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UPSC Mains 2023 PSIR Paper 2

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Q1(a) · 10 marks

What are the crucial functions of empirical political theory in Comparative Politics?

PSIR GS 2 · 2023 · Comparative Politics

Revision summary

Empirical political theory studies observable political facts with concepts that evidence can test.

Its functions are description, classification, explanation, middle-range theory, and checking claims against practice.

It shifted Comparative Politics from legal texts alone toward behaviour and institutions.

Sartori's warning against conceptual stretching is part of that discipline.

It does not cancel culture or critical theory; it supplies the evidence those approaches still need.

Introduction

Empirical political theory in Comparative Politics studies observable political behaviour, institutions, and outcomes with concepts that can be checked against evidence. It does not replace philosophy. It tests what states and citizens actually do.

Body

What empirical political theory is

- It grew with the behavioural movement associated with David Easton, Gabriel Almond, and later quantitative and case-work that asked for statements that data can support or refute.
- It treats votes, cabinets, parties, courts, and public spending as facts that can be classified and compared, not only as legal texts.
- Giovanni Sartori insisted that concepts must travel without stretching, so empirical work needs clear definitions before counting.

Crucial functions

- **Description:** it records how governments, parties, and citizens behave across countries.
- **Classification:** it groups regimes, party systems, and federal designs so that like cases sit together.

- **Explanation:** it links causes such as class, institutions, or political culture to outcomes such as stability or turnout.
- **Middle-range theory:** it builds limited generalisations, for example about coalition cabinets or consociational bargains, rather than one law for all politics.
- **Evaluation of claims:** it checks whether a constitution or a slogan matches practice.

Role in Comparative Politics

- It moved the field from formal-legal catalogues of constitutions toward comparison of real processes.
- It supplies the evidence base on which later interpretive and critical work, including Robert Cox's distinction between problem-solving and critical theory, can still argue.
- It remains limited when culture, meaning, and history are ignored, yet without it comparison becomes opinion.

Flow diagram

Empirical political theory -> Describe and classify
Empirical political theory -> Explain and test
Explain and test -> Comparative Politics
Describe and classify -> Comparative Politics

Conclusion

Empirical political theory describes, classifies, and tests political life across states. In Comparative Politics its role is to keep concepts tied to evidence so that comparison is more than a list of unique stories.

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Q1(b) · 10 marks

What are the difficulties faced by a political theorist in comparing the States?

PSIR GS 2 · 2023 · Comparative Politics

Revision summary

States are unlike in size, history, and capacity, so the unit of comparison is not automatic.

Conceptual stretching, Galton's problem, and selection bias are standard difficulties.

Data are political products, and language changes the meaning of institutions.

Interdependence means States are not independent experiments.

Designs such as most-similar cases reduce error; they do not remove it.

Introduction

Comparing States is the core of Comparative Politics, yet States differ in size, history, language, and data. The difficulty is to compare without false identity and without giving up generalisation.

Body

Conceptual and unit problems

- Sartori's conceptual stretching appears when one word, such as democracy or federalism, is applied to unlike regimes.
- The State as a unit is not the same object in a small island, a continental federation, and a weak post-conflict territory.
- Galton's problem appears when States are not independent cases because they copy laws, parties, or constitutions from one another.

Method and data

- Small-N comparison cannot control every variable; large-N work often lacks valid indicators for the same idea in every country.
- Official statistics, election results, and survey items are produced by States and may hide repression or informal power.
- Language, legal tradition, and political culture change the meaning of a vote, a court, or a party label.

Politics of comparison

- Selection bias appears when only successful or only failed States are studied.
- Levels of analysis mix when a scholar compares a cabinet in one country with a whole region in another.
- Robert Keohane's complex interdependence and world-economy hierarchies mean that two States are never isolated laboratories.

How the field still proceeds

- Most-similar and most-different designs, process tracing, and careful concept formation reduce, but do not erase, these difficulties.

Flow diagram

Compare States -> Concept stretching
Compare States -> Data and language
Compare States -> Interdependence of cases
Concept stretching -> Limits of generalisation
Data and language -> Limits of generalisation
Interdependence of cases -> Limits of generalisation

Conclusion

Comparing States is difficult because concepts, data, dependence among cases, and unequal power distort the objects being compared. The political scientist's task is disciplined comparison, not the claim that States are identical units.

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Q1(c) · 10 marks

How does democratic politics construct citizenship?

PSIR GS 2 · 2023 · Comparative Politics

Revision summary

Citizenship in a democracy is made by law, votes, and social rights, not only by birth records.

Marshall's civil, political, and social rights describe how that status has thickened.

Parties, movements, and civic education teach people to act as citizens.

Democracies still contest migrants, minorities, and documents of belonging.

Construction is therefore both inclusion and a fight over who is inside.

Introduction

Citizenship is not only a passport. Democratic politics constructs it by granting rights, demanding duties, and teaching who belongs to the political community. The construction is legal, social, and everyday.

Body

Legal construction

- Constitutions and statutes name who is a citizen, who can vote, and who can hold office.
- T. H. Marshall's sequence of civil, political, and social rights shows how democracies have thickened citizenship from legal equality toward welfare claims.
- Universal adult franchise, independent courts, and equal protection make the citizen a rights-bearing person rather than a subject.

Political practice

- Parties, elections, and campaigns teach citizens to see themselves as choosers of governments.
- Civil society, unions, and social movements expand who is heard, including workers, women, and minorities.
- Public education, conscription in some states, and civic ritual create a shared political identity.

Contests inside democracy

- **Democracies also exclude:** property tests in the past, and today disputes over migrants, refugees, and dual nationality show that citizenship is fought over.
- In India, adult franchise from 1950, later panchayati raj, and debates on identification documents show construction as an ongoing process, not a finished list.
- Democratic politics therefore constructs citizenship by inclusion through rights and by conflict over the boundary of the people.

Flow diagram

Democratic politics -> Civil political social rights

Democratic politics -> Elections and parties

Democratic politics -> Boundary of membership

Civil political social rights -> Citizenship

Elections and parties -> Citizenship

Boundary of membership -> Citizenship

Conclusion

Democratic politics constructs citizenship through law, elections, welfare, and civic practice. It makes members into rights-holders and voters, while the boundary of membership remains a live political question.

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Q1(d) · 10 marks

What is the structure and functions of International Court of Justice?

PSIR GS 2 · 2023 · Contemporary Global Concerns

Revision summary

The ICJ is the UN's principal judicial organ, with 15 judges elected by the Assembly and the Council.

Contentious cases are between States that have consented to jurisdiction.

Advisory opinions answer legal questions from authorised UN bodies.

Article 38 lists the sources the Court applies.

Enforcement of judgments can go to the Security Council, which limits the Court against the P5.

Introduction

The International Court of Justice is the principal judicial organ of the United Nations. It sits at The Hague under the UN Charter and its own Statute. It settles legal disputes between States and gives advisory opinions to authorised UN organs.

Body

Structure

- The Court has 15 judges elected for nine-year terms by the General Assembly and the Security Council, voting separately.
- Five seats are filled every three years. No two judges may be nationals of the same State.
- Chambers, including a Chamber of Summary Procedure, may sit for particular cases.
- Only States may be parties in contentious cases. International organisations are not litigants there.
- The Registry is the permanent secretariat. Official languages are English and French.

Functions

- Contentious jurisdiction decides legal disputes when States consent, by special agreement, by a treaty clause, or by an optional-clause declaration under the Statute.
- Advisory jurisdiction answers legal questions put by the General Assembly, the Security Council, or other authorised organs and specialised agencies.
- The Court applies treaties, custom, general principles, and, as subsidiary means, judicial decisions and teachings of publicists, as listed in Article 38 of the Statute.
- Judgments are binding on the parties to that case. Article 94 of the Charter allows a party to seek Security Council action if the other side fails to comply.

Limits

- Consent is the gate. Powerful States often withhold it or ignore political disputes that they refuse to treat as legal.
- The Security Council's enforcement role means the Court cannot police the P5 by itself.
- Advisory opinions are not judgments, though they carry legal and political weight.

Flow diagram

UN Charter and ICJ Statute -> 15 judges The Hague

15 judges The Hague -> Contentious cases States

15 judges The Hague -> Advisory opinions

Contentious cases States -> Article 94 UNSC

Conclusion

The ICJ is a 15-judge UN court for inter-State law and for advisory opinions. Its structure is elective and professional. Its functions depend on State consent and, for enforcement, on a Security Council that is itself political.

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Q1(e) · 10 marks

Discuss the structure and functions of UN Security Council.

PSIR GS 2 · 2023 · India and the UN System

Revision summary

The Security Council has five permanent members with a veto and ten elected members for two years.

Nine votes including the P5 are needed on substance.

Chapter VI covers disputes; Chapter VII covers threats, sanctions, and force.

Peacekeeping is a Council practice that the 1945 text did not fully name.

The veto makes the Council a concert of major powers as well as a legal organ.

Introduction

The Security Council is the UN organ charged with primary responsibility for international peace and security. Its structure of five permanent members and ten elected members, and the veto, shape every function it performs.

Body

Structure

- **Article 23 of the Charter provides five permanent members:** China, France, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom, and the United States.
- Ten non-permanent members are elected by the General Assembly for two-year terms, with regard to contribution to peace and to equitable geography.
- Each member has one vote. **Article 27** requires nine affirmative votes, including the concurring votes of the permanent members, on non-procedural matters. That is the veto.
- The Council is so organised as to be able to function continuously. A member must be able to send a representative at all times.

