

WRAP Exams · wrapexams.com

Prelims PYQ, Mains model answers, and copy evaluation. Write to the desk for this paper, a doubt, or the AI waitlist.

ask@wrapexams.com · +91 85951 84903 · wrapexams.com

UPSC Mains 2023 PSIR Paper 1

Year-wise PYQ pack · WRAP model answers with canonical links

Official UPSC stems in exam order. Each live answer sits on one WRAP URL; this PDF is the year pack, not a second copy of the article. Open the link under a question for the full page.

<https://wrapexams.com/upsc/mains/psir/gs-1/2023/>

Q1(a) · 10 marks

Normative approach in Political Science.

PSIR GS 1 · 2023 · Political Theory

Revision summary

The normative approach asks what political life ought to be and argues about justice, liberty, and obligation.

Plato, **Aristotle**, the contract theorists, Mill, and **Rawls** are central practitioners.

Easton and Dahl supply empirical maps of systems and decisions that cannot replace the question of right.

Communitarian critics warn that abstract persons can hide real communities.

Indian Parts III and IV show that a constitution is itself a public set of ought-statements.

Introduction

The normative approach in political science asks what political life ought to be, not only what rulers and voters in fact do. It treats justice, authority, liberty, and obligation as claims that can be argued, not only as survey items.

Body

What the approach does

- A normative inquiry defines concepts such as the state, right, and legitimacy, and then tests a claim against a rival claim.
- **Plato** and **Aristotle** set the pattern by asking which regime is just, not only which city was strong.
- **Hobbes**, **Locke**, and **Rousseau** used contract arguments to say when coercion is justified.
- **John Rawls** rebuilt that tradition as justice as fairness: equal basic liberties, fair opportunity, and the difference principle.
- **J. S. Mill** treated liberty of thought and discussion as a condition of human development, which is a value claim, not a vote count.

Contrast with empirical work

- **David Easton** defined politics as the authoritative allocation of values and asked for observable systems of demand, support, and output.

- **Robert Dahl** asked who actually prevails in decisions, which is a behavioural test of power.
- The normative approach does not replace those methods. It supplies the standard by which an allocation or a decision can be called just or unjust.
- Behavioural critics said norms were untestable metaphysics. The reply is that measurement cannot invent the question of right.

Limits

- Normative theory can ignore institutions and history if it stays with ideal persons only.
- **Michael Sandel** and **Michael Walzer** later showed that abstract persons may hide the communities in which people actually live.
- The approach remains necessary because a constitution, including India's Parts III and IV, is itself a set of ought-statements that courts and legislatures must interpret.

Flow diagram

Normative approach -> Ought claims
Normative approach -> Plato Mill Rawls
Easton Dahl -> Is: systems and decisions
Ought claims -> Justice and legitimacy
Is: systems and decisions -> Justice and legitimacy

Conclusion

The normative approach studies politics as reasoned argument about what ought to bind. Easton and Dahl describe allocation and decisions; **Plato**, Mill, and **Rawls** judge them. Political science needs both, because facts do not by themselves yield justice.

Open WRAP page —

<https://wrapexams.com/upsc/mains-answers/psir-gs-1/2023/normative-approach-in-political-science/>

Q1(b) · 10 marks

Multicultural perspective on rights.

PSIR GS 1 · 2023 · Political Theory

Revision summary

Multicultural theory treats culture as a condition of using liberty, not as a private hobby.

Kymlicka, Taylor, Parekh, and Walzer argue for recognition and, in some cases, group rights.

Indian **Articles 25** to 30 and linguistic states are the constitutional form of that argument.

Ambedkar's Article 17 and sex-equality limits block a group veto over civil liberty.

The perspective fails if it either ignores minorities or traps persons inside the group.

Introduction

A multicultural perspective on rights holds that equal citizenship is not only the same list of individual liberties for every person. It also asks how language, religion, and culture structure who can use those liberties.

Body

The claim

- Liberal rights, in **Locke**, **Mill**, and **Rawls**, attach first to individuals as free and equal persons.
- **Will Kymlicka** argued that some group-differentiated rights are needed so that minority cultures can supply the context of choice that liberals already value.
- **Charles Taylor** named recognition: misrecognition can injure dignity even when the civil code is formally equal.
- **Bhikhu Parekh** treated cultural diversity as a permanent feature of modern states, not as a temporary exception.
- **Michael Walzer** in *Spheres of Justice* held that goods should be distributed by the meanings a community already gives them, which resists a single nationwide metric of right.

Indian text

- **Articles 25** to 28 protect freedom of religion; **Articles 29 and 30** protect the cultural and educational rights of minorities.
- Personal law and linguistic federalism after the **States Reorganisation Act, 1956**, are institutional forms of this perspective.
- **Ambedkar** still insisted that group custom cannot cancel equal civil liberty, which is why **Article 17** abolishes untouchability.

