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UPSC Mains 2022 PSIR Paper 2

Year-wise PYQ pack · WRAP model answers with canonical links

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<https://wrapexams.com/upsc/mains/psir/gs-2/2022/>

Q1(a) · 10 marks

Discuss the main limitations of the comparative method to the study of Political Science.

PSIR GS 2 · 2022 · Comparative Politics

Revision summary

Comparison substitutes for experiment, as Lijphart argued.

Mill's designs fail when variables outnumber cases.

Galton's problem and conceptual stretching are standing limits.

Official data and Eurocentric concepts add political distortion.

The method is disciplined inference, not a controlled trial.

Introduction

The comparative method is the main tool of Comparative Politics. It seeks general statements from a small number of States. Its limits are conceptual, statistical, and political.

Body

What the method tries to do

- **John Stuart Mill's method of agreement and difference is the classical template:** hold some factors constant and vary others.
- Arend Lijphart treated comparison as a substitute for experiment when the political scientist cannot randomise regimes.
- Giovanni Sartori insisted that concepts must travel without stretching, or the comparison is only a word.

Main limitations

- **Too many variables and too few cases:** cabinets, culture, class, and colonial history cannot all be controlled in a handful of States.
- **Galton's problem:** States copy constitutions and parties, so cases are not independent experiments.
- **Conceptual stretching:** democracy, federalism, or failed State mean unlike things in India, Belgium, and a post-conflict territory.
- **Selection bias:** studying only wars or only successful democracies distorts causes.

- Data are State products. Official turnout, growth, and rights scores may hide informal power.
- Value-laden concepts and Eurocentric baselines, which dependency writers and Immanuel Wallerstein's world-system work also flag, make "development" a loaded yardstick.
- Language and meaning change the same institution. A vote is not the same act in every political culture.

What still remains

- Most-similar and most-different designs and process tracing reduce error. They do not make Political Science a laboratory.

Flow diagram

Comparative method -> Few cases many variables

Comparative method -> Galton dependence

Comparative method -> Sartori stretching

Few cases many variables -> Limits of inference

Galton dependence -> Limits of inference

Sartori stretching -> Limits of inference

Conclusion

The comparative method is limited by few cases, dependent cases, stretched concepts, biased selection, and political data. It remains necessary. It is not a proof machine.

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Q1(b) · 10 marks

What are the main challenges faced by the developing countries in the era of globalisation?

PSIR GS 2 · 2022 · Globalisation

Revision summary

Globalisation opens markets and tightens external rules.

Wallerstein's hierarchy and Prebisch's trade concern still describe many late developers.

Capital flight, TRIPS, and farm subsidies in the North cut policy space.

Inequality, informality, and climate costs are domestic faces of the same pressure.

Regional and South-South bargains are the usual reply, not autarky.

Introduction

Globalisation thickens trade, capital, data, and rules across borders. For developing countries it is opportunity and pressure at once. The challenges are economic, political, and social.

Body

Economic challenges

- Terms of trade and commodity dependence still fit parts of Raul Prebisch's older UNCTAD warning, even after export growth in East Asia.
- Immanuel Wallerstein's core-periphery map still describes technology and finance concentrated in a few States.
- Sudden capital flight, as in the 1997 Asian crisis, shows how open accounts can punish late developers.
- WTO rules, TRIPS, and agricultural subsidies in rich States constrain policy space that earlier industrialisers used.
- Joseph Stiglitz stressed that IMF-style conditionality can deepen recessions before growth returns.

Political and social challenges

- Sovereignty is shared with rating agencies, investors, and treaty dispute panels.
- Tax competition, illicit flows, and a digital divide widen inequality inside States.
- Labour informality and weak social security meet import shocks and automation.
- Climate rules and carbon borders add costs that developing States did not create in the same historical share.

Agency that remains

- South-South clubs, BRICS finance, and regional trade pacts are attempts to rewrite, not exit, globalisation.

Flow diagram

Globalisation -> Trade and TRIPS
Globalisation -> Capital volatility
Globalisation -> Rules of WTO IMF
Trade and TRIPS -> Challenges for South
Capital volatility -> Challenges for South
Rules of WTO IMF -> Challenges for South

Conclusion

Developing countries face volatile capital, unequal rules, squeezed policy space, and social inequality under globalisation. The era is not a level market. It is a hierarchy that they must bargain inside.

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Q1(c) · 10 marks

Discuss the commonalities between the Marxist and Realist approach to the study of International Politics.

PSIR GS 2 · 2022 · Approaches to the Study of International Relations

Revision summary

Both approaches deny that trade and law automatically pacify world politics.

Carr's critique of utopia feeds realist and Marxist readings.

Morgenthau and Waltz stress State power; Lenin and Wallerstein stress capital and hierarchy.

Institutions are treated as masks or tools, not as a world government in waiting.

The commonality is conflictual materialism; the split is State versus class.

Introduction

Marxism and realism are rival maps of International Politics. They still share a hard core: conflict, material power, and distrust of liberal harmony. E. H. Carr already stood near that overlap.

Body

Shared starting points

- Both reject Wilsonian and commercial-liberal claims that law, trade, or public opinion by themselves produce peace.
- E. H. Carr's Twenty Years' Crisis attacked utopianism. Realists read him as power politics. Marxists read him as a critique of liberal ideology.
- Politics is conflictual. For Hans Morgenthau it is interest defined as power. For V. I. Lenin it is imperialism as monopoly capitalism.
- Material capability matters. Kenneth Waltz counts poles of power. Marxists count class and the world-economy, as in Wallerstein's later system.

Shared scepticism

- The State is not a moral person. Realists treat it as a security actor. Marxists treat it as tied to class and capital, yet still as a unit of war and law.
- International institutions can mask hierarchy. Realists see them as tools of the strong. Robert Cox's critical theory, drawing on Marx, asks whose order a regime serves.
- History is struggle, not a smooth legal community.

The remaining divide

- **The unit of analysis differs:** State versus class and capital. The commonality is the refusal of a harmony-of-interests story.

Flow diagram

Liberal harmony -> Rejected by both
Realism Carr Morgenthau Waltz -> Conflict and power
Marx Lenin Wallerstein -> Conflict and power
Conflict and power -> International Politics as struggle

Conclusion

Marxist and realist approaches meet in conflict, material power, and suspicion of liberal peace. They part on whether the motor is anarchy among States or capitalism and class. Carr is the hinge writer for that overlap.

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WRAP Exams

Q1(d) · 10 marks

Bipolar structure of the world is more stable than the multipolar one. Comment.

PSIR GS 2 · 2022 · Comparative Politics

Revision summary

Waltz held that two poles watch each other more safely than many poles.

Cold War NATO-Warsaw pairing is the exhibit of central stability.

1914 illustrates multipolar chain-ganging.

Proxy wars show that bipolar peace was not global peace.

Deutsch and Singer, and later interdependence, qualify the law-like claim.

Introduction

Kenneth Waltz argued that a bipolar world is clearer and more stable than a multipolar one. The claim is structural. It is not a moral praise of the Cold War.

Body

Waltz's case for bipolarity

- In Theory of International Politics, two superpowers can watch each other without the shifting alliances of 1914.
- Deterrence is simpler. Miscounting friends is less likely than in a five-power Europe.
- The Cold War nuclear pair, NATO facing the Warsaw Pact, produced a long peace among the poles even as proxy wars ran in the periphery.

The multipolar contrast

- Waltz held that multipolarity multiplies dyads, misperception, and chain-ganging, as before the First World War.
- John Mearsheimer later feared instability in a Europe or Asia with several great powers after the Soviet collapse.

Limits of the claim

- Karl Deutsch and J. David Singer had argued that multipolarity can spread risk and interaction opportunities.
- Bipolarity exported war to Korea, Vietnam, and Afghanistan. Stability at the centre was not peace for the Third World.
- A unipolar moment after 1991, and today's China-United States rivalry inside a still messy rest, show that polarity is not a two-box story.
- Robert Keohane's complex interdependence adds that economic ties can dampen or complicate polarity logic.

Flow diagram

Waltz bipolarity -> Clear deterrence
Multipolarity -> Alliances misperception
Clear deterrence -> Stability at the poles
Alliances misperception -> 1914-type risk

Conclusion

Waltz's bipolarity is more stable at the great-power core because it simplifies deterrence and alliance arithmetic. It is not more just, and it was not peaceful for the periphery. Multipolarity is more accident-prone, not automatically more warlike in every decade.

