now common sense. Later feminism-towards equality, against dowry, **Shah Bano** (1985) and the contested 1986 Act, **Vishaka** (1997), POSH, and the demand to reform personal laws-walks on that floor. Without **Phule-Ambedkar**, reform remains charity to "our women."

Limits

Law did not abolish patriarchy. Female labour-force participation is uneven; sex ratio and unpaid care persist. Muslim, Christian and customary personal laws still fragment rights. Elite feminist NGOs can speak past rural and Adivasi women. The claim is not that suffering ended. The claim is that **this movement changed the terms**: education plus legal equality plus a critique of endogamy, rather than a plea to restore a golden shastric womanhood.

Flow diagram

Phule schools and Satyashodhak -> Ambedkar Hindu Code and Constitution

Elite 19th c reform -> Ambedkar Hindu Code and Constitution

Ambedkar Hindu Code and Constitution -> Later feminist law and movements

Conclusion

The **Phule-Ambedkar** reform movement is the most effective because it joined women's education to anti-caste democracy and to statute. Nineteenth-century elite reform opened the file; this line made women's status a question of citizenship. Later judgments and movements extend it; they do not replace it.

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Q1(d) · 10 marks

How did Colonial Policies for the tribes affected their socio-economic conditions in India? Discuss.

Sociology GS 2 · 2025 · Tribal communities in India

Revision summary

Colonial tribal policy combined forest reservation, land revenue, labour recruitment and criminal tribes law.

Economic effects were land alienation, indebtedness and incorporation as cheap labour.

Missions and schools created a small elite and cultural change.

Elwin's isolation and Ghurye's assimilation framed official thought more than they described the frontier.

Independent India's ST law and FRA still answer that colonial structure.

Introduction

Colonial tribal policy was not one speech. It was a bundle of **forest law, land revenue, labour recruitment, criminal labelling and missionary work**, run through excluded and partially excluded areas. The socio-economic effect was to pull Adivasi communities into a **cash and timber frontier** while telling administrators they were either a museum piece or a Hindu mass waiting to be absorbed.

Body

Land, forest and labour

The **Indian Forest Acts** (1865, 1878, 1927) turned shifting cultivation, hunt and grazing into offences against reserved forest. Land settlements favoured plough agriculture and outsiders. Moneylenders and sahuikars followed the road. **Santhal, Munda and Bhil** country saw alienation that later laws (Chotanagpur Tenancy, 1908; Wilkinson's Rules; agency tracts) only partly slowed. Tea in Assam, mines on the **Chota Nagpur plateau**, and plantations used **indenture and sardari** recruitment. A tribal household became a **labour unit** for a distant market.

The **Criminal Tribes Act, 1871** (repealed after Independence, with a denotified aftermath) stamped whole communities as hereditary criminals. That was a socio-economic policy: it restricted movement and justified police control over poor peripatetic groups, many of them not "forest tribes" in Elwin's sense.

Missions brought **script, clinic and a new elite**, and also cultural rupture. **Census** and ethnography froze "tribe" as a category beside caste.

Isolation and assimilation

Verrier Elwin argued for protection and cultural autonomy (a national park of cultures, later qualified). **G. S. Ghurye** in *The Aborigines-So-Called and Their Future* treated tribes as **backward Hindus to be assimilated**. **Policy oscillated: inner line and excluded areas on one side; roads, contractors and Hinduisation on the other. Neither pole stopped differentiation** inside the tribe: headmen, converts, and mine workers versus those left on residual commons.

The colonial legacy is the present grammar of Scheduled Tribes, Fifth and Sixth Schedules, and the still-unfinished **Forest Rights Act, 2006**.

Flow diagram

Forest and land law -> Alienation and debt
Plantation and mine labour -> Alienation and debt
Criminal Tribes Act -> Stigma and police
Elwin vs Ghurye -> Protection or assimilation

Conclusion

Colonial policies commercialised tribal land and forest, criminalised mobility, and recruited labour, while intellectuals argued isolation versus assimilation. The socio-economic result was dispossession plus a thin educated elite-not splendid isolation and not equal citizenship.

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Q1(e) · 10 marks

How would you appropriate to characterise G. S. Ghurye as a practitioner of 'theoretical pluralism'?

Sociology GS 2 · 2025 · Perspectives on the study of Indian society

Revision summary

Ghurye combined Indology, historical diffusion, ethnography and urban survey rather than one school.

Caste features, sadhus, gotra, Mahadev Kolis and tribal assimilation show the range.

He is not Srinivas's structural functionalist, Desai's Marxist, or Dumont's structuralist.

Pluralism is a practice visible in the books, not a slogan he coined.

Limits include a Hindu civilisational tilt and relatively weak class analysis.

Introduction

G. S. Ghurye is often boxed as the Indologist of caste. That box is too small. He practised **theoretical pluralism**: he used texts, history, diffusion, field observation and urban survey as the problem required. The unity is a civilisational curiosity about India, not a single ism.

Body

Several tools, one workshop

As Indologist he read Sanskrit and classical features of **caste**. As historian-diffusionist he wrote on Indian Sadhus, Gotra and Charana, and cultural spread across regions. As ethnographer-sociologist he supervised and wrote on **Mahadev Kolis** and urban groups in Bombay, bringing the city into a discipline that others left to the village. On **tribes** he argued assimilation into Hindu society, using both colonial ethnography and his reading of custom. He wrote on **dress, occupation and social tensions**, which are empirical themes, not shlokas.

Pluralism here means **problem-driven method**. Caste history needed texts and the census. Urban poor needed survey. Civilisation needed comparison. He did not become a structural-functionalist like Srinivas, nor a Marxist like **A. R. Desai**, nor a Dumontian ideologist. Students at Bombay received a wide syllabus: Indology plus sociology.

Why "practitioner" matters

Ghurye did not write a manifesto of pluralism. We characterise him that way because his **oeuvre is mixed**. That is a strength against one-theory imperialism. It is also a limit. The Hindu civilisational frame can swallow tribe and minority as residual. Class, gender and the colonial state as a structure get less systematic treatment than in Desai or later subaltern work. **Dumont** accused Indian sociology of mixing empiricism without a theory of hierarchy; Ghurye's reply is the archive itself: many theories, patiently used.

To call him only "Indologist" is to miss the Kolis and the city. To call him only empiricist is to miss the shastra. Pluralism is the accurate label.

Flow diagram

Ghurye -> Indology of caste
Ghurye -> Diffusion and history
Ghurye -> Urban ethnography
Ghurye -> Tribe as backward Hindu

Conclusion

Ghurye is a practitioner of theoretical pluralism because caste, tribe, city and civilisation each drew a different kit-text, diffusion, survey-under one Indian sociology. The price of that breadth is a Hindu-centred synthesis and a thinner political economy.

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Q2(a) · 20 marks

Do you think that in a society like India orthogenetic changes take place through differentiation? Do you observe continuities in the orthogenetic process ? Elaborate your answer with suitable examples

Sociology GS 2 · 2025 · Politics and Society

Revision summary

Yogendra Singh's orthogenetic change is transformation generated inside **Indian civilisation**.

Differentiation of roles, jati, household and sect is the main inner mechanism.

Sanskritization and Bhakti are examples of mobility and critique on inherited ladders.

Continuities appear in marriage, village, and sacred public language even after factories and votes.

Western and Islamic contacts are heterogenetic; they are absorbed through this differentiating structure.

Introduction

Yogendra Singh argued that Indian society changes from within-**orthogenetic** change-and not only when the West arrives. That inner change works largely through **differentiation**: roles, cults and institutions split and specialise, while older meanings hitch a ride. Continuities are therefore not failures of modernity; they are how the orthogenetic process actually looks.

Body

Orthogenetic change and differentiation

Orthogenetic sources include the **Little and Great traditions** (Redfield via Marriott and Singer), **Bhakti and reform**, the internal logic of varna-jati, and the long history of statecraft. Differentiation means a priestly role splits from kingship, a jati splits by occupation and region, a joint household throws out a nuclear residential unit, a sect splits from a sampradaya, and a caste association splits from the village panchayat. **Sanskritization** is orthogenetic mobility: groups rearrange themselves on an inherited ladder rather than inventing class from nothing.

Singh did not deny **heterogenetic** shocks-Islam, British law, industrial capitalism, the Constitution. He insisted that those shocks are **interpreted through** an already differentiating civilisation. NEP 2020's bilingual classroom, electronic voting, and corporate mandirs are intelligible as new specialised institutions wearing old names.

Continuities you can still observe

- **Hierarchy does not vanish when a factory opens. It** re-specialises: a dominant caste becomes a political caste; purity rules weaken in the canteen and tighten at marriage. **I. P. Desai** and **A. M. Shah** showed family continuity beneath residential split. Village studies after Srinivas show the village remaining a **ritual and vote unit** even when men live in Surat or Gulf dormitories. **Dumont's** encompassing hierarchy is too stiff as a total theory, but the idiom of rank continues in matrimony and food.
- **Examples of continuity-through-differentiation:** the **Khap** using WhatsApp; **Jat and Patel** agitations mixing agrarian status with OBC demand; **Ambedkarite Buddhism** as orthogenetic critique using a civilisational repertoire; **Ramjanmabhoomi** politics as politicised great

tradition. Green Revolution technology differentiated kulak from labourer without ending caste in the labour gang.

- **So yes:** in a society like India, orthogenetic change proceeds through differentiation. Continuities are the other face of the same process-not a separate "tradition" sitting outside history.

Flow diagram

Orthogenetic sources -> Differentiation of roles
Heterogenetic contact -> Differentiation of roles
Differentiation of roles -> New institutions
Differentiation of roles -> Continuities of rank and kin

Conclusion

- **Singh's orthogenetic thesis is still usable:** India modernises by splitting roles and institutions while recycling hierarchy, kinship and sacred language. Heterogenetic forces matter, but they land on a differentiating old structure. The task is to name both the split and the leftover bond.