Functions

- It investigates disputes and recommends adjustment under Chapter VI.
- Under Chapter VII it may determine a threat to the peace, a breach of the peace, or an act of aggression, and decide on measures not involving force (**Article 41**) or force (**Article 42**).
- It authorises sanctions, arms embargoes, and most United Nations peacekeeping operations, which sit in practice between Chapters VI and VII.
- It recommends admission of new UN members and nominates the Secretary-General together with the Assembly's appointment.
- It may refer situations to the International Criminal Court where the Rome Statute allows, as a political-legal function added after 1945.

Working facts

- Subsidiary bodies include sanctions committees and the **Military Staff Committee**, which has never operated as the Charter's armed-force design intended.
- Reform debates, including India's claim treated in Paper II Section B, target the 1945 map of power, not the idea of a security council as such.

Flow diagram

UN Charter -> P5 veto

UN Charter -> Ten elected members

P5 veto -> Chapter VI and VII

Ten elected members -> Chapter VI and VII

Chapter VI and VII -> Sanctions PKO force

Conclusion

The Security Council's structure is P5 plus ten elected members, with a veto on substance. Its functions run from pacific settlement to sanctions, force authorisation, and peacekeeping. Effectiveness follows great-power agreement, not the text alone.

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Q2(a) · 20 marks

Discuss the relevance of the normative ethos of the Non-Aligned Movement in magnifying India's soft power in pursuit of her national interest

PSIR GS 2 · 2023 · Key concepts in International Relations

Revision summary

NAM's ethos is non-membership of Cold War blocs, sovereignty, and anti-colonial solidarity.

Belgrade 1961 organised a movement, not an army.

India's founder role still reads as diplomatic autonomy in much of Africa and Asia.

Nye's soft power here is legitimacy and voice, carried by training, vaccines, UN work, and Global South summits.

The ethos is strained by a large membership and by India's later multi-alignment, but it has not been discarded.

Introduction

The Non-Aligned Movement was organised as a diplomatic identity, not as a military bloc. Its ethos is independent judgment, anti-colonial solidarity, and peaceful coexistence. India used that ethos from Belgrade onward, and still uses it as a source of soft power among developing States.

Body

Ethos of NAM

- **Bandung in 1955 and Belgrade in 1961 set the core:** no membership of Cold War military alliances, respect for sovereignty, and opposition to colonialism and racial domination.
- **Jawaharlal Nehru**, Josip Broz Tito, Gamal Abdel Nasser, Kwame Nkrumah, and Sukarno treated non-alignment as the right to decide each issue, not as equidistance as a formula.
- Panchsheel and the UN Charter language of peaceful coexistence supplied the moral vocabulary.
- The ethos was South-South consultation, economic self-reliance talk, and nuclear-disarmament pressure on both camps.
- It was never a command structure. Consensus and a rotating chair were the method, which later made the movement large and slow, a point taken up in 3(a).

India inside that ethos

- India was a founder and a regular chair and host. It linked NAM to the Commonwealth, the UN, and later to the G77 without becoming a treaty ally of either superpower.
- During the Cold War this gave India voice among Afro-Asian States even when the 1971 Treaty with the USSR looked, to critics, like a tilt.
- After the Cold War, India did not dissolve NAM. It kept the forum while adding other clubs.

Soft power

- Joseph Nye's soft power is attraction through culture, values, and perceived legitimacy of policy, not through force or payment alone.
- NAM ethos supplies India with a story of autonomy that many African, Asian, and Latin American governments still recognise.

- Vaccine supplies, ITEC training, disaster relief, and the Voice of Global South Summit rest on that recognition more than on NAM communiqués.
- At the United Nations, India can speak as a large democracy that was not a NATO or Warsaw Pact member, which still matters in votes and in peacekeeping politics.
- G20 presidency in 2023, including the African Union's seating, used the same South-facing language.

Limits

- Soft power is reduced when neighbours contest India's regional role, or when NAM itself is divided on Ukraine, Myanmar, or Palestine.
- Multi-alignment with the Quad and with Russia is a later practice. It does not erase the NAM vocabulary; it sits beside it.
- Ethos without delivery of development finance is a thin resource next to China's capital.

Flow diagram

Bandung Belgrade -> NAM ethos autonomy
NAM ethos autonomy -> India founder role
India founder role -> Soft power Global South
Soft power Global South -> UN G20 ITEC

Conclusion

NAM's ethos is independent choice, anti-colonial solidarity, and peaceful coexistence without a military headquarters. India draws soft power from being seen as an originator of that ethos, provided policy still looks autonomous and useful to the Global South.

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Q2(b) · 15 marks

In what ways does the functionalist approach in International relations help in maintaining peace and order in global politics?

PSIR GS 2 · 2023 · Approaches to the Study of International Relations

Revision summary

Mitrany argued that peace grows from agencies built around concrete functions.

Haas's neofunctionalism added spillover and used European integration as evidence.

Keohane's institutions are a related but more State-centric account of cooperation.

The EU shows functional peace among members; it does not erase great-power anarchy.

Cox notes that functional order can lock in a hierarchy unless the order itself is questioned.

Introduction

Functionalism in International Relations argues that peace is built by practical cooperation on shared tasks, not first by a world government or by a balance of power. David Mitrany is the main source. Later neofunctionalism used the European Union as the test case.

Body

Mitrany's claim

- In A Working Peace System, David Mitrany held that form should follow function. Agencies should be designed around tasks such as health, posts, rivers, and trade.
- Loyalty would shift toward those agencies as they delivered welfare. War would become harder because societies were tied by working links.
- The approach was a reply to both power politics and to a single federal constitution imposed from above.

From functionalism to neofunctionalism

- **Ernst Haas added spillover:** cooperation in one sector creates pressure for cooperation in related sectors.
- The European Coal and Steel Community, the Treaty of Rome, and later the single market are the usual illustrations of that path toward the European Union.
- **Robert Keohane's later neoliberal institutionalism is a cousin, not a twin:** institutions reduce transaction costs and cheating among self-interested States, without Mitrany's hope that the State itself would fade.

Peace and order

- Functional ties can create zones of stable peace among members, as in Western Europe after 1950.
- United Nations specialised agencies, technical standards, and some peacekeeping support tasks follow a functional logic even when the Security Council remains realist.
- Order here is problem-solving order, which Robert Cox would call work within the given interstate system.

Limits

- High politics of security, identity, and survival do not spill over on a timetable. Charles de Gaulle, Brexit, and wars on the EU's edge show the ceiling.

- Kenneth Waltz and John Mearsheimer treat anarchy and relative power as first. Functional clubs do not remove the security dilemma among great powers.
- The Global South often experienced functional agencies as rules written in the core, which is Cox's point about whose order is being stabilised.

Flow diagram

Mitrany form follows function -> Task agencies
Task agencies -> Haas spillover
Haas spillover -> European Union
Waltz Mearsheimer anarchy -.limits. -> European Union

Conclusion

Functionalist peace is cooperation by task, with Mitrany's working agencies and Haas's spillover. It explains the European Union's internal order better than it explains great-power war. It is a method of tying States, not a substitute for power politics at the system's top.

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Q2(c) · 15 marks

How does the regime change and political crisis in Myanmar threaten regional security and peace?

PSIR GS 2 · 2023 · India and the UN System

Revision summary

The February 2021 military takeover ended Myanmar's elected government and widened civil war.

Refugees, drugs, and stalled Kaladan and trilateral-highway work hit India and Bangladesh.

China kept infrastructure and political access to the junta.

ASEAN's Five-Point Consensus was not implemented.

Regional security declined because a weak State on several borders became a vacuum, not a buffer.

Introduction

On 1 February 2021 the Myanmar military detained elected leaders and ended the National League for Democracy government. Regime change here means that coup. Regional security in South and South-East Asia has been affected through borders, refugees, arms, and competing great-power access.

Body

The domestic shock that became regional

- Armed conflict spread among the Tatmadaw, People's Defence Forces, and ethnic armed organisations.
- Civilian deaths, destroyed towns, and collapsed services produced displacement inside Myanmar and across borders.
- The Rohingya crisis from 2017 was not resolved; the coup added new refugee and trafficking pressures on Bangladesh, India, and Thailand.

Immediate neighbours

- India faces an unstable frontier with Mizoram, Manipur, and Nagaland, with refugee inflows and a harder environment for the Kaladan Multi-Modal Transit Transport Project and for the India-Myanmar-Thailand trilateral highway.
- Cross-border insurgent sanctuaries and the drugs trade of the Golden Triangle become easier when the centre does not hold.
- Bangladesh carries a large Rohingya population with little prospect of safe return.
- China retains pipelines, ports, and political access to the junta, which shifts the regional balance toward Beijing if other States isolate Naypyidaw without an alternative channel.

Regional organisations

- ASEAN adopted a Five-Point Consensus that the junta did not implement. The organisation's non-interference habit limited coercion.
- SAARC and BIMSTEC cannot substitute. Myanmar sits in BIMSTEC, so connectivity plans stall.
- The United Nations Security Council has spoken in statements more than in Chapter VII force, given P5 positions.