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Q1(e) · 10 marks

National Interest is an essentially contested concept. Comment.

PSIR GS 2 · 2022 · Key concepts in International Relations

Revision summary

Gallie's essentially contested concepts fit national interest.

Morgenthau tried to fix it as power; Carr showed it as ideology of the strong.

Keohane and liberals thicken it with institutions and absolute gains.

Wendt and Marxists relocate it in identity or class.

Policy still uses the word; analysis must unpack it.

Introduction

National interest is the working phrase of foreign policy. W. B. Gallie called some concepts essentially contested: the dispute is about meaning, not only about facts. National interest is one of those concepts.

Body

Why it is contested

- Hans Morgenthau presented interest defined as power as an objective compass. Even he admitted that the concrete content changes with time and culture.
- E. H. Carr showed that great powers dress their interest as the interest of the international community.
- Liberals and Robert Keohane's institutionalists include absolute gains, trade, and regimes inside "interest." Realists keep relative power and survival first.
- **Constructivists after Alexander Wendt treat interest as socially made:** identity tells a State what to want.
- Marxists treat the official national interest as often the interest of a dominant class or of capital.

Practice

- In India the same word covers Panchsheel, the 1971 treaty tilt, the 1998 tests, and later Quad consultations. Each government claims continuity of interest.
- Security, welfare, prestige, and values compete. There is no single algorithm that ends the argument.

What follows for analysis

- The concept is indispensable and unstable. The scholar's job is to name whose interest, which time horizon, and which theory is being smuggled in.

Flow diagram

National interest -> Realist power survival
National interest -> Liberal gains regimes
National interest -> Constructivist identity
National interest -> Marxist class

Conclusion

National interest is essentially contested because power, welfare, identity, and class offer rival contents for the same word. Morgenthau's compass is a starting claim, not a settlement.

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WRAP Exams

Q2(a) · 20 marks

How has the electoral democracy augmented the participation of people in the democratic process?

PSIR GS 2 · 2022 · Comparative Politics

Revision summary

Competitive elections turn subjects into choosers of governments.

Dahl's polyarchy pairs contestation with inclusive participation.

Parties, local bodies, and reservations thicken who takes part between national polls.

Movements and media still orbit the electoral calendar.

Money, exclusion, and thin institutions can reduce the vote to a ceremony.

Introduction

Electoral democracy makes the people choosers of governments through regular, competitive, and inclusive votes. Participation is not only turnout on polling day. It is the wider process that elections organise.

Body

From subject to voter

- Joseph Schumpeter's thin model already treated the vote as the method by which leaders are authorised. Universal adult franchise widened that method beyond property and gender bars.
- **Robert Dahl's polyarchy adds contestation plus participation:** opposition parties, free information, and the right to run for office.
- Once the ballot is secret and counted, rulers must court numbers. That is the first augmentation of popular weight.

How elections thicken participation

- Parties, campaigns, and manifestos teach issues and recruit workers between polls.
- Interest groups, unions, and the press use the electoral cycle to bargain, which Almond and Verba's civic-culture work treated as a participant orientation.
- Federal and local elections, including India's 73rd and 74th Amendment panchayat and municipality polls, multiply offices and bring women and weaker sections onto the roll of representatives through reservations.
- Alternation in office, when it occurs, shows that participation can change governments without a coup.

Beyond the booth

- Social movements time protests to elections. That is still electoral democracy's magnet, not a rival universe.
- New instruments such as postal ballots, voter-education drives, and electronic rolls lower some costs of taking part.

Limits that still bind

- Schumpeterian elitism, money, media capture, and majoritarian pressure can hollow participation even when turnout is high.

- Samuel Huntington's political-order warning is that rapid mobilisation without institutions can strain, not deepen, democracy.
- Electoralism is not the whole of democracy. Rights, courts, and civil society must sit beside the vote, as India's Emergency and later restorations showed.

Net effect

- Compared with colonial subjecthood or one-party acclamation, competitive elections still expand who counts, who is heard, and who can be turned out.

Flow diagram

Universal franchise -> Voters as choosers
Voters as choosers -> Parties campaigns
Parties campaigns -> Local polls reservations
Local polls reservations -> Thicker participation
Money majoritarianism -.limits. -> Thicker participation

Conclusion

Electoral democracy augments participation by turning people into voters, party workers, and local office-holders, and by forcing elites to seek numbers. The augmentation is real. It is incomplete wherever money, exclusion, or weak institutions freeze the process into a ritual.

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Q2(b) · 15 marks

Discuss the role of social movements in strengthening the democratic processes in developing societies

PSIR GS 2 · 2022 · Politics of Representation and Participation

Revision summary

Movements are sustained claims that widen the people who count in politics.

In developing societies they compensate for thin parties and weak local institutions.

Indian environmental and information campaigns, and anti-apartheid struggle, are teaching cases.

They feed laws and courts as well as street protest.

Violence and State repression are the failure modes, not the definition.

Introduction

In developing societies the formal vote often arrived before dense civic institutions. Social movements fill that gap. They put new issues and new groups into the democratic process.

Body

What movements do for democracy

- Charles Tilly treated movements as sustained public claims on power. They expand the demos beyond the notables who first captured independence parties.
- **They convert needs into rights language:** land, wages, environment, caste dignity, and gender.
- They watch the State between elections, which Guillermo O'Donnell called a dimension of democratic quality, not a luxury.

Developing-society cases

- India's Chipko, Narmada Bachao, and later right-to-information campaigns pushed accountability onto the public agenda.
- Anti-apartheid mobilisation in South Africa made majority rule more than a constitutional clause.
- Peasant leagues, trade unions, and indigenous movements in Latin America bargained inside and against electoral regimes.

How the process is strengthened

- **Agenda setting:** issues that parties ignore become campaign material.
- **Inclusion:** women, Dalits, ethnic minorities, and informal workers learn to organise as citizens.
- **Institutional spillover:** new laws, commissions, and public-interest litigation often follow street and court combined pressure.

Risks

- Violence, secession, and capture by patrons can weaken the same process.
- The State may criminalise protest and still hold elections. Movement strength then measures how democratic the democracy is.

Flow diagram

Social movements -> Agenda and rights
Social movements -> Inclusion of new groups
Agenda and rights -> Stronger democratic process
Inclusion of new groups -> Stronger democratic process
Elections -> Stronger democratic process

Conclusion

Social movements strengthen developing democracies by widening who claims, what is claimed, and how governments are watched. They are not a substitute for elections. They stop electoral democracy from shrinking to a five-year ritual.

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Q2(c) · 15 marks

Describe the composition of the International Court of Justice (ICJ). Discuss its voluntary jurisdiction

PSIR GS 2 · 2022 · Contemporary Global Concerns

Revision summary

Fifteen judges serve nine-year terms after parallel Assembly and Council elections.

Legal-system representation is a Statute goal; ad hoc judges fill nationality gaps.

- **Contentious jurisdiction is consent-based:** compromis, treaty, or optional clause.

Article 36(2) declarations usually carry reservations and reciprocity.

Advisory opinions and Article 94 enforcement sit beside, not inside, that voluntary core.

Introduction

The International Court of Justice is the principal judicial organ of the United Nations. It sits at The Hague under the UN Charter and the ICJ Statute. Composition is elective. Jurisdiction in contentious cases is voluntary.

Body

Composition

- Article 3 of the Statute provides 15 judges. No two may be nationals of the same State.
- Judges are elected for nine-year terms by the General Assembly and the Security Council, voting independently. Five seats turn over every three years.
- The Statute asks for representation of the main forms of civilisation and the principal legal systems, not for a simple P5 court, though practice has often included a judge from each permanent member.
- Ad hoc judges may sit when a party has no national on the bench.
- Chambers, including a Chamber of Summary Procedure, may hear particular cases. Official languages are English and French.
- Only States may be parties in contentious proceedings. The Registry is the permanent secretariat.

Voluntary jurisdiction

- Consent is the gate. A State may accept jurisdiction by special agreement (compromis), by a treaty clause, or by a declaration under the optional clause of Article 36(2) of the Statute.
- Optional-clause declarations are often riddled with reservations as to time, subject, and reciprocity. The Court still needs a matching title of jurisdiction.
- Forum prorogatum and transfer from the Permanent Court of International Justice supply other consent paths.
- Advisory opinions requested by the General Assembly, the Security Council, or authorised agencies are not judgments between States. They do not rest on the same bilateral consent.