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Q2(b) · 20 marks

'Agrarian class structure has been undergoing changes due to modern forces.' Critically examine

Sociology GS 2 · 2025 · Industrialization and Urbanisation in India

Revision summary

Thorner's malik-kisan-mazdoor map still orients agrarian class, with caste as the usual skin.

Land reform thinned intermediaries unevenly; ceilings and tenancy left loopholes.

Green Revolution and commercial farming produced capitalist farmers and a larger hired workforce.

MGNREGA, migration and peri-urban land markets further split classes.

Change is real but not a uniform national shift from feudalism to pure agrarian capitalism.

Introduction

Agrarian class structure in India was never a simple two-class war. **Daniel Thorner** spoke of malik, kisan and mazdoor. **A. R. Desai** and **D. N. Dhanagare** read peasant movements through class fractions. Modern forces-legislation, technology, markets and welfare-have **rearranged** those fractions without wiping out caste or landlord power everywhere.

Body

The older map

Zamindari, ryotwari and mahalwari produced different mixes of rent, revenue and labour. After zamindari abolition, intermediaries were legally thinned, but **ceiling evasion, benami, and tenancy insecurity** left a class of surplus-appropriators. In wet rice and canal regions, a **rich peasant / capitalist farmer** layer grew. In dry regions, smallholders and labourers remained exposed. **Kathleen Gough, Bêteille** and village ethnography showed class sitting on caste: landowning dominant castes, tenant middle groups, and Dalit labour.

Modern forces

Land reform was regionally uneven (Kerala and West Bengal versus Bihar's delayed theatre). The **Green Revolution** (Punjab, Haryana, west UP, parts of Tamil Nadu and Andhra) differentiated a tractor-and-tube-well class from hired labour, raised yields, and later fed a crisis of water, debt and surplus youth. **Commercialisation** and **contract farming** insert companies into cane, poultry and vegetables. **Reverse tenancy** appears where small owners lease to machine-owning farmers. **MGNREGA** and PDS shift the bargaining power of labour, especially women, without creating a full rural proletariat in **Marx's** sense. **Migration**-circular, Gulf, factory-turns the village into a labour-exporting household. Corporate land acquisition and peri-urban real estate create a **rentier** layer of non-cultivating owners.

Caste still organises who owns the tubewell and who does the weeding. **Jats, Reddys, Patidars, Vokkaligas** illustrate agrarian class as status group. Farmer protests mix price politics with that status. At the bottom, landless Dalit and Adivasi labour remain the most proletarianised, now also in brick kilns and construction. Women do a large share of field work yet rarely hold title, so class maps are **gender-blind** unless we name unpaid family labour.

APMC markets, corporate retail, and the brief **farm laws** conflict showed that "modern forces" include the state as price-maker, not only the tractor. Dairy cooperatives and contract poultry create petty commodity producers who look independent and remain tied to companies. **NITI** and insurance schemes treat the farmer as an entrepreneur; village ethnography still finds debt, honour, and jati in the same ledger.

- **The critical point:** modern forces have **pluralised** agrarian classes-petty commodity producers, capitalist farmers, absentee landlords, migrant labour-rather than delivering one national kulak versus one national labourer.

Flow diagram

Thorner malik kisan mazdoor -> Green Revolution and markets
Green Revolution and markets -> Capitalist farmer / reverse tenancy
Green Revolution and markets -> Migrant and MGNREGA labour
Green Revolution and markets -> Non-cultivating rentiers

Conclusion

Agrarian class structure is changing under law, technology, markets and migration, but it is still a caste-inflected, regionally split formation. Thorner's three terms remain a useful skeleton; the flesh is now Green Revolution capital, welfare wages, and non-cultivating owners.

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Q2(c) · 10 marks

How same sex marriages are responsible for population dynamics in India? Discuss

Sociology GS 2 · 2025 · Population Dynamics

Revision summary

Navtej Johar decriminalised consensual same-sex relations; Supriyo did not create a right to marry.

National fertility and population growth are driven by education, contraception and urban costs.

Any demographic effect of same-sex unions is small because numbers are small and many still enter heterosexual marriage.

The clearer effects are on household form, inheritance gaps and kinship ideology.

Serious analysis avoids both moral panic and the claim that queer marriage will reshape India's age structure.

Introduction

Same-sex marriage is **not** a general civil right in India today. **Navtej Singh Johar** (2018) read down **Section 377** and protected adult consensual same-sex relations. **Supriyo @ Supriya Chakraborty** (2023) refused to constitutionalise marriage, leaving adoption, succession and spousal social security largely to the heterosexual legal family. Population dynamics must be discussed from that thin legal base, not from a Western marriage-equality census.

Body

Law, kinship and numbers

India's fertility decline is driven by **female schooling, contraception, urban costs and the two-child norm**, not by queer marriage. Even where same-sex couples live together in metros, their share of households is small. Any effect on **crude birth rate or TFR** is negligible at national scale. Some couples raise children through prior heterosexual marriage, kinship care, or informal adoption; that rearranges a few households, it does not rewrite the age pyramid.

- **What can change, slowly, is the morphology of the household:** more single-person and chosen-kin units in cities, less automatic joint-family absorption of a gay adult as a "unmarried child." **G. P. Murdock's** nuclear-family universalism never fitted India well; queer households make the misfit visible. Stigma, family violence, and dependence on natal property still push many people into opposite-sex marriage, which **supports fertility more than it reduces it**.
- **Health and migration matter more than nuptiality:** HIV programmes, urban anonymity, and IT/service class cultures create visible queer scenes without moving the Sample Registration System.
- **Honest sociology:** same-sex marriage talk affects **kinship ideology, law, and middle-class identity** far more than it "causes" population increase or decrease. If Parliament or a future Court extends civil unions, the demographic imprint would still be modest beside female labour, education and urban housing.

Flow diagram

377 gone / marriage not granted -> Few legally visible couples

Education and contraception -> Fertility decline

Few legally visible couples -> tiny Fertility decline

Few legally visible couples -> Household and kinship politics

Conclusion

Same-sex relations are partly decriminalised; marriage is not generally recognised. Population size and fertility are almost untouched. The live effects are on household form, legal exclusion, and the politics of kinship-not on a national birth crisis or boom.

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Q3(a) · 20 marks

What do you mean by nation building? What is the role of religion in nation building? Elaborate your answer

Sociology GS 2 · 2025 · Perspectives on the study of Indian society

Revision summary

Nation building is the creation of a shared political community on top of a diverse social structure.

In India religion provides both unifying symbols and census-based fracture lines.

Partition, personal law, and **Articles 25-28** institutionalised that double role.

Secularism, Ambedkarite critique and majoritarian nationalism are competing methods of building the we.

The outcome depends on courts, parties and everyday pluralism, not on religion vanishing.

Introduction

Nation building is the long work of turning a **state** into a **felt political community**: a people who share institutions, a story, and some willingness to pay tax and accept the vote of strangers. In India that work began under colonial sociology of communities and exploded at **Partition**. Religion is not a side theme. It is one of the main languages in which the nation is imagined, contested and administered.

Body

What nation building requires

M. N. Srinivas and later political sociologists stressed a **horizontal solidarity** across caste and region. **A. R. Desai** read the national movement as a bourgeois project with peasant and working-class tributaries. **Partha Chatterjee** split the inner spiritual domain from the outer material domain of the colonial state. Nation building after 1947 meant Constitution, planning, official language bargains, and a **developmental state** that promised dignity without erasing diversity.

Religion's double role

Religion supplied **symbols of sacrifice** (**Gandhi's** Ram, Khilafat, Gurbani in the INA's mixed registers) and **everyday pluralism**-shared shrines, syncretic practice, the constitutional bundle of **Articles 25-28**. It also supplied **enumerated majorities and minorities** (census, separate electorates, personal law). **T. N. Madan** and **Ashis Nandy** criticised Nehruvian secularism as too thin for believers; **Rajeev Bhargava** defended a principled distance. **Ambedkar** warned that Hinduism as social structure (caste) could not be the unspoken nation unless annihilated.

- **Mechanisms of fracture**: riot systems (Paul Brass), temple-mosque litigation, personal-law exceptionalism, and party mobilisation of sacred geography. Mechanisms of binding: a common electoral roll, military and cricket public, pilgrimage mixed with tourism, and court-enforced rights. **Uniform Civil Code** remains a sociological test: equality of citizens versus autonomy of religious groups.

Contemporary **majoritarian nationalism** tries to nation-build through a dominant religious identity. That can produce a strong we-feeling for some and a **second-class script** for others. Classical Congress secularism tried to nation-build around religion as private and

personal-law as group right. Both are nation-building strategies; they allocate dignity differently.

Religion will not leave the Indian nation. The sociological question is whether it remains a **plural public ethic** or becomes a **boundary of blood and census**.

Flow diagram

Nation building -> Constitution and vote
Nation building -> Religious symbols and law
Religious symbols and law -> Plural coexistence
Religious symbols and law -> Communal majorities
Constitution and vote -> Plural coexistence

Conclusion

Nation building in India is the making of a civic we on a religiously dense society. Religion can sacralise the Republic or split it into enumerated flocks. Institutions-vote, court, school, personal law-decide which face prevails, not a hope that belief will simply fade.

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Q3(b) · 20 marks

Do you think that new economic reforms of British rule have disrupted the old economic system of India? Substantiate your answer with suitable examples

Sociology GS 2 · 2025 · Rural and Agrarian Social Structure

Revision summary

The old economy combined peasant agriculture, artisan castes and layered trade, not a frozen idyll.

