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UPSC Mains 2024 Sociology Paper 2

Year-wise PYQ pack · WRAP model answers with canonical links

Official UPSC stems in exam order. Each live answer sits on one WRAP URL; this PDF is the year pack, not a second copy of the article. Open the link under a question for the full page.

<https://wrapexams.com/upsc/mains/sociology/gs-2/2024/>

Q1(a) · 10 marks

What, according to you, are the factors responsible for the continuance of caste system in India? Explain.

Sociology GS 2 · 2024 · Caste System

Revision summary

Caste continues as organisation and ideology, not only as village custom.

Ambedkar's endogamy, Dumont's hierarchy, and Ghurye's features still describe marriage, food and stigma.

Srinivas showed mobility inside caste; Bêteille and Desai linked it to land, class and power.

The Constitution and reservations recast caste as a political identity rather than simply erasing it.

Markets and cities loosened occupation more than they loosened kinship.

Introduction

Caste did not survive in India because villagers are 'traditional'. It survived because it is still a **practical grammar** of marriage, occupation, ritual rank and political mobilisation. **G. S. Ghurye** listed its classical features. **B. R. Ambedkar** located its engine in **endogamy**. **Louis Dumont** stressed the ideology of purity and pollution. **M. N. Srinivas** showed mobility inside the same ranked world. Continuance means these mechanisms still work after the Constitution, factories and cities.

Body

Ideology, ritual and everyday rank

Dumont's Homo Hierarchicus argued that caste is a system of **status**, organised around purity and pollution, in which the priest encompasses the king. That ideology is weaker in a factory canteen than in a wedding kitchen, but it has not disappeared. Temple entry disputes, separate eating, and the stigma of sanitation work show that **untouchability** remains a living practice, not only a colonial census category. **Gopal Guru** and field reports on manual scavenging show how occupation and pollution still stick to Dalit labour even when the law forbids it.

Ghurye's features-segmental division, hierarchy, restrictions on feeding and marriage, civil and religious disabilities, and lack of free occupational choice-have loosened unevenly.

Occupation opened more than marriage. That unevenness is itself a factor of continuance: people can work together and still refuse kinship.

Endogamy, kinship and the household

Ambedkar's 1916 essay treated **endogamy** as the key that closed the caste as a corporation. Matrimonial advertisements, caste-filtered apps, gotra and biradari councils, and honour violence keep that closure. **Irawati Karve** mapped regional kinship; those maps still organise who may marry whom. Residential nuclearisation, as **A. M. Shah** and **I. P. Desai** noted, does not dissolve the joint property and ritual unit. A software engineer in Bengaluru may still need a caste match for a sister's wedding. Kinship is therefore not a leftover. It is a daily factory of caste.

Economy, class and the village-city continuum

A. R. Desai read caste as ideology covering class. Land, tenancy and agricultural labour still follow jati lines in many regions. **André Beteille's** Tanjore work showed that caste, class and power overlap but are not identical; the overlap is enough to reproduce rank. In cities, **Nandini Gooptu** and labour studies show caste in informal work, domestic service, and hiring networks. The mill has declined; the **contract and gig** worker often still enters through a caste-kin chain. **Sanskritization** (Srinivas) and dominant-caste politics keep groups investing in caste identity because it yields honour and votes, not only ritual purity.

State, law and democratic politics

The Constitution abolished untouchability and promised equality. Reservation, SC/ST law, and the **Prevention of Atrocities Act** also **named** caste as a public identity. Caste associations became **interest groups** (**Lloyd and Susanne Rudolph: the modernity of tradition**). **Mandal politics, OBC lists, and sub-quotas made caste a language of rights. Dipankar Gupta** noted that caste today is often a competition among blocks rather than a single ladder, yet competition still requires the block. The census debate, creamy-layer fights, and local panchayat seats reserved by caste all keep the category administratively alive.

- **So continuance is over-determined:** ideology, endogamy, labour markets, and the democratic state each give caste a job to do.

Flow diagram

Endogamy and kinship -> Continuance of caste
Purity ideology -> Continuance of caste
Labour and land -> Continuance of caste
Politics and reservation -> Continuance of caste

Conclusion

Caste continues because endogamy, ritual rank, labour recruitment and electoral organisation still pay. Law weakened some disabilities without dismantling the marriage market or the pollution of certain work. A sociological account therefore names several reproducing factors rather than a single leftover custom.

Open WRAP page — <https://wrapexams.com/upsc/mains-answers/sociology-gs-2/2024/what-according-to-you-are-the-factors-responsible-for-the-continuance-of-caste-system-in-india-explain/>

Q1(b) · 10 marks

Discuss the changes taking place in the industrial class structure in India.

Sociology GS 2 · 2024 · Social Classes in India

Revision summary

The older industrial class was a minority organised mill and PSU workforce.

Mills declined; contract labour, circular migration and job work expanded.

Services and IT added a salariat above a large informal industrial and logistics workforce.

Caste and gender still sort who enters secure versus hazardous work.

Unions lost the mill colony world and have only partly regrouped.

Introduction

India's industrial class was never a simple copy of the European proletariat. **A. R. Desai** placed it inside a colonial and then mixed-economy structure. **Mark Holmström** described the organised factory worker as a minority beside a vast unorganised mass. Since the 1980s, and sharply after 1991, that structure has shifted toward **contract, services, and self-employment** while a small formal core remains.

Body

From mill colony to fragmented labour

- **The classic picture was the textile mill, steel town, and public-sector township:**

relatively stable male employment, union density, housing colonies, and a visible working-class culture in Bombay, Kanpur, Jamshedpur and Ahmedabad. Deindustrialisation of mills, lockouts, and the rise of **powerlooms and job work** broke that colony. **Jan Breman**'s circular migrants and footloose labour show the replacement type: rural-urban sojourners without a lifetime factory identity.

The organised sector's share of employment stayed small. What changed is the **internal composition of even registered factories**: a thin regular roll and a thick contract, trainee and apprentice belt. Labour codes and earlier Contract Labour regulation did not stop this dualism. Trade unions lost density where plants casualised. New unions appear in autos, platforms and public schemes, but they rarely match the old mill's bargaining world.

Services, IT and a split middle

Industry in the national accounts now sits beside a large **services** share. A software and BPO salariat, retail chains, and logistics parks create white-collar and grey-collar layers that older class maps called petty bourgeoisie or new middle class (**Satish Deshpande, Pavan Varma** in public debate; sociologists stress its caste and English advantages). Below them, warehouse pickers, delivery riders, and sanitation and construction crews expand an **informal working class** linked to industry without factory status.

Caste and gender structure the split. Dalit and Adivasi workers remain over-represented in hazardous and 'polluting' industrial niches. Women entered garments, electronics assembly and home-based piecework more than they entered the old heavy-industry core. The 'industrial class' is therefore not one consciousness. It is a **hierarchy of security**.

What the structure now looks like

• **One can sketch four layers:** a small **managerial-technical** stratum; a shrinking **regular industrial worker**; a large **contract and informal industrial workforce**; and an **own-account** mass in workshops and platforms. Linkages run through putting-out, brand value chains, and labour contractors. Holmström's 'citadel and the rest' is still a usable image, except the citadel is smaller and the rest is wired to global production.

The political effect is weaker class-for-itself action and stronger **populist, caste and regional** claims, which is why industrial class change is also a change in Indian democracy's social base.

Flow diagram

Old mill and PSU core -> Thin formal citadel
Old mill and PSU core -> Contract informal mass
Services IT logistics -> Thin formal citadel
Services IT logistics -> Contract informal mass

Conclusion

Industrial class structure in India has moved from a mill-centred organised core to a dual system of a small formal citadel and a vast contract-informal mass, now extended into services and platforms. Caste and gender sort people across those layers. The old working class has not vanished; it has been reorganised.

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Q1(c) · 10 marks

Is patriarchy a key to understanding different forms of inequalities in Indian society? Elaborate.

Sociology GS 2 · 2024 · Perspectives on the study of Indian society

Revision summary

Patriarchy is a structure of control over labour, sexuality and status, not only prejudice.

Uma Chakravarti's Brahmanical patriarchy links caste honour to the regulation of women.

Ambedkar's endogamy thesis makes gender central to caste reproduction.

Class inequalities run through unpaid care and segmented female work.

The state both reforms and reproduces gender through personal law and welfare.

Introduction

Patriarchy is a **durable arrangement** that places men, as a category, in control of women's labour, sexuality, mobility and representation, and that ranks masculinities among men. In India it is not a separate room next to caste and class. **Uma Chakravarti's Brahmanical patriarchy** shows how caste honour is stored in the control of women. That is why patriarchy is a key to several inequalities, not only to 'women's issues'.

Body

Gender as the hinge of caste and kinship

Ambedkar argued that caste reproduces through **endogamy**. Endogamy is a patriarchal rule about whose body may bear the next generation. Honour killings, khap diktats, and the policing of elopement are caste inequality enacted as gender control. **Leela Dube** showed how kinship and food rules socialise girls into caste. If one studies inequality without patriarchy, one misses how jati closes.

Class inequality also runs through gender. Unpaid care and field work subsidise male wages. Female labour-force participation remains low and U-shaped in many datasets; the 'housewife' is an economic institution. Domestic workers, mostly women from poorer castes, transfer care from one class to another. **Sylvia Walby's** public and private patriarchy is useful: the household and the labour market both extract.

State, law and other patriarchies

The Hindu Code Bills, **Article 15**, Panchayati Raj reservations, **POSH**, and the Protection of Women from **Domestic Violence Act** show the state both challenging and using gender. Personal laws still fragment rights across religious communities. Muslim, Christian and customary systems are not copies of Brahmanical patriarchy, but they too organise property and marriage through male lines in many regions. Adivasi customary authority can be relatively more open in some groups and still exclude women from land.

- **Patriarchy also ranks men:** junior males, Dalit men, and sexual minorities face violence from dominant masculinities. That is why the key opens more than one lock-caste atrocity, communal targeting of women, and workplace harassment are different forms that share a gender grammar.

Limits matter. Land, capital and the colonial-modern state have logics that are not reducible to gender alone. **A. R. Desai's** political economy still explains agrarian class. Patriarchy is a

necessary analytic for Indian inequalities; it is not a **sufficient** total theory.

Flow diagram

Patriarchy -> Kinship and endogamy
Patriarchy -> Caste honour
Patriarchy -> Unpaid and paid labour
Patriarchy -> Law and personal status

Conclusion

- **Yes:** patriarchy is a key to caste, class, kinship and state inequalities in India because those systems store honour, labour and property in gendered control. Brahmanical patriarchy is the densest form, not the only form. The key must be used with class and community, not instead of them.

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Q1(d) · 10 marks

Do you think that family bondings are being affected by the changing kinship patterns in India? Comment.

Sociology GS 2 · 2024 · Systems of Kinship in India

Revision summary

Kinship patterns in India are changing through migration, law, education and marriage markets.

Shah and I. P. Desai separate residential nuclearisation from continuing joint family obligations.

Bonds are stressed around care, authority and marriage choice.

Remittances, caste weddings and digital contact keep translocal jointness alive.

The family remains the main care institution for most groups.

Introduction

Kinship is the rule-bound organisation of descent, marriage, residence and care. Family bonding is the **practical solidarity that those rules support: who eats together, who pays for a hospital, who decides a wedding. In India those patterns are changing. The question is whether bonds are breaking or being reorganised.** Village ethnography and urban studies both point to reorganisation more than to a simple collapse.

Body

What is changing

A. M. Shah distinguished household from family: people may live in smaller residential units while remaining a joint family for property and ritual. I. P. Desai found similar 'jointness' beneath nuclear façades. That distinction is now stretched by Gulf and metropolitan **migration**, dual-earner households, and delayed marriage. North Indian village exogamy and Dravidian cross-cousin patterns (**Karve**, Dumont, Trautmann) still operate, but they compete with office romances, caste-endogamous 'love' matches, and a small rise in inter-caste and delayed first marriage.