What voluntary means in practice

- Powerful States can stay outside a case, as the United States did after Nicaragua in the 1980s by limiting its optional-clause exposure.
- Judgments bind the parties to that case. Article 94 of the UN Charter points enforcement toward the Security Council, which remains political.

- Voluntary jurisdiction is therefore a legal technique of a society of sovereigns, not a world supreme court.

Flow diagram

ICJ Statute -> 15 judges elected
ICJ Statute -> Article 36 optional clause
Article 36 optional clause -> Consent reservations
Consent reservations -> Contentious case
15 judges elected -> Contentious case

Conclusion

The ICJ is a 15-judge UN court elected by the Assembly and the Council. Its contentious jurisdiction exists only where States have consented, especially through the optional clause with reservations. Composition is professional and representative in design. Power still sits at the consent gate.

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Q3(a) · 20 marks

Critically examine the rise of People's Republic of China (PRC) as a great power and its implications on Asian Political order

PSIR GS 2 · 2022 · Changing International Political Order

Revision summary

China's rise is economic, military, and institutional, from BRI and AIIB to the SCO.

Waltzian capability and Mearsheimer's warning both fit the regional reaction.

The South China Sea, Taiwan, and the Himalaya are the sharp edges of the new order.

- **Neighbours hedge:** trade with China, security with the United States, Japan, and the Quad.

Ageing, technology denial, and a still-plural Asia block a simple Chinese hegemony.

Introduction

The People's Republic of China has moved from a revolutionary outsider to a great power in wealth, arms, and diplomacy. Asia's political order is being recast around that rise. The change is not a completed Chinese hegemony.

Body

The rise

- Reform after 1978 produced decades of growth, a manufacturing core, and a claim to the world's second-largest economy.
- Military modernisation, a blue-water navy, and nuclear and missile forces support great-power status in Waltz's capability sense.
- The Belt and Road Initiative, the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, and a larger IMF and UN voice show order-shaping, not only catching up.
- The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, partnership with Russia, and a claim to Taiwan as a core interest mark a security posture beyond Deng's hiding of strength.

Implications for Asian order

- **East Asia:** the United States alliance net (Japan, South Korea, Australia) has tightened. The Quad and AUKUS are balancing replies in Mearsheimer's offensive-realist reading of a rising China.
- **South China Sea:** island building and nine-dash claims collide with UNCLOS and with ASEAN claimants. Hierarchy threatens the older ASEAN-centred diplomatic process.
- **South Asia:** the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor and Himalayan border crises, including 2020 in eastern Ladakh, pull India toward the Indo-Pacific and away from a purely continental freeze.
- Central Asia and the SCO give Beijing a continental club that is not NATO and not a US-led order.
- **Economic order:** trade dependence on China sits beside security fear, a classic interdependence trap that Keohane and Nye described in other regions.

Critical limits

- Demographic ageing, debt, and technology controls from the United States qualify linear rise.
- **Asian order is still multipolar at the second tier:** India, Japan, ASEAN, and Russia are not satellites.

- A Chinese-led hierarchy would need consent that many neighbours refuse. The result is a contested dual order: economic gravity toward China, security insurance toward the United States and minilateral groups.

Flow diagram

PRC great-power rise great-power rise -> BRI AIIB trade
PRC great-power rise -> Navy missiles SCO
BRI AIIB trade -> Asian dual order
Navy missiles SCO -> Asian dual order
Quad US alliances -> Asian dual order

Conclusion

The PRC is a great power by capability and by institutional reach. Asian political order has become a dual structure of Chinese economic weight and counter-coalitions such as the Quad. The implication is rivalry and hedging, not a settled Beijing Concert.

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Q3(b) · 15 marks

Discuss the conceptual dimensions of collective security

PSIR GS 2 · 2022 · Key concepts in International Relations

Revision summary

Collective security treats peace as indivisible and aggression as everyone's business.

Claude contrasted it with balance of power and with world state.

The League failed; the Charter put force decisions in the Security Council.

NATO is collective defence, not the same inclusive machine.

The veto and weak automaticity are the built-in conceptual limits.

Introduction

Collective security is the idea that peace is a common good and that aggression against one is the concern of all. It is a legal-political design, not a synonym for every alliance.

Body

Core concept

- Inis Claude treated collective security as an alternative both to a pure balance of power and to world government.
- The community of States agrees in advance to identify aggression and to combine against the aggressor, including former friends.
- Universality, automaticity of response, and the indivisibility of peace are the classical dimensions.

Legal architecture

- The League of Nations Covenant tried the idea and failed over Manchuria and Ethiopia.
- The UN Charter, Chapters VI and VII, especially **Articles 39** to 42, locates determination and measures in the Security Council.
- **Article 51** preserves individual and collective self-defence until the Council acts. That clause is the hinge toward alliances.

Distinctions that matter

- **Collective security is inclusive:** the aggressor is unknown in advance. NATO is collective defence against a named outside threat.
- Peacekeeping is a later practical overlay, often with consent, not the full Chapter VII vision of the **Military Staff Committee**.
- Humanitarian intervention and the Responsibility to Protect borrow the language of common peace and split the original State-consent core.

Conditions and failures

- Great-power concert is required. The veto is the Charter's admission that collective security yields to polarity, which Waltz would treat as structural fact.
- Without agreed definition of aggression, and without troops on call, the concept becomes a resolution rather than a system.

Flow diagram

Collective security -> Universal against unknown aggressor

Collective security -> UN Charter VII

UN Charter VII -> Veto polarity

NATO -> Collective defence named threat

Conclusion

Collective security's dimensions are universal membership, prior commitment against unknown aggressors, and centralised enforcement. The UN Charter writes that design and then qualifies it with the veto and **Article 51**. Alliances such as NATO are cousins, not the same concept.

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Q3(c) · 15 marks

Discuss the efficacy of global conventions to combat international terrorism

PSIR GS 2 · 2022 · Contemporary Global Concerns

Revision summary

Terrorism law is a bundle of sectoral conventions, not one world statute.

UNSC 1373 and FATF gave post-2001 teeth on finance and safe haven.

Hijacking and open sponsorship became harder.

Definitional splits, Charter disputes, and weak territories cap efficacy.

Treaties are a floor; politics and intelligence remain the walls.

Introduction

Global conventions against terrorism are a patchwork of treaties, Security Council decisions, and financial rules. They have narrowed safe havens. They have not produced one agreed crime of terrorism or an end to the tactic.

Body

The legal web

- Sectoral UN conventions cover hijacking, hostages, terrorist bombing, terrorist financing, and nuclear terrorism, rather than one comprehensive definition.
- The 1999 International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism and the 1997 Terrorist Bombing Convention are the workhorses of extradition and criminalisation.
- Security Council Resolution 1373 (2001), under Chapter VII, bound all members to freeze assets and deny safe haven, a legislative leap beyond ordinary treaty pace.
- The **Financial Action** Task Force standards travel into domestic banking law.

Where efficacy shows

- Aviation and maritime conventions made hijacking a rarer diplomatic bargain.
- Financing rules, listing, and mutual legal assistance have raised the cost of open State sponsorship.
- Extradition webs and INTERPOL notices help when political will exists.

Where efficacy fails

- No comprehensive convention exists because "freedom fighter versus terrorist" still splits the General Assembly.
- Powerful States use exceptional self-defence claims and targeted killings that sit uneasily with the UN Charter.
- Safe havens persist in weak territories. Encryption and informal value transfer outrun old convention text.
- Human-rights blowback from emergency laws can feed the very recruitment conventions aim to dry up.

Net judgment

- Conventions are necessary floor rules. They are not a strategy. Intelligence, politics, and development sit outside the treaty page.

Flow diagram

Sectoral UN conventions -> Financing bombing hijack
UNSC 1373 FATF -> Binding finance rules
Financing bombing hijack -> Partial efficacy
Binding finance rules -> Partial efficacy
No single definition -limits. -> Partial efficacy

Conclusion

Global anti-terror conventions work best as criminal-law and finance tools against named acts. Their efficacy is limited by definitional deadlock, the veto politics of listing, and the gap between text and ungoverned space. They constrain; they do not cure.

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Q4(a) · 20 marks

Identify and evaluate the reasons for deadlock in the WTO negotiations on fisheries between the developing and developed countries

PSIR GS 2 · 2022 · Globalisation

Revision summary

Doha mandated cuts in harmful fisheries subsidies.

IUU and overfished-stock bans are the easier slice; overcapacity is the deadlock.

Developing Members want S&DT for small-scale and food-security fleets.

Developed Members fear loopholes for large emerging distant-water fleets.