Land settlements monetised revenue and strengthened landlord or state claims on the peasant.

Nationalists argued deindustrialisation and drain; revisionists note regional survival and later mills.

Socially, craft castes and towns lost patronage and many entered labour markets.

- **Disruption is the right word:** the old articulation of field and craft was broken even if not every loom stopped.

Introduction

Pre-colonial India was not an unchanging village republic, but it did have an **old economic system**: peasant agriculture, artisan castes, local exchange, and long-distance trade in cloth, spices and metals. British **new economic reforms**-permanent and other land settlements, one-way free trade, railways, and a gold-standard drain-did **disrupt** that system. The debate is about depth and regional variation, not about whether a shock occurred.

Body

Land and surplus

Permanent Settlement (Bengal, 1793), **ryotwari** and **mahalwari** turned revenue into a rigid claim. Zamindars and the colonial state captured surplus that had been negotiated in a more layered agrarian order. Peasants faced **cash rent, debt and eviction**. Commercial crops-indigo, opium, cotton, jute-tied the field to Manchester and China. **A. R. Desai** treated this as the making of a colonial social formation: agriculture subordinated to metropolitan industry.

Craft, town and drain

Deindustrialisation of handloom and urban craft is the classic thesis of **R. C. Dutt and nationalist historians: Lancashire cloth, tariffs, and the destruction of courtly demand hollowed artisan towns. Revisionists note some regional weaving survival and later mill growth in Bombay and Ahmedabad. The sociological truth sits in between: occupational castes** of weavers, spinners and metal workers lost secure patronage; many became agricultural labour or slum labour. Railways moved grain to ports in famine years (a **Dadabhai Naoroji** / later **Mike Davis** point about Victorian holocausts) even as they integrated markets.

The **drain of wealth (unrequited exports, Home Charges)** is a macro story with micro effects: **thinner local demand for artisans, a new comprador and professional middle class**, and a peasantry that met the world market without industrial absorption at home. Famine codes and grain exports in bad years made the new market morally visible to

nationalists.

Disruption was not total erasure. Jajmani-like ties, village moneylenders, and caste-based crafts adapted. **Dharma Kumar** and later **Tirthankar Roy** warned against a golden-age village and stressed regional variation, credit, and some craft dynamism. That caution is useful. It does not cancel **A. R. Desai**'s point that the colonial state re-gearred surplus toward the metropolis. Socially, **weaving jatis**, salt and forest communities, and tribal shifting cultivators met the Forest Act as an economic reform by another name.

Still, the **direction** of reform-private landed property, free trade in manufactures, forest enclosure-broke the old articulation of field, craft and little kingdom. A mill proletariat appeared in Bombay and Kanpur; it was too small to absorb those pushed off the loom and the occupancy holding.

Flow diagram

Land settlements -> Cash surplus to state / zamindar
Free trade and mills -> Artisan displacement
Railways and drain -> Cash surplus to state / zamindar
Artisan displacement -> Peasant and urban labour

Conclusion

British economic reforms did disrupt India's old agrarian-artisan system by monetising land, opening the market on unequal terms, and draining surplus. Mills and some crafts survived in spots; the social structure of occupation and village still bears the scar.

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Q3(c) · 10 marks

Describe the main features of Indian new middle class. How is it different from the old middle class?

Sociology GS 2 · 2025 · Social Classes in India

Revision summary

The old middle class grew from colonial education, law and bureaucracy and later staffed the Nehruvian state.

The new middle class grew after 1991 around private services, IT and consumption.

Béteille and Misra describe the older service stratum; Fernandes describes the consumer-citizen.

Caste and English schooling shape entry into both.

The new class is larger but still a minority; it has not absorbed the informal majority.

Introduction

- **The old Indian middle class was largely a child of the colonial state:** clerks, lawyers, doctors, teachers and the early ICS/IAS. The **new middle class** is a child of **1991**, private services, and consumption. They share aspiration and English; they do not share the same employer or the same idea of the public good.

Body

Old middle class

B. B. Misra traced a professional and bureaucratic stratum created by English education and law courts. It led the national movement, staffed Nehruvian planning, and often spoke a language of **austerity, science and secular office**. Caste was not absent-Kayastha, Brahmin, Bhadrak, Tamil Brahmin over-representation-but the **role model was the gazetted officer**, not the mall. **André Béteille** stressed education and the service class as a relatively autonomous domain of inequality beside caste and land.

New middle class

- **After liberalisation**, Leela Fernandes **and others describe a consumer-citizen:** IT and BPO, finance, organised retail, private hospitals and coaching. Income is more private-sector and contractual. Culture is branded, gated, and media-saturated. Politics often leans toward **order, anti-corruption spectacle and Hindu-majoritarian comfort**, rather than the old socialist vocabulary-though this varies by city and caste. Reservation debates split this class: some see merit as a sacred scarce good; OBC and Dalit professional fractions are themselves a new middle class.

- **Differences:** employer (state vs private/global); security (pensioned vs flexible); spatial form (civil lines vs gated township); gender (a larger visible cohort of employed women in services); and relation to the poor (planning paternalism vs security-and-consumption distance).

Continuity: both use **education as the main elevator**, both remain skewed by caste and metro location, and both fear falling into the informal majority.

The new class is numerically larger yet still a minority. Calling all smartphone users "middle class" is advertising, not sociology.

Flow diagram

Old middle class -> State professions

New middle class -> Private services and consumption

Education -> Old middle class

Education -> New middle class

Conclusion

The old middle class was professional-bureaucratic and state-facing. The new middle class is private, consuming and globally linked. Caste and schooling structure both. The shift is real; it is not the death of the old service class, which still sits in sarkari offices.

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Q4(a) · 20 marks

Who is said to be the pioneer of village studies in India? Illustratively describe contributions of some Indian sociologists on village studies. How their approaches are distinct from each other?

Sociology GS 2 · 2025 · Rural and Agrarian Social Structure

Revision summary

Srinivas is the pioneer of intensive village fieldwork in Indian sociology, with Rampura and the dominant caste.

Dube's Shamirpet offered a holistic community study; Majumdar mixed survey and anthropology.

Marriott and Dumont-Pocock insisted the village be read through civilisational and ideological categories.

Béteille separated caste, class and power as no longer symmetrical.

Marxist and political-anthropological village studies further shifted the master variable to surplus and faction.

Introduction

If one name is asked for the **pioneer of intensive village field studies** in professional Indian sociology, it is **M. N. Srinivas**-Rampura, the dominant caste, sanskritization, and the book view versus field view. He was not alone. **S. C. Dube**, **D. N. Majumdar**, **McKim Marriott**, **Louis Dumont** and **David Pocock**, and **André Béteille** built a library of villages with **distinct theoretical knives**.

Body

Srinivas and the field village

- **Srinivas made the village a total social fact observed over time:** caste ranking, factions, harvest, and the dominant caste as a local power fact. The method is **structural-functional ethnography** with a historical eye. It dethroned purely textual Indology without ignoring ritual.

Other approaches

S. C. Dube (Indian Village, Shamirpet) wrote a more holistic community study, accessible and administrative in tone, mapping groups, economy and changing leadership. **D. N. Majumdar** combined anthropology and village survey, including Himalayan and north Indian sites, with a stronger physical-anthropology inheritance. **Marriott's** Kishan Garhi work and the little/great tradition dialogue treated the village as a **civilisational node**, not an isolate. **Dumont and Pocock's** "**For a Sociology of India**" scolded empiricism that ignored indigenous ideology; the village must be thought with hierarchy, not only with British community-study templates. **Béteille's** Sripuram (Caste, Class and Power) broke the functionalist calm: land, education and panchayat created **asymmetry**-caste, class and power no longer sat in one pyramid.

Marxist village work (**A. R. Desai**, later agrarian studies) asked who took the surplus, not how the ritual rank held. **F. G. Bailey** (Bisipara) brought political anthropology and factions. **Kathleen Gough** brought class and Kerala's radical countryside. Earlier, **W. H. Wiser's** jajmani study and the Wisconsin / Cornell projects treated the village as a service economy. **Oscar Lewis** in Rampur used a comparative peasant lens. These are not footnotes; they show

that "village studies" was always a **plural craft**.

Dumont also doubted the village as a sociological isolate: caste and civilisation overflow the revenue boundary. That critique is a distinct approach, not a denial of Srinivas's ethnography. After the 1970s, feminists and Dalit scholars asked whose village the monograph had been—rarely the landless woman's.

Approaches differ on the **unit** (village as isolate vs as node), the **master variable** (ritual rank, land, state, civilisation), and the **politics** (harmony, conflict, colonial construction). **M. N. Srinivas** remains the pioneer of the Indian field village; distinctiveness is the point of the rest of the syllabus.

Flow diagram

Srinivas Rampura -> Field / dominant caste
Dube Shamirpet -> Holistic community
Marriott / Dumont-Pocock -> Civilisation and ideology
Beteille Sripuram -> Caste class power

Conclusion

Srinivas pioneered the intensive Indian village monograph as sociology. Dube and Majumdar widened survey and community description. Marriott and Dumont-Pocock civilisationalised the village. Beteille politicised it as caste-class-power. One village, several sciences.

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Q4(b) · 20 marks

"Industrial class structure is a function of social structure of Indian society." Do you agree with this statement? Analyze

Sociology GS 2 · 2025 · Social Classes in India

Revision summary

Indian industrial classes include owners, managers, a small formal workforce and a large informal majority.

Recruitment, unions and job queues follow caste, kinship, language and sending villages.

Breman, Holmström and Ramaswamy show particularism inside industry, not a pure proletariat.

Owners too are often community-based business groups.