- **Law recast authority:** the Hindu Succession amendments, maintenance case law, and the **Domestic Violence Act** give wives and daughters claims that older karta power did not assume. NEP-era education and women's college enrolment change who can refuse a match. Smartphones keep a migrant son in daily contact and also expose youth to matches outside the local field.

Are bonds affected?

Yes. Authority of elders over marriage and occupation is weaker where wages are individual. Care of the aged is more contested when daughters-in-law work and sons live in another city. Divorce and separation, though still low by world standards, are more visible. Live-in and delayed household formation in metros alter the timing of bonding.

No, if 'affected' means emptied. **Patricia Uberoi** showed the family as an ideological site that modern India keeps investing in. Remittances, WhatsApp kin groups, caste samaj weddings, and return for death pollution show **translocal jointness**. Gay and lesbian couples still often negotiate with natal families rather than living as isolated individuals. The household remains the main welfare institution because public care is thin.

Bonded labour, kinship and the short 10-marker close

Family bonding is also affected when a bonded or circular-migrant husband is absent for months and the wife runs the farm under a father-in-law. That is kinship change produced by labour unfreedom, which links this short note to bonded labour and to agrarian class. The comment asked by the question is therefore: **yes, bonds are affected; no, they are not simply over.**

So changing kinship patterns **stress** bonds, **redistribute** them toward conjugal and sibling ties in some classes, and **stretch** them across cities. They do not replace kinship with a market of strangers for most Indians.

Flow diagram

Migration education law -> Changing kinship patterns

Changing kinship patterns -> Residential split

Changing kinship patterns -> Translocal jointness

Translocal jointness -> Bonds recast not erased

Conclusion

- **Family bondings are affected:** residence splits, marriage choice widens a little, and elder authority is bargained. The Indian pattern is still jointness under new logistics-money, phones, and caste marriage markets-rather than the death of the family.

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Q1(e) · 10 marks

Despite the efforts of the government, bonded labour still continues in India. Discuss.

Sociology GS 2 · 2024 · Systems of Kinship in India

Revision summary

The 1976 Act abolished bonded labour in law; neo-bondage continues in kilns, farms and migration streams.

Advances and contractors tie Dalit, Adivasi and other poor households season after season.

Breman's neo-bondage is market unfreedom, not only old agrestic serfdom.

Rescue without credit and work leads to re-bondage.

Informal capitalism and caste together explain why government effort has not ended the practice.

Introduction

The **Bonded Labour System (Abolition) Act, 1976** declared bondage void, freed bonded workers, and promised rehabilitation. **Article 23** already barred begar and similar forms. Yet brick kilns, quarries, agriculture, handlooms, domestic work and trafficking corridors still produce **debt bondage**. Continuance is a social structure, not only a gap in policing.

Body

Why the Act does not empty the field

Bondage in India is typically an advance (peshgi) that ties a worker or a family to a contractor (sardar, thekedar) for a season or years. Caste organises who can be tied: Dalit and Adivasi households, and some extremely backward peasant groups, enter kilns and fields with fewer exit options. **Jan Breman** described neo-bondage: not a lifelong serf on one master's land, but a renewable unfreedom through labour-market intermediaries. Child labour and women's unpaid help on the same site deepen the tie.

Government efforts-surveys, release certificates, NHRC orders, Central Sector Scheme for rehabilitation-assume a detectable master-servant pair. Contract chains, interstate migration, and cashless advances hide that pair. Employers call workers 'free' because they may leave after the season; leaving without clearing the advance is not free. Panchayats and local police often share the employer's class or caste world. Rescue without land, credit or a job produces **re-bondage**.

Sectors and the wider economy

Agriculture after land reform still uses attached labour in pockets. Construction and kilns around cities feed on seasonal Bihar, Odisha, Chhattisgarh and Rajasthan streams. The informalisation noted in industrial class structure is the same story: the organised citadel outsources risk to a bonded margin. Trafficking and the Juvenile Justice and child labour laws overlap this field; they have not closed it.

Continuance therefore sits at the junction of **caste, credit, migration and informal capitalism**. The Act remains necessary. It is not sufficient without cheap rural credit, enforceable minimum wages, contractor licensing that works, and rehabilitation that includes housing and work rather than a one-time stipend.

Flow diagram

Debt advance -> Bonded labour
Caste and landlessness -> Bonded labour
Contractors and migration -> Bonded labour
Weak rehab -> Bonded labour

Conclusion

Bonded labour continues because debt, caste and labour contracting still produce unfreedom after legal abolition. Government schemes treat cases; the structure reproduces workers. Release plus livelihood is the sociological test, not the existence of a 1976 statute.

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Q2(a) · 20 marks

Differentiate between 'Western' and 'Indological' perspectives on the study of Indian society. Bring out the major aspects of G. S. Ghurye's contribution to 'Indological' approach

Sociology GS 2 · 2024 · Perspectives on the study of Indian society

Revision summary

Western perspectives start from class, function, modernisation or Marxism and then read India.

Indological perspectives start from shastra and civilisational categories such as varna and jati.

Ghurye used Indology to specify caste features, gotra, sadhus and cultural history.

He combined texts with urban and tribal ethnography and an assimilation thesis on tribes.

The method is strong on continuity and weak on class, gender and minority as independent structures.

Introduction

Two professional habits have organised the sociology of India. A **Western** perspective starts from concepts forged in European and American debates-class, bureaucracy, modernisation, structure-function, Marxism-and asks how India fits or fails those concepts. An **Indological** perspective starts from **Indian texts and civilisational categories**-varna, jati, ashrama, dharma-and treats them as the first grammar of the social system. **G. S. Ghurye** is the central Indian name for the second habit, though he never worked as a pure philologist.

Body

The Western perspective

Colonial administrators and early anthropologists often used Western race science, evolutionism and later functionalism. After Independence, **A. R. Desai used Marxist political economy: Indian society as a class structure shaped by colonialism and the state. M. N. Srinivas**, trained in the Oxford structural-functional tradition, used the **field view** of the village, dominant caste, sanskritization and westernization. **Yogendra Singh** used modernisation theory, recast as orthogenetic and heterogenetic change. **Louis Dumont** is a partial exception: a Western scholar who insisted on Indian ideological categories, which is why he sits on the border of the two perspectives.

The Western kit is strong on **power, class, state and observed practice**. It is tempted to treat Indian categories as epiphenomena, or to read the village as a delayed Europe. Marxists sometimes reduced caste to class. Functionalists sometimes underplayed conflict. The gain is comparison and a language for capitalism and bureaucracy.

The Indological perspective

Indology reads Dharmashastra, epics, Puranas, Buddhist and Jain canons, inscriptions and later commentaries as maps of social order. **McKim Marriott** and Dumont-Pocock's "**For a Sociology of India**" argued that Indian facts need Indian thought. The method explains long continuities: hierarchy, ritual rank, joint-family duty, and the idea of a ranked cosmos. Its risk is the **book view** that Srinivas criticised: Brahmanical texts over-represent priests and under-represent women, artisans, Adivasis and bargaining in the field.

Ghurye's contribution

Ghurye, at Bombay, made Indology sociological. In *Caste and Race in India* he used Sanskrit and historical materials to fix **features of caste**: segmental division, hierarchy, restrictions on feeding and marriage, civil and religious disabilities, and lack of unrestricted occupational choice. He discussed race and caste without reducing the system to a simple racial stock tale. Gotra and Charana, work on sadhus, Indian costume, and civilisational diffusion showed a **historical-Indological** method: texts plus the spread of custom.

He did not stop at the library. Studies of **Mahadev Kolis** and urban groups brought ethnography in. On tribes he argued **assimilation** into Hindu society (The Aborigines-So-Called), against **Verrier Elwin's** isolation. That thesis is Indological in spirit: tribes as backward Hindus rather than as a separate civilisation. It is also political: it shaped integrationist policy talk.

- **Major aspects, then:** (1) caste as a civilisational institution described from texts and history; (2) diffusion and cultural history of Indian social forms; (3) a Hindu-centred synthesis of tribe, sect and city; (4) theoretical pluralism in method-text, survey, diffusion-without a single imported ism. Limits follow the same list. Class and gender are thinner than in Desai or later feminism. Minorities can appear as residuals. Dumont later accused Indian sociology of mixed empiricism; Ghurye's reply is the archive of books, not a tight theory of hierarchy.

Ghurye's Hindu-civilisational frame also shaped how later Bombay students read sect, costume and urban types as Indian facts first, Western labels second. That pedagogical contribution is easy to miss if one only lists books. **S. C. Dube** and village sociologists who followed still had to answer Ghurye's archive even when they chose the field. **Yogendra Singh** later placed Indology inside a map of Indian sociological traditions rather than treating it as pre-sociology.

Critics remain necessary. A purely Indological Ghurye can under-describe mill labour, Partition, and Muslim and Christian personal worlds. A purely Western class analysis can miss why a factory worker still needs a caste match. The productive use of the contrast is sequential: read the text for the claimed order, then read the field for land, gender and the state.

The contrast should not be turned into a war. Srinivas needed Indology to name sanskritization. Ghurye needed observation to write the Kolis. Indian sociology still works by **holding the two perspectives in tension**.

Flow diagram

Western concepts -> Class field modernisation
 Indology texts -> Caste dharma varna
 Ghurye -> Caste dharma varna
 Ghurye -> Ethnography Kolis city
 Class field modernisation -> Sociology of India
 Caste dharma varna -> Sociology of India

Conclusion

Western perspectives explain India with class, field and modernisation; Indological perspectives explain it with texts and civilisational categories. Ghurye made the second into a university sociology of caste, gotra, sadhus and tribe-as-Hindu, using texts with ethnography. The approach is indispensable for hierarchy and continuity, and incomplete for labour, gender and the state.

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WRAP Exams

Q2(b) · 20 marks

What are the definitional problems involved in identifying tribes in India? Discuss the main obstacles to tribal development in India

Sociology GS 2 · 2024 · Tribal communities in India

Revision summary

Tribe in India is an administrative and historical label, not one anthropological type.

Ghurye's assimilation and Elwin's isolation disagree on what tribes are.

ST lists, not isolation tests, now identify groups, which creates political and scientific problems.

Land alienation, forest law and displacement are the main development obstacles.

FRA, PESA and the Fifth and Sixth Schedules exist; implementation and consent remain weak.

Introduction

'Tribe' in India is not a clean scientific species. It is a **colonial and constitutional label laid on many kinds of community: plough peasants, forest cultivators, pastoralists and hunters. Definitional problems are therefore the first obstacle to policy. Development schemes then meet land alienation, forest law, displacement and a thin voice in the state. Virginius Xaxa** has insisted that tribes be treated as a **society with history**, not as a leftover of evolution.

Body

Definitional problems

Nineteenth-century ethnography used isolation, 'primitive' technology, animism and kinship as markers. The census then froze lists. **Ghurye** argued that many so-called aborigines were **backward Hindus**, sharing caste-like ranking and Sanskrit contact. **Elwin** stressed distinct culture, myth and forest livelihood and favoured protection. Neither definition matches all groups. The **Santal, Gonds, Bhils, Nagas and Andaman peoples** do not form one social type.