Security reading

- For Waltz, a collapsing State is a local power vacuum that neighbours and extra-regional powers fill.
- For Keohane, the failure is also of regional regimes that cannot lock in a transition bargain.
- India's line has been engagement with multiple actors, humanitarian access, and border management, rather than a democracy-export war.

Flow diagram

Feb 2021 coup -> Internal war displacement
Internal war displacement -> India Bangladesh Thailand borders
Internal war displacement -> China access ASEAN stall
India Bangladesh Thailand borders -> Regional insecurity
China access ASEAN stall -> Regional insecurity

Conclusion

The 2021 coup turned Myanmar from a difficult partner into a source of refugees, drugs, stalled connectivity, and greater Chinese leverage. Regional security is worse because ASEAN cannot enforce its own consensus and because South Asian forums were already weak.

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Q3(a) · 20 marks

"During the Cold War, the Non-Aligned Movement tried to become a Third force in World Politics, but failed because it was too large and unwieldy." Discuss

PSIR GS 2 · 2023 · Changing International Political Order

Revision summary

NAM was a third diplomatic force, not a third army, during the Cold War.

Decolonisation expanded membership and prestige.

Consensus among unlike States produced communiqués more than enforcement.

Intra-member wars and Cuba's Soviet ties exposed the stretch of the label.

The movement remains a South forum; unwieldy is a fair description of its method, not a reason to deny its early role.

Introduction

NAM presented itself as a third diplomatic force beside NATO and the Warsaw Pact. The comment is largely right: the identity was real in the 1960s, and size plus disagreement later reduced operational unity. Unwieldy does not mean useless.

Body

Third force in the Cold War

- A third force meant a caucus of States that refused formal alliance with Washington or Moscow and that bargained in the UN and in economic talks as a group.
- After Belgrade 1961, NAM coordinated positions on decolonisation, apartheid, and superpower bases.
- It was a force in diplomacy and in numbers at the General Assembly, not a third military pole. It had no joint command and no common nuclear deterrent.
- India, Yugoslavia, and Egypt gave it early prestige. The 1973 oil politics and the New International Economic Order debate showed South bargaining power, even when OPEC was not NAM as such.

Why it grew

- Decolonisation multiplied members. Newly independent States wanted a seat in a club that was not a pact.
- Membership rules were political and loose. States with quite different alignments still claimed the label.
- Havana 1979 and later summits showed a wider ideological range, including Cuba's close Soviet ties, which older members read as a strain on non-alignment.

Large and unwieldy

- Consensus decision-making among 100-plus members produced long communiqués and few binding outcomes.
- Conflicts among members, including India-Pakistan, Iran-Iraq, and later Gulf wars, could not be settled by NAM.
- Economic diversity from oil exporters to least-developed countries split interests on trade and debt.

- After 1991 the bipolar map that had made a "third" identity simple disappeared. The movement remained, with a weaker contrast object.

Comment that stays fair

- Size was a success of anti-colonial politics and a failure of tight coordination. Both are true.
- Robert Cox would say NAM was a counter-hegemonic language inside a still US-centred world order, not a new order of its own.
- India still uses NAM meetings and the related Global South vocabulary, which shows residual political value.
- The accurate comment is that NAM was a diplomatic third force, never a third superpower, and that expansion without a secretariat of power made it unwieldy.

Flow diagram

US USSR blocs -> NAM third diplomatic force
NAM third diplomatic force -> Membership growth
Membership growth -> Consensus unwieldy
Consensus unwieldy -> Residual Global South forum

Conclusion

NAM was a third force in the sense of a non-bloc diplomatic coalition during the Cold War. It became too large for consensus to equal action. The comment holds if third force is not confused with a third military camp.

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Q3(b) · 15 marks

Account for the rise of European Union as a highly influential regional organisation

PSIR GS 2 · 2023 · Changing International Political Order

Revision summary

The EU grew from the 1951 coal and steel pool to a union of law, market, and for many members a currency.

Mitrany and Haas explain the method of task integration and spillover.

Market size and regulation give the Union influence beyond its members.

Enlargement spread that legal order eastward.

Military dependence on NATO and internal splits cap that influence.

Introduction

The European Union rose from a coal-and-steel pool among six States to a union with a single market, a currency for many members, and a dense legal order. Influence comes from market size, law, and a method of pooling sovereignty that other regions have not copied at the same depth.

Body

Historical rise

- The Schuman Plan and the European Coal and Steel Community (1951) tied French and German heavy industry after two world wars.
- The Treaty of Rome (1957) created a common market. The **Single European Act** and the Maastricht Treaty (1992) added political union language, a path to the euro, and a common foreign and security policy in name.
- Enlargement after 1993 and 2004 spread EU law across **Central and Eastern Europe**. The **Lisbon Treaty (2007)** adjusted institutions after that growth.

Why it became influential

- **Functionalist and neofunctionalist logic, from Mitrany and Haas, fits the early decades:** trade and regulation spilled into more policies.
- The single market sets product, data, and competition rules that exporters worldwide must meet. That is regulatory influence, sometimes called the Brussels effect.
- The euro, the European Central Bank, and a large aid and trade network give the Union weight in the IMF, WTO, and climate talks.
- Internally it is a security community. Externally it is a civilian power that still relies on NATO for hard defence, which is a limit as well as a condition of its rise.

Limits that still sit inside the account

- Brexit showed that pooling is reversible in politics if not easily in law.
- Disagreement on migration, fiscal union, and Ukraine-war energy policy shows that influence is not the same as a single State.
- For Waltz, the EU does not cancel anarchy among great powers. For Keohane, it is the densest regime complex in the system.

Flow diagram

ECSC Rome Maastricht -> Single market euro law

Single market euro law -> Global regulatory influence

NATO hard security -external condition. -> Global regulatory influence

Conclusion

The EU rose through task-based integration, enlargement, and a single market whose rules travel. It is highly influential as a regulatory and economic union. It is less so as a military actor, which is part of the same history.

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Q3(c) · 15 marks

Narrate the various ways in which rapid environmental degradation is posing a serious threat to human security. Illustrate your answer with suitable examples

PSIR GS 2 · 2023 · Comparative Politics

Revision summary

Human security after UNDP 1994 centres people, not only territorial defence.

Climate, pollution, water stress, and ecosystem loss kill and displace without a foreign army.

Bay of Bengal cyclones, Pakistan 2022 floods, and urban air are South Asian exhibits.

COVID-19 linked ecology, health, and later vaccine rules.

Realist State security remains relevant for war; it is incomplete for this class of threat.

Introduction

Human security, as used after the UNDP Human Development Report of 1994, is safety of people in daily life, not only safety of States from invasion. Environmental degradation now produces that insecurity through water, food, disease, and disaster, including in South Asia.

Body

From State security to human security

- Traditional realism, including Waltz, ranked military threats first. Environmental harm was a domestic or scientific issue.
- Human security treats drought, flood, pollution, and epidemic as security problems because they kill, displace, and break livelihoods.
- **Robert Cox's critical theory helps here:** an order that protects capital and great-power stability can still leave people exposed to climate and toxic risk.

How degradation produces insecurity

- Climate change raises heat, cyclone intensity, and glacier melt, which hit farming and coastal cities.
- Deforestation, mining, and air pollution raise respiratory disease and destroy commons that the poor use.
- Water stress between upstream and downstream users, including India-Pakistan Indus politics and India-China Brahmaputra concern, can feed diplomatic conflict.
- Loss of fisheries and soil pushes migration, which then appears as a border and urban security issue.

Examples

- Cyclones in the Bay of Bengal, including events that have struck Odisha, West Bengal, and Bangladesh, show how a "natural" disaster is worsened by degraded mangroves and dense coastal poverty.
- The 2022 Pakistan floods linked monsoon extremes, river management, and mass displacement.
- Delhi's seasonal air quality is a public-health emergency that no army can treat as a foreign enemy.

- COVID-19 showed how ecological disturbance and global travel can create a health-security shock; vaccine nationalism then appeared at the WTO, treated in Section B.
- Sahel drought and farmer-herder conflict show the same chain in Africa, which also shapes India's development diplomacy there.

Policy implication

- Mitigation, adaptation, disaster management, and climate finance are security policy in this frame, not extras after defence.

Flow diagram

Environmental degradation -> Health food water
Health food water -> Displacement conflict
Displacement conflict -> Human insecurity
UNDP 1994 1994 -> Human insecurity

Conclusion

Environmental degradation is a major source of human insecurity because it destroys health, food, water, and shelter at scale. Examples from South Asian floods and storms, urban air, and global disease show that State military balance does not measure this threat.

Open WRAP page — <https://wrapexams.com/upsc/mains-answers/psir-gs-2/2023/narrate-the-various-ways-in-which-rapid-environmental-degradation-is-posing-a-serious-threat-to-human-security-illustrate-your-answer-with-suitable-examples/>

Q4(a) · 20 marks

Critically examine the impact of Globalisation on the developing countries of the world

PSIR GS 2 · 2023 · Globalisation

Revision summary

Globalisation is deeper cross-border economic and legal integration, marked by the WTO era.

Some developing countries gained manufacturing and services growth.

Others faced financial crises, TRIPS costs, and commodity dependence.

Wallerstein and Cox stress hierarchy; Keohane stresses what regimes can still do for weaker States.

India's post-1991 path is partial opening plus defence of policy space, not a single verdict for all of the South.