Capitalism reworks these ties but has not replaced them with a casteless class structure.

Introduction

Industrial class structure is the pattern of **owners, managers, regular workers and a vast irregular workforce** around factories, mills and now platforms. In India that pattern is **a function of the wider social structure**, not a carbon copy of nineteenth-century Manchester. Caste, kinship, language and the village labour-sending household organise who stands on which shop floor.

Body

Why the statement is largely true

A. R. Desai expected industrialisation to push class contradiction forward. What arrived was a **dual labour market**. **Jan Breman** described **footloose labour: circular migrants, contractors, and the absence of a stable proletariat**. **Mark Holmström** showed how "the town" of organised industry still ran on particularistic ties. **E. A. Ramaswamy** and union studies found **caste and region inside the union**, not only against it. **D. N. Dhanagare** and others noted that the industrial working class was often **upper-shudra or specific jatis** in a given mill town, with Dalits in the hardest informal jobs.

Recruitment through sardars, kin chains from one district, and language clusters (Bhojpuri in Mumbai's informal economy, Telugu in construction) is social structure at work. Women are concentrated in garments, electronics assembly and home-based piecework-**gendered class**. Public-sector "labour aristocracy" reproduced the old middle-caste/upper-caste schooling advantage. **N. R. Sheth's** factory studies already showed that Indian industrial relations carry community and paternalism, not only a wage bargain.

- **Platform gig work is a new chapter of the same book:** algorithms look class-neutral; entry still runs on a smartphone, a deposit, and a caste-region network in the city. The **unorganised majority** (NCEUS) is the industrial class structure that census "workers in industry" understate.

Qualifications

Industry also **reworks** social structure. A badge, a PF number, and a strike can create class solidarity that caste forbids in the village well. Automobile and IMT unions have at times spoken a wage language across jati. **New economic policy casualised even this: contract labour inside the factory wall blurs class. Capitalists themselves are not a casteless bourgeoisie; business communities** (Marwari, Chettiar, Patel, new OBC capital) show

social structure on the owners' side too. Family firms use kinship as a trust technology that textbooks call "culture" and accountants call control.

Public-sector steel and coal towns created a more classical working class for a generation; privatisation and contract mining then **re-informalised** it. So the function of social structure is historically timed, not a timeless essence.

- **So one should agree:** Indian industrial classes are functions of caste-kin-region-gender structure and of capitalist accumulation. To say they are only a function of social structure would deny the factory's own discipline. To say they are only Marxian classes would deny the contractor, the jati, and the village.

Flow diagram

Caste kin gender region -> Recruitment and contracting
Industrial capital -> Recruitment and contracting
Recruitment and contracting -> Formal workers
Recruitment and contracting -> Informal / footloose labour
Recruitment and contracting -> Community-based owners

Conclusion

- **Yes, with a hinge:** industrial class structure in India is produced by capitalism operating through caste, kinship, gender and migration. Formal workers, informal majority and community-based owners are the resulting map.

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Q4(c) · 10 marks

What is kinship? Briefly explain G. P. Murdock's contribution to the study of the kinship system

Sociology GS 2 · 2025 · Perspectives on the study of Indian society

Revision summary

Kinship organises descent, marriage, residence, inheritance and care beyond raw biology.

Murdock's Social Structure compared hundreds of societies on those axes.

He argued the nuclear family is a universal functional unit, often inside larger kin groups.

Indian joint family, gotra exogamy and Dravidian cross-cousin marriage qualify a simple nuclear picture.

Caste endogamy makes Indian kinship a political as well as a domestic institution.

Introduction

Kinship is the organised set of relations that come from descent, marriage and socially recognised parenting. It allocates **who may marry whom, who inherits, who lives together, and who must care**. It is not only biology. **G. P. Murdock** made this a comparative science with a world sample, which Indian sociology still uses-and argues with.

Body

Murdock's contribution

In Social Structure (1949) Murdock coded hundreds of societies (the number often cited is about 250 in that book, later expanded in the Ethnographic Atlas). He classified **residence** (patrilocal, matrilocal, neolocal, avunculocal), **descent** (patrilineal, matrilineal, bilateral), and **cousin marriage**. His famous claim was that the **nuclear family is universal**: a man and woman and their children as a functional unit of sex, economy and socialisation, even when embedded in larger kin groups.

The method was **cross-cultural statistical comparison**, a break from purely speculative evolutionism. It gave later demographers and family sociologists a grid.

Indian caveats

India's **joint family**, vansh, gotra, North Indian village exogamy, and Dravidian **cross-cousin** marriage (Karve, Dumont, Trautmann) do not fit a simple nuclear-universal story. Murdock allowed that nuclear units sit inside extended structures; Indian ethnography shows the **property and ritual corporation** of the joint household as more than a cluster of nuclear cells. **Patricia Uberoi** and **A. M. Shah** document **change: residential nuclearisation with continuing joint obligations**. **Kinship here is also caste**: endogamy is the hinge of the jati.

Murdock remains the pioneer of systematic comparison. Indian kinship studies supply the necessary resistance: region, caste and jointness.

Flow diagram

Kinship -> Descent

Kinship -> Marriage rules

Kinship -> Residence

Murdock sample -> Kinship

Karve Dumont Shah -> Kinship

Conclusion

Kinship is the rule-bound organisation of descent and marriage. Murdock gave a comparative map and a nuclear-family thesis. Indian systems of joint family, gotra and Dravidian alliance show why that map needs local theory, not why comparison should be abandoned.

Open WRAP page — <https://wrapexams.com/upsc/mains-answers/sociology-gs-2/2025/what-is-kinship-briefly-explain-g-p-murdocks-contribution-to-the-study-of-the-kinship-system/>

Q5(a) · 10 marks

'The transfer of land from cultivating to the non-cultivating owners is bringing about transformation in Indian society.'
Justify your answer by giving suitable illustrations.

Sociology GS 2 · 2025 · Perspectives on the study of Indian society

Revision summary

Land is moving from tillers to rentiers, urban buyers, and machine-owning lessees.

Peri-urban real estate, benami, absentee title and reverse tenancy are the main paths.

Class polarises; caste elites often convert land into urban capital while labour stays land-poor.

Women's field rights and village agrarian identity weaken.

Acquisition law mediates price more than it reverses the social shift.

Introduction

When title to land moves from those who **plough** to those who **collect rent, interest or plot value**, the village changes its spine. This is not only the old zamindar story. It is also the **builder, the NRI, the commission agent, and the machine-owning farmer** who leases in. Indian society is being recast around that transfer.

Body

How land leaves the cultivator

Colonial settlements and post-independence ceilings never fully locked land to the tiller. **Benami**, gifts to kin, and temple or trust holding kept large owners alive. After the 1990s, **peri-urban real estate** around Delhi, Bengaluru, Pune and Hyderabad converted cultivating families into one-time cash sellers-and often into labour on what was their field. **Absentee ownership** by professionals and politicians is common in canal belts. **Reverse tenancy** in Punjab and west UP lets small owners lease to tractor-capitalists; the cultivator of record is not the cultivator of fact.

Contract farming and warehouse finance can similarly separate **control** from the household that still lives in the village.

Social transformation

- **Class:** a rentier and speculative stratum grows; petty peasants become wage or gig labour.
 - **Caste:** dominant landed castes may cash out into education and urban property while still commanding the panchayat; Dalit labour remains land-poor.
 - **Gender:** women who worked the field lose customary use when a plot becomes a layout.
 - **Politics:** farmer identity becomes a claim on MSP and compensation more than on tilling. Village studies after Srinivas already saw non-cultivating power; the scale is now metropolitan.
 - **Illustrations:** Greater Noida and Gurugram farmland; SEZ and highway takings; coastal tourism plots; and mining belts where Adivasi cultivators become a displaced proletariat.
- RFCTLARR 2013** tries to price this; it does not stop the class shift.

Flow diagram

Cultivating household -> Sale lease acquisition
Sale lease acquisition -> Non-cultivating owner
Non-cultivating owner -> Rent speculation reverse tenancy
Cultivating household -> Labour and migration

Conclusion

Land moving to non-cultivating owners turns peasants into labour, villages into land banks, and caste power into real-estate power. The transformation is already visible on the urban fringe and in reverse tenancy belts.

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Q5(b) · 10 marks

Bring out various factors responsible for declining of village Industries in India.

Sociology GS 2 · 2025 · Perspectives on the study of Indian society

Revision summary

Village industries declined through colonial competition, forest enclosure and the collapse of patronage.

Post-independence mill goods, power-looms and plastics continued the squeeze.

Credit, GST, and migration now pull youth out of hereditary crafts.

Some clusters brand and survive; most artisan households enter informal labour.

The process reorders caste occupations, not only GDP shares.

Introduction

Village industries—handloom, pottery, oil-press, carpentry, leather, smithy—were never a romantic extra. They were a **caste-organised division of labour** tied to the agrarian surplus. Their decline is a long process with colonial roots and contemporary accelerators.

Body

Long decline

Colonial **free trade and mills** undercut weavers and many urban-rural crafts (the deindustrialisation debate). Forest law cut artisan access to wood, bamboo and lac. **Moneylenders** replaced patronage. After Independence, **KVIC, handloom boards and reservations** slowed but did not reverse the fall. Factory soap, plastic and mill cloth are cheaper than the village product. **Power-looms** ate handlooms; Chinese and Tiruppur goods ate residual niches.

Present factors

Credit is scarce without collateral; **GST and compliance** hurt tiny units. Youth **migrate** to construction and delivery rather than inherit a stigmatised craft. **Raw materials** are commercialised. Skills are not aligned with NEP 2020's promise unless local clusters (Moradabad brass, Kannauj attar, Khurja pottery) capture a brand. **Jajmani** collapse means the potter is not paid in grain by the dominant caste; he needs a cash market that the village no longer is.