- **After Independence the operational definition is the Scheduled Tribe list:** a political-administrative schedule, not a fieldwork test. Groups campaign to enter or leave it. Criteria used by commissions-geographical isolation, distinctive culture, backwardness, shy contact-are circular and often outdated. Sanskritization and conversion blur 'animism'. Inter-marriage and markets blur isolation. Some ST groups are stratified internally; some non-ST forest peasants look similar on the ground. **Tribe versus caste** is a continuum in many regions, as Srinivas and Bailey noted in different ways. Language is not decisive: tribal speakers of Indo-Aryan or Dravidian tongues still sit on lists. Religion is not decisive: Christian, Hindu and sarna identifications coexist.
- **So identification problems are:** (1) colonial evolutionist residue; (2) mismatch between anthropological type and ST schedule; (3) internal diversity; (4) mobility and contact that ruin isolation tests; (5) political incentive to claim or deny the label.

Obstacles to tribal development

Land and forest are the material core. **Colonial Forest Acts** and the **Indian Forest Act, 1927** turned customary use into concession. Post-Independence dams, mines, factories and

protected areas displaced millions. The **Forest Rights Act, 2006** promised community and individual rights; implementation is uneven and often hostile in the field. **Fifth Schedule** protections, Governors' powers and **PESA, 1996** are weakly used. **Sixth Schedule** councils in the Northeast have more institutional muscle but their own elite politics.

- **Human development obstacles follow:** boarding schools that break language, poor health and nutrition, indebtedness, and trafficking. **Development-induced displacement** without land-for-land creates a new casual labour class. Mining and counter-insurgency in central India militarise everyday life. A small **tribal elite** captures jobs and contracts; Xaxa and others warn against reading ST reservation as group development. Isolation, assimilation and integration as policy models (**Elwin, Ghurye, and official integration**) have all failed when they ignore land and consent.

Health, schooling and language are not side issues. Residential schools can produce a small salariat and a large experience of cultural loss. NEP 2020's mother-tongue aim matters here if it includes tribal languages rather than only major regional standards. Without land, a degree still sends youth into the same informal labour stream described for industry.

Obstacles are therefore definitional and structural together. If the state cannot say who is a tribe except by a list, and if the list's lands are taken for national development, 'tribal development' becomes a residual welfare budget beside extraction.

Flow diagram

Unclear tribe definition -> ST list politics

Forest and land loss -> Obstacles to development

Mines dams parks -> Obstacles to development

ST list politics -> Obstacles to development

FRA PESA Schedules PESA Schedules -.weak use. -> Obstacles to development

Conclusion

Tribes in India are hard to identify because the word mixes colonial typing, lived diversity and a political ST schedule. Development stalls where forest and land rights are insecure, displacement is routine, and policy oscillates between isolation and assimilation without tribal control over resources. FRA, PESA and the Schedules are the available tools; their weak use is the main contemporary obstacle.

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Q2(c) · 10 marks

What, according to Andre Beteille, are the bases of agrarian class structure in India? Analyse

Sociology GS 2 · 2024 · Caste System

Revision summary

Béteille based agrarian class on land property and labour, not on caste rank.

Owners, tenants and agricultural labourers are the main classes in his Tanjore study.

Caste, class and power are three interacting dimensions.

Ownership, control and labour remain the operational bases.

Corporate farming, reverse tenancy and public works modify the actors without cancelling the scheme.

Introduction

André Béteille studied a Tanjore village as a system of **caste, class and power**. Agrarian class, for him, is not another name for jati. It is built on **property in land**: who owns, who controls tenancy and who sells labour. Those bases organise the village economy. Caste and panchayat power overlap them without being the same thing.

Body

Land as the class base

Béteille distinguished landowners, tenants and agricultural labourers as the principal agrarian classes, with finer grades of absentee owner, cultivating owner, sharecropper and attached labour. The base is **rights in land and the product**, not ritual rank. A Brahmin landowner and a non-Brahmin landowner can sit in the same class; a poor Brahmin may not. This was a deliberate break from treating the village as only a caste map, and from a crude Marxism that ignored status.

- **Class rests on three practical bases: ownership** (title and the power to alienate), **control** (who decides cropping, credit and tenancy), and **labour** (who must sell work to eat). Green Revolution machinery, reverse tenancy and peri-urban sale have shuffled these bases, but they are still Béteille's questions.

Caste and power as related structures

In Caste, Class and Power, the three dimensions can diverge. Non-Brahmin owners could rise in the class map while Brahmins kept ritual status. Panchayat and party power could shift toward numerically strong cultivating groups. Analysis means using the three together: agrarian class explains surplus and dependence; caste explains marriage and honour; power explains who commands the local state.

What 'bases' still miss

Béteille wrote before contract farming, MNREGA, and widespread female agricultural labour statistics. The bases still work if we ask who commands machines, warehouses and mandi credit. A commission agent can control the crop without owning the plot. A woman who weeds all season without her name on the patta is in the labour class even when the household is recorded as a small owner. Caste still sorts gangs. The analysis is therefore: **land rights as the class base**, with caste and power as overlapping structures, updated for contractors and

the welfare state.

Flow diagram

Land ownership -> Agrarian class
Control of tenancy -> Agrarian class
Sale of labour -> Agrarian class
Caste status -> Agrarian class
Local power -> Agrarian class

Conclusion

For Bêteille, agrarian class structure rests on ownership, control and use of land, visible as owners, tenants and labourers. Caste and power interact with that structure but are not its definition. The triad still analyses rural India if we add new controllers of land and labour.

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Q3(a) · 20 marks

Why is the study of marriage important in Sociology? Analyse the implications of changing marriage patterns for Indian society

Sociology GS 2 · 2024 · Perspectives on the study of Indian society

Revision summary

Marriage regulates sexuality, filiation, property and group closure, which is why sociology treats it as central.

Ambedkar and ethnographers of Indian kinship made endogamy and alliance core tools.

Age at marriage, arranged love, migration and law are changing the field unevenly.

Caste endogamy remains strong; inter-marriage is politically explosive.

Implications run through gender bargaining, fertility and household authority.

Introduction

Marriage is not only a wedding. In sociology it is the **institution that regulates sexuality, filiation, property and group boundaries**. **Levi-Strauss** treated alliance as the exchange that makes society. **Ambedkar** treated endogamous marriage as the lock of caste. Indian ethnography-**Karve, Dumont, Uberoi**-made marriage the door to kinship regions. If marriage changes, caste, household and inequality change with it. That is why the study is important, and why new patterns have large implications.

Body

Why sociology studies marriage

Marriage links the domestic group to the political economy. It organises **legitimacy of children**, claims on land and surname, care of the aged, and the unpaid labour of women. It is a market of honour: hypergamy, dowry and kanyadan idioms rank families. It is a demographic engine: age at marriage shapes fertility. It is a legal status: personal laws, the **Special Marriage Act**, and criminal law on bigamy and cruelty sit here. Without marriage, accounts of caste, class and religion miss their reproduction.

Functionalists saw it as meeting needs of personality and socialisation (Murdock's nuclear unit). Conflict and feminist theories see it as a site of **patriarchy and property**. Both are usable in India if neither is treated as the whole story.

Changing patterns

Age at marriage has risen with schooling, especially for girls in many states, though child marriage persists in belts of Rajasthan, Bihar and elsewhere. Companionacy and 'arranged love' mixes have grown in urban middle classes; caste **endogamy** remains high. Inter-caste and inter-religious marriages exist and attract violence and social boycott. Dowry has not died with education; it has inflated in some status groups. Divorce and separation are more thinkable, still stigmatised. Migration produces delayed co-residence and translocal conjugality. Live-in relations and the **Navtej Johar** (2018) reading of **Section 377** changed the public status of same-sex intimacy, while **marriage equality** remains legally unsettled after later litigation. NRI and app-mediated matches extend the field without dropping filters of caste and language.

Hindu Succession reform, the **Domestic Violence Act**, and optional civil marriage slightly shift bargaining inside the couple. Personal law plurality means Muslim, Christian and customary marriages change on different clocks.

Implications

For **caste**, stable endogamy means caste continues even when occupation opens. For **gender**, later marriage and schooling can raise women's voice; dowry, honour and unpaid care can still intensify. For **demography**, later and fewer marriages interact with falling fertility and with a marriage squeeze in some sex-ratio-distorted regions. For the **household**, conjugality gains against the joint karta in some classes, while wedding expenditure and kin ritual expand as status theatre. For **politics**, love jihad discourses, anti-conversion marriage laws in some states, and khap intervention show the state and community fighting over the same institution.

Kinship studies also show that marriage is the hinge of **alliance versus descent** debates. If North Indian village exogamy and gotra rules loosen only at the edges, the North remains an alliance-avoiding, descent-heavy field. If Dravidian cross-cousin practice declines with schooling, South Indian kinship is changing its reproduction rule, not only its wedding film style. **Uberoi** and family sociologists would add that the state now marries people through registration, NRI law, and welfare lists, so marriage is also a **citizenship event**.

Changing patterns therefore do not mean the death of arranged caste marriage. They mean a **differentiated field**: a metropolitan edge of choice and delay, and a large core of endogamous arrangement, with conflict at the boundary.

Flow diagram

Marriage institution -> Caste endogamy
Marriage institution -> Gender and property
Marriage institution -> Demography
Education law migration -> Marriage institution
Education law migration -> New patterns of choice and delay

Conclusion

Marriage is sociologically important because it reproduces groups, property and gender. Indian patterns are shifting in age, media and law, but endogamy and honour still organise most matches. The implication is a split modernity: more individual bargaining inside a caste marriage market, not a general free market of individuals.

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Q3(b) · 20 marks

Do you think that the constitutional provisions for women have led to their uplift? Give reasons for your answer

Sociology GS 2 · 2024 · Perspectives on the study of Indian society

Revision summary

Articles 14, 15 and 16 and panchayat reservations made women constitutional citizens and local office-holders.

Hindu Code, labour and harassment law extended that personhood.

Literacy, some delay of marriage, and public visibility are real gains.

Labour force, son preference, violence and personal-law plurality limit uplift.

The result is partial, caste-class uneven citizenship rather than completed equality.

Introduction

The Constitution made women **citizens**, not only dependants of a community. Articles 14, 15, 16, Directive Principles on equal pay and maternity, Article 51A, and later the 73rd and 74th **Amendments** with reserved panchayat and municipality seats, are the core provisions. They have led to real uplift in law and in some public roles. They have not dissolved **Brahmanical and other patriarchies** in the household, the field and the street. The honest answer is a qualified yes.

Body

What the provisions did

Article 15 bars sex discrimination and allows special measures. Article 16 opens public employment. These clauses underwrote the Hindu Code project that **Ambedkar steered: marriage, divorce, succession and adoption as statute rather than only custom. Maternity benefit, equal remuneration law, and later POSH** sit on that floor. Panchayati Raj reservations created a large class of **women representatives**, including sarpanchs who, even when mediated by male kin, entered the local state. The Supreme Court in cases from Shah Bano through Vishaka to later privacy and adultery judgments used constitutional equality to push personal and criminal law.

- **Education and health missions used the citizenship frame:** girls' schooling, ICDS, and reproductive programmes treat women as public subjects. Relative to 1950, literacy, age at marriage in many states, and visibility in universities and services are genuine uplift.

Why the record is not emancipation

Uplift is not the same as equality of condition. Female labour-force participation is weak and informal. Unpaid care is uncouned. Sex ratio and gender-biased abortion (despite PCPNDT) show households still preferring sons. Violence-domestic, caste, communal, workplace-continues; law exists, conviction and social support lag. Personal laws still fragment Muslim, Christian and customary rights. Panchayat reservation meets **proxy rule** and violence against women who sit in the chair. NEP 2020 can widen schooling without automatically raising workplace power.

Uma Chakravarti and feminist political economy argue that constitutional liberalism meets a social structure that stores honour in women's bodies. **Béteille** would add that a right on paper is not a resource in the village class map. So provisions led to uplift **where the state**

and organised movements could convert text into seats, schools and case law. They did not uplift evenly across caste, class, region and religion.