MC12's partial treaty parked the hardest pillar rather than ending the conflict.

Introduction

WTO fisheries talks sit in the Doha Round mandate to curb harmful subsidies. Developing and developed members agree that overfishing is real. They deadlock on who may still subsidise, for how long, and under what special and differential treatment.

Body

What the negotiation is about

- The Doha Development Agenda asked Members to clarify and improve WTO rules on fisheries subsidies, targeting illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing, overfished stocks, and overcapacity.
- The SDG 14.6 deadline added political heat. Ministerial Conference 12 in 2022 produced a partial Agreement on Fisheries Subsidies. The hardest pillar, overcapacity and overfishing with wide exceptions, was left for later. That leftover is the continuing North-South deadlock.

Reasons for deadlock

- **Historical responsibility:** developing coastal States argue that industrial distant-water fleets of the EU, Japan, the United States, and others built overcapacity. They want policy space for small-scale fishers and for national food security.
- **Special and differential treatment (S&DT):** India and the African, Caribbean and Pacific group seek longer transition periods, higher de minimis thresholds, and exemptions for low-income fishers. Developed Members treat open-ended S&DT as a loophole for large emerging fleets, including China's.
- **IUU listing and determination:** who certifies a vessel as IUU, coastal State or a rich-member list, is a sovereignty fight.
- **Transparency and notification:** weak data in the South meets demands for vessel-level reporting that many administrations cannot yet meet.
- **Livelihood versus export:** Northern conservation NGOs and some developed governments frame a global public good. Southern negotiators frame artisanal employment and protein.
- **Single-undertaking memory:** fisheries was tied to agriculture and industrial market access for years, so mistrust from the wider Doha stall spilled into this file.
- **China's dual status:** a developing-member label with a huge distant-water fleet blurs the old North-South binary and hardens US and EU positions.

Evaluation

- **The deadlock is not ignorance of science. It is distribution:** who pays for conservation with jobs and who keeps fuel and vessel subsidies.
- A ban on IUU and on subsidies to already overfished stocks is the easier moral consensus. Capacity-enhancing subsidies are the class conflict of the world-economy, which Wallerstein's hierarchy helps name.
- Partial legal success at MC12 shows bargaining is possible when the most sensitive S&DT and overcapacity texts are parked. Parking is not settlement.

Flow diagram

Doha fisheries mandate -> IUU and overfished stocks and overfished stocks
Doha fisheries mandate -> Overcapacity subsidies
S and DT India ACP -> Overcapacity subsidies
EU US Japan conservation -> Overcapacity subsidies
Overcapacity subsidies -> North-South deadlock

Conclusion

Fisheries deadlock is a North-South bargain over S&DT, historical overcapacity, IUU designation, and China's fleet, not a quarrel about whether fish stocks matter. Until livelihood space for developing coastal States is written in durable exceptions, the Doha fisheries file will keep stalling on the hard pillar.

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Q4(b) · 15 marks

What is the realist prescription to the States to ensure their survival in an anarchical world?

PSIR GS 2 · 2022 · Comparative Politics

Revision summary

Anarchy means no higher protector, so States must help themselves.

Morgenthau defines interest as power; Carr rejects utopian reliance on opinion.

Balance internally by arms and externally by alliances such as NATO.

Defensive realists stop at security; offensive realists push toward hegemony.

Regimes may help, but realists refuse to treat them as a substitute for capability.

Introduction

- **Realists start from anarchy:** no world government sits above the State. Survival is the first interest. The prescription is self-help, power, and careful alignment, not trust in law alone.

Body

Anarchy and survival

- **Kenneth Waltz's structural realism:** the organising principle is anarchy, so States must provide their own security.
- **Hans Morgenthau's classical line:** interest defined as power, prudence, and a balance that checks any would-be master.
- E. H. Carr warned against relying on liberal harmony while others arm.

The operational prescription

- **Self-help:** maintain armed forces, intelligence, and economic capacity that can be mobilised.
- **Balance of power:** internally by arms, externally by alliances. NATO is a realist instrument even when dressed as a community.
- **Relative gains:** watch partners who may convert cooperation into tomorrow's threat, a reply to Robert Keohane's more optimistic institutionalism.
- Nuclear deterrence for those who can, as Waltz also argued that nuclear bipolarity can stabilise.
- Defensive realists (Waltz) say seek enough security, not maximum empire. Offensive realists (John Mearsheimer) say regional hegemony is the safer peak. Both still prescribe power, not disarmament by example.

What realists tell States not to do

- Do not outsource survival to the UN Charter's collective security when the veto can freeze it.
- Do not assume trade or a regime will bind a rising peer. China policy debates inside Asia follow this caution.

Limits inside the school

- The prescription can feed security dilemmas. One State's survival kit is another's threat.
- It under-describes domestic choice and the pull of institutions that Keohane maps in After Hegemony.

Flow diagram

Anarchy Waltz -> Self-help
Self-help -> Balance of power
Balance of power -> Survival
Morgenthau interest as power -> Survival
Keohane regimes -.qualifies. -> Survival

Conclusion

The realist prescription in anarchy is self-help, a balance of power, attention to relative gains, and distrust of paper guarantees. Survival is ensured by capability and alignment, not by the harmony of interests. How much power is 'enough' divides Waltz from Mearsheimer.

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Q4(c) · 15 marks

Russian-Ukraine crisis has cast a dark shadow on the energy needs of the member states of the European Union (EU).

Comment

PSIR GS 2 · 2022 · Comparative Politics

Revision summary

EU members, especially Germany, had leaned on Russian pipeline gas.

The 2022 war turned that flow into a coercive lever.

Prices, storage, and winter risk became security politics.

Diversification to LNG and non-Russian fuels is costly and incomplete.

NATO's front and EU energy policy now move together, against older commercial peace.

Introduction

Russia's war on Ukraine, intensified in 2022, turned EU energy from a market file into a security file. Pipeline dependence met NATO's eastern front. The shadow is price, shortage risk, and a forced green-and-LNG scramble.

Body

The dependence that the crisis exposed

- Germany and several Central European members had built gas security on Russian pipelines, including Nord Stream, under a commercial peace assumption that Carr would have called utopian.
- Oil, coal, and nuclear fuel links added depth. Interdependence here was asymmetric, closer to a weapon than to Keohane and Nye's benign complex interdependence.

Immediate shadow on needs

- Price spikes in gas and electricity hit households and industry across the EU.
- Threats to and damage around Nord Stream, plus Russian payment and cut-off politics, made winter storage a strategic target.
- Sanctions on Russian energy forced a hunt for seaborne LNG, Norwegian and North African gas, and US cargoes, at higher cost and with new infrastructure bottlenecks.

Alliance and order

- NATO's reinforcement of the eastern flank and EU emergency coordination (including REPowerEU-type plans to cut Russian fuels) fused energy with collective defence.
- **The crisis also split tempo:** some members prolonged nuclear or coal; others accelerated renewables. Cohesion of needs is not cohesion of mix.

Wider IR reading

- Waltzian anarchy returned to a region that had treated energy as a functional spillover of the European Union.
- The Global South faced fertiliser and grain shocks too, but the question's focus is EU members' energy needs: they discovered that a revisionist supplier can hold the thermostat.

Flow diagram

Russia Ukraine war -> Pipeline cuts prices
Pipeline cuts prices -> EU energy needs
EU energy needs -> LNG Norway US
EU energy needs -> NATO plus REPowerEU

Conclusion

The Russia-Ukraine war darkened EU energy security by revealing pipeline dependence, spiking prices, and forcing a rushed diversification toward LNG and non-Russian fuels. Functional European peace did not cancel realist supply risk. NATO and the Commission now treat kilowatt-hours as strategy.

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Q5(a) · 10 marks

Peaceful co-existence remains the cornerstone of India's foreign policy. Comment.

PSIR GS 2 · 2022 · Recent developments in Indian Foreign policy

Revision summary

Panchsheel made peaceful coexistence a named Indian doctrine with China in 1954.

NAM and the UN carried the same language of sovereignty and non-interference.

Wars and border crises show the cornerstone can crack.

1998 and later US and Quad ties add realist insurance.

The phrase remains official; the practice is coexistence plus capability.

Introduction

Peaceful coexistence is the claim that unlike systems can live without war if sovereignty is respected. India wrote it into Panchsheel and still recites it. Practice has added harder balancing.