Electricity, roads and mobile money did not automatically revive the workshop. They often made **urban factory goods cheaper to fetch**. Cooperative and SHG credit under NRLM helps some women weavers and food processors; it rarely rebuilds a whole jati occupation. Leather and sanitation-linked crafts still carry **pollution stigma**, so "**skill India**" without anti-caste dignity is a half measure.

Sociologically, decline is **occupational mobility mixed with distress**. Some artisan castes sanskritize or enter government jobs; many become footloose labour (**Breman**). Women home-based workers remain invisible in the informal sector. Village industry decline is thus a chapter in **class formation and caste re-ranking**, not only a missing subsidy.

Flow diagram

Colonial mills and forests -> Craft decline

Cheap factory goods -> Craft decline

Youth migration -> Craft decline

Craft decline -> Informal labour

Craft decline -> Surviving clusters

Conclusion

Village industries fell because cheaper manufactures, lost commons, thin credit, and out-migration destroyed their market and labour. Caste crafts became either branded clusters or residual poverty.

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Q5(c) · 10 marks

Discuss the social bases of political mobilization in Independent India. Has some change occurred in these during the last 60-70 years?

Sociology GS 2 · 2025 · Visions of Social Change in India

Revision summary

Early mobilisation ran through the Congress coalition, language states and dominant-caste farmers.

Mandal made OBC politics central; Dalit parties institutionalised Ambedkarite identity.

Mandir and regional parties reordered religion and federal identity.

Media, the new middle class and DBT welfare added new glues.

Caste, class and region did not vanish; their hierarchy of importance shifted.

Introduction

Independent India's politics never floated free of society. The **social bases** of mobilisation have been caste, class, language, region, religion and, later, a welfare-beneficiary identity. Over seventy years the mix has shifted from a **Congress catch-all** to a more **segmented and mediated** arena.

Body

Early decades

The national movement bequeathed a **coalitional Congress (Rajni Kothari's Congress system): Brahmins and other elites plus dependent rural votes, with socialist and communist class pockets. Language** reorganised states. **Farmer** and **landed dominant castes** (Srinivas) captured state politics. Religion was never absent (Hindu Code debates, communal riots) but was not always the master frame.

The long shift

Mandal (1990) and **Indra Sawhney** (1992) made **OBC** the central arithmetic in the Hindi belt; **Christophe Jaffrelot** called it a silent revolution. **Dalit** parties (BSP) turned Ambedkarite identity into a vote. **Mandir** politics from the 1980s-90s recentred **religious polarisation**. Regional parties (DMK, TDP, Shiv Sena, Akalis, TRS/BRS) mobilised **linguistic and sub-national** pride. After 1991, a **new middle class** and private media changed campaign style. The last fifteen years added **direct benefit transfer, welfare delivery and digital campaigning** as a social base of their own: the beneficiary household.

Women vote more autonomously in some surveys; they are not yet a single bloc. Class remains: farmers' protests, union belts, and informal labour, but class is usually spoken **through** caste and region. **Yogendra Yadav** described a democratic upsurge of the socially disadvantaged; later work asked whether that upsurge was captured by new elites of the same groups.

Social media and WhatsApp do not invent new bases so much as **intensify** religious and caste publics that already existed. Farmer identity in 2020-21 showed that class can still break through when prices and law hit a landed constituency. Adivasi belts mobilise around jal-jungle-zameen more than around a national Left.

- **Change, then:** from one-party accommodation to **competitive caste-religious federalism**, then toward a **national religious-welfare** combination-without the older bases disappearing.

Flow diagram

Congress system -> Mandal OBC Dalit
Congress system -> Regional linguistic
Mandal OBC Dalit -> Mandir plus welfare
Regional linguistic -> Mandir plus welfare

Conclusion

- **Mobilisation still sits on caste, region and religion. What changed is the ranking:** OBC and Hindu-majoritarian frames rose, Congress catch-all fell, and welfare media now glue coalitions that land reform once promised to.

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Q5(d) · 10 marks

What are the major problems faced by the labour migrants while working in informal sectors of Indian States? Discuss.

Sociology GS 2 · 2025 · Rural and Agrarian transformation in India

Revision summary

Interstate migrants in informal work are hired through contractors, not stable contracts.

Wage theft, unsafe housing, and missing social security are the core problems.

Women and children carry extra risks of harassment and lost schooling.

COVID reverse migration exposed their civic invisibility.

Portability laws and e-SHRAM are incomplete answers to a structural informality.

Introduction

Most Indian migrants who cross state lines to work do not enter a factory with a standing order. They enter **informal sectors**: construction, brick kilns, garments, domestic work, street vending, and now platforms. Their problems are **legal invisibility plus social distance** in the host state.

Body

The usual injuries

Contractors mediate hiring; the principal employer denies the relation. **Wage theft**, delayed payment, and piece-rates below minimum wage are routine. Housing is a jhuggi, a night shelter, or a site shed-**no tenancy right**. Health is out-of-pocket; accidents in construction are frequent; ESI rarely follows the worker. **Documents**-ration card, voter ID, e-SHRAM, One Nation One Ration-do not travel smoothly, so PDS and school admission break. **Women** face sexual harassment and unpaid care; **children** miss school or work. Language and caste isolation block unions. During **COVID-19**, reverse migration showed that the city would use their labour and not keep their bodies.

The **Interstate Migrant Workmen Act, 1979** was weakly enforced. **BOCW** cess boards are state-bound. Labour codes promise portability; practice is still the munshi's notebook. **Jan Breman's** footloose labour remains the right phrase: circular, indebted, and replaceable.

Host states want labour, not citizens. Sending states want remittances, not political anger. Migrants fall between. **Occupational safety is a sociological fact: heat, dust, falling from slabs, and pesticide exposure in destination farms. Unionisation is hard because the worksite dissolves when the building is finished. During elections they are a vote in the village and a non-person in the city.** Platform workers add a new informal layer without solving housing or PDS.

A just response would be portable social security, landlord-employer liability, and the right to stay. Until then, "problems of labour migrants" are the normal operating system of Indian informal capitalism.

Flow diagram

Sending household -> Contractor
Contractor -> Informal worksite
Informal worksite -> Wage and housing risk
Informal worksite -> Documents do not port

Conclusion

Informal migrant labour faces wage theft, bad housing, broken social security, gendered risk, and civic non-recognition. Law exists on paper; the contractor and the disaster reveal the social fact.

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Q5(e) · 10 marks

Do you think that law has been able to abolish child labour in India? Comment.

Sociology GS 2 · 2025 · Industrialization and Urbanisation in India

Revision summary

The 1986 Act as amended in 2016 bans most child work under 14 but allows family-enterprise help.

RTE adds a schooling right that is unevenly realised.

Child labour persists in agriculture, kilns, domestic and home-based informal work.

Poverty, caste occupations and weak inspection explain the gap between statute and practice.

Law delegitimised the practice more than it abolished it.

Introduction

Indian law **restricts** child labour; it has not **abolished** it. The **Child Labour (Prohibition and Regulation) Act, 1986**, amended in **2016**, bans work for children under 14 in most occupations, allows help in family enterprises outside school hours, and treats 14-18 as adolescents barred from hazardous work. **RTE 2009** promises schooling. The street, the kiln, and the farm still employ children.

Body

Why law is not enough

Child labour lives in the **informal and agricultural majority**, where labour inspectors barely go. The **family enterprise clause is a sociological barn door: a loom, a dhaba, or a farm can hide a working child as "help."** **Poverty and indebtedness** make households treat children as earners. **Caste** assigns leather, sanitation, and brick-kiln work to the young of particular jatis. Girls do **unpaid care and home-based piecework** that statistics miss. Migration splits enrolment. COVID schooling loss pushed many back to work.

Law without a living wage, universal childcare, and inspection of contractors produces **paper abolition**. **ILO** conventions and National Policy on Child Labour set the right norm. **Census** and NSS/PLFS still find working children, especially as unpaid family workers. Rescue raids without scholarships and midday meals send the child back to the same kiln. **NCPCR** and childline matter; they cannot replace household income.

- **The honest comment:** law **delegitimised** factory child labour in the organised sector and created rescue-and-school pathways; it did not end the social demand for cheap, docile labour in the informal economy. Abolition would require treating child labour as a **class and caste relation**, not only as a missing FIR. NEP 2020's schooling push helps only if attendance is cheaper than work.

Flow diagram

CLPR Act and RTE -> Organised sector decline

Family enterprise loophole -> Informal persistence

Poverty and caste -> Informal persistence

Conclusion

Law has reduced visible child labour in organised industry and named it a wrong. It has not abolished the practice, because family loopholes, informality, and household poverty keep children at work.

Open WRAP page — <https://wrapexams.com/upsc/mains-answers/sociology-gs-2/2025/do-you-think-that-law-has-been-able-to-abolish-child-labour-in-india-comment/>

WRAP Exams

Q6(a) · 20 marks

In what respects have the constitutional provisions changed the socio-economic and political conditions of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes in India? Critically examine

Sociology GS 2 · 2025 · Tribal communities in India

Revision summary

Articles 15-17, 16(4), legislative reservation, commissions and the Schedules form the SC/ST constitutional machine.

They produced political presence and an educated professional minority unprecedented in 1950.

PoA, PESA and FRA extend protection into violence and livelihood, with weak delivery.

Landlessness, atrocities, displacement and intra-group inequality remain.

The Constitution changed conditions without completing social democracy.

Introduction

The Constitution did not leave Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes to charity. It built a **protective discrimination and representation machine**: equality clauses, abolition of untouchability, reservation in legislatures and services, scheduled-area government, and later national commissions. The sociological question is how far that machine changed **life chances** as well as **letterhead**.