Introduction

Globalisation is the thickening of cross-border flows of goods, capital, people, data, and rules. For developing countries the impact is mixed: growth and technology for some, vulnerability and rule-taking for many. A critical examination must use both the growth record and the hierarchy of the world economy.

Body

Channels of impact

- Trade opening after the **Uruguay Round and the WTO (1995)** cut some tariffs and locked in intellectual property, services, and investment-related rules.
- Capital account opening brought foreign direct investment and also sudden stops, as in the 1997 East Asian crisis.
- Global production chains moved manufacturing to China, Vietnam, Bangladesh, and parts of India, raising exports and wage employment in those niches.
- Ideas, media, and standards travelled with firms and with international financial institutions.

Gains

- East Asian and then Chinese industrialisation cut global extreme poverty on a large scale.
- India after 1991 gained in services, pharmaceuticals, and later digital exports, while remaining a cautious capital-account reformer.
- Access to medicines, telecom, and higher education expanded for urban middle classes.
- Keohane's regimes argument is that rules can protect weaker traders from pure bilateral power, when the rules are actually enforced.

Costs and hierarchy

- Immanuel Wallerstein's core-periphery map still describes commodity exporters that take price shocks.
- TRIPS raised the cost of some medicines and seeds until flexibilities and later COVID-era fights, including the incomplete 2022 vaccine decision.
- Footloose capital and tax competition limit the developmental State that had built Korea and Taiwan in an earlier, less legalised WTO world.

- Robert Cox treats globalisation as a hegemonic order of production and ideas, not as a neutral technology. Structural adjustment often cut public services first.
- Joseph Stiglitz and UNCTAD work document inequality within countries even where average GDP rose.
- Environment and labour standards were weakly globalised compared with finance, which is the human-security link from 3(c).

Differentiation

- Developing countries are not one case. China became a manufacturing core. Many African oil and mineral exporters remained price-takers.
- India's story is partial integration with policy space claims at the WTO on food stocks and e-commerce.
- Critical examination therefore rejects both "globalisation as gift" and "globalisation as only loot." It is a structured process with winners, losers, and room for State strategy.

Flow diagram

Globalisation WTO FDI chains -> Growth technology
Globalisation WTO FDI chains -> Rule-taking shocks inequality
Growth technology -> Differentiated developing States
Rule-taking shocks inequality -> Differentiated developing States

Conclusion

Globalisation has raised trade and technology access for developing countries that could enter production chains, and it has locked others into commodity and debt vulnerability. The impact depends on domestic capability and on who writes the rules, which is why Cox and the WTO fights belong in the same answer.

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Q4(b) · 15 marks

What do you mean by offensive and defensive realism?

PSIR GS 2 · 2023 · Comparative Politics

Revision summary

Both theories are structural realisms under anarchy.

Defensive realism, with Waltz, treats moderate power and balancing as rational.

Offensive realism, with Mearsheimer, treats the search for regional hegemony as rational for great powers.

The security dilemma is shared; the predicted amount of expansion is not.

Institutions are secondary in both, unlike in Keohane.

Introduction

Offensive and defensive realism are both structural realist theories. They start from anarchy, self-help, and relative power. They disagree on how much power a State should seek and on whether expansion is the rational path to security.

Body

Shared ground

- **Both follow Kenneth Waltz's third-image start:** the international system is anarchic. There is no world government.
- Survival is the first goal. Intentions of others are uncertain. Capabilities matter more than speeches.
- **The security dilemma, developed by John Herz and Robert Jervis, is the shared mechanism:** steps that one State takes to be safe can look like threats to another.

Defensive realism

- Waltz's Theory of International Politics is the main defensive text. States seek enough power to be secure, not maximum power.
- Excess power triggers balancing. Conquest is often self-defeating because of nationalism, nuclear weapons, and the costs of occupation.
- **Stephen Walt's balance-of-threat and Jervis's offence-defence balance sit in this family:** moderation can be rational.
- Stability is more likely when defence is easy and when great powers accept a balance.

Offensive realism

- John Mearsheimer's The Tragedy of Great Power Politics holds that great powers seek regional hegemony and as much power as they can get, because only hegemony ends the survival problem.
- The structure creates revisionist behaviour even among status-quo-minded leaders. Buck-passing and war are expected tools.
- Offshore balancers, in this view, try to stop a peer hegemon in another region, which is how Mearsheimer reads United States policy toward potential Asian hegemons.

Distinction that matters

- Defensive realism predicts more restraint and more balancing against expansion. Offensive realism predicts more expansion and more tragedy.
- Neither is Keohane's institutionalism. Institutions, for both realisms, are thin. For Keohane they can still shape cheating and information.
- **India's nuclear and Quad choices can be read in both frames:** minimum deterrence looks defensive; concern to prevent Chinese regional hegemony looks closer to Mearsheimer's problem.

Flow diagram

Anarchy uncertainty -> Waltz defensive enough power
Anarchy uncertainty -> Mearsheimer offensive hegemony
Waltz defensive enough power -> Balancing restraint
Mearsheimer offensive hegemony -> Expansion tragedy

Conclusion

Defensive realism says States should seek security, not domination, because the system punishes greedy expansion. Offensive realism says the same system forces great powers to seek hegemony. The distinction is about rational strategy under anarchy, not about whether power politics exists.

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Q4(c) · 15 marks

Discuss the various constraints on American hegemony today. Which of these are likely to become more prominent in the future?

PSIR GS 2 · 2023 · Changing International Political Order

Revision summary

US hegemony mixed force, money, alliances, and a claim to liberal rules.

China's rise, the Afghanistan end in August 2021, and WTO-era rule disputes are present constraints.

Cox treats hegemony as consent as well as power; consent is thinner now.

Keohane allows cooperation after hegemony, which also means others will not wait on Washington.

The future is contested primacy, not automatic Chinese succession.

Introduction

American hegemony after 1945 combined military reach, the dollar, alliance networks, and a claim to organise liberal rules. Constraints now come from other centres of capability, from institutions the United States itself built, and from domestic politics. The future is a thicker multipolarity, not an automatic Chinese replacement.

Body

What hegemony meant

- Charles Kindleberger and later hegemonic-stability arguments treated a lead State as the supplier of open trade and reserve currency.
- Robert Cox added that hegemony is also consent around production and ideas, not only ships and bases.
- The United States after 1991 looked unipolar in military terms. That moment was already shorter than the word empire suggested.

Present constraints

- China's industrial, naval, and technological rise in Asia is the first peer-scale challenge in that region, which is why the Quad exists.
- Russia's war on Ukraine showed both US alliance leadership in NATO and the limit of global isolation of a nuclear P5 member.
- The WTO appellate crisis, industrial subsidies, and export controls show that Washington will not always live under the rules it designed. Keohane's After Hegemony already argued that cooperation can persist without a single hegemon, and also that the hegemon may defect.
- Wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, ending with the Taliban takeover of Kabul in August 2021, displayed the limit of military primacy in political reconstruction.
- Domestic polarisation, debt, and industrial capacity gaps constrain long campaigns and even the making of trade agreements.

Future

- Demographic and military advantages remain large. The dollar and alliance system have not collapsed.

- **Future constraint is diffusion:** EU regulation, Indian and Global South preference for multi-alignment, and issue-based clubs such as I2U2 and the Quad rather than a single US-led map.
- **Offensive-realist reading:** the United States will try to stop a Chinese regional hegemon. Defensive-realist reading: over-extension is the risk.
- The likely future is contested primacy, not a clean handover and not a restored 1990s unipolarity.

Flow diagram

US post-1945 hegemony -> China Asia rise
US post-1945 hegemony -> Long wars 2021 Kabul
US post-1945 hegemony -> Institutions and domestic limits
China Asia rise -> Contested primacy
Long wars 2021 Kabul -> Contested primacy
Institutions and domestic limits -> Contested primacy

Conclusion

American hegemony is constrained by China's rise, by the political failure of long wars, by rule-breaking in the very institutions Washington built, and by US domestic limits. The future is competitive multipolarity in which the United States remains first in many capabilities but not the organiser of a settled consent.

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Q5(a) · 10 marks

Explain the major features of India's Foreign Policy in the 21st century.

PSIR GS 2 · 2023 · Recent developments in Indian Foreign policy

Revision summary

India kept autonomy and added many partnerships at once.

The US civil nuclear path and later defence logistics marked a new Western channel.

Act East, BIMSTEC, and a stalled SAARC reshaped the neighbourhood method.

China's rise and the Quad moved policy toward the Indo-Pacific.

G20 and Global South summits updated older NAM claims for a growth-centred State.

Introduction

India's 21st-century foreign policy kept strategic autonomy and added multi-alignment, economic statecraft, and a harder maritime view of China. The change is of mix and of partners, not a simple drop of NAM language.

Body

From non-alignment as centre to multi-alignment

- The Cold War NAM core remains a vocabulary. Practice added simultaneous work with the United States, Russia, the European Union, Japan, and the Global South.
- The 2008 India-United States civil nuclear path and later logistics and foundational agreements showed a strategic partnership that 20th-century non-alignment had not contained.
- Russia remained a defence and energy partner even as its share of new arms orders fell.

Neighbourhood and East

- **Neighbourhood First and Act East** replaced a thinner Look East slogan with connectivity, BIMSTEC, and ASEAN-centred diplomacy.
- SAARC stalled. Sub-regional and trans-regional clubs grew.