Body

The cornerstone as doctrine

- The 1954 Panchsheel agreement with China listed mutual respect for territorial integrity, non-aggression, non-interference, equality, and peaceful coexistence.
- **Jawaharlal Nehru** carried the same vocabulary into Bandung, NAM, and the UN Charter's friendly-relations language.
- The idea was a reply to Cold War bloc war and to colonial intervention, not a vow of passivity.

Continuity

- India still prefers diplomacy, UN process, and strategic autonomy over joining NATO.
- Neighbourhood First, Act East, and Global South voice keep coexistence as the public grammar of a civilisational State.

Strain and update

- 1962 with China, 1971 with Pakistan, Kargil, and 2020 Ladakh show that coexistence is a preference, not a guarantee.
- Nuclear tests in 1998, later Quad consultations, and logistics pacts with the United States sit beside Panchsheel talk.
- Realists such as Morgenthau would call coexistence a policy when power allows, not a law of nature.

Judgment

- **The cornerstone remains the official first stone. The building now has more steel:** deterrence, minilateral groups, and issue-based alignment.

Flow diagram

Panchsheel 1954 -> Peaceful coexistence

Peaceful coexistence -> NAM UN diplomacy

Peaceful coexistence -> Deterrence Quad after shocks

NAM UN diplomacy -> Indian foreign policy

Deterrence Quad after shocks -> Indian foreign policy

Conclusion

Peaceful coexistence is still India's declared cornerstone through Panchsheel, NAM memory, and UN diplomacy. It has not been the only tool since 1962. Autonomy plus deterrence is the working mix.

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Q5(b) · 10 marks

Discuss the ways and means to realise greater economic co-operation among the Member States of South Asia.

PSIR GS 2 · 2022 · India and South Asia

Revision summary

Intra-South Asian trade is thin because of politics and non-tariff walls.

SAARC and SAFTA remain the pan-regional frame; they move slowly.

BIMSTEC and BBIN are the practical means when SAARC is frozen.

Energy, roads, and customs are the functional tools.

Indian asymmetry and the Pakistan file decide how far any club can go.

Introduction

South Asia trades little with itself compared with ASEAN or the EU. Greater economic cooperation needs working clubs, connectivity, and a political floor that SAARC has lacked.

Body

Institutional ways

- Revive SAARC where consensus allows, and use SAFTA with fewer sensitive-list holes.
- Push BIMSTEC, BBIN, and the Bay of Bengal where Pakistan's veto does not sit.
- Energy grids, motor-vehicle agreements, and power trade are functional steps in Mitrany's sense: task first, flag later.

Means on the ground

- Cross-border electricity, petroleum pipelines, and digital payments lower the cost of small trade.
- Harmonised customs, last-mile roads in the north-east and Nepal-Bhutan corridors, and fewer non-tariff barriers matter more than summit communiqués.
- **People mobility:** visas, medical and education travel, and a calmer India-Bangladesh trading regime already show gains.

Political means that economics cannot skip

- India-Pakistan freeze is the structural block. Sub-regional geometry is the workaround, not a full South Asian market.
- Chinese extra-regional finance is a hedge for smaller States. Indian delivery speed has to match, or cooperation stays a speech.
- **Asymmetry:** India must offer non-reciprocal access in some lines, as earlier Gujral-era logic suggested, without sounding like a hegemon.

Flow diagram

SAARC SAFTA -> Limited by consensus

BIMSTEC BBIN -> Connectivity energy

Connectivity energy -> Greater economic cooperation

Limited by consensus -> Greater economic cooperation

Conclusion

Greater South Asian economic cooperation runs through SAFTA repair, BIMSTEC and BBIN connectivity, energy and customs hardware, and a political decision to work around the SAARC stall. Geography is not a market until barriers and mistrust fall.

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WRAP Exams

Q5(c) · 10 marks

Discuss the steps required to realise hydro-co-operation between India and Bangladesh.

PSIR GS 2 · 2022 · India and South Asia

Revision summary

The 1996 Ganga Treaty is the working model of dry-season sharing.

The **Joint Rivers Commission** is the institutional means.

Teesta remains the political missing piece.

Flood data, Brahmaputra transparency, and inland navigation are the next hardware steps.

Indian federal politics is as decisive as diplomacy with Dhaka.

Introduction

India and Bangladesh share the Ganga-Brahmaputra-Meghna basin. Hydro-cooperation is water-sharing, navigation, power, and flood data. Treaties exist. Teesta and some upstream projects still wait.

Body

What is already in place

- The 1996 Ganga Water Sharing Treaty at Farakka set a dry-season formula for thirty years and a **Joint Committee**.
- The **Joint Rivers Commission**, from the 1970s, is the standing bilateral body for fifty-plus shared rivers.
- Power trade, the Sundarbans, and inland protocol routes show that water is also electricity and cargo, not only a barrage dispute.

Steps still required

- Conclude a Teesta arrangement that West Bengal's politics can live with, or a creative package of storage, canals, and seasonal guarantees.
- Share flood and monsoon data in real time; climate extremes make last-minute warning a humanitarian step.
- **Joint basin** planning on the Brahmaputra and Barak, including transparent talk on Tipaimukh-type projects, to cut Dhaka's fear of upstream control.
- Navigation protocols, dredging, and last-mile inland ports so Bangladesh gains transit value, not only water volume.
- **Sub-regional hooks:** BBIN and BIMSTEC energy so Bhutanese hydropower and Indian grids include Bangladesh as a paying partner.
- Domestic federal coordination in India, because water is a State subject in practice at the political bottleneck.

Spirit

- Hydro-cooperation needs Panchsheel-style non-harm plus engineering. A treaty without federal buy-in will not flow.

Flow diagram

Ganga Treaty 1996 -> Joint Rivers Commission

Teesta deal -> Hydro-cooperation

Data navigation power -> Hydro-cooperation

Joint Rivers Commission -> Hydro-cooperation

Conclusion

India-Bangladesh hydro-cooperation needs a Teesta settlement, live flood data, joint basin planning, navigation and power links, and Indian federal consensus. The 1996 Ganga Treaty is the template. Completing the unfinished rivers is the step that still defines the relationship.

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Q5(d) · 10 marks

Explain the significance of Basic Exchange and Co-operation Agreement (BECA) for Indo-US strategic relations.

PSIR GS 2 · 2022 · Changing International Political Order

Revision summary

BECA (2020) shares geospatial intelligence for navigation and precision.

It sits with LEMOA and COMCASA as the US foundational set.

The pact thickens Indo-US military interoperability for the Indo-Pacific.

Quad awareness gains; a NATO **Article 5** does not appear.

Data-trust and Russia-origin platforms remain the practical ceiling.

Introduction

BECA is a 2020 foundational defence agreement on geospatial intelligence. With LEMOA and COMCASA it moved India-United States military ties from political talk to interoperable systems.

Body

What BECA does

- It allows sharing of maps, satellite data, and geospatial products that guide missiles, aircraft, and navigation.
- Accuracy at sea and in the Himalaya rises when Indian platforms can use US-origin geospatial feeds under agreed safeguards.

Strategic significance

- Together with LEMOA (logistics) and COMCASA (communications security), BECA completes a triad that the United States usually signs with close partners.
- It supports Quad maritime domain awareness and Indo-Pacific operations without a NATO treaty.
- It signals that New Delhi will take enabling pacts with Washington while keeping Russian kit, which is autonomy as multi-alignment, not non-alignment as distance.

Limits

- Trust over data, end-use monitoring, and India's other suppliers still cap how deep the plug-in goes.
- China reads BECA as balancing. That is part of the significance, not an accident.

Flow diagram

LEMOA logistics -> Foundational triad
 COMCASA comms -> Foundational triad
 BECA geospatial -> Foundational triad
 Foundational triad -> Indo-US Quad operations

Conclusion

BECA's significance is geospatial interoperability plus a political marker that India-US strategic relations now include the sensitive layer of maps and targeting support. It is an enabler of partnership, not a mutual defence clause.

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WRAP Exams

Q5(e) · 10 marks

Discuss the role of public diplomacy in the enhancement of India's global standing.

PSIR GS 2 · 2022 · India's Contribution to the Non-Alignment Movement

Revision summary

Public diplomacy targets foreign societies, not only cabinets.

Nye's soft power is the theoretical name for that attraction.

India's tools are culture, diaspora, ITEC, and development goods.

Standing rises when the story is believed at the UN and in the G20.

Domestic contradiction and thin budgets are the brakes.

Introduction

Public diplomacy speaks to foreign publics, not only to foreign offices. Joseph Nye called the asset soft power. India uses culture, diaspora, development partnership, and digital media to raise standing.