Workplace and property are the stubborn middle. Without land titles and without regular jobs, a reserved panchayat seat does not feed a household. NEP 2020 and scholarships can raise enrolment; they do not automatically raise bargaining inside marriage. POSH does not reach the brick kiln or the farm. So constitutional uplift is strongest in **legal personhood and local office**, middling in **education**, and weakest in **informal labour and the private family**.

- **Reasons, in short:** the Constitution changed the legal person; patriarchy, land and labour markets still organise everyday inequality; implementation is local and male-dominated; community personal law was only partly constitutionalised.

Flow diagram

Arts 14 15 16 73rd 74th -> Hindu Code POSH DV

Arts 14 15 16 73rd 74th -> Panchayat seats

Patriarchy land violence -> Uneven uplift

Hindu Code POSH DV -> Partial uplift

Panchayat seats -> Partial uplift

Uneven uplift -> Partial uplift

Conclusion

Constitutional provisions have led to women's uplift in citizenship, education, local office and a body of protective law. They have not completed uplift because marriage, work and violence remain structured by caste-patriarchy and uneven enforcement. The provisions are a necessary floor, not a finished building.

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Q3(c) · 10 marks

Education is a key to social development. Elucidate

Sociology GS 2 · 2024 · Visions of Social Change in India

Revision summary

Social development is more than GDP; education is a main public lever for capabilities.

Ambedkar treated schooling as anti-caste equipment.

NEP 2020 recasts foundational learning and language policy as development tools.

Bourdieu's cultural capital and India's dual school system show reproduction of inequality.

Education works as a key when joined to work, health and anti-discrimination.

Introduction

- **Social development means a wider set of capabilities than income growth:** health, literacy, dignity, and the ability to take part in public life. Education is a **key** because it is the main public institution that can reallocate those capabilities across generation. In India that claim is tested every day in government schools, coaching factories and the **National Education Policy, 2020**.

Body

How education develops society

Literacy and numeracy lower child mortality when they reach mothers; they raise the chance of using law, banks and panchayats. Schooling delayed marriage in many groups and is a pathway out of some hereditary occupations. **Ambedkar** treated education as a weapon against caste, not as polish. Public employment and the professions still filter by credentials. NEP 2020's stress on foundational literacy, mother tongue, and multiple exit points is an attempt to treat school as development infrastructure rather than only as an exam funnel.

Education also builds a common civic language-unevenly, in a multilingual society. That is development in **Srinivas**'s westernization sense and in **Yogendra Singh**'s modernisation of tradition: new roles without a total cultural wipe.

The key can jam

Pierre Bourdieu's cultural capital is visible in English-medium private schools versus understaffed rural schools. Caste and class buy coaching. **NEP** can still leave a dual system. Gendered drop-out, disability exclusion, and Adivasi language mismatch show that school can reproduce the structure it is asked to dissolve. **A. R. Desai** would remind us that education without land and work is a limited solvent of class.

So education is a key, not a master key. It works when tied to health, work and anti-discrimination; it fails as a slogan that blames the poor for not 'valuing school'.

Flow diagram

Education -> Capabilities and health
Education -> Occupational mobility
Education -> Citizenship
Caste class English -> Education

Conclusion

Education is a key to social development because it spreads capabilities, delays some patriarchal clocks, and opens civic and occupational doors. In India it is also a market of inequality. NEP 2020 is a reform of the key; caste, class and language still decide whose lock it opens.

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WRAP Exams

Q4(a) · 20 marks

How do religious communities contribute to the cultural diversity of India?

Sociology GS 2 · 2024 · Religion and Society

Revision summary

Religious communities produce diversity through worship, kinship, law, education and neighbourhoods.

Hindu sects, Muslims, Christians, Sikhs, Jains, Buddhists, Parsis and tribal religions each add institutions.

Articles 25-30 protect this as a constitutional plurality.

Caste-like ranking and communal conflict mean diversity is stratified.

Personal law is both a cultural contribution and a gender problem.

Introduction

India's cultural diversity is not a food festival. It is a **living arrangement of languages, kinship rules, worship, law and neighbourhoods** that religious communities have historically produced. **M. N. Srinivas**'s local and all-India Hinduism, **T. N. Madan** on religious identity, and **Imtiaz Ahmad** on Muslim caste-like stratification show communities as social structures, not only as belief. They contribute diversity by keeping different public worlds in one political territory.

Body

What communities contribute

- **Hindu society itself is internally diverse:** Shaiva, Vaishnava, Shakta, Bhakti regional cultures, and jati custom. That internal plurality is a community contribution, not a homogeneous bloc. Muslim communities added Persian-Arabic literacy, Sufi shrines that overlap Hindu pilgrimage geographies, distinct kinship (including cousin marriage in many groups), and a personal-law tradition. Christians-Syrian, Latin, tribal and Dalit Christians-added schools, hospitals and new associational forms, especially in the South and Northeast. Sikhs institutionalised *sangat*, *langar* and a distinct script and law. Jains and Buddhists (including **Ambedkarite Navayana**) shaped ethics of *ahimsa*, urban mercantile trust, and a modern anti-caste religion. Parsis left a dense urban civic footprint in Bombay. Tribal *sarna*, *donyi-polo* and related practices keep non-Sanskritic sacred geographies that the Forest Rights struggle also defends.

Diversity appears in **calendar and cuisine**, in **architecture**, in **music**, and in **family law**. The Constitution's Articles 25-30 protect profession, practice, institutions and minority education. That legal pluralism is itself a contribution: communities run schools, *waqf*, *gurdwaras* and maths as public-cultural infrastructure.

Contribution is not only harmony

Communities also contribute **hierarchy and conflict**. Caste among Hindus, and caste-like ranking among Muslims and Christians, structure diversity as inequality. Communal riots, temple-mosque disputes, and anti-conversion politics show diversity as a field of power. **Ashis Nandy** and others distinguished religion as faith from religion as ideology; sociology must keep both. Personal laws can protect cultural difference and freeze gender inequality. Uniform civil code debates are therefore debates about how much diversity the family may

carry.

Religious communities also **translate** into electoral blocks, which is diversity entering democracy (Kothari's Congress system and its later fragmentation). The contribution to culture is then inseparable from the contribution to politics.

- **Everyday diversity is also neighbourhood-level:** a dargah sharing a qasba with a temple, a Kerala church calendar beside Onam, a Punjab gurdwara langar that feeds across faith while caste can still appear in who cooks. **S. C. Dube's** village studies and later urban ethnography show syncretism and boundary-making as twins. Festivals become public culture on television; that is contribution as well as commodification. Diaspora temples and mosques then export Indian diversity and sometimes a harder identity than the mixed street at home.

- **A fair account says:** without these communities there is no Indian cultural diversity as we know it; with them, diversity is stratified and sometimes violent. The sociological task is to describe both.

Flow diagram

Religious communities -> Ritual calendar food
Religious communities -> Personal law and trusts
Religious communities -> Schools shrines maths
Religious communities -> Electoral and conflict fields
Ritual calendar food -> Cultural diversity
Personal law and trusts -> Cultural diversity
Schools shrines maths -> Cultural diversity

Conclusion

Religious communities contribute India's cultural diversity by institutionalising different languages of worship, kinship, education and law inside one state. They also organise inequality and conflict. Diversity here is a structured plurality, not a slogan of automatic tolerance.

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Q4(b) · 20 marks

What do you understand by decentralisation of power? What is its role in strengthening the roots of democracy in India? Elaborate

Sociology GS 2 · 2024 · Politics and Society

Revision summary

Decentralisation transfers authority, funds and functions to local governments.

The 73rd and 74th Amendments are India's main constitutional design for that transfer.

Reservations and local elections can broaden who holds power.

PESA links decentralisation to tribal consent in Schedule Five areas.

Parallel missions, weak finance and proxy rule limit democratic deepening.

Introduction

Decentralisation of power means shifting **decision, money and administration** from distant capitals toward local governments that citizens can see. In India the constitutional form is **Panchayati Raj** and urban local bodies after the **73rd and 74th Amendments (1992)**. The sociological claim is that democracy grows roots when the village and the ward can tax, plan and punish, not only when they vote in a Lok Sabha election.

Body

What decentralisation is

Political decentralisation creates elected councils. Administrative decentralisation posts functionaries downward. Fiscal decentralisation assigns revenues and grants. India attempted all three, unevenly. The Eleventh and Twelfth Schedules list functions. **State Finance Commissions** and the **Union Finance Commission** (from the **Eleventh Commission** onward) were meant to fund them. **PESA** extends Gram Sabha powers in **Fifth Schedule** areas. This is more than 'participation theatre' if the Gram Sabha can refuse a mining lease or a fake beneficiary list.

M. N. Srinivas's dominant caste and **Béteille**'s local power warn that the village is not a republic of equals. Decentralisation without land reform can strengthen the already strong. That is not an argument against local government. It is an argument for **who sits in it**.

Strengthening democratic roots

Regular local elections create a second and third tier of politicians. Reservation for women, SCs, STs and often OBCs brings new personnel into the state, which is a change in the social composition of power, not only in procedure. MNREGA social audits, local planning, drinking water and sanitation schemes need a panchayat to be more than a contractor's desk. Urban ward committees, however weak, are the only everyday face of the city for slum citizens.

- **Decentralisation also trains opposition and accountability:** a sarpanch can be unseated locally. That is **democratic deepening** in the sense of more arenas of contest, closer to livelihood. **Rajni Kothari**'s worry about a distant Congress system meets a partial reply here: multiple centres.

Limits that keep roots shallow

States still control inspectors, engineers and many funds. Parallel bodies-mission societies, smart-city special purpose vehicles, nominated boards-**recentralise**. Elite capture and proxy

women sarpanchs are documented. Caste panchayats and khaps can rival statutory panchayats on marriage. Municipalities lack staff and depend on octroi-replacement grants. Without control over land use and police, local democracy is a grievance window.

Fiscal design decides whether the root is a tap or a poster. When the Union and state run MNREGA, housing and sanitation as missions with parallel staff, the panchayat becomes a last-mile contractor. When a Gram Sabha can publish a list and refuse a fake job card, decentralisation is a democratic check. Urban local bodies face a sharper version: city growth (census towns, peri-urban NCR) often sits outside municipal limits, so the people who need local democracy are still in a village panchayat or a census village with urban work.

So the role in strengthening democracy is **real and conditional**. It works where elections are held, seats are not purely proxies, and functions-funds-functionaries actually move. It fails where decentralisation is a slogan over a scheme-driven collectorate.

Flow diagram

73rd and 74th Amendments -> Panchayats and municipalities
Panchayats and municipalities -> Wider participation
Panchayats and municipalities -> Women SC ST seats
Elite capture parallel bodies -> Shallow roots
Panchayats and municipalities -> Deeper local democracy
Shallow roots -> Deeper local democracy

Conclusion

Decentralisation is the constitutional shift of power to panchayats and municipalities. It strengthens democratic roots by multiplying elected offices, reserving seats for excluded groups, and locating some goods in the Gram Sabha. Capture, parallel bodies and starved finances limit that role. The roots grow only where the local body is a government, not a helpdesk.

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Q4(c) · 10 marks

What are the different forms of untouchability still practised in India? Discuss with suitable illustrations

Sociology GS 2 · 2024 · Caste System

Revision summary

Untouchability is practised exclusion on grounds of hereditary pollution, abolished in **Article 17** but not in social geography.

Forms include water, food, temple, housing, school and marriage bans.

Manual scavenging continues despite the 2013 Act.

Urban cups, sewers and housing filters are contemporary illustrations.

Guru's humiliation and **Ambedkar's** annihilation agenda still describe the structure.