China, Quad, and the sea

- Border crises, including 2020 in eastern Ladakh, moved China from a manageable rivalry toward a central military problem.
- The Quad's revival, Malabar exercises, and Indo-Pacific language placed India in a maritime balancing set without a NATO treaty.
- Offensive-realist readings of Chinese power and defensive-realist caution about over-alignment both appear in official practice.

Global South and domestic link

- Energy, diaspora, and trade became first-order tools. G20 presidency in 2023 and Voice of Global South diplomacy updated NAM-era claims.
- Foreign policy is now sold more openly as a support to growth, technology, and Indian-origin communities abroad.

Flow diagram

20th century NAM core -> Multi-alignment

Multi-alignment -> Quad US Japan

Multi-alignment -> Russia energy arms

Multi-alignment -> Global South G20

Conclusion

The major 21st-century changes are multi-alignment, a tighter economic and diaspora policy, Act East, and a maritime-plus-border response to China. Autonomy is still the stated doctrine. The partner set is wider than the 20th-century NAM map.

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Q5(b) · 10 marks

What are the reasons for lack of 'regionness' in South Asia?

PSIR GS 2 · 2023 · India and South Asia

Revision summary

Regionness is shared political identity plus working institutions.

South Asia has a dominant India, a blocked India-Pakistan pair, and Chinese alternatives for smaller States.

SAARC consensus cannot produce EU-style spillover.

Security is a conflict complex, not a community.

BIMSTEC is a work-around that still does not make a South Asian region.

Introduction

Regionness means a shared political identity and working regional institutions, as in the European Union's dense law. South Asia has geography and some culture in common. It has not produced that political region.

Body

Structural reasons

- India is so much larger in economy, military, and population that neighbours fear a centre rather than join a club. Asymmetry is the first fact.
- India-Pakistan conflict over Kashmir, terrorism, and nuclear signalling blocks SAARC, which works by consensus.
- Extra-regional China offers arms, infrastructure, and political backing that lets smaller States hedge against India.

Identity and security

- **Barry Buzan's regional security complex idea fits:** South Asia is a conflict formation, not a security community.
- Nationalisms, Partition memory, and majority-minority politics inside States make a thin regional "we."
- Ethnic conflict and insurgency, treated in 5(d), spill across borders and poison trust.

Institutional thinness

- SAARC's charter and the South Asian Free Trade Area did not create EU-style spillover. Mitrany's functional path needs a political floor that is missing.
- BIMSTEC and the Bay of Bengal exclude Pakistan and still move slowly. They prove the demand for work-arounds, not the existence of regionness.
- People-to-people trade and culture exist. They have not been turned into a regional political community.

Flow diagram

Indian asymmetry -> Weak SAARC

India Pakistan conflict -> Weak SAARC

China hedge -> Weak SAARC

Weak SAARC -> Low regionness

Conclusion

South Asia lacks regionness because of Indian asymmetry, the India-Pakistan freeze, Chinese extra-regional pull, and conflictual identities. Geography is not a region in the EU sense without institutions and trust.

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Q5(c) · 10 marks

Why is the compromise reached at WTO regarding the Covid-19 vaccine manufacturing not a Trade Related Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) waiver?

PSIR GS 2 · 2023 · Comparative Politics

Revision summary

India and South Africa asked for a wide TRIPS waiver on COVID health products.

The 2022 Ministerial Decision was a limited, conditional easing for vaccines.

Tests and treatments were not given the same treatment.

Technology transfer, not only law, remained the production bottleneck.

The outcome was a compromise that preserved TRIPS more than it waived it.

Introduction

India and South Africa proposed a broad TRIPS waiver in 2020 so that patents would not block COVID-19 vaccines, diagnostics, and therapeutics. The June 2022 Ministerial Decision was a narrower, time-bound compromise. It was not the waiver as drafted.

Body

What a TRIPS waiver would have been

- A waiver would have suspended specified TRIPS obligations for a set of COVID products so that more producers could copy and export without each patent-holder's permission.
- Developing-country demand was for speed, coverage of vaccines plus treatments and tests, and simple eligibility.

What the 2022 decision was

- Members authorised a limited easing of compulsory-licensing rules for COVID-19 vaccines, with conditions on eligible members, duration, and notification.
- Diagnostics and therapeutics were left for later discussion, not covered in the same way.
- Legal complexity remained. Many manufacturers still needed technology transfer, not only a legal permission.
- Export and eligibility clauses were tighter than the India-South Africa text.

Comment

- **Keohane's regime view fits:** the WTO produced a bargain that kept the TRIPS regime standing rather than opening a hole in it.
- **Cox's view also fits:** intellectual-property order serving research firms in the core was protected while a public-health emergency was met with a minimum deal.
- India could still use existing TRIPS flexibilities and its own vaccine production. The political point is that the club did not rewrite IP for the South.
- Calling the outcome a waiver in headlines was inaccurate. It was a compromise that left TRIPS largely intact.

Flow diagram

India South Africa waiver 2020 -> WTO 2022 Ministerial
WTO 2022 Ministerial -> Limited vaccine CL ease
WTO 2022 Ministerial -> Diagnostics therapeutics deferred
Limited vaccine CL ease -> TRIPS regime still standing

Conclusion

The COVID-19 vaccine decision at the WTO eased some compulsory-licensing steps for vaccines. It was not the broad TRIPS waiver India and South Africa sought. The regime survived the pandemic with a narrow carve-out.

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Q5(d) · 10 marks

Why do ethnic conflicts and insurgencies continue to remain major impediments to regional co-operation in South Asia?

PSIR GS 2 · 2023 · India and South Asia

Revision summary

Insurgency and ethnic war in South Asia routinely cross borders.

Sanctuary charges, refugees, and military alerts replace trade talks.

SAARC and road-and-port plans stall on insecure stretches, including Afghanistan 2021 and Myanmar 2021.

Domestic ethnic politics also block a regional "we."

Cooperation needs a security floor that these conflicts remove.

Introduction

Ethnic conflict and insurgency in South Asia cross borders. They produce refugees, accusations of sanctuary, and military alerts. Regional cooperation needs trust and open borders. Those conflicts work against both.

Body

Cross-border chains

- Insurgents use neighbouring territory as sanctuary. States then treat neighbours as security problems rather than as market partners.
- Refugee flows, as with Rohingya in Bangladesh and populations after the Myanmar 2021 coup, strain host politics and bilateral agendas.
- Tamil conflict in Sri Lanka, Maoist and hill conflicts, and Afghanistan's wars after decades of intervention all fed suspicion among capitals.

Direct hits on cooperation

- SAARC cannot run a normal summit politics when terrorism and Kashmir dominate India-Pakistan exchanges.
- **Connectivity projects stop at insecure stretches:** Afghanistan after August 2021, Myanmar after February 2021, and parts of the North-East-Myanmar frontier.
- Intelligence and army staffs crowd out trade ministries in bilateral time.

Identity politics inside cooperation

- Ethnic parties and diaspora lobbies in one State mobilise against another State's government, which makes "regional identity" harder than a brochure.
- Majority nationalism in several States reads minority kin across the border as a threat.
- BIMSTEC and SCO then become partial clubs that manage some issues while the full South Asian table stays empty.

Flow diagram

Ethnic conflict insurgency -> Sanctuary refugees
 Sanctuary refugees -> Trust failure
 Trust failure -> SAARC connectivity stall

Conclusion

Ethnic war and insurgency hamper South Asian cooperation by closing borders, blocking summits, and turning neighbours into security files. Functional trade cannot spill over, in Mitrany's sense, while sanctuary and refugee crises remain first.

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WRAP Exams

Q5(e) · 10 marks

What diplomatic steps has India taken to articulate the interests of the Global South in International Politics?

PSIR GS 2 · 2023 · Contemporary Global Concerns

Revision summary

Global South diplomacy continues NAM and G77 in a new institutional setting.

India hosted South summits and used G20 2023 to seat the African Union.

ITEC, credit, vaccines, and UN peacekeeping are the material side.

WTO food and IP fights remain part of the same file.

China's finance is the main competitor for Southern attention.

Introduction

Global South diplomacy is India's claim to speak with developing countries on trade, climate finance, food, and UN reform. It continues NAM and G77 habits with new platforms such as the Voice of Global South Summit and the G20 year 2023.

Body

Lineage

- NAM, the G77, and UNCTAD are the older stages. India used them for decolonisation, NIEO language, and later for climate differentiation.
- The claim is leadership without a formal empire and without OECD membership.

Current instruments

- Voice of Global South Summits collected demands on debt, fuel, and fertiliser before and during the Indian G20 presidency.
- African Union seating in the G20 was presented as a South win inside a Northern-heavy table.
- ITEC, lines of credit, vaccines, and peacekeeping are material complements to speeches.
- At the WTO, India still defends public stockholding and told the TRIPS-waiver story in 5(c).

Limits

- Many Southern States also deal with China as banker and builder. India's offer is smaller in capital.
- Multi-alignment with the Quad can look, to some NAM members, like a tilt. India answers with autonomy and with Russia and energy ties.
- Diplomacy succeeds when it delivers finance, technology, and UN voice, not when it only recalls Bandung.

Flow diagram

NAM G77 -> Voice of Global South

Voice of Global South -> G20 2023 AU seat

G20 2023 AU seat -> Trade climate UN votes

ITEC credit PKO -> Trade climate UN votes

Conclusion

India's Global South diplomacy is NAM lineage plus G20-era convening and development tools. It is real as voice and training. It is constrained as a capital alternative to China.