Body

Tools India uses

- The Ministry of External Affairs' public diplomacy work, Indian missions, and ICCR cultural centres carry yoga, classical arts, and contemporary India.
- Diaspora outreach, Pravasi occasions, and student mobility make a people-to-people lobby in the United States, the Gulf, and Africa.
- ITEC training, lines of credit, vaccines, and disaster relief are public diplomacy with material proof.
- **Digital India**, cinema, and English-language media compete in a crowded information order.

How standing rises

- Attraction reduces the cost of coalitions at the UN, in the G20, and among Global South voters.
- A democratic, post-colonial story still differs from great-power coercion, which NAM memory amplifies.

Limits

- Neighbourhood images, communal polarisation, and press-freedom indices can cancel a festival of India.
- China's capital and the West's universities still outspend Indian cultural budgets.
- Public diplomacy cannot replace capability. It can make capability more legitimate.

Flow diagram

Public diplomacy -> Culture ICCR yoga

Public diplomacy -> Diaspora ITEC vaccines

Culture ICCR yoga -> Global standing

Diaspora ITEC vaccines -> Global standing

Conclusion

Public diplomacy enhances India's standing when culture, diaspora, and development delivery match the claim of a responsible democracy. It is Nye's attraction at work. It fails when domestic practice contradicts the message.

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WRAP Exams

Q6(a) · 20 marks

Discuss the relevance of the demand for New International Economic Order (NIEO) in the present era of globalisation

PSIR GS 2 · 2022 · Evolution of the International Economic System

Revision summary

NIEO 1974 demanded fairer trade, finance, and technology for the South.

Globalisation produced growth for some and locked unequal rules for many.

WTO S&DT, IMF quotas, and climate finance are the living agenda.

BRICS and new banks are institutional substitutes for a UN-commanded order.

China's dual role and market facts make a pure 1974 replay impossible.

Introduction

The New International Economic Order was demanded by the G77 in UN General Assembly resolutions of 1974. It asked for fairer trade, technology, and finance for the South. Globalisation did not cancel that demand. It changed the instruments.

Body

What NIEO asked

- Sovereign control over resources, better commodity terms, more aid, technology transfer, and a larger voice in the IMF and World Bank.
- UNCTAD and the Prebisch lineage supplied the diagnosis of unequal exchange.
- **Wallerstein's world-system reading is harsher:** the core will not gift a new order; conflict over surplus is normal.

What globalisation did

- Some East Asian and Indian growth showed that insertion into trade can raise incomes. That is the liberal reply.
- TRIPS, financial crises, tax havens, and farm subsidies in rich States showed that rules still tilt. That is why Stiglitz and UNCTAD still sound like 1974 on different files.
- The WTO replaced much of the old NIEO bargaining table. Special and differential treatment fights, including fisheries, are NIEO in committee language.

Present relevance

- **Voice:** BRICS, the New Development Bank, Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, and IMF quota debates are institutional NIEO by other means.
- **Justice:** climate finance, loss and damage, and vaccine equity replay technology and resource claims.
- Food and energy shocks after 2022 revived commodity politics that 1974 knew well.
- Digital public goods, data localisation, and platform taxes are new NIEO chapters that the 1974 text did not name.

What is obsolete

- A UNGA resolution cannot command markets. Cartel power like 1970s oil is rare for most commodities.

- **South-South gaps:** China is both a developing-member claimant and a core manufacturer. The old G77 unity is thinner.

Balanced claim

- The spirit of NIEO-policy space, fairer rules, and Southern voice-is live. The letter of 1974 state-managed prices is not the working programme.

Flow diagram

NIEO 1974 G77 -> Voice and policy space
Globalisation WTO -> Rules still tilted
Voice and policy space -> BRICS climate digital
Rules still tilted -> BRICS climate digital

Conclusion

- **NIEO remains relevant as a justice claim inside globalisation:** rules, finance, technology, and climate. It is less relevant as a single UN command economy. Today's means are WTO bargaining, BRICS finance, and climate funds, not a replay of 1974 resolutions alone.

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Q6(b) · 15 marks

Critically examine the major factors responsible for a turnaround in the trajectory of India's foreign policy in the post-cold war period

PSIR GS 2 · 2022 · Recent developments in Indian Foreign policy

Revision summary

Soviet collapse and the 1991 crisis forced an economic and diplomatic reset.

Look East and later Act East opened a second geography.

The 1998 tests and the US civil nuclear path recast status and technology access.

China's rise pushed hedging without a NATO choice.

NAM vocabulary survived inside a wider multi-alignment.

Introduction

The Cold War's end removed the bipolar frame in which Indian non-alignment had been easiest to explain. The 1990s turnaround was toward economic opening, Look East, and later a US nuclear path, without a formal alliance.

Body

Structural factors

- Soviet collapse cut a diplomatic and arms pillar. Waltzian polarity change forced adaptation.
- The 1991 balance-of-payments crisis tied foreign policy to markets, the IMF moment, and later WTO entry.
- Unipolarity, then China's rise, recast threat and opportunity.

Domestic and leadership factors

- Economic reforms made trade, oil, and investment first-order diplomatic goals.
- Look East under Narasimha Rao, nuclear tests in 1998, the Pokhran-to-NSG path, and the India-US civil nuclear breakthrough were sequential bets on status and technology.
- Coalition politics and a growing diaspora in the West pulled policy toward Washington without erasing Moscow.

Ideas

- From NAM as the centre of gravity toward strategic autonomy and multi-alignment.
- Gujral's neighbourhood doctrine, Vajpayee's US opening, and later Act East named the turn.

Critical caution

- Russia, NAM summits, and Global South language never vanished. The turnaround is mix, not a conversion to a US ally.
- 1998 tests angered the West before they enabled the later nuclear bargain. Trajectory was jagged.
- China policy oscillated between partnership slogans and border military crisis.

Flow diagram

Cold War end 1991 crisis -> Policy turnaround

Look East -> Policy turnaround

1998 tests US nuclear path -> Policy turnaround

China rise -> Policy turnaround

Conclusion

Post-Cold War Indian foreign policy turned because polarity, bankruptcy risk, and China's rise made old single-track non-alignment insufficient. Reforms, Look East, 1998, and the US nuclear path are the markers. Autonomy remained the stated end. The partner set widened.

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Q6(c) · 15 marks

Discuss the reasons behind India's refusal to sign the nuclear non-proliferation treaty (NPT)

PSIR GS 2 · 2022 · Contemporary Global Concerns

Revision summary

The NPT recognises only five nuclear-weapon States by a 1967 date.

India rejected that hierarchy as unequal law.

China's arsenal and later Pakistan made accession a security risk.

1974 and 1998 locked a weapons-capable identity.

A US-led NSG waiver later gave civilian trade without signature.

Introduction

The NPT of 1968 divides nuclear-weapon States as of 1967 from all others. India refused to sign as a nuclear have-not. The reasons are legal inequality, security, and status.

Body

Discriminatory structure

- Article IX's cut-off date freezes five recognised nuclear-weapon States. India called this nuclear apartheid, not a genuine non-proliferation community.
- Disarmament duties on the five remained vague. Horizontal proliferation was policed more than vertical reduction.

Security and autonomy

- China tested in 1964. The 1962 war sat in memory. An open-ended non-nuclear vow looked reckless in a Waltzian self-help world.
- Pakistan's programme and later tests made a unilateral NPT accession even less likely.
- Peaceful nuclear explosion in 1974 and the 1998 tests showed a dual civil-military path that the NPT's non-nuclear box could not hold.

Diplomatic identity

- NAM and NIEO-era India treated unequal treaties as a continuation of hierarchy, akin to Carr's unmasking of status-quo law.
- India offered a nuclear-weapon-free world and later a voluntary test moratorium, but not accession as a non-nuclear-weapon State.

After refusal

- NSG sanctions followed 1974 and 1998. The later US civil nuclear deal and NSG waiver gave trade without NPT signature, which confirmed New Delhi's bet that exceptionalism could be bargained.
- Additional Protocol-style safeguards on civilian facilities were accepted as a price. The NPT itself was not.

Flow diagram

NPT 1968 cut-off 1968 cut-off -> Discriminatory status

China 1964 Pakistan -> Security self-help

Discriminatory status -> India refuses to sign

Security self-help -> India refuses to sign

1974 and 1998 tests -> India refuses to sign

Conclusion

India refused the NPT because it froze a hierarchy of nuclear haves, ignored its China-Pakistan security setting, and contradicted equal sovereignty. 1974 and 1998 made the refusal material. Later civil nuclear commerce came despite, not through, the treaty.