Introduction

Untouchability is the social practice of treating persons as **polluting to touch, well, temple, kitchen or neighbourhood** because of hereditary rank. **Article 17** abolished it. The **Protection of Civil Rights Act** and the **Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act** criminalise it. **B. R. Ambedkar** and **Gopal Guru** insist it is still a lived geography of humiliation. Forms have shifted from the village well to the urban housing society and the sanitation contract.

Body

Classic and continuing forms

- **Water and food:** separate tumblers in some teashops, refusal of shared utensils, and exclusion from village tanks still appear in field reports from Rajasthan, Tamil Nadu and northern states. Temple and ritual: barred entry, separate queues, and denial of priesthood. Occupation: hereditary assignment of leather, sanitation and death work; **manual scavenging** continues despite the **PEMSR Act, 2013**. Residence: Dalit hamlets at the edge, urban ghettos, and housing-society filters. School: seating, mid-day meal serving, and teacher prejudice. Marriage: the sharpest closure; inter-caste couples face violence.

Newer illustrations

Urban anonymity does not end caste. Domestic workers may have separate cups. Matrimonial sites hide filters that are untouchability's cousin. Sanitation workers died in sewers in Delhi and other cities while municipalities outsourced the stigma. During droughts, water-tanker access can reproduce the well. In campuses, mess and hostel discrimination recurs. **Guru's** language of humiliation names the everyday, not only the riot.

- **Untouchability today is therefore** legal-illegal: forbidden and practised. Illustrations should stay tied to water, food, worship, work, housing and marriage-the same axes Ghurye listed as disabilities, now in new settings.

Flow diagram

Untouchability -> Water food temple

Untouchability -> Scavenging and stigmatised work

Untouchability -> Housing and marriage

Untouchability -> Urban and campus forms

Conclusion

Untouchability is still practised as exclusion from water, food, temples, housing, honourable work and marriage, with manual scavenging as its stark occupational form. Law abolished the status; social geography keeps the practice. Urban and digital life recast it more than they erase it.

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Q5(a) · 10 marks

Examine with suitable examples the recent trends in the growth of urban settlements in India.

Sociology GS 2 · 2024 · Industrialization and Urbanisation in India

Revision summary

- **Urban growth is more than four old metros:** NCR, Bengaluru and Hyderabad show sprawl and private urbanism.

Census towns mark in-situ urbanisation without municipal status.

Corridors, smart-city projects and gated enclaves fragment the city.

Secondary cities absorb education and services.

Class, caste and informality shape who gets infrastructure.

Introduction

Urban growth in India is not only the swelling of Delhi, Mumbai, Kolkata and Chennai. Recent decades show **sprawl, census towns, corridor cities and gated fragments**. The **Census** idea of an urban place-size, density, non-farm work-now covers settlements that still look like large villages. That mismatch is itself a trend.

Body

Metropolitan concentration and sprawl

Million-plus agglomerations keep drawing migrants and capital. Mumbai-Pune, Delhi-NCR, Bengaluru, Hyderabad and Ahmedabad-Gandhinagar illustrate **peri-urban growth: farms become plots, then gated colonies and logistics parks**. **Gurgaon/Gurugram** is a textbook of private urbanism beside villages that supply labour and land. Floods in Chennai and Bengaluru show that growth has outrun drainage as a public good.

Census towns, secondary cities and corridors

- **A large share of recent urbanisation is census towns:** statutory rural, functionally urban. This is in-situ urbanisation, often along highways, not a move into the old municipal core. Tier-2 cities-Indore, Coimbatore, Lucknow, Bhubaneswar-grow as service and education hubs. Industrial corridors and 'smart city' projects try to **plan** growth; much actual settlement remains unplanned slum and peri-plot.

Gated housing, malls and SEZs produce **splintered urbanism** (a useful description even without the jargon as a brand): elite islands, informal work around them. Caste and religion still sort neighbourhoods. The trend is therefore dual: more urban people, and more unequal urban form.

Smaller towns along national highways in Uttar Pradesh, Rajasthan and Tamil Nadu show ribbon development: workshops, marriage halls, coaching centres and rental rooms without a municipal plan. Hill towns and pilgrimage cities add a seasonal urbanism that the census captures poorly. Coastal peri-urban Goa and Kerala mix tourism capital with local land sale, which is another named trend: **urbanisation through real estate rather than through a mill**.

- **Recent growth is also** digital and logistical: warehouses, delivery hubs, and student PG belts around coaching and IT. That is urban settlement without a mill chimney, which matters for how we read industrialisation later in this paper.

Flow diagram

Megacity agglomerations -> Peri-urban sprawl
Census towns -> In-situ urbanisation
Gated SEZ islands -> Splintered city
Peri-urban sprawl -> Urban settlement growth
In-situ urbanisation -> Urban settlement growth
Splintered city -> Urban settlement growth

Conclusion

Recent urban growth in India combines megacity sprawl, census-town in-situ urbanisation, corridor and gated fragments, and strained infrastructure. Examples from NCR, Bengaluru, Hyderabad and census towns show a society becoming urban without becoming equal or fully municipal.

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Q5(b) · 10 marks

Is there a connection between labour migration and informal sector? Justify your answer with reference to Indian context.

Sociology GS 2 · 2024 · Rural and Agrarian transformation in India

Revision summary

Most Indian labour migrants enter informal work, not a formal citadel.
Contractors, advances and caste-kin networks organise the move.
Construction, garments, domestic work and platforms illustrate the link.
COVID return walks showed the city does not socially incorporate this labour.
Informality and migration reproduce each other.

Introduction

Yes, there is a tight connection. Most internal migrants in India do not enter a formal factory with a provident fund. They enter **construction, workshops, domestic service, vending, kilns and now platforms**-the **informal sector**. Migration supplies flexible labour; informality is how that labour is used without social security.

Body

How the link works

Jan Breman's circular migrants move between village and work site without becoming a stable urban proletariat. Labour contractors recruit by kin and caste, pay advances, and keep people outside the regular roll. That is the same dualism **Holmström** described inside industry. The informal sector is not a traditional leftover; it is how Indian capitalism uses **migrant flexibility**.

Construction in Mumbai, Delhi and Gulf-oriented Kerala streams; garments in Tiruppur and NCR; domestic work in every metro; and seasonal agriculture in Punjab all rest on this link. The COVID-19 lockdown made the connection visible when informal migrants walked home because the city had no claim on them.

Justification in the Indian context

If migration went mainly into organised public-sector jobs, informality would be a side issue. The employment structure is the opposite. Even registered firms subcontract. **e-SHRAM** and One Nation One Ration are attempts to follow the migrant inside informality, which admits the link. Caste and region organise niches: eastern India to western construction, Adivasi streams to brick kilns.

The connection is two-way. Informal demand pulls migrants. Migrant oversupply keeps work informal by weakening unions. Village land, however small, subsidises urban cheap labour-**A. R. Desai's** political economy still holds.

- **So the justification is structural:** India's informal sector is a **migrant labour regime**, not a separate traditional economy.

Flow diagram

Village labour surplus -> Circular migration
Circular migration -> Informal construction services
Contractors -> Informal construction services
Informal construction services -> Flexible cheap labour

Conclusion

Labour migration and the informal sector are connected because migrants are recruited into unsecured work through contractors, and because firms stay informal by using that circulating labour. Indian cities and harvests run on that link.

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Q5(c) · 10 marks

Are slums the manifestations of industrialisation and urbanisation in India? Explain.

Sociology GS 2 · 2024 · Industrialization and Urbanisation in India

Revision summary

Slums are insecure dense settlements tied to urban labour, not only to poverty as a personal trait.

Mill and port cities produced classic industrial slums such as parts of Mumbai.

Service and construction urbanisation produces slums without a factory core.

Caste, tenure politics and eviction cycles shape Indian slums.

They manifest growth under informality more than a simple planning failure.

Introduction

Slums are dense settlements with insecure tenure, poor water and sanitation, and a close mix of living and earning. In India they are not an accident at the edge of growth. They are how **urbanisation with thin formal housing and informal labour** actually looks. Industrialisation is part of the story, not the whole story.

Body

Industrialisation and the mill city

Dharavi beside Mumbai's old industrial and now service economy, mill lands, and port work is the classic picture: labour needed by the city cannot afford formal shelter, so it builds **self-housing** on residual land. Jamshedpur's planned core and its labour bustees, Kanpur's old mill neighbourhoods, and garment pockets in NCR show the same. Industry wants cheap labour at the gate; it does not build enough quarters.

Urbanisation beyond the factory

India urbanises through construction, services and census-town sprawl. Slums and informal colonies appear around those jobs too: domestic workers near elite housing, construction workers on sites, waste workers near dumps. **Mike Davis**-style planetary slum arguments fit only if we keep Indian specificity: caste clusters inside slums, political patronage of votes, and periodic eviction for 'world-class' projects.

Are slums manifestations of industrialisation and urbanisation? **Yes**, as the housing form of a labour regime that urbanises without a corresponding right to the city. **Not only**, because rural landlessness, partition-era camps, and failure of public housing also feed them. Slums are the **urban face of informality**, which industrialisation and urbanisation in India have jointly expanded.

Clearance without work and tenure just shifts the slum. In-situ upgrading and the political organisation of slum dwellers (Mumbai, Ahmedabad) show they are also a **social world**, not only a planning disease.

Flow diagram

Industry and construction demand -> Cheap informal labour

Urban land markets -> Unaffordable formal housing

Cheap informal labour -> Slums

Unaffordable formal housing -> Slums

Conclusion

Slums in India manifest industrial and urban growth that needs cheap labour and does not provide secure housing. They also manifest caste, patronage and public-housing failure. Treating them as the city's outside misses that they are how the Indian city is made.

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Q5(d) · 10 marks

Discuss the changing nature of political elites in India.

Sociology GS 2 · 2024 · Rural and Agrarian transformation in India

Revision summary

Political elites are regular decision-makers in parties and the state.

Kothari's Congress system centred a professional and upper-caste mediating elite.

Mandal and regional parties diversified caste and linguistic composition.

Post-1991 capital and media reshaped recruitment and funding.

Women and informal labour remain weakly present inside the elite.

Introduction

Political elites are the relatively small set of people who **regularly shape binding decisions** in parties, ministries, state capitals and now in business-media nexuses. Independent India's elite was never a closed European aristocracy. It has still changed in **social composition and in how power is organised**.

Body

The older pattern

Rajni Kothari's Congress system described a centrist, English-educated, often upper-caste professional and landed elite that mediated factions. **André Bêteille** and others noted the overlap of caste status, land and office. The Rudolphs showed tradition modernising as caste federations entered this elite as brokers rather than as revolution.

What has changed

Mandal and state-level OBC parties brought **backward-caste elites** into chief ministerships and cabinets. Regional parties produced linguistic and state elites. Business wealth after 1991 entered politics more openly through funding, media and candidate selection. Dynastic succession sits beside self-made contractors. Hindu nationalist organisation created a parallel elite of swayamsevaks and communication managers. Women remain under-represented except where dynasty or reservation operates. Dalit and Adivasi elites exist (BSP's rise and plateau, ST leaders in the Northeast and central India) but rarely command the core of capital.

The elite is **more plural in caste and region, more capital-intensive, and more media-facing**. It is not a simple replacement of Brahmin-Kayastha lawyers by farmers. Corporate and professional layers still matter in the Union. Local elites in panchayats are a different storey of the same building after the 73rd Amendment.

- **Changing nature, then:** from a relatively coherent Congress-era professional-landed centre to a **federal bazaar of caste blocs, regional bosses, business and organisational cadres**, still male-dominated and still distant from informal labour.