Body

What the provisions did

Article 17 made untouchability a public crime, later given teeth by the **Protection of Civil Rights Act** and the **SC/ST (PoA) Act, 1989**. **Articles 15(4) and 16(4)** authorised reservation in education and posts; **330-334** (and analogous Rajya Sabha/state seats) guaranteed political presence. **338 and 338A** created NCSC and NCST. **Fifth and Sixth Schedules** recognised tribal territorial difference. **Article 46** directed the state to promote educational and economic interests. Together they produced an **SC/ST professional and political class** that did not exist in 1950: IAS and engineering graduates, panchayat presidents, and a Dalit-Bahujan intelligentsia.

Panchayati Raj reservations (73rd/74th) and scholarships widened the base. Forest rights (FRA 2006) and **PESA (1996)** tried to convert schedule into livelihood, with mixed results. **Article 21A** and RTE matter here because SC/ST exclusion from school was a social fact, not a taste.

Critical remainder

Landlessness among SC agricultural labour remains high. Atrocities continue; conviction rates disappoint. **ST** displacement by dams and mines shows that schedule plus industrial policy can collide. A **creamy layer** debate, and the Supreme Court's opening to **sub-classification** within SC, register internal inequality. Women of both groups face a double bind. Political reservation can yield **proxy candidates**. Urban informal SC/ST workers live outside the reservation office.

E. V. Ramasamy and regional anti-caste parties show that constitutional clauses work only when a movement uses them. **Ghurye's** assimilation thesis for tribes sits uneasily beside **Fifth Schedule** autonomy; policy still wobbles. Manual scavenging bans exist; the occupation persists as a caste-class knot. Constitutional change is **real and unfinished**: status mobility for a minority of families, continued structural violence and asset poverty for the many.

Ambedkar wanted social democracy, not only a schedule. The provisions moved India toward that; they did not complete it. A critical exam answer therefore holds two sentences together: representation rose; land, safety and dignity did not rise in step.

Flow diagram

Arts 15-17 16 330-342 Schedules -> Legislative and service presence

Arts 15-17 16 330-342 Schedules -> Education and a middle class

Land violence informal work -> Unfinished equality

Conclusion

Constitutional provisions created representation, a service class, and a legal language against untouchability and tribal dispossession. They have not equalised land, safety or dignity. The record is structural progress with a harsh remainder.

Open WRAP page — <https://wrapexams.com/upsc/mains-answers/sociology-gs-2/2025/in-what-respects-have-the-constitutional-provisions-changed-the-socio-economic-and-political-conditions-of-scheduled-castes-and-scheduled-tr/>

Q6(b) · 20 marks

Discuss the trend of urbanization in India. Do you think that Industrialization is the only precondition of urbanization? Give you arguments

Sociology GS 2 · 2025 · Industrialization and Urbanisation in India

Revision summary

India's urbanisation is rising but remains metro-concentrated and full of census towns and slums.

Kundu's exclusionary urbanisation captures labour demand without inclusive housing.

Tertiary growth, administrative history, transport and agrarian distress urbanise besides factories.

Industrial belts exist and matter; they do not exhaust the trend.

Policy that waits only for industry misses actually existing urban India.

Introduction

India is urbanising, but **slowly by East Asian standards** and **unevenly**. Metros swallow growth; small towns proliferate as **census towns** without municipal capacity. Industrialisation of the classical mill-town sort is **one** pathway. It is not the only precondition, and in many places it is not even the main one.

Body

The trend

The urban share crossed 31 percent in 2011 and has continued upward through metro regions (Delhi, Mumbai, Bengaluru, Hyderabad, Chennai, Kolkata, Pune, Ahmedabad). A large part of recent urban increase is **reclassification**: settlements that look urban in density and non-farm work but remain rural on paper until they become census towns. **Peri-urban** belts mix factories, farm remnant, and gated housing. Slums and informal rental rooms absorb labour. **Amitabh Kundu** stressed **exclusionary urbanisation**: the poor are needed as labour and pushed to the edge as residents.

Not only industry

Tertiary employment-trade, transport, public administration, education, health, IT and domestic service-now urbanises without a matching manufacturing boom. Colonial **presidency cities** and **railway / cantonment / district** towns were administrative before they were industrial. **Hill stations and temple towns** urbanised through services and pilgrimage. **Distress migration** after agrarian squeeze fills construction, not a Fordist plant. **SEZs and IT parks** create a thin formal core and a thick informal periphery (**Breman** again).

Census 2011 already showed that male non-farm work in large villages produces urban numbers without chimneys. **Smart cities** and AMRUT invest in selected statutory towns; census towns lack the same pipes. Gendered urbanisation matters: women in domestic work and garments urbanise the labour force while remaining invisible in master plans. **Gated communities** are a class form of the city; they need guards and maids who cannot afford to live beside them.

If industrialisation were the only precondition, India's modest manufacturing share could not explain census-town growth. **Transport corridors, education markets, and state employment** urbanise. The risk of the "only industry" thesis is policy that waits for factories while **unserviced urbanisation** proceeds.

- **True industry still matters:** Tiruppur, Morbi, Ludhiana, the auto belts. They are necessary chapters, not the whole book. A sociological answer therefore rejects industrialisation as the only precondition, while still granting it as a major one.

Flow diagram

Manufacturing towns -> Urbanisation
Services and IT -> Urbanisation
Admin and census towns -> Urbanisation
Distress migration -> Urbanisation
Urbanisation -> Exclusionary edge

Conclusion

Urbanisation in India is metro-led, informal, and increasingly tertiary. Industrialisation is a major engine, not the sole precondition. **Census** towns, services, administration and distress migration urbanise without a mill.

Open WRAP page — <https://wrapexams.com/upsc/mains-answers/sociology-gs-2/2025/discuss-the-trend-of-urbanization-in-india-do-you-think-that-industrialization-is-the-only-precondition-of-urbanization-give-you-arguments/>

Q6(c) · 10 marks

Which measures would you suggest for preventing caste conflicts in India ? Justify your argument

Sociology GS 2 · 2025 · Challenges of Social Transformation

Revision summary

Caste conflict is organised competition over honour, land, jobs and votes.

Prevention needs prosecution under atrocity law, not only peace meetings.

Common schooling, wages and land reduce the material fuse.

Panchayat reservation forces some sharing of dominant-caste power.

Anti-caste public culture and slow change in endogamy are the deep levers.

Introduction

Caste conflict is not a misunderstanding that a poster can cure. It is competition over **honour, women, land, jobs and the vote**, organised by ranked birth groups. Prevention must therefore change **interests and everyday contact**, not only preach harmony.

Body

What works, and why

- **Law:** swift PoA prosecution, witness protection, and action against social boycott reduce the payoff to public violence. Impunity is a cause. **Ambedkar** was right that political safeguards without social mixing fail; but law still raises the cost of atrocity.
- **Economy and education:** land to the landless, enforcement of minimum wages, and **common schools** (not caste-segregated hostels as destiny) shrink the material fuse. Béteille's point that education can split caste from class is a preventive if access is real. **Reservation** lowers zero-sum street fights over the first clerk's post by routing claim into rules-while generating its own backlash, which must be politically managed, not denied.
- **Local institutions:** mixed panchayats, shared irrigation, and public dining in mid-day meals attack **untouchability as practice**. Srinivas's dominant caste will not vanish; rotating chairs and SC/ST/women seats force some sharing.
- **Culture:** Ambedkarite public (books, **Buddha** viharas, jalsas) and inter-caste association in unions and cities create **counter-honour**. Moral appeals to varna harmony reproduce the hierarchy that explodes. Police reform and social-media rumour control matter because many recent clashes travel as **forwarded honour**.
- **Justify:** conflict falls when **exit and voice** exist-migration, parties, courts-and when **endogamy** slowly yields, which is the slowest lever. Béteille's asymmetry thesis is practical here: if class, caste and power no longer coincide, cross-cutting ties can dampen total war. If they re-align in a riot, prevention has failed.

Flow diagram

PoA and courts -> Prevention
 School land wages -> Prevention
 Panchayat voice -> Prevention
 Anti-caste culture -> Prevention

Conclusion

Prevent caste conflict by raising the legal cost of violence, spreading assets and common schooling, sharing local office, and building anti-caste public culture. Harmony without annihilation of caste is a truce, not a prevention.

Open WRAP page — <https://wrapexams.com/upsc/mains-answers/sociology-gs-2/2025/which-measures-would-you-suggest-for-preventing-caste-conflicts-in-india-justify-your-argument/>

WRAP Exams

Q7(a) · 20 marks

What are the Private and Public network and support systems operative in Indian society for the aged? Suggest measures to curb down the challenges before care givers of the aged

Sociology GS 2 · 2025 · Perspectives on the study of Indian society

Revision summary

Private support for the aged is still mainly kin, plus a small paid-care market.

Public support is pensions, NPHCE and the 2007 Maintenance Act, all thin relative to need.

Nuclear residence and migration weaken the joint-family guarantee without ending dependence.

Caregivers, mostly women, face time poverty and little respite.

Measures must combine adequate pensions, home services and gender-equal family law.

Introduction

India still tells itself that the **joint family** will keep the aged. Demography, migration and women's labour have already thinned that promise. Support now sits in a **private-public mix**: kin and paid hands on one side; thin pensions and clinics on the other. Caregivers-mostly women-are the hidden institution.