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Q7(a) · 20 marks

What are the main drivers of India-Japan Strategic and Global Partnership?

PSIR GS 2 · 2022 · India and the Global Centres of Power

Revision summary

China's rise is the structural driver of India-Japan closeness.

Abe's FOIP and India's Act East locked the Indo-Pacific frame.

Japanese ODA, corridors, and the 2016 nuclear deal are economic drivers.

The Quad and 2+2 are the security method, not NATO.

Trade still lags the political headline, which is the partnership's unfinished piece.

Introduction

India and Japan named a Strategic and Global Partnership in the 2000s and thickened it under Shinzo Abe. The drivers are China, the Indo-Pacific, economics, and compatible democracies. It is a partnership, not a NATO alliance.

Body

Strategic drivers

- China's rise, the East China Sea, the Himalaya, and the South China Sea created a shared balancing interest that Mearsheimer would treat as structural.
- Abe's Free and Open Indo-Pacific and India's Act East met in the Quad with Australia and the United States.
- A 2+2 foreign-and-defence format, Malabar exercises, and a civil nuclear cooperation agreement (2016) moved the pair beyond aid rhetoric.
- Japan's constitutional constraints still matter. The driver is capacity-building and interoperability, not a joint expeditionary command.

Economic and developmental drivers

- Japanese ODA, the Delhi-Mumbai Industrial Corridor, and the Mumbai-Ahmedabad high-speed rail are visible stakes in Indian growth.
- Supply-chain resilience after COVID and after China risk pushed both toward trusted manufacturing.
- Africa and BIMSTEC connectivity talk extends the economic map beyond bilateral trade, which is still below potential.

Political and social drivers

- Two Asian democracies with no historical bilateral war and a positive occupation-era memory in India of Japanese opposition to colonialism, however selective that memory is.
- Diaspora, students, and public diplomacy lower the distrust that still marks India-China ties.

Limits that clarify the drivers

- Trade gaps, delayed projects, and India's Russia oil and defence channel after 2022 annoy Tokyo.
- Neither wants a China-containment label that would trap ASEAN. The driver is hedging plus public goods, not a war plan.

Net

- The partnership is driven by a China-shaped Indo-Pacific, Japanese capital, Indian markets and navy, and Quad multilateralism.

Flow diagram

China rise -> India-Japan partnership

Abe FOIP Act East -> India-Japan partnership

ODA corridors nuclear deal -> India-Japan partnership

Quad 2 plus 2 -> India-Japan partnership

Conclusion

India-Japan strategic partnership is driven by China's power, Abe-era Indo-Pacific thinking, Japanese investment, and democratic affinity, organised through the Quad and 2+2 without a mutual defence treaty. Economics and security now travel together.

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Q7(b) · 15 marks

What are the implications of 'Look-East' Policy on the north-eastern region of India?

PSIR GS 2 · 2022 · India and South Asia

Revision summary

Look East recast the north-east from a cul-de-sac to an ASEAN bridge.

Kaladan, the IMT highway, and BIMSTEC are the hardware of that claim.

Insurgency, drugs, and Myanmar's coup are the security implications.

Ecology and tribal land are the domestic social implications.

Gains remain below promise until corridors actually run and stay safe.

Introduction

Look East, later Act East, treated India's north-east as a bridge to ASEAN rather than a dead-end frontier. Implications are connectivity, security, ecology, and uneven local gain.

Body

Intended implications

- Roads, the Kaladan Multi-Modal Transit to Myanmar, the India-Myanmar-Thailand highway, and border haats were meant to end the region's partition-era isolation.
- Trade with Bangladesh and Myanmar, plus BIMSTEC, would give landlocked north-eastern States a Bay of Bengal outlet.
- Tourism, education, and cultural diplomacy with South-East Asia use ethnic kinships across the border.

Security and political implications

- Insurgency, arms, and narcotics routes can thicken with the same corridors that carry legal trade.
- Myanmar's post-2021 turmoil showed that Act East hardware depends on a neighbour's order.
- China watches the same geography from the north. Connectivity is also a strategic denial and a vulnerability.

Development implications

- Some State capitals gain logistics jobs. Hill ecologies and tribal land rights face dams, highways, and in-migration.
- The policy can look Delhi-centric unless local governments and Inner Line regimes are part of the design.
- Bangladesh transit and water politics (Ganga, Teesta) sit next door; the north-east is not only a Myanmar story.

Balance

- Look East is the best available growth story for the region. Delivery gaps and conflict in Myanmar have so far kept implications below the brochure.

Flow diagram

Look East Act East -> Kaladan IMT highway
Kaladan IMT highway -> North-east as bridge
Myanmar instability insurgency -> Risks
North-east as bridge -> Implications mixed
Risks -> Implications mixed

Conclusion

Look East implies a north-east that is a commercial and cultural bridge to ASEAN. It also implies new security, land, and ecological pressures. The implication is opportunity plus exposure, not an automatic peace dividend.

Open WRAP page — <https://wrapexams.com/upsc/mains-answers/psir-gs-2/2022/what-are-the-implications-of-look-east-policy-on-the-north-eastern-region-of-india/>

Q7(c) · 15 marks

Explain the factors which justify India's claim for a permanent seat at the UN security council

PSIR GS 2 · 2022 · India and the UN System

Revision summary

A permanent seat is claimed as overdue Council reform.

India cites size, democracy, economy, and peacekeeping contribution.

G4 diplomacy presents the claim as a package, not a vanity seat.

Nuclear responsibility and Indian Ocean weight are security arguments.

P5 inertia, especially China's, is the political obstacle.

Introduction

India seeks a permanent UN Security Council seat as part of reformed multilateralism. The claim is that 1945 power no longer matches 21st-century contribution and legitimacy.

Body

Contribution factors

- **Population and democracy:** a large, constitutionally democratic State whose inclusion would widen the Council's representative base beyond the 1945 victors.
- **Economy and peacekeeping:** a major economy and one of the UN's largest historical troop contributors, which [Article 23](#) already lists as a criterion for elected seats.
- **Diplomacy:** NAM founder, G20 member, and a regular elected member of the Council with a record of drafting and mediation attempts.

Security and order factors

- Nuclear-weapon capability outside the NPT, plus a no-first-use-style public doctrine, is used to argue that India is a responsible stakeholder, not a spoiler.
- Indo-Pacific and Indian Ocean geography make Indian consent useful for any Council claim to speak for Asian peace.
- G4 coordination with Japan, Germany, and Brazil frames the claim as Council reform, not a solo demand.

Justice of the map

- Africa and Latin America lack a permanent seat. India's claim is often paired with wider expansion so that the veto club is less a 1945 museum.
- The P5 veto, which Waltz would call polarity written into the Charter, is exactly what India says must be updated.

Obstacles that do not cancel the justification

- China, and sometimes others, can stall text. Pakistan campaigns against India. These are power facts. They do not erase the representative case.

Flow diagram

Population democracy economy -> Claim to permanent seat

Peacekeeping G20 -> Claim to permanent seat

G4 reform reform -> Claim to permanent seat

1945 veto map -.blocks. -> Claim to permanent seat

Conclusion

India's claim rests on population, democracy, economy, peacekeeping, and Asian security weight, plus the datedness of the 1945 P5. Justification is contribution plus representativeness. The veto politics of the present Council is the barrier, not the absence of a case.

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Q8(a) · 20 marks

How does India-Israel bilateral ties reflect the autonomy of India's foreign policy choices?

PSIR GS 2 · 2022 · Recent developments in Indian Foreign policy

Revision summary

India kept Israel at arm's length in the NAM decades, then opened fully in 1992.

Defence and technology became the core of the bilateral.

Autonomy means choosing that core without a US or Arab veto.

Continued UN votes on Palestine show de-hyphenation, not capture.

Gulf energy and Iran files run in parallel, which is multi-alignment.

Introduction

India recognised Israel in 1950, kept a thin relationship through the Cold War, and opened full ambassadors in 1992. Deeper defence and technology ties since then show that New Delhi will choose partners against older bloc habits. Autonomy is the point of the story, not a romance of the relationship.

Body

From freeze to choice

- Cold War India voted with Arab and NAM positions on Palestine and delayed full embassy exchange. That was also a choice, driven by energy, diaspora in the Gulf, and anti-colonial identity.
- 1992 full diplomatic relations, after the Cold War and after Madrid-process optics, showed that the old package deal could be unbundled.