Flow diagram

Congress professional landed elite -> Regional OBC Dalit elites

Congress professional landed elite -> Business media money

Party organisations -> Recomposed political elite

Regional OBC Dalit elites -> Recomposed political elite

Business media money -> Recomposed political elite

Conclusion

Political elites in India have widened by caste and region since Mandal and the rise of state parties, and they have grown closer to business and media after 1991. The older professional-landed Congress type has not vanished; it has been crowded. Labouring classes still enter mainly as voters, not as the elite itself.

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Q5(e) · 10 marks

What is your assessment about the recent farmers' movement in India? Elaborate.

Sociology GS 2 · 2024 · Social Movements in Modern India

Revision summary

The 2020-21 movement opposed three Union farm laws and won repeal in 2021.

Its core was organised cultivators of the north-western grain belt, including strong women's support work.

It used sit-ins, highways and a food-producer moral claim.

It succeeded as a veto; it did not transform landless labour's condition.

It continues the New Farmers' Movement tradition at a national scale.

Introduction

The **farmers' movement of 2020-21** was a prolonged sit-in, mainly at Delhi's borders, against three Union farm laws on trade, contract farming and stock limits. The laws were **repealed in 2021**. Assessment means asking who moved, how, what they won, and what agrarian structure they could not change.

Body

Who and how

Unions from Punjab, Haryana and western Uttar Pradesh-often **Jat and related cultivating groups** with a history of Green Revolution surplus and MSP grain-led the blockade. **BKU** and later a wider coalition, including women langar and kit-work, made it more than a male tractor protest. It used highways, social media, and a moral language of annadata. That is a **regional agrarian class movement** with a nationalist frame, not an all-India landless labour uprising.

Assessment

As a veto on a particular liberalisation of grain trade, it succeeded. It showed that organised farmers can still check the Union when logistics (Punjab-Delhi) and union density align. It politicised MSP as a public guarantee. Limits are clear: landless Dalit labour and many dryland farmers were weakly centred; corporate and class inequalities inside agriculture remain; the movement did not rewrite tenancy or women's land titles. Some violence and a contested Republic Day tractor march complicated its civic claim.

Sociologically it is a **dominant-cultivator defence of a state-supported grain regime**, allied at times with wider rural anger, effective as protest, incomplete as agrarian justice. Compared with earlier New Farmers' Movements (Sharad Joshi, BKU in the 1980s), it was more national-media visible and more focused on Union statute.

- **The assessment, then:** historically large, regionally skewed, tactically successful on repeal, structurally conservative on labour and landless interests.

Flow diagram

Three farm laws 2020 -> Border sit-ins unions
Punjab Haryana west UP cultivators -> Border sit-ins unions
Border sit-ins unions -> Repeal 2021 MSP politics
Landless and dryland weakly centred -> Border sit-ins unions

Conclusion

The 2020-21 farmers' movement was a powerful, union-led, Green-Revolution-belt mobilisation that forced repeal of the three laws. It defended MSP and cultivator dignity more than it represented all rural classes. That is both its strength and its limit.

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Q6(a) · 20 marks

Discuss the major challenges related to women's reproductive health in India. What measures would you suggest to overcome these challenges?

Sociology GS 2 · 2024 · Population Dynamics

Revision summary

Reproductive health covers survival, fertility control, nutrition and freedom from violence.

India improved institutional delivery while anaemia, unmet need and obstetric violence remain.

Caste, class and son preference structure who gets respectful care.

Female sterilisation still carries too much of the programme burden.

Measures must join public facilities to food, wages, schooling and male responsibility.

Introduction

Reproductive health is not only hospital births. It is the social chance to control fertility, survive pregnancy, eat enough, and live without sexual violence. In India those chances are still sorted by **class, caste, region and patriarchy**. NFHS rounds show progress in institutional delivery and stubborn gaps in anaemia, unmet need and respectful care. The challenge is a health system problem and a gender-structure problem together.

Body

Major challenges

Maternal mortality has fallen nationally but remains high in pockets of BIMARU and tribal districts. Anaemia among women of reproductive age is widespread, which is nutrition and unpaid work, not only iron tablets. Unmet need for contraception persists; female sterilisation still dominates the method mix, which places the body-burden on women. Adolescent marriage and pregnancy continue in several states. Unsafe abortion sits beside the MTP law because stigma and access fail. Infertility is medicalised for those who can pay and is a source of abandonment for those who cannot. Son preference, despite **PCPNDT**, shapes sex-selective practices and the experience of repeated pregnancy.

Caste and Adivasi status structure who meets a specialist and who meets a rude labour room. **Dalit and Muslim women** report discrimination in some facilities. Violence-domestic and sexual-makes reproductive autonomy a fiction. Occupational exposure in agriculture and informal work, and the double shift of care, undermine health before a clinic is reached. Surrogacy and the ART market create a class split: some women's reproduction is a service.

Patriarchy is the hinge. Who decides the next child, who goes to the PHC, who pays for a C-section in a private nursing home-these are household power questions. **Uma Chakravarti's** control of sexuality is visible in honour and in the silence around RTIs.

Measures

A public system of **free, high-quality antenatal, delivery, abortion and postnatal care**, including respectful midwifery, is the base. **ASHA** and ANM workers need pay, training and protection; they are the gendered frontline of the state. Expand reversible contraception and male methods so sterilisation is not the default. Enforce PCPNDT without turning every

pregnancy into a police event. Tie **POSHAN**, PDS and women's wages (MNREGA, NRLM) to anaemia, because tablets fail on hungry bodies. Delay marriage through schooling (NEP-era access is relevant) and enforce child-marriage law with community work, not only raids.

- **Legal measures:** full implementation of MTP amendments, **POSH and the Domestic Violence Act** as reproductive-health infrastructure. Panchayat women members can audit facilities if they are not proxies. Community-based monitoring, as in some Jan Swasthya experiments, reduces humiliation. Address infertility as public care, not only as a private IVF market.
- **Measures must include** men and in-laws: counselling, paternity leave where the formal sector exists, and campaigns that treat spacing as a joint duty. For Adivasi areas, language-capable staff and FRA-linked livelihoods reduce the malnutrition that pregnancy then reveals.

Nutrition, violence and the last mile

ASHAs cannot fix a household that withholds food from a daughter-in-law or that demands a son. POSHAN and PDS matter only if women control rations. Transport to a FRU at night is a public-goods and safety question, which is why maternal death is also a village-road and police-attitude story. Private nursing homes convert obstetric emergency into debt, which is class. Measures that ignore this last mile will keep reproducing NFHS gaps even as institutional delivery percentages look good on a dashboard.

Without land, wages and an end to obstetric violence, clinic construction will not finish the job. Reproductive health is a **social development** target, which is why it belongs in Paper II beside education and labour.

Flow diagram

Patriarchy caste class -> MMR anaemia unmet need
 Weak disrespectful care -> MMR anaemia unmet need
 Public care nutrition contraception -> Improved reproductive health
 MMR anaemia unmet need -> Public care nutrition contraception

Conclusion

Women's reproductive health in India is constrained by anaemia, uneven maternity care, a sterilisation-heavy programme, son preference, violence and caste-class barriers. Measures that work are a respectful public system, nutrition and wages, contraception that does not dump risk on women, and a direct attack on household patriarchy. Clinics without those social supports will keep reproducing the same NFHS gaps.

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Q6(b) · 20 marks

What is sustainable development? How can sustainability be achieved in India where livelihood needs conflict with environmental protection?

Sociology GS 2 · 2024 · Challenges of Social Transformation

Revision summary

Sustainable development meets needs now without wrecking future needs and requires equity, not only green technology.

In India, forest, mine, Green Revolution and coastal conflicts show livelihood versus protection as class conflict.

Guha and Gadgil's ecosystem people versus omnivores is a usable map.

FRA, PESA and Gram Sabha consent are tools to join conservation with rights.

Costs should shift toward high consumption and corporate externalities, not only toward the poor.

Introduction

Sustainable development, in the Brundtland sense, meets present needs without destroying the ability of future generations to meet theirs. In India the same phrase is used in NITI documents and in protest. The hard part is that **today's livelihood**-fuelwood, fish, factory jobs, paddy-often **is** the pressure on soil, forest, air and water. Sociology treats that as a conflict of classes and regions, not as a misunderstanding that a slogan can dissolve.

Body

What sustainability means here

It is not only carbon accounting. It includes **livelihood security, equity, and ecological limits**. **A. R. Desai** would ask who owns the resource. **Ramachandra Guha** and **Madhav Gadgil distinguished omnivores and ecosystem people: urban-industrial India consumes what forest and coastal communities inhabit**. **Chipko, Narmada, and later Niyamgiri** made that distinction political.

Where livelihood conflicts with protection

Forest dwellers need NTFP, shifting cultivation or grazing; the Forest Department and tiger reserves need exclusion. Miners and the treasury need bauxite and coal; Dongria Kondh and Hasdeo Arand communities need the hill. Green Revolution Punjab needs water and fertiliser; downstream and future soils pay. Coastal fishers need the sea; ports and SEZs need the same shore. Urban poor need cheap housing; wetlands that flood-buffer the city get built on. A blanket ban without alternatives is conservation against the poor. Unregulated extraction is livelihood for contractors and loss for the next generation of the same poor.

How sustainability can be approached

- **First**, rights-based access: the **Forest Rights Act, 2006**, PESA, and community forest management, so protection is not alienation. Second, **livelihood substitution that people accept**: MNREGA on local ecology, non-timber enterprises, fisheries co-management, not only tourist photography. Third, **technology and agronomy** that cut poison and water waste-but these fail if prices and MSP keep pushing monoculture. Fourth, **urban sustainability** as housing and public transport for labour, not only solar rooftops on gated colonies. Fifth,

democratic planning: Gram Sabha consent, social impact under land-acquisition law, and the right to say no, as in Niyamgiri's Gram Sabhas.

Sustainability in a poor, unequal country is a **bargain among classes mediated by the state**. It cannot be a museum forest beside hungry villages, and it cannot be growth that treats air and groundwater as free. The 2020-21 farmers' movement, Chipko's memory, and FRA struggles are parts of that bargain. Education (NEP's environmental aims) and women's groups in Chipko-type mobilisations matter because women often carry the daily fuel-and-water load.

Urban middle-class environmentalism (clean air, lakes, plastic bans) can conflict with waste-picker and street-vendor livelihoods. That is the same trilogy in the city: development as a world-class aesthetic, environment as amenity, and the identity of informal workers who live from the discarded city. A sociological sustainability answer must keep that urban conflict beside Chipko and Niyamgiri, or it will sound like a ministry pamphlet.

There will remain conflict. The sociological task is to **shift costs upward**-to luxury consumption, corporate externalities, and wasteful public projects-rather than to Adivasi and slum livelihoods.

Flow diagram

Present livelihoods -> Conflict
Ecological limits -> Conflict
FRA PESA consent PESA consent -> Sustainable path
Fair alternatives -> Sustainable path
Conflict -> Sustainable path

Conclusion

Sustainable development is development within ecological limits and across generations. In India it collides with livelihoods because the poor live inside the resources that the powerful want to fence or extract. FRA, democratic consent, and fair alternatives are the practical path. A pure ban and a pure extractive growth both fail the definition.

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Q6(c) · 10 marks

Critically examine the relevance of development planning in India

Sociology GS 2 · 2024 · Visions of Social Change in India

Revision summary

Planning meant Five-Year Plans, public investment and a mixed economy.

It built industry and science and left caste-agrarian power under-attacked.

Desai read it as bourgeois-state planning.

NITI Aayog replaced the Commission but missions and state plans continue.

Climate, health and equity still require democratic planning, not only markets.

Introduction

Development planning in India was the **Nehruvian bet** that a mixed economy, Five-Year Plans, and public investment in steel, dams and IITs could build a national productive base and reduce poverty. **NITI Aayog** replaced the **Planning Commission** in 2015. The question is not nostalgia. It is whether a society this unequal still needs a public map of investment, or only markets and schemes.