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WRAP Exams

Q6(a) · 20 marks

Arms trade, economic ties and congruent geo-political interests are no longer the three pillars of India - Russia relationship in the emerging strategic context. Comment

PSIR GS 2 · 2023 · Changing International Political Order

Revision summary

The old model was Soviet and Russian arms, a small economy, and anti-unipolar geopolitics.

India now diversifies weapons; Russia is no longer the future monopoly supplier.

After 2022, oil dominates trade and brings sanctions risk.

Russia's closeness to China weakens its value as India's Asia balancer.

The three names remain; the balanced three-pillar picture does not.

Introduction

For decades India-Russia ties were described through defence supply, a thin but strategic economy, and a geopolitical fit against a common map of China and the West. The statement is partly right: the old balance among those three has broken. It is too strong if it means the relationship has no remaining structure.

Body

Arms

- The Soviet Union and then Russia were the main source of Indian combat aircraft, tanks, submarines, and later the S-400 system.
- That pillar is weaker. India now buys from France, the United States, Israel, and domestic lines. Spare-part risk after 2022 and CAATSA pressure on customers of Russian systems accelerated diversification.
- Joint projects such as BrahMos still exist. New big-ticket dependence is no longer the whole of Indian modernisation.
- Arms remain a pillar in the inventory of the services. They are no longer the future-monopoly pillar they were in the 1970s-1990s.

Economy

- Pre-2022 trade was small next to India-China or India-US trade. Energy, diamonds, and fertilisers mattered more than a full production partnership.
- After 2022, discounted Russian oil made energy a suddenly large economic fact. That is a new economic pillar, not the old industrial-cooperation dream.
- Payment systems, shipping insurance, and Western secondary-sanctions risk make this energy trade politically costly and operationally awkward.
- Investment, connectivity through INSTC, and the rupee-rouble experiments have not matched the oil spike.

Geopolitics

- Shared interest in a multipolar order, a UN Security Council relationship, and caution about a unipolar United States still exist.
- The China-Russia closeness after 2022 is the shock. A partner that is also Beijing's close strategic partner is a less simple geopolitical asset for New Delhi after Galwan.

- Russia remains useful on Afghanistan-era intelligence memory, Central Asia, and as a veto-wielding P5 member that India does not want as an enemy.
- Mearsheimer's great-power map now places Russia as a declining European war State more than as India's Asia balancer.

Comment

- **The three headings still name the files. Their relative weights have changed:** oil up, new arms down, geopolitics more contradictory.
- Keohane's view of lingering regimes fits the residual defence and nuclear-technical cooperation. Cox's view of a shifting world order fits Russia's turn toward China.
- The fair comment is that the classic equal three-pillar model is outdated. A thinner, energy-heavy, politically constrained partnership remains.

Flow diagram

Soviet era three files -> Arms diversified
Soviet era three files -> Economy now oil-heavy
Soviet era three files -> Geopolitics Russia-China bind
Arms diversified -> Thinner partnership
Economy now oil-heavy -> Thinner partnership
Geopolitics Russia-China bind -> Thinner partnership

Conclusion

Arms, economy, and geopolitics still describe India-Russia files, but they are not three equal pillars. Diversified arms, oil-heavy trade, and a Russia-China bind have rebuilt the relationship on a narrower and more awkward base.

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Q6(b) · 15 marks

Discuss the importance of India's role in UN peacekeeping operations as a ground for its claim to a permanent seat in the UN Security Council

PSIR GS 2 · 2023 · India and the UN System

Revision summary

India is a historic top troop contributor to UN peacekeeping.

That record supports a claim to help write the mandates, not only to staff them.

G4 and African positions seek Council expansion; Charter amendment needs P5 consent.

China is a central political obstacle among the five.

Peacekeeping strengthens India's case; it cannot by itself create a seat.

Introduction

India has been among the largest cumulative contributors of troops and police to United Nations peacekeeping. It uses that record, plus population, democracy, and economy, to claim a permanent Security Council seat. Contribution and representation are the two halves of the argument.

Body

Peacekeeping record

- Indian personnel have served in operations from Korea and the Congo to Namibia, Somalia, South Sudan, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo in later decades.
- India has taken casualties in UN service and has supplied force commanders and formed units, not only observers.
- The record is a Chapter VI-VII practical contribution to Council mandates that India does not write as a permanent member.
- **Limits exist:** great-power wars are not UNPKO tasks, and some missions have weak mandates. India still shows up with troops when many P5 members do not.

The permanent-seat claim

- The G4 (India, Japan, Germany, Brazil) seek expansion of permanent and non-permanent membership. The African Ezulwini Consensus seeks two African permanent seats.
- **India's case:** share of world population, a large economy, nuclear and space capability, democracy, NAM and Global South voice, and peacekeeping numbers.
- The 1945 P5 map omits India, Africa as a continent with permanent rights, and Latin America.

Link and tension

- **Peacekeeping is the moral and practical link:** those who carry out [Article 42](#)-adjacent tasks should sit where [Article 24](#) power is.
- The veto is the hard problem. Existing P5 members do not easily dilute it. China has been the most explicit political obstacle to India's permanent seat among the five.
- Reform needs Charter amendment, which needs P5 consent. That is why the claim is long, not why it is empty.

- Keohane would note that institutions lag power. Waltz would note that seats follow capability only when incumbents allow it.

Flow diagram

UN peacekeeping troops -> Contribution argument
Size economy democracy -> Contribution argument
Contribution argument -> G4 reform claim reform claim
P5 veto Charter veto Charter -.blocks. -> G4 reform claim

Conclusion

India's peacekeeping record is a standing contribution to UN security work. The permanent-seat claim rests on that record plus size and capability. The Council's 1945 structure, not India's contribution, is the binding constraint.

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Q6(c) · 15 marks

Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD) performs an important role in India's strategic balancing act to withstand the dominance of China in Asia. Discuss

PSIR GS 2 · 2023 · India's Contribution to the Non-Alignment Movement

Revision summary

The Quad is Australia, India, Japan, and the United States in a non-treaty Indo-Pacific format.

It can help at sea, in technology, and in public goods such as vaccines.

It cannot run a land war on the India-China border or replace ASEAN.

Members' other ties, including India's Russia file, cap militarisation.

It is a balancing layer, not a complete counter to China in Asia.

Introduction

The Quad is a consultative grouping of Australia, India, Japan, and the United States. It aims at a free and open Indo-Pacific. It can constrain Chinese power in some maritime and technology fields. It is not a NATO for Asia and cannot "counter" China in every domain.

Body

What the Quad is

- It began in the 2004 tsunami core and 2007 security talk, lapsed, and returned in the late 2010s as China's South China Sea, Belt and Road, and border behaviour hardened.
- Leaders' summits, working groups on vaccines, climate, critical minerals, and maritime domain awareness are the method.
- Malabar exercises overlap in membership but are not identical to the Quad as a legal organ. There is no **Article 5**.

Where it can counter

- Naval presence, information sharing, and quality infrastructure offers can raise the cost of Chinese maritime coercion in the Indian Ocean and Western Pacific.
- Technology and supply-chain work can reduce exclusive dependence on Chinese manufacturing in some sectors.
- For Mearsheimer, this is balancing against a potential Asian hegemon. For Waltz, it is a loose coalition whose cohesion is not guaranteed.
- India's participation signals that Asia's balancing is not only a US-Japan-Australia line.

Where it cannot

- It does not fight a land war for India on the Himalaya. The 2020 Ladakh crisis was an India-China military problem first.
- ASEAN States reject a NATO copy. Several depend on China for trade.
- **Members differ:** India will not become a treaty ally; it still buys Russian energy and speaks NAM language.
- **Keohane's point applies:** without a dense alliance contract, cooperation is issue-based and reversible.

How far

- The Quad is a partial maritime and techno-political counter, not a full-spectrum counter to China in Asia.
- It works best as one layer with bilateral US alliances, AUKUS, European presence, and each member's national military.

Flow diagram

Quad consultative -> Maritime tech vaccines

Maritime tech vaccines -> Partial constraint on China

No Article 5 no Himalaya war -.limits. -> Partial constraint on China

Conclusion

The Quad can complicate Chinese maritime and technology dominance and can reassure some partners. It cannot substitute for Indian land power, ASEAN consent, or a treaty army. Countering China in Asia remains a set of overlapping tools, of which the Quad is one.

Open WRAP page — <https://wrapexams.com/upsc/mains-answers/psir-gs-2/2023/quadrilateral-security-dialogue-quad-performs-an-important-role-in-indias-strategic-balancing-act-to-withstand-the-dominance-of-china-in-asia-discuss/>

Q7(a) · 20 marks

"India's Nuclear policy is deeply influenced by its cultural beliefs and the pragmatic approach of its foreign policy." Discuss

PSIR GS 2 · 2023 · Recent developments in Indian Foreign policy

Revision summary

Moral and anti-colonial language made India a critic of nuclear inequality and a late tester.

China and Pakistan, plus a closed NPT, made weapons a pragmatic choice by 1998.

Credible minimum deterrence and no first use carry the cultural claim into doctrine.

The 2008 civil nuclear path was pragmatic normalisation, not NPT accession as a non-weapon State.

Defensive-realist security, not offensive hegemony, is the better fit for the declared doctrine.