Body

Private networks

The **son's household** remains the normative carer in much of North India; South Indian and matrilineal pockets differ. Siblings, daughters (increasingly after marriage), neighbours, and caste associations fill gaps. **Paid care**-ayahs, nursing homes in metros, unregulated "old age homes"-is a class good. **I. P. Desai** and later family sociologists showed residential nuclearisation with continuing obligation; the aged may live apart and still depend on remittances. Loneliness, property disputes, and elder abuse sit inside this private sphere. The **Maintenance and Welfare of Parents and Senior Citizens Act, 2007** tries to legally compel children-an admission that custom slipped. NRI children and Gulf migrants stretch care across WhatsApp: money without hands.

Public networks

Indira Gandhi National Old Age Pension and state top-ups, widow pensions, **NPS** for the formal few, railway concessions, and the **National Programme for Health Care of the Elderly** are the public kit. Coverage is low relative to need; amounts are often below nutrition. Ayushman and state health schemes help some hospital episodes, not daily ADL care. Public-sector pensions and CGHS cover a minority. For the informal majority, the public network is a **thin cash plus a crowded OPD**. That gap is why private kin remain the real welfare state of old age, with all the gender injustice that implies.

Caregivers

Daughters-in-law and daughters juggle **unpaid geriatric care**, paid work, and children. Migration leaves **skipped-generation** households. Dementia and chronic disease raise skill needs that kin do not have. Male carers exist but are culturally licensed to "help," not to own the roster. Measures: **living pensions**, day-care and home-nursing as public services, respite

for carers, gender-equal inheritance actually enforced, crèche-like geriatric centres at panchayat level, and recognition of care time in labour law. Without this, "family values" is a subsidy extracted from women. A public caregiver allowance, like a modest MGNREGA for care, would sociologically name the work.

Flow diagram

Kin and paid ayahs -> Older person
Pensions NPHCE 2007 Act -> Older person
Women caregivers -> Kin and paid ayahs
Pensions day care respite -> Women caregivers

Conclusion

Private kin still do most elder care; public pensions and clinics are thin. Caregivers need money, services and time off, not only a duty lecture. Ageing policy is family policy and gender policy together.

Open WRAP page — <https://wrapexams.com/upsc/mains-answers/sociology-gs-2/2025/what-are-the-private-and-public-network-and-support-systems-operative-in-indian-society-for-the-aged-suggest-measures-to-curb-down-the-chall/>

Q7(b) · 20 marks

"Educational development is the only Panacea for country's all ills and evils." Critically examine the above statement with reference to NEP-2020

Sociology GS 2 · 2025 · Perspectives on the study of Indian society

Revision summary

Education is necessary for mobility and anti-caste citizenship but not a solo panacea.

NEP 2020 reforms structure, language, vocation and equity on paper.

Without teachers, public finance and jobs, it becomes credentialism and a dual private-public system.

Caste, land and informal labour reproduce ills that schooling alone cannot dissolve.

Phule-Ambedkar were right to start with the school and wrong if we stop there.

Introduction

Education is a **necessary solvent** of many Indian ills. It is not the **only panacea**. NEP 2020 is the latest state attempt to make schooling and higher education do too much-nation-building, skills, equity, culture-while the surrounding structure of **caste, informal labour and underfunded public systems** remains. A sociological reading must praise the ambition and refuse the magic.

Body

What NEP gets right

NEP names **foundational literacy**, mother-tongue / home-language teaching in early years, a 5+3+3+4 structure, **vocational** exposure, multiple entry-exit in higher education, and a concern for **Socio-Economically Disadvantaged Groups**. If implemented with teachers and buildings, this could reduce the brutal sorting that Bêteille described as the education system reproducing inequality. Phule and Ambedkar already treated the school as the first anti-caste institution. In that lineage NEP is not trivial. The four-year undergraduate design and Academic Bank of Credits try to differentiate a rigid degree into stacked skills-Singh's language of differentiation applied to the university.

Why education is not enough

Ills such as **landlessness, atrocity, gendered unpaid labour, pollution, and jobless growth** are not cured by a better textbook. A degree without employment yields credential inflation and coaching factories. **Caste endogamy** can absorb graduates. **Privatisation and philanthropy in NEP's financing imagination risk a dual system: English private for the new middle class, understaffed public for the rest-the opposite of a panacea. The digital** push meets a device-and-connectivity divide that COVID exposed. Mother-tongue policy collides with the labour market's English premium unless the state equalises both.

Yogendra Singh would treat NEP as heterogenetic state reform landing on an orthogenetic schooling culture of tuitions and honour. **Desai** would ask who owns the private university. Implementation depends on state finances and teacher unions, not on a PDF from Delhi. Elite boarding schools and under-resourced government schools will both quote NEP and remain two Indias of opportunity. Critical examination: NEP is a **necessary reform script**, not a substitute for industrial policy, health (which determines attendance), and annihilation of

caste in everyday life. Treat it as one institution among others-not as a holy single lever.

Flow diagram

NEP 2020 2020 -> School and skill
School and skill -> Some mobility
Caste land jobs health -> Structural ills
School and skill -> not sufficient Structural ills

Conclusion

NEP 2020 can widen learning and skill if publicly funded and fairly staffed. It cannot be the only cure for India's structural evils. Education plus land, health, jobs and anti-caste law is a programme; education alone is a slogan.

Open WRAP page — <https://wrapexams.com/upsc/mains-answers/sociology-gs-2/2025/educational-development-is-the-only-panacea-for-countrys-all-ills-and-evils-critically-examine-the-above-statement-with-reference-to-nep-202/>

Q7(c) · 10 marks

How Dalit movements in India have facilitated their Identity formation? Analyze

Sociology GS 2 · 2025 · Social Movements in Modern India

Revision summary

Dalit identity was produced by movements, not merely discovered by the census.

Phule and Ambedkar supplied counter-history, a political name and Buddhist conversion.

Panthers, literature, BSP and campus groups nationalised that public.

Law and commemoration keep the identity visible.

Internal splits exist; they do not cancel the movement-made we.

Introduction

- **Dalit identity was not a census leftover waiting to be found.** Movements made it: a name instead of a slur, a history instead of a karma story, and a public instead of a quarter outside the village. Identity formation here is **political self-making**.

Body

From stigma to subject

Phule offered shudra-atishudra as a counter-genealogy. **Ambedkar** turned untouchable into a **rights-bearing minority**, then **Dalit** (broken) as a chosen political name, and conversion to **Navayana Buddhism** (1956) as exit from Hindu hierarchy. Journals, mahila sabhas, and temple-entry satyagrahas taught people to speak as a **we**. The Mahad tank and Kalaram temple struggles were identity lessons in public space: we will take water and gods that were closed.

Post-Independence **Republican** politics, **Dalit Panthers** (1970s Maharashtra) with literature of rage, **BSP** and bahujan arithmetic, and campus Ambedkarite groups spread a **national Dalit public**. Autobiography (Pawar, Valmiki, Bama) and commemorations of Bhima-Koregaon or **Ambedkar** Jayanti are identity technologies. **PoA cases** and reservation struggles keep the identity legally alive. Film, hip-hop and social media now carry the same we into youth cultures that village studies never saw.

Identity is not frozen. Sub-caste, class, region and gender split the we. Hindu majoritarian offers of incorporation compete with Ambedkarite autonomy. Women's Dalit writing insisted that the movement's we had been male. Still, without movements there would be scheduled castes as an administrative heap, not a **political identity**. Naming, history-telling, religious exit, and party symbols are the four workshops of that identity. Without the movement, the schedule is a file; with it, the schedule becomes a people.

Flow diagram

Phule Ambedkar -> Name and dhamma
 Panthers literature -> Dalit public
 Parties and campuses -> Dalit public
 Name and dhamma -> Dalit public

Conclusion

Dalit movements formed identity by renaming, converting, writing and organising for power. The identity is a project-contested, internally diverse, and still necessary against stigma.

Open WRAP page — <https://wrapexams.com/upsc/mains-answers/sociology-gs-2/2025/how-dalit-movements-in-india-have-facilitated-their-identity-formation-analyze/>

WRAP Exams

Q8(a) · 20 marks

Is it possible to have sustainable development in India? Cite major environmental issues and suggest a few measures to achieve the sustainability

Sociology GS 2 · 2025 · Challenges of Social Transformation

Revision summary

Sustainable development is possible in India only if growth is decoupled from dumping costs on the poor.

Main issues are climate risk, air and water stress, forest loss, land conversion and inequality.

Guha-Gadgil's sociology of ecosystem people versus omnivores still explains who suffers.

Measures include just energy transition, FRA, crop and city reform, and SDG-consistent budgets.

Possibility is a political path, not a technical guarantee.

Introduction

Sustainable development is **possible in India**, not as a green slogan and not as a freeze on the poor. It is possible as a **politically enforced path**: lower carbon and pollution intensity, restored commons, and a fairer share of ecological space. The obstacles are structural-coal-and-car growth, caste-class dumping of waste, and a development state that still treats nature as a free input.

Body

Major issues

- **Climate**: monsoon instability, heat, Himalayan water towers, and coastal risk. **Air**: Indo-Gangetic winter smog as a class-blind killer that still hits outdoor labour first. **Water**: groundwater mining in Green Revolution belts, polluted rivers, and peri-urban tanker mafias. **Forests and biodiversity**: mining and linear projects versus FRA and Gram Sabha. **Land**: conversion of cultivating fields (Q5a) and displacement. **Inequality**: the rich consume; the poor live beside the dump, the mine, and the floodplain. **Energy**: coal lock-in versus renewable jobs that may not go to the same districts.
- **Sociology adds**: environmentalism of the poor (Guha, Gadgil's omnivores vs ecosystem people), urban middle-class beautification that evicts, and caste in sanitation work. Chipko, Narmada, and Niyamgiri are not "green extras"; they are conflicts over who owns the future of a river or a hill.