Body

What planning did and did not do

Planning created a heavy-industry and scientific infrastructure, a language of balanced regional growth, and anti-poverty programmes. **A. R. Desai** criticised it as planning for a bourgeois state that left agrarian class power intact. Licence-permit raj and public-sector inefficiency were real. Green Revolution planning raised grain and stratified the village. Caste and gender were thin in early plan documents.

After 1991, indicative planning shrank. Growth accelerated in services and some industry; inequality and informality remained. **NITI Aayog** is a **think-tank and competitive-federalism** body, not a Commission that allocates Plan funds. States still plan; the Union still runs missions. So planning did not die. It **changed form**.

Relevance now

Climate, urban infrastructure, health, and a just energy transition cannot be left only to firms. COVID showed the need for public capacity. Caste-class targeting of health and education still needs a map, which is planning by another name. The risk of NITI-style planning is **rankings without redistribution**. The risk of old planning is rigidity. Relevance lies in **democratic, ecological, federal planning**-closer to FRA consent and panchayat lists than to a closed Yojana Bhavan.

Planning also names **who is the public**. Five-Year Plans spoke of the poor as targets; NITI dashboards speak of states as competitors. Both can hide caste and gender unless the plan is forced to list them. **S. C. Dube** and village studies showed why a national plan fails when it ignores local structure. Relevance today is therefore not a return to licence raj. It is a public investment map for health, skills (NEP), energy and urban services that is **open to Gram Sabha and legislative audit**.

Critically, planning remains relevant as **coordination and equity**. It is obsolete as a fantasy of total state control of prices and licences.

Flow diagram

Five-Year Plans -> Mixed economy base

1991 reforms -> NITI competitive federalism competitive federalism

Mixed economy base -> Still need public coordination

NITI competitive federalism -> Still need public coordination

Conclusion

Indian development planning built a public productive base and failed to undo agrarian and caste inequality. After 1991 and **NITI Aayog** it is no longer a Soviet-style command system. It remains relevant for climate, infrastructure and redistribution if it is federal and rights-based.

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Q7(a) · 20 marks

Analyse the trilogy between environmental movement, development, and tribal identity

Sociology GS 2 · 2024 · Social Movements in Modern India

Revision summary

The trilogy means development, environment and tribal identity define one another on the ground.

Dams, mines and parks have displaced Adivasis in the name of the nation.

Chipko, Narmada and Niyamgiri joined livelihood, ecology and peoplehood.

FRA and PESA are legal attempts to institutionalise that join.

Urban green talk that drops tribe and class misunderstands Indian environmentalism.

Introduction

Environmental movement, development, and tribal identity form a **trilogy** because each term defines the other two in central India and the Himalaya. 'Development' as dam, mine, plantation or park arrives on **Adivasi land**. The protest is called environmental in the city and is lived as **identity, livelihood and sacred geography** in the village. **Virginius Xaxa** and Guha-Gadgil help us keep all three in one analysis.

Body

Development as dispossession

Post-Independence planning treated forests and rivers as national stock. Dams on the Narmada, mines in Odisha, Jharkhand and Chhattisgarh, and protected areas produced **development-induced displacement**. Tribal identity is not a costume. It is a relation to land, myth, clan and language. When the hill is mined, identity is attacked, not only income. The **Fifth Schedule**, PESA and FRA exist because this was already known and still happens.

Environmentalism and identity

Chipko is often remembered as tree-hugging. In the hills it was also peasant and women's control of forests against commercial felling-identity as pahari livelihood. Narmada combined environmental critique of large dams with adivasi and peasant displacement. **Niyamgiri** fused Dongria Kondh sacred identity, biodiversity, and a no to bauxite. Pathalgadi and related assertions mix constitutional Schedule identity with resistance to land laws.

Urban climate discourse can **strip** these movements of tribe and class and keep only carbon. That is a sociological error. Conversely, identity politics without ecology can bargain for a share of mining royalties and still lose the forest. The trilogy is the claim that **you cannot analyse one vertex alone**.

How the three now interlock

The state offers development as jobs and roads; companies offer CSR; security forces treat some belts as insurgency. Environmental law (EIA, Forest Conservation) is the paperwork of the same conflict. Tribal identity becomes a legal resource (ST, FRA claims) and a stigma (primitive, anti-national). Movements succeed when they join **Gram Sabha legality, ecological knowledge, and a public story** the rest of India can hear.

Mining belts also show the trilogy inside the movement. Some households want jobs in the plant; some want the sacred grove left alone; women often carry both the water shortage and the protest. The state then offers cash and a public hearing. **Development** becomes a language of compensation; **environment** becomes a file in the ministry; **identity** becomes an ST certificate. The trilogy is the refusal to let those three files stay separate.

- **The trilogy also includes internal difference:** tribal elites, Christian and sarna splits, and women who carry water and oppose liquor and mines in different ways. A trilogy is not a harmony.

Flow diagram

Development projects -> Tribal land and forest
Tribal identity -> Tribal land and forest
Environmental movement -> Tribal land and forest
Tribal land and forest -> Trilogy of conflict and claim

Conclusion

Environmental movements, development projects and tribal identity are one structure of conflict over land and meaning. Development that ignores identity is dispossession; environmentalism that ignores tribe is aesthetic; identity that ignores ecology can sell the hill. FRA and Gram Sabha consent are the institutional names of the trilogy.

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Q7(b) · 20 marks

To what extent have the legal provisions been effective in curbing violence against women in India? Give your argument

Sociology GS 2 · 2024 · Challenges of Social Transformation

Revision summary

India's VAW law includes 498A, the DV Act, post-Nirbhaya rape reform and POSH.

Law has changed norms and created institutions.

Conviction, investigation and informal-sector reach remain weak.

Caste, honour and digital abuse show competing patriarchal jurisdictions.

- **Effectiveness is partial:** stronger as recognition than as daily protection.

Introduction

- **India has a thick file of laws against violence that women face:** cruelty in marriage (498A), dowry death provisions, the **Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005**, reformed rape law after **Nirbhaya (2012-13)**, **POSH (2013)**, PCPNDT, and the Trafficking and POCSO statutes where girls are concerned. Effectiveness is **partial**. Law has named the violence and opened institutions. It has not brought the social rate of violence under control, because patriarchy, police practice and delayed courts still organise the field.

Body

What law has achieved

Law created a public language. Dowry death and domestic violence are not only 'family matters' in statute. Vishaka to POSH made the workplace a site of state duty. Fast-track rhetoric and the 2013 criminal amendments widened the definition of sexual assault. Protection officers and shelter homes exist on paper and, in some districts, in fact. Panchayat women members and movements (after Mathura, after Nirbhaya, after Hathras) use these texts. That is effectiveness as **norm change and institutional presence**.

Some deterrence is real for visible public employees and for families that fear a 498A FIR. POSH committees in universities and firms, where they function, alter everyday behaviour.

Where law is thin

NCRB numbers are not a simple map of violence; they mix reporting and incidence. Conviction rates for rape and domestic cruelty remain low. Investigation is hostile; two-finger myths died slowly. Informal 'compromise' and village panchayats send women home. **498A** is contested as misuse; the contest itself can chill genuine complaints. The **DV Act** is civil-protection oriented and under-resourced. POSH barely reaches informal labour, which is where most women work. Caste atrocity against Dalit women is sexual violence plus untouchability; PoA and rape law both apply and both fail in many trials.

Honour killings, khap orders, and communal targeting of women show extra-legal patriarchal law competing with the Constitution. Digital violence outruns IT and criminal provisions. During COVID, domestic violence rose while movement to a thana fell.

- **Extent: moderately effective as recognition, weakly effective as everyday protection, least effective for informal, rural, Dalit, Adivasi and disabled women.** Legal provisions are a necessary condition of curb, not a sufficient one. Police reform, forensic capacity, shelters, and a change in household power (property, wages, education) are the missing half.

Informal workplaces remain the largest hole. A domestic worker, farm labourer or vendor faces violence with almost no POSH committee and with a police station that may send her back to the employer or husband. Legal provisions written for offices and for 'cruelty in marriage' do not automatically travel there. Effectiveness must therefore be measured **by class of work**, not only by the elegance of the statute.

- **A sociological argument therefore refuses two slogans:** that law is useless, and that law has solved VAW. **Ambedkar's** insight that rights need social conscience still holds. **Uma Chakravarti's** Brahmanical patriarchy explains why the same family that uses a smartphone still polices a daughter.

Flow diagram

498A DV POSH rape reform -> Public naming
498A DV POSH rape reform -> Committees shelters FIRs
Patriarchy police delay -> Weak everyday curb
Public naming -> Partial effectiveness
Committees shelters FIRs -> Partial effectiveness
Weak everyday curb -> Partial effectiveness

Conclusion

Legal provisions have partly curbed violence against women by naming it, creating POSH and DV machinery, and widening sexual-assault law. They have been limited by police-court practice, informal work, caste, and household patriarchy. The extent of effectiveness is real at the level of norms and uneven at the level of safety.

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Q7(c) · 10 marks

Trace the social and historical origins of Dalit movements in modern India

Sociology GS 2 · 2024 · Social Movements in Modern India

Revision summary

Dalit movements arise from untouchability as a social structure and from modern public institutions.

Phule's anti-caste education is an early modern origin.

Ambedkar joined agitation, law and Navayana Buddhism.

Regional Adi and temple-entry struggles are parallel origins.

Panthers and electoral parties are later forms of the same historical line.

Introduction

Dalit movements in modern India did not begin with a party symbol. They began from the **social fact of untouchability**-excluded wells, schools, temples and honour-and from a modern chance to speak in print, law and the census. **Phule**, **Ambedkar**, regional Adi traditions, and later Panthers and electoral parties are chapters of one long refusal of hereditary humiliation.

Body

Social origins

Caste as endogamy and pollution (**Ambedkar**, **Ghurye's disabilities**) produced a shared injury across regions, with local names: Mahar, Pulaya, Paraiyar, Chamar, and many others. Colonial courts, missions, army and municipalities opened small exits. The census named 'Depressed Classes' and made numbers a political resource. That is the historical opening of a modern Dalit public.

Historical line

Jotirao and Savitribai Phule's Satyashodhak work and schools attacked Brahmanical monopoly of knowledge. Non-Brahmin movements in Madras and elsewhere were related but not identical; Dalit streams often had to fight both Brahmin and intermediate-caste dominance. **Ad Dharm** in Punjab, **Namashudra** organising in Bengal, and temple-entry struggles (Vaikom, Guruvayur, later temple laws) made dignity a public demand. **Ambedkar** unified a national programme: Mahad water, Nashik temple, Independent Labour Party, the Poona Pact conflict with **Gandhi**, conversion to Buddhism in 1956, and the constitutional abolition of untouchability. That is the hinge of modern origins.

Post-Independence Republican currents, the **Dalit Panthers** in 1970s Maharashtra (literature plus street), **BAMCEF** and **BSP** in the north, and many regional manch continued the line into electoral and cultural politics. Origins remain social: landlessness, stigmatised labour, and the insult of touch. Origins are also historical: without colony, print and the Constitution, the movement would not have this shape.

Print, night schools, and the Depressed Classes press in several languages created a **counter-public** in which origins became a story people could share across regions. Without that historical infrastructure, **Phule** and **Ambedkar** would remain local teachers. With it, Dalit

movement origins are national and still unfinished.

Tracing origins therefore means joining **structure (caste) + colonial modernity + named organic intellectuals and organisations.**

Flow diagram

Untouchability and endogamy -> Colonial public census missions
Colonial public census missions -> Phule schools Satyashodhak
Colonial public census missions -> Ambedkar Mahad Constitution
Ambedkar Mahad Constitution -> Panthers BSP cultural politics

Conclusion

Dalit movements originate in the caste structure of humiliation and in modern opportunities to organise. **Phule** and **Ambedkar** are the principal architects; regional Adi and temple-entry struggles and later Panthers and parties extend the same origin story into the present.