Introduction

India's nuclear story runs from moral opposition to great-power weapons, through the 1974 peaceful explosion, to the 1998 tests and a declared doctrine of credible minimum deterrence and no first use. Cultural beliefs supplied the language of restraint. Pragmatic foreign policy supplied the arsenal, the doctrine, and the later search for civil nuclear commerce.

Body

Cultural and moral beliefs

- Anti-colonial thought and Buddhist and Gandhian non-violence gave Indian public language a suspicion of nuclear weapons as civilisational failure.
- **Jawaharlal Nehru** backed civilian atomic science and world nuclear disarmament at the same time. Homi Bhabha's programme was scientific modernism inside that moral frame.
- The **Rajiv Gandhi Action Plan** of 1988 still spoke a disarmament idiom at the UN.
- After 1998, official doctrine kept no first use and minimum deterrence, which is a cultural-political choice not required by Mearsheimer's offensive-realist logic of maximum capability.

Pragmatic drivers

- China's 1964 test and the 1962 war created a security reason that moral language could not erase.
- Pakistan's programme and later declared weapons made a dyad that Indian planners could not ignore.
- **The NPT (1968) as a closed club pushed India toward an outsider path:** 1974 "peaceful nuclear explosion," then 1998 weapon tests after the extended NPT and CTBT pressures.
- Pragmatism after 1998 meant a doctrine, a command structure, a moratorium on further tests, and the 2008 civil nuclear opening with the United States and the NSG waiver.
- Export controls, IAEA safeguards on civilian reactors, and missile development (Agni series) are the practical State, not the ashram.

How the mix works

- Culture explains why India delayed, why it rejected the NPT as unequal, and why NFU was advertised as responsible stewardship.

- Pragmatism explains why India tested, why it built a triad path, and why it bargained for nuclear commerce without joining the NPT as a non-weapon State.
- **Defensive-realist reading:** nuclear weapons are for survival and for stopping blackmail, not for conquest. That fits NFU better than offensive realism.
- Diplomacy toward the Global South still uses disarmament talk even while India is a weapon State outside the NPT.

Tensions

- No first use is a political promise. Future doctrine debates, missile defence, and tactical-weapon talk can strain it.
- Moral exceptionalism is weaker when India also seeks great-power status with a nuclear portfolio.

Flow diagram

Disarmament moral language -> NFU minimum deterrence
China Pakistan NPT club -> 1974 1998 tests
1974 1998 tests -> NFU minimum deterrence
NFU minimum deterrence -> NSG civil nuclear bargain

Conclusion

- **Indian nuclear policy is a mix:** a cultural claim to restraint and equal global rules, and a pragmatic arsenal built against China and Pakistan and then normalised through the NSG-era bargain. Neither half alone explains 1974, 1998, and NFU together.

Open WRAP page — <https://wrapexams.com/upsc/mains-answers/psir-gs-2/2023/indias-nuclear-policy-is-deeply-influenced-by-its-cultural-beliefs-and-the-pragmatic-approach-of-its-foreign-policy-discuss/>

Q7(b) · 15 marks

What steps has India taken to regain its foothold in Afghanistan since the Taliban has taken over the country in August 2021?

PSIR GS 2 · 2023 · Recent developments in Indian Foreign policy

Revision summary

August 2021 ended India's Republic-era development partnership as it stood.

Foothold now is aid, a technical presence, and counter-terror diplomacy.

Chabahar remains the land-sea work-around to Pakistan.

Recognition of the Taliban is still withheld.

Success is measured by access and by security, not by a return to 2019 politics.

Introduction

The Taliban entered Kabul in August 2021 as US and allied forces left. India's embassy closed. Foothold now means humanitarian access, political contact without full legal recognition, connectivity options, and limits on anti-India terrorism. It does not mean the pre-2021 development-and-democracy partnership restored as it was.

Body

What was lost

- India had built the Afghan parliament building, the Salma Dam, power lines, and training for civilians and some security personnel under the Republic.
- Direct air and political access collapsed. Pakistan's geography again sat across the land route.

What foothold can still mean

- Humanitarian food, medicine, and earthquake or winter aid keep an Indian name among Afghans and a channel to de facto authorities.
- A technical mission in Kabul, opened after 2021, is a thin diplomatic presence short of ambassadorial recognition of the Taliban government.
- Intelligence and regional tables with Russia, Iran, and Central Asian States aim at ISKP and at any use of Afghan soil against India.
- Chabahar and the INSTC idea remain a way to reach Afghanistan and Central Asia without Pakistan, if Iran sanctions and Afghan security allow cargo.

Constraints

- The Taliban's ideology, treatment of women, and intra-Afghan war limit any values partnership.
- Pakistan's influence is real though not total. China talks economic access. India is not first in either queue.
- Full recognition would clash with India's own line on terrorism and with Western sanctions maps. Non-recognition without contact would mean zero foothold.

Policy mix

- **Pragmatism:** talk to the authority that holds Kabul. Culture and past investment: stay on the Afghan people's side with aid.
- Do not outsource the file only to the Quad or only to Russia. It is a regional security file first.

Flow diagram

Taliban Aug 2021 -> Republic projects paused
Republic projects paused -> Humanitarian technical mission
Humanitarian technical mission -> Limited foothold
Chabahar regional talks -> Limited foothold

Conclusion

India retains a foothold after August 2021 through aid, a limited mission, regional security talks, and the Chabahar option. It cannot restore the Republic-era political project. The test is whether Afghan soil is used against India and whether a civilian channel survives.

Open WRAP page — <https://wrapexams.com/upsc/mains-answers/psir-gs-2/2023/what-steps-has-india-taken-to-regain-its-foothold-in-afghanistan-since-the-taliban-has-taken-over-the-country-in-august-2021/>

Q7(c) · 15 marks

What are the challenges and limitations in India - Iran relations?

PSIR GS 2 · 2023 · Comparative Politics

Revision summary

Sanctions after the JCPOA crisis cut India's Iranian oil and complicated Chabahar contractors.

INSTC is a map still waiting on regional stability.

I2U2 and Israel ties sit poorly with Tehran's regional map.

Afghanistan 2021 is both a shared file and a source of different bets.

The challenge is to keep a working corridor without a sanctions-proof or all-weather pact.

Introduction

India and Iran share civilisational contact, a stake in Afghanistan, and the Chabahar-INSTC connectivity idea. The relationship is repeatedly strained by United States sanctions, energy payment problems, Israel policy, and slow project delivery. Challenges are structural, not only diplomatic mood.

Body

Sanctions and energy

- Iran was a major crude supplier to India. US withdrawal from the JCPOA and secondary sanctions cut that trade for long stretches.
- Payment, insurance, and shipping became the daily challenge. Rupee and third-country mechanisms were incomplete substitutes.
- After 2022 India also had discounted Russian oil, which further reduced Iran's share.

Connectivity that moves slowly

- Chabahar is the flagship. It competes with time, with Gwadar's China-Pakistan story, and with US sanctions risk for firms.
- INSTC needs Russian, Iranian, and Caucasian stability. War in Ukraine and Caucasus shocks delay a corridor sold as geopolitics.

Regional politics

- India deepened ties with Israel, the UAE, and the United States, including I2U2, while Iran remains in a hostile set toward Israel and often toward Washington.
- Afghanistan after August 2021 is a shared interest against some militant groups and a divergence on who holds legitimate power.
- Iran-Saudi and Iran-Gulf cycles pull Indian labour, energy, and Hajj-related diplomacy in two directions.

Domestic and identity files

- Shia pilgrimage, Chabahar workers, and occasional statements on Kashmir or on minorities can irritate either capital.
- Neither side treats the other as an enemy. Neither can offer a full strategic cover against the other's main threat.

Reading

- Keohane's complex interdependence is thin here because finance and insurance are weaponised by a third State.
- Pragmatic foreign policy keeps Chabahar alive as a hedge. It has not produced a sanctions-proof partnership.

Flow diagram

US sanctions JCPOA end -> Energy payment cut
US sanctions JCPOA end -> Chabahar delay
I2U2 Israel UAE US -> Diplomatic divergence
Energy payment cut -> Limited partnership
Chabahar delay -> Limited partnership
Diplomatic divergence -> Limited partnership

Conclusion

India-Iran challenges are US sanctions on energy and firms, slow corridors, and India's simultaneous West Asia partnerships with Iran's rivals. The relationship survives as a limited connectivity and regional-security file, not as an all-weather alliance.

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Q8(a) · 20 marks

What are the external determinants of the Foreign Policy of a State?

PSIR GS 2 · 2023 · Indian Foreign Policy

Revision summary

External determinants are systemic power, geography, economic dependence, and international institutions.

Waltz and Mearsheimer emphasise anarchy and great-power threat; Keohane adds regimes and interdependence.

Cox adds the hegemonic structure of ideas and production.

India's live external set includes China, Pakistan, Myanmar 2021, Afghanistan 2021, and sanctions maps.

Governments still choose among constrained options, which is why multi-alignment is a policy, not a geography.

Introduction

External determinants are facts outside a State that shape what its foreign policy can attempt. They include the distribution of power, geography, economic dependence, international institutions, and the behaviour of neighbours and great powers. Domestic politics still matters. This question asks for the outside set.