What the bilateral now contains

- Defence, drones, intelligence, and agriculture technology became the hard core.
- Water, start-ups, and homeland security added a civilian layer.
- High visits and a public partnership replaced the earlier hush.

How this is autonomy

- Autonomy, in Indian usage, is the right to decide each file. E. H. Carr would note that all States mix morality and interest; India stopped treating Israel as a forbidden moral absolute.
- India still votes at the UN on Palestinian questions in ways that annoy Israel. That de-hyphenation is the proof of choice, not of capture.
- Gulf energy, Iranian Chabahar, and Abraham Accords-era diplomacy show a West Asia policy of several channels at once, which is multi-alignment rather than a US or Arab veto over New Delhi.
- Realist self-help after 1990s terrorism and after 1998 status-seeking made Israeli defence a tool. NAM rhetoric did not get a veto over that tool.

Limits of the showcase

- A relationship can look autonomous and still be shaped by US technology rules and by Hindu-nationalist affinity politics at home.

- Gaza wars periodically test how far public diplomacy can hold the two-track vote-and-weapons mix.

Judgment

- India-Israel ties reflect autonomy because they were delayed when NAM logic demanded delay, deepened when security and tech demanded depth, and still sit beside a Palestine voting record. That is issue-based choice.

Flow diagram

Cold War thin ties -> 1992 full relations
1992 full relations -> Defence tech
Defence tech -> Autonomy as issue-based choice
UN Palestine votes -> Autonomy as issue-based choice

Conclusion

India-Israel relations display foreign-policy autonomy as the power to open, thicken, and still qualify a partnership. Full ties after 1992 and defence cooperation did not abolish Palestine votes. The mix is the Indian claim to decide, not to join someone else's camp.

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Q8(b) · 15 marks

Discuss the consequences of illegal cross-border migration in India's north-eastern region

PSIR GS 2 · 2022 · Comparative Politics

Revision summary

Porous borders with Bangladesh and Myanmar structure the problem.

Assam's Accord and NRC politics show demographic fear becoming law.

Insurgency and trafficking are the security consequences.

Informal labour is the economic pull that fencing does not erase.

Diplomacy with Dhaka and a lawful citizenship process are part of any remedy.

Introduction

The north-east sits on open historical frontiers with Bangladesh and Myanmar. Illegal cross-border migration is a charged political fact. Its consequences are demographic, security, economic, and legal.

Body

Demographic and political consequences

- Local majorities in Assam and some other States fear a shift in language, land, and electoral rolls. The Assam Accord of 1985 and later NRC exercises grew from that fear.
- Citizenship, detection, and deportation became permanent campaign issues. Polarisation is itself a consequence.

Security consequences

- Insurgent groups have used poorly policed borders for sanctuary, arms, and funds.
- Trafficking in people, cattle, and narcotics rides the same paths as labour migration.
- Communal and ethnic clashes have followed rumours and census politics, which weakens the democratic process that Paper II Section A treats as participation.

Economic and ecological consequences

- Cheap labour fills construction, farm, and urban informal work. That is a pull factor as well as a grievance.
- Forest and char land come under pressure. Floodplain ecology in Assam is not infinitely elastic.

Legal and diplomatic consequences

- Pushback, fencing, and identity documents strain India-Bangladesh ties even when governments cooperate on security.
- Statelessness risk for those who fall out of rolls is a human-rights and administrative consequence, not only a partisan talking point.
- **Inner Line Permit States face a different mix:** fewer electoral-roll fights, more anxiety about cultural dilution.

Policy implication

- Consequences cannot be managed by fencing alone. Labour demand, border policing, and a lawful citizenship process have to travel together.

Flow diagram

Illegal cross-border migration -> Demography electoral rolls

Illegal cross-border migration -> Insurgency trafficking

Illegal cross-border migration -> Assam Accord NRC law

Demography electoral rolls -> Consequences in NER

Insurgency trafficking -> Consequences in NER

Assam Accord NRC law -> Consequences in NER

Conclusion

Illegal migration in the north-east has demographic, insurgency, labour, and citizenship-law consequences. It feeds both a security problem and a politics of belonging. The region's Act East bridge role is harder while this file stays inflamed.

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Q8(c) · 15 marks

Discuss India's vision of a New World order in the 21st century

PSIR GS 2 · 2022 · Recent developments in Indian Foreign policy

Revision summary

India wants a multipolar order with a reformed Security Council.

Multi-alignment replaces single-camp Cold War maps.

The Indo-Pacific and the Quad sit beside BRICS and NAM memory.

NIEO justice claims return as WTO, climate, and digital rules.

The vision mixes realist balancing of China with institutional rule-shaping.

Introduction

India's 21st-century vision is a multipolar, reformed multilateral order in which the Global South has voice and India has a seat at the high table. It is not a call to smash the UN. It is a call to update 1945.

Body

What the vision contains

- Reformed UN Security Council, with India as a permanent member, as the political centrepiece.
- **Strategic autonomy and multi-alignment:** work with the Quad and with BRICS, with the US and with Russia, without a NATO treaty.
- **Rules that are not only Western, yet not a Chinese hierarchy:** a free and open Indo-Pacific plus Panchsheel language of coexistence.
- **Economic order:** WTO reform, climate justice, digital public infrastructure as a Southern offering, and NIEO-like policy space inside globalisation.
- Vasudhaiva Kutumbakam and yoga-era public diplomacy as the cultural dressing of the same claim, which Nye would call soft power.

How it differs from 1974 and from NAM purity

- India now wants to shape rules as a rising power, not only to denounce them as a have-not.
- It accepts globalisation's markets while demanding fairer fisheries, food, and finance outcomes.
- It treats China as a rival to be balanced, which 1950s coexistence did not have to do in the same way.

Realist and institutional mix

- Waltz and Mearsheimer explain the China-balancing half.
- Keohane's institutions explain why India still invests in the UN, G20, and WTO rather than in pure self-help.
- The vision therefore is a concert of several poles, not unipolarity and not a revolutionary anti-system.

Flow diagram

Indian vision -> Multipolarity autonomy

Indian vision -> UNSC reform G20

Indian vision -> Indo-Pacific Quad

Indian vision -> Global South NIEO spirit

Conclusion

India's 21st-century new world order is multipolar, UN-reformed, economically more equal, and Indo-Pacific in geography. Autonomy is the method. A permanent Council seat and Global South voice are the tests of whether the vision is succeeding.

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Compiled answer key

Last pages of this pack. Each question links to the WRAP model answer on wrapexams.com.

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Q1(a) 10 marks	Q1(b) 10 marks	Q1(c) 10 marks	Q1(d) 10 marks
Q1(e) 10 marks	Q2(a) 20 marks	Q2(b) 15 marks	Q2(c) 15 marks
Q3(a) 20 marks	Q3(b) 15 marks	Q3(c) 15 marks	Q4(a) 20 marks
Q4(b) 15 marks	Q4(c) 15 marks	Q5(a) 10 marks	Q5(b) 10 marks
Q5(c) 10 marks	Q5(d) 10 marks	Q5(e) 10 marks	Q6(a) 20 marks
Q6(b) 15 marks	Q6(c) 15 marks	Q7(a) 20 marks	Q7(b) 15 marks
Q7(c) 15 marks	Q8(a) 20 marks	Q8(b) 15 marks	Q8(c) 15 marks

Question-wise key

Q1(a) · 10 marks Solution

Q1(b) · 10 marks Solution

Q1(c) · 10 marks Solution

Q1(d) · 10 marks Solution

Q1(e) · 10 marks Solution

Q2(a) · 20 marks Solution

Q2(b) · 15 marks Solution

Q2(c) · 15 marks Solution

Q3(a) · 20 marks Solution

Q3(b) · 15 marks Solution

Q3(c) · 15 marks Solution

Q4(a) · 20 marks Solution

Q4(b) · 15 marks Solution

Q4(c) · 15 marks Solution

Q5(a) · 10 marks Solution

Q5(b) · 10 marks Solution

Q5(c) · 10 marks Solution

Q5(d) · 10 marks Solution

Q5(e) · 10 marks Solution

Q6(a) · 20 marks Solution

Q6(b) · 15 marks Solution

Q6(c) · 15 marks Solution

Q7(a) · 20 marks Solution

Q7(b) · 15 marks Solution

Q7(c) · 15 marks Solution

Q8(a) · 20 marks Solution

Q8(b) · 15 marks Solution

Q8(c) · 15 marks Solution

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