Measures

A just **energy transition** with retraining in coal belts; **crop diversification** and procurement that does not mandate paddy where aquifers die; **public transport and compact cities** against exclusionary sprawl; genuine **FRA and PESA**; enforcement against industrial effluent; **SDG-aligned** budgets that treat Goal 13 and Goal 10 together; and making the **polluter**-not the ragpicker-pay. NEP and skill policy should include green trades without romanticising unpaid Adivasi conservation. Heat action plans, urban forests, and crop insurance are adaptation; they fail if they ignore informal outdoor labour.

- **Possibility is empirical**: India already runs a huge renewable programme and a huge coal programme. Sustainability is the political choice to stop using the poor as the sink. **Yogendra**

Flow diagram

Just transition FRA compact cities -> Conditional sustainability

Open WRAP page — <https://wrapexams.com/upsc/mains-answers/sociology-gs-2/2025/is-it-possible-to-have-sustainable-development-in-india-cite-major-environmental-issues-and-suggest-a-few-measures-to-achieve-the-sustainable-development-goals/>

Q8(b) · 20 marks

Do you think that forced displacement of labourers has caused their deprivation and resultant inequalities during the recent past years? Elaborate

Sociology GS 2 · 2025 · Challenges of Social Transformation

Revision summary

Forced displacement strips land, commons and urban foothold, then cheapens labour.

Cernea's impoverishment risks and Fernandes's undercounting still describe Indian projects.

Recent drivers include mining, highways, city beautification, conflict, climate and COVID reverse migration.

Women, ST, SC and migrants lose most; land-value winners gain.

R&R law exists; deprivation remains the modal outcome when consent and livelihoods are thin.

Introduction

Forced displacement is not a moving truck. It is the **loss of land, commons, shop and papers**, after which people must sell labour on worse terms. In the recent past-urban clearance, mining, highways, conflict and COVID lockdowns-this has **deepened inequality** rather than sharing development's surplus.

Body

Mechanisms

Michael Cernea's impoverishment risks (landlessness, joblessness, homelessness, marginalisation, food insecurity, morbidity, social disarticulation) still fit Indian projects. **Walter Fernandes** documented undercounting of the displaced, especially Adivasis. **Amita Baviskar** showed how a dam or a city park can be an elite environmental good built on someone else's eviction. Special economic zones and coastal tourism add a post-liberalisation chapter that the old Narmada literature already predicted: public purpose becomes private accumulation.

When a household is moved, **cultivating rights** become a contractor's gang (**Breman**). Women lose forest and field income first. Children lose school continuity. Compensation, if paid, is often captured by men and brokers. **RFCTLARR 2013** and Forest Rights consent are the legal counter; implementation lags, and many urban evictions use municipal law instead. Cash compensation without land-for-land is itself a class device: it looks fair and spends quickly.

Recent past

Mining and industrial corridors in Odisha, Jharkhand, Chhattisgarh; **smart city** and riverside "beautification" evictions; highway and railway widening; **Kashmir and North-East** conflict displacement; climate floods and erosion in Assam and the Sundarbans; and **COVID-19**, which forced migrant labour to walk home-a displacement from the city without a project plaque. Each episode transfers security from labour to capital or to a cleaner skyline. SEZ and coastal regulation fights show the same class map with a blue-economy vocabulary.

Inequality rises because the already asset-poor (ST, SC, Muslims in some city clearances, women-headed households) lose the only capital they had-location and networks-while receivers of the project gain land value. Labour deprivation is the **next scene**: once disembedded, people accept lower wages, longer hours, and no union. That is why displacement is a stratification event, not a logistics event. Recent years did not invent this pattern of dispossession; they sped it up through industrial corridors, expanding cities and a pandemic that treated migrant labour as disposable mobility.

Flow diagram

Forced displacement -> Asset loss
Asset loss -> Worse labour terms
Worse labour terms -> Inequality
RFCTLARR FRA -> weak Forced displacement

Conclusion

- **Yes:** forced displacement in recent years has deprived labour of assets and bargaining power and has widened inequality. Law names rehabilitation; the social outcome is often a new informal proletariat.

Open WRAP page — <https://wrapexams.com/upsc/mains-answers/sociology-gs-2/2025/do-you-think-that-forced-displacement-of-labourers-has-caused-their-deprivation-and-resultant-inequalities-during-the-recent-past-years-elab/>

Q8(c) · 10 marks

What are the Indian government's schemes launched for poverty alleviation after the United Nation's Declaration of 'Sustainable Development Goals - 2015' ? Briefly describe

Sociology GS 2 · 2025 · Rural and Agrarian transformation in India

Revision summary

SDG 2015 became a frame for Indian poverty policy rather than a single new statute.

PM-KISAN, Ayushman Bharat, Jal Jeevan and PMAY are major post-2015 launches.

NFSA, MGNREGA and NRLM pre-date 2015 but were continued and digitised in the SDG era.

POSHAN, PMGKAY and Ujjwala sit in the same toolkit.

The package is broad; landless and informal workers still fall through title-based and insurance-based designs.

Introduction

The UN **Sustainable Development Goals** (2015), especially **SDG 1** (no poverty) and related goals on food, health, water and work, became a frame for Indian welfare. Some schemes were **new after 2015**; others were **older rights** continued and digitally recast. A brief sociological catalogue should keep that distinction.

Body

Post-2015 launches and recasts

PM-KISAN (2019) pays an income support to landholder farmer families-poverty alleviation as a cash transfer, skewed toward those with title. **Ayushman Bharat** (2018)-PM-JAY insurance plus health and wellness centres-attacks medical impoverishment (SDG 3). **Jal Jeevan Mission** (2019) targets household tap water (SDG 6). **PMAY** (Gramin 2016, Urban 2015) is housing as asset and dignity (SDG 11). **National Nutrition Mission / POSHAN** (2018) and the continued **NFSA, 2013** (implemented through the SDG years with One Nation One Ration portability) address hunger. **NRLM / DAY-NRLM** (pre-2015 architecture, expanded with SHGs and lakhpati didi targets) is women's livelihood poverty work (SDG 5 and 1). **MGNREGA** (2005) continued as a rural employment floor through the SDG period, including a COVID spike in demand.

- **Other aligned instruments: e-SHRAM, PMGKAY** food extra during COVID, **Ujjwala, Saubhagya**, and Direct Benefit Transfer plumbing. Together they form a **welfare architecture mapped onto SDGs**, not a single anti-poverty law.
- **Limits belong in a brief note:** landless labour gains less from PM-KISAN; insurance is not a health system; MGNREGA wages and delays remain political. PMAY can become a pucca house without a livelihood. Jal Jeevan can deliver a tap and still fail on quality. The schemes still matter as the state's post-2015 poverty toolkit, especially when read as **SDG 1 plus 2, 3, 5, 6, 8 and 11** rather than as rival ministries.

Sociologically they also recast the poor as **Aadhaar-verified beneficiaries**, which is inclusion and surveillance together. That is the post-2015 signature as much as any new acronym.

Flow diagram

SDGs 2015 -> PM-KISAN DBT

SDGs 2015 -> Ayushman

SDGs 2015 -> Jal Jeevan

SDGs 2015 -> PMAY

NFSA MGNREGA NRLM -> SDGs 2015

Conclusion

After 2015 India combined new transfers (PM-KISAN, Ayushman, Jal Jeevan, PMAY) with continued rights (NFSA, MGNREGA, NRLM). That is the government's SDG-era poverty package: wide, digital, and still uneven for the landless informal poor.

Open WRAP page — <https://wrapexams.com/upsc/mains-answers/sociology-gs-2/2025/what-are-the-indian-governments-schemes-launched-for-poverty-alleviation-after-the-united-nations-declaration-of-sustainable-development-goals/>

Compiled answer key

Last pages of this pack. Each question links to the WRAP model answer on wrapexams.com.

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Q1(a) 10 marks	Q1(b) 10 marks	Q1(c) 10 marks	Q1(d) 10 marks
Q1(e) 10 marks	Q2(a) 20 marks	Q2(b) 20 marks	Q2(c) 10 marks
Q3(a) 20 marks	Q3(b) 20 marks	Q3(c) 10 marks	Q4(a) 20 marks
Q4(b) 20 marks	Q4(c) 10 marks	Q5(a) 10 marks	Q5(b) 10 marks
Q5(c) 10 marks	Q5(d) 10 marks	Q5(e) 10 marks	Q6(a) 20 marks
Q6(b) 20 marks	Q6(c) 10 marks	Q7(a) 20 marks	Q7(b) 20 marks
Q7(c) 10 marks	Q8(a) 20 marks	Q8(b) 20 marks	Q8(c) 10 marks

Question-wise key

Q1(a) · 10 marks Solution

Q1(b) · 10 marks Solution

Q1(c) · 10 marks Solution

Q1(d) · 10 marks Solution

Q1(e) · 10 marks Solution

Q2(a) · 20 marks Solution

Q2(b) · 20 marks Solution

Q2(c) · 10 marks Solution

Q3(a) · 20 marks Solution

Q3(b) · 20 marks Solution

Q3(c) · 10 marks Solution

Q4(a) · 20 marks Solution

Q4(b) · 20 marks Solution

Q4(c) · 10 marks Solution

Q5(a) · 10 marks Solution

Q5(b) · 10 marks Solution

Q5(c) · 10 marks Solution

Q5(d) · 10 marks Solution

Q5(e) · 10 marks Solution

Q6(a) · 20 marks Solution

Q6(b) · 20 marks Solution

Q6(c) · 10 marks Solution

Q7(a) · 20 marks Solution

Q7(b) · 20 marks Solution

Q7(c) · 10 marks Solution

Q8(a) · 20 marks Solution

Q8(b) · 20 marks Solution

Q8(c) · 10 marks Solution

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