Body

Systemic structure

- Kenneth Waltz's neorealism puts anarchy and the distribution of capabilities first. A unipolar, bipolar, or multipolar setting changes alliance and nuclear choices.
- John Mearsheimer adds that a rising regional hegemon in Asia forces other States to balance or buck-pass. China's rise is that kind of external determinant for India.
- **Robert Keohane's complex interdependence adds non-military channels:** trade, finance, and regimes that constrain even strong States.

Geography and neighbourhood

- Borders, chokepoints, and the presence of unstable neighbours are standing external facts. For India: Pakistan, China, Myanmar after 2021, and Afghanistan after August 2021.
- Land-locked neighbours and island States create different demand for transit and navy.
- Extra-regional bases and navies in the Indian Ocean are part of the same map.

Economic and technological environment

- Energy prices, food prices, and semiconductor or medicine supply chains set daily diplomacy. The WTO TRIPS-COVID fight was an external legal-economic determinant.
- Sanctions regimes created by the United States or the UN Security Council shape third-party trade, as in India-Iran and India-Russia oil.
- Climate and pandemic shocks, treated as human security in 3(c), arrive from outside any one cabinet.

Institutions and ideas

- UN Charter rules, the NPT club, IMF conditionality, and climate treaties are external legal facts.
- Robert Cox stresses that world order includes ideas and production structures. A State's foreign policy is made inside a hegemonic or post-hegemonic order, not in a vacuum.
- Diasporas and transnational media are external-social determinants that still act on capitals.

How they operate

- External determinants set the menu. They do not write every line. India still chose multi-alignment rather than a US treaty.
- **Ranking matters:** a border war crowds out a trade talk. A financial crisis can reverse a doctrine for a decade.
- Functionalist agencies and the EU show that some regions thicken institutions so that external determinants become shared rules. South Asia has not.

Flow diagram

System polarity China US -> Foreign policy menu
Borders ocean neighbours -> Foreign policy menu
Energy sanctions WTO -> Foreign policy menu
UN NPT ideas Cox -> Foreign policy menu

Conclusion

Foreign policy is bounded by anarchy and power, by geography and neighbours, by energy and sanctions, and by international rules and hegemonic ideas. For India those bounds now include China, a thin South Asian region, and a contested American-led order. Choice remains, inside that set.

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Q8(b) · 15 marks

Discuss the significance of "West Asia Quad" in the light of India's 'Look West' policy

PSIR GS 2 · 2023 · Recent developments in Indian Foreign policy

Revision summary

Look West treats the Gulf and Israel as central to energy, labour, and investment.

I2U2 is India, Israel, UAE, and the United States in a 2022 project grouping.

Food parks and clean energy are the public work, not a mutual-defence treaty.

Abraham Accords politics made the table easier.

Iran and Palestine remain outside its scope and still constrain India's full West Asia map.

Introduction

I2U2 groups India, Israel, the United Arab Emirates, and the United States. It is the so-called West Asia Quad. Look West, or Think West, is India's effort to treat the Gulf and Israel as seriously as Act East treats ASEAN. I2U2 is a project arm of that turn, not a NATO in the Gulf.

Body

Look West

- Energy imports, Indian workers in the Gulf, remittances, and later defence and investment with the UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Israel made West Asia a core interest, not a transit zone.
- The Abraham Accords reduced the cost of India dealing openly with Israel and Gulf States at the same table.
- Chabahar and Iran remained a parallel, harder file, which is why Look West is a set, not a single alliance.

What I2U2 does

- Announced in 2022, it has worked on food parks, hybrid energy, and water and space-related cooperation rather than on a joint army.
- It uses US technology, Gulf capital, Israeli innovation, and Indian scale and food demand.
- For India it is economic statecraft and status among West Asian partners, consistent with multi-alignment.

What it is not

- It is not a substitute for NAM or for Global South diplomacy. Several NAM States oppose Israeli policy. India separates I2U2 projects from UN votes that still use older language.
- It does not resolve Palestine, Yemen, or Iran. Tehran reads the geometry as unfriendly, which feeds the 7(c) challenge.
- It cannot police the Strait of Hormuz by itself. US and local militaries still dominate hard security.

Fit with theory

- **Keohane's clubs:** a small regime for specific goods. Mitrany's function: food and energy tasks first.
- **Mearsheimer's map:** the United States knitting partners on China's western approaches and on Iran. India participates where projects serve growth.

Flow diagram

Look West energy diaspora -> I2U2 2022
I2U2 2022 -> Food energy water projects
Iran Palestine files -.not solved. -> I2U2 2022

Conclusion

I2U2 is a functional West Asian club that fits India's Look West bet on Gulf capital, Israeli technology, and US partnership. It extends multi-alignment into projects. It does not replace Iran policy, Palestinian diplomacy, or Indian labour protection in the Gulf.

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Q8(c) · 15 marks

Discuss the major drivers of India's interests in Africa

PSIR GS 2 · 2023 · Comparative Politics

Revision summary

Drivers are material (oil, minerals, markets), social (diaspora, students), diplomatic (UN and AU), and maritime.

NAM history is a resource of trust, not a full explanation.

China's capital presence is a competitive driver of Indian offers.

Peacekeeping and ITEC are tools as well as values.

A durable interest needs local jobs and sea-lane security, not only summit photographs.

Introduction

India's African interests are driven by energy and minerals, markets, Indian-origin communities, UN and Global South politics, maritime security in the western Indian Ocean, and competition with other extra-regional powers, especially China. History and NAM solidarity are real. They are not the only drivers.

Body

Material drivers

- Hydrocarbons from West Africa and minerals, including those used in batteries and industry, matter to Indian growth.
- African markets buy Indian vehicles, pharmaceuticals, and telecom. Lines of credit and EXIM Bank finance try to lock that access.
- The western Indian Ocean is a sea line for energy to India. Piracy off Somalia in earlier years made navy visits and information sharing a security driver.

People and history

- Diaspora in East and Southern Africa, and students in Indian universities, create a social lobby and a soft-power channel, in Nye's sense.
- Anti-colonial cooperation, NAM, and Gandhi's South Africa years supply a political memory that African elites still recognise, if delivery follows.

Diplomatic drivers

- Fifty-plus African UN votes matter for Council reform, for country-specific files, and for climate and trade coalitions.
- Global South diplomacy, the African Union's G20 seat, and ITEC training are instruments of that vote-and-voice interest.
- Peacekeeping in several African UN missions is both contribution and presence.

Strategic competition

- China's infrastructure scale is the benchmark African governments compare. India's offer is people-centred projects, digital public goods talk, and a smaller capital envelope.
- Extra-regional bases and ports in the Horn and on islands pull India to keep naval friendships from Oman to Mauritius and further west.

What does not drive alone

- A civilising mission is not the official driver. Resource extraction without local industry would repeat a pattern India criticises in others.
- **The honest list is mixed:** resources, votes, diaspora, sea lanes, and status as a Southern partner.

Flow diagram

Energy minerals markets -> India Africa interests

Diaspora NAM memory -> India Africa interests

UN votes AU G20 -> India Africa interests

IOR security China -> India Africa interests

Conclusion

India's African interests are driven by resources and markets, diaspora and NAM memory, UN votes and AU diplomacy, and Indian Ocean security under China's shadow. Solidarity language works when it is tied to those drivers, not when it replaces them.

Open WRAP page — <https://wrapexams.com/upsc/mains-answers/psir-gs-2/2023/discuss-the-major-drivers-of-in-dias-interests-in-africa/>

Compiled answer key

Last pages of this pack. Each question links to the WRAP model answer on wrapexams.com.

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Q1(a) 10 marks	Q1(b) 10 marks	Q1(c) 10 marks	Q1(d) 10 marks
Q1(e) 10 marks	Q2(a) 20 marks	Q2(b) 15 marks	Q2(c) 15 marks
Q3(a) 20 marks	Q3(b) 15 marks	Q3(c) 15 marks	Q4(a) 20 marks
Q4(b) 15 marks	Q4(c) 15 marks	Q5(a) 10 marks	Q5(b) 10 marks
Q5(c) 10 marks	Q5(d) 10 marks	Q5(e) 10 marks	Q6(a) 20 marks
Q6(b) 15 marks	Q6(c) 15 marks	Q7(a) 20 marks	Q7(b) 15 marks
Q7(c) 15 marks	Q8(a) 20 marks	Q8(b) 15 marks	Q8(c) 15 marks

Question-wise key

Q1(a) · 10 marks Solution

Q1(b) · 10 marks Solution

Q1(c) · 10 marks Solution

Q1(d) · 10 marks Solution

Q1(e) · 10 marks Solution

Q2(a) · 20 marks Solution

Q2(b) · 15 marks Solution

Q2(c) · 15 marks Solution

Q3(a) · 20 marks Solution

Q3(b) · 15 marks Solution

Q3(c) · 15 marks Solution

Q4(a) · 20 marks Solution

Q4(b) · 15 marks Solution

Q4(c) · 15 marks Solution

Q5(a) · 10 marks Solution

Q5(b) · 10 marks Solution

Q5(c) · 10 marks Solution

Q5(d) · 10 marks Solution

Q5(e) · 10 marks Solution

Q6(a) · 20 marks Solution

Q6(b) · 15 marks Solution

Q6(c) · 15 marks Solution

Q7(a) · 20 marks Solution

Q7(b) · 15 marks Solution

Q7(c) · 15 marks Solution

Q8(a) · 20 marks Solution

Q8(b) · 15 marks Solution

Q8(c) · 15 marks Solution

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