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Q8(a) · 20 marks

Highlight the major contributions of the reform movements in pre-independent India

Sociology GS 2 · 2024 · Social Movements in Modern India

Revision summary

Reform movements made custom criticisable and legible before Independence.

Sati abolition, widow remarriage and girls' schooling are core gender contributions.

Brahmo, Arya, Aligarh and Singh Sabha recast religious communities.

Phule, Narayana Guru and **Ambedkar** pushed reform beyond elite salons.

Limits include caste-class narrowness; the institutional legacy remains large.

Introduction

Reform movements in pre-independent India were organised efforts to change **religion, caste, gender and education** under colonial rule. They did not begin the nationalist movement, but they created a public in which the nation could later speak. Their major contributions are institutional and moral, not only famous names.

Body

Social and gender contributions

The campaign against **sati** (Rammohan Roy, 1829 abolition) and **Vidyasagar's** widow remarriage work made women's bodily fate a public legislative question. Age of consent debates, however contested, put child marriage on the table. **Savitribai and Jotirao Phule** contributed schools for girls and for those excluded by caste, which is a deeper contribution than bhadralok petitioning. These moves built the later ground for Hindu Code and for constitutional equality.

Religious and caste contributions

Brahmo Samaj and later Prarthana currents contributed a critique of idolatry and caste rigidity among elites. **Arya Samaj** contributed shuddhi, vernacular education, and a militant reform of Hindu practice that also fed majoritarian politics. **Aligarh** and related Muslim modernism contributed English-modern education for a Muslim elite (and a contested political legacy). **Singh Sabha** reform recast Sikh institutions. **Narayana Guru** in Kerala contributed a temple-opening, 'one caste, one religion, one god' attack on pollution that massified reform beyond the salon. **Ambedkar's** pre-1947 work is both Dalit movement and reform: Mahad, temple, and a programme to annihilate caste.

Missionary and anti-missionary contests contributed print, schools and a new competitive public. Temperance, anti-nautch and sanitising campaigns contributed a middle-class moral code with both emancipatory and controlling sides for women.

National and institutional contributions

Reform produced **associations, colleges, presses and laws** that nationalism later used. It contributed the idea that custom is criticisable. **M. N. Srinivas's** sanskritization and westernization both run through these movements: some copied Sanskritic respectability; some copied missionary education.

- **Reform also contributed** new subjectivities: the widow as a person who may remarry, the lower-caste student as a person who may read, the community as something that can be purified or annihilated. Those subjectivities later filled legislatures. The nationalist movement borrowed this moral energy and sometimes asked women and Dalits to wait. Highlighting contributions therefore includes that tension: reform made the social question public; it did not finish it.

Limits are part of the highlight. Many movements were **upper-caste, male and urban**. They often sought a purified community, not annihilation of caste. Peasants and Adivasis had parallel risings that textbooks under-name as reform. Contribution is still large: without this pre-independence work, independent India's women's law, Dalit constitutionalism and public education would have had a thinner soil.

Flow diagram

Brahmo Arya Aligarh -> Public of print and law
Phule Narayana Guru Ambedkar -> Mass anti-caste education
Public of print and law -> Contributions to modern India
Mass anti-caste education -> Contributions to modern India

Conclusion

Pre-independence reform movements contributed public critique of sati, widowhood, child marriage and caste exclusion, new schools and sects, and the habit of legislating custom. **Phule**, Narayana Guru and **Ambedkar** massified what bhadralok reform began. The contribution is foundational and socially uneven.

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Q8(b) · 20 marks

Identify different forms of inequalities associated with agrarian social structure in India

Sociology GS 2 · 2024 · Social Classes in India

Revision summary

Agrarian structure organises land, labour, caste and household.

Class forms include owners, tenants, landless and new reverse tenancy.

Caste maps onto field labour and honour in the village.

Women's farm work without title is a central inequality.

Region and ecology split irrigated surplus growers from dryland and forest poor.

Introduction

Agrarian social structure is the organised pattern of **land, labour, caste and household** in the countryside. Inequality here is not one gap. It is several forms that overlap. **Daniel Thorner's** malik, kisan and mazdoor, **Béteille's** owners-tenants-labourers, and **Dhanagare's** peasant strata give a class language. Caste and gender decide who sits in each class.

Body

Class forms

- **Ownership inequality:** large holders, medium cultivating owners, petty owners, tenants, and landless labourers. **A. R. Desai** stressed landlord and peasant class conflict under colonialism and after. Tenancy and sharecropping shift surplus without always shifting title. Reverse tenancy in machine-owning belts is a new class twist: small owners lease out to capitalist farmers. Attached and migrant labour (**Breman**) is unfreedom as well as poverty. Green Revolution and later horticulture markets widened the gap between surplus growers in Punjab-Haryana-coastal Andhra and dryland smallholders.

Caste and status forms

- **Land maps onto jati in many regions:** dominant cultivating castes versus Dalit labour. Béteille showed the map is not perfect, which is why analysis needs both dimensions. Untouchability in fields, separate hamlets, and exclusion from well and temple are agrarian inequalities, not extras. OBC assertion and land reform leftovers produced new dominant groups without equality for the landless.

Gender, generation and region

Women work in fields and lack titles; widows and daughters lose land in practice despite the 2005 succession amendment. Girls' unpaid farm work subsidises male status. Regional inequality-irrigated versus rainfed, hill versus plain, Adivasi forest versus caste village-is agrarian too. Policy (ceilings, tenancy law, MNREGA, PM-KISAN) redistributes unevenly: title-based transfers miss the landless woman.

- **Forms, listed: property class, tenancy, labour unfreedom, caste rank, gendered landlessness, and regional-ecological inequality.** They stack. A Dalit landless woman migrant is not three separate case studies. She is the structure at its intersection.

Credit, irrigation and markets are further forms. A household with a tube well and KCC sits in a different class from one that buys water. MSP-linked grain belts differ from cash-crop distress belts. Contract farming can look like opportunity and still transfer risk downward.

These are agrarian inequalities even when the caste names stay the same.

The 2020-21 farmers' movement showed cultivator inequality vis-à-vis the state and corporates; it did not erase these internal forms.

Flow diagram

Land rights -> Class inequality
Tenancy and labour -> Class inequality
Caste rank -> Agrarian inequality
Gendered title -> Agrarian inequality
Class inequality -> Agrarian inequality

Conclusion

Agrarian inequality in India takes the forms of class (land, tenancy, labour), caste rank, gendered exclusion from title, and regional-ecological gaps. Thorner and Bêteille still name the class skeleton. Caste and gender put flesh on who occupies each bone.

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Q8(c) · 10 marks

What are pressure groups? Discuss their role in decision-making in democracy

Sociology GS 2 · 2024 · Politics and Society

Revision summary

Pressure groups influence public decisions without mainly seeking office.

Unions, chambers, caste sabhas, farm unions and NGOs are Indian types.

They aggregate demands, supply expertise and sometimes veto legislation.

The Rudolphs read caste associations as modern interest groups.

Informal poor are under-organised, so influence stays unequal.

Introduction

Pressure groups are organised bodies that try to **shape public decisions** without, as their main goal, forming the government. Trade unions, FICCI and CII, caste associations, farmers' unions, student bodies, and issue NGOs are Indian examples. In a democracy they can carry information and votes to decision-makers. They can also **capture** the state for a narrow interest. Their role is therefore double.

Body

What they do in decision-making

- **They aggregate demands:** a chamber drafts a tax memo; a union bargains a wage board; a caste mahasabha bargains on reservation lists. They supply expertise that bureaucracies lack. They veto: the 2020-21 farm unions blocked three laws; business lobbies slow labour reform; environmental groups delay projects through courts. **Lloyd and Susanne Rudolph** treated caste sabhas as modern pressure groups-the modernity of tradition. Panchayati Raj opened a local target for these groups.

Parties need them for funds and crowds; that is how they enter cabinets without being parties. Media campaigns and PIL are Indian tools of pressure.

Democratic gain and loss

- **Gain:** minorities, workers and farmers can be heard between elections. **Ambedkarite** organisations keep atrocity law on the agenda. Women's groups pushed Vishaka and POSH. Loss: moneyed groups out-shout slum dwellers; khaps pressure on marriage; communal organisations pressure policing. Unorganised informal labour has weak groups, so decision-making hears the mill union or the chamber more than the migrant.

- **Role in democracy: necessary intermediaries, unequal in power, sometimes a parallel government.** Regulation of lobbying, inner democracy in unions, and RTI are attempts to civilise that role. Without pressure groups, representative democracy is only a periodic vote. With only the strongest groups, it is a market of influence.

Decision-making in India also runs through **courts and regulators**. Environmental groups, industry chambers and campus unions all use PIL and public hearings. That is pressure as legal mobilisation. It can expand democracy (information, delay of harmful projects) or stall redistribution (endless litigation by those who can pay lawyers). The role is still decision-shaping, not office-seeking.

The 73rd Amendment, POSH committees, and farm-law repeal are all decision sites where pressure groups were visible. That is the empirical core of the answer.

Flow diagram

Pressure groups -> Demands expertise votes
Demands expertise votes -> State decisions
Unequal resources -> Skewed influence
Skewed influence -> State decisions

Conclusion

Pressure groups are organised interests that seek to influence decisions rather than to sit as the cabinet. In Indian democracy they deepen voice and also skew it toward those who can organise money, caste and logistics. Their role in decision-making is indispensable and structurally unequal.

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Compiled answer key

Last pages of this pack. Each question links to the WRAP model answer on wrapexams.com.

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Q1(a) 10 marks	Q1(b) 10 marks	Q1(c) 10 marks	Q1(d) 10 marks
Q1(e) 10 marks	Q2(a) 20 marks	Q2(b) 20 marks	Q2(c) 10 marks
Q3(a) 20 marks	Q3(b) 20 marks	Q3(c) 10 marks	Q4(a) 20 marks
Q4(b) 20 marks	Q4(c) 10 marks	Q5(a) 10 marks	Q5(b) 10 marks
Q5(c) 10 marks	Q5(d) 10 marks	Q5(e) 10 marks	Q6(a) 20 marks
Q6(b) 20 marks	Q6(c) 10 marks	Q7(a) 20 marks	Q7(b) 20 marks
Q7(c) 10 marks	Q8(a) 20 marks	Q8(b) 20 marks	Q8(c) 10 marks

Question-wise key

Q1(a) · 10 marks Solution

Q1(b) · 10 marks Solution

Q1(c) · 10 marks Solution

Q1(d) · 10 marks Solution

Q1(e) · 10 marks Solution

Q2(a) · 20 marks Solution

Q2(b) · 20 marks Solution

Q2(c) · 10 marks Solution

Q3(a) · 20 marks Solution

Q3(b) · 20 marks Solution

Q3(c) · 10 marks Solution

Q4(a) · 20 marks Solution

Q4(b) · 20 marks Solution

Q4(c) · 10 marks Solution

Q5(a) · 10 marks Solution

Q5(b) · 10 marks Solution

Q5(c) · 10 marks Solution

Q5(d) · 10 marks Solution

Q5(e) · 10 marks Solution

Q6(a) · 20 marks Solution

Q6(b) · 20 marks Solution

Q6(c) · 10 marks Solution

Q7(a) · 20 marks Solution

Q7(b) · 20 marks Solution

Q7(c) · 10 marks Solution

Q8(a) · 20 marks Solution

Q8(b) · 20 marks Solution

Q8(c) · 10 marks Solution

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