Limits

- **Susan Moller Okin** asked whether multicultural accommodation can trap women inside group rules.
- A rights perspective that is only individual can erase minorities; a perspective that is only communal can erase dissenters inside the group.
- The workable line is individual basic liberties plus limited group rights that do not destroy exit, equality of sexes, and the secular public law of the state.

Flow diagram

Multicultural rights -> Individual liberties

Multicultural rights -> Group-differentiated rights

Multicultural rights -> Recognition

Individual liberties -> Mill Rawls

Group-differentiated rights -> Arts 29 and 30

Conclusion

The multicultural perspective adds recognition and group-differentiated rights to the liberal list of individual liberties. Kymlicka, Taylor, Parekh, and Walzer state the case. Articles 25 to 30 show the Indian form, bounded by Ambedkar's civil equality.

Open WRAP page —

<https://wrapexams.com/upsc/mains-answers/psir-gs-1/2023/multicultural-perspective-on-rights/>

Q1(c) · 10 marks

State of Nature as State of War (Hobbes).

PSIR GS 1 · 2023 · Political Theory

Revision summary

- **Hobbes's state of nature is a state of war:** a condition of known readiness to fight where there is no common power.

Competition, diffidence, and glory are the three causes of quarrel.

Natural equality of vulnerability makes pre-emptive violence rational.

The sovereign ends the war by monopolising judgment and force.

Locke, **Mill**, and constitutional democracy keep a common power and then limit it, which **Hobbes** refused as a right against the sovereign.

Introduction

Thomas Hobbes in *Leviathan* (1651) treats the state of nature as a state of war. War here is not only open battle. It is a known disposition to fight when there is no common power to keep all in awe.

Body

Why nature is war

- **Hobbes starts from natural equality of vulnerability:** the weakest can kill the strongest by secret plot or alliance.
- **Three causes of quarrel follow:** competition for scarce goods, diffidence (fear of being attacked first), and glory (reputation).
- Without a common judge, each has a natural right to everything that seems necessary to self-preservation, including another's body.
- The result is continual fear and danger of violent death, and a life that cannot support industry, agriculture, or science.
- Covenants without the sword are words. Only a sovereign with effective power ends the war by monopolising judgment and force.

What the claim is not

- The state of nature is a logical reconstruction of life without political authority, not a dated anthropology of all tribes.
- **Locke** denied that nature is already war; he treated it as inconvenience without an impartial judge, and he kept a right of revolution.
- **Rousseau** treated unsocialised humans as not yet in Hobbesian war; war arrives with property and comparison.
- **Foucault** later studied power inside the ordered state, which **Hobbes** had pictured as the exit from war, not as war by other means.

Political use

- The argument justifies a strong sovereign, including in a commonwealth by institution, because the alternative is insecurity.
- Limited government after **Locke**, **Mill**, and **Dahl**'s polyarchy accepts the need for a common power and then binds that power by law, rights, and contestation.

- Indian public order clauses and the Union's duty to protect States against internal disturbance (**Article 355**) still assume that political authority exists to prevent a return to private force.

Flow diagram

State of nature -> Equal vulnerability
Equal vulnerability -> State of war
State of war -> Sovereign common power
Sovereign common power -> Peace and industry
Locke Mill -> Limits on that power

Conclusion

Hobbes identifies the state of nature with a state of war because equal vulnerability, competition, fear, and glory have no common judge. The sovereign is the exit. Later liberals keep the common power and add legal limits that **Hobbes** did not grant against the sovereign.

Open WRAP page —

<https://wrapexams.com/upsc/mains-answers/psir-gs-1/2023/state-of-nature-as-state-of-war-hobbes/>

Q1(d) · 10 marks

Foucault's concept of power.

PSIR GS 1 · 2023 · Concept of power, hegemony, ideology and legitimacy.

Revision summary

Foucault treats power as productive relations that form subjects through discipline and the government of populations.

The concept goes beyond **Hobbes**'s sovereign sword and Dahl's A-over-B decisions.

Power and knowledge work together in prisons, clinics, schools, and statistics.

Resistance is inside power relations, not a pure exterior.

The account describes how people are governed; it does not by itself say which government is just.

Introduction

Michel Foucault treats power as a relation that produces conduct, knowledge, and subjects, not only as a stock of force held by a sovereign. The concept is meant to study how people are governed in prisons, clinics, schools, and statistics, as well as in law.

Body

Against the sovereign map

- **Hobbes** located power in a common sword. **Dahl** located it in A getting B to do what B would not otherwise do.
- **Foucault** does not deny those maps. He says they miss capillary power that runs through routines and classifications.
- Disciplinary power trains bodies in time-tables, exams, and surveillance, as in Discipline and Punish.
- Bio-power governs populations through birth, health, and security, as in the lectures on governmentality.
- **Power and knowledge work together:** a science of crime or sexuality is already a way of ruling.

What power is, on this view

- Power is productive. It makes kinds of persons (the delinquent, the patient, the citizen) rather than only forbidding acts.
- Power is relational and mobile. It is exercised, not owned as a thing.
- Resistance is internal to power relations; it is not a pure outside.
- The state remains important as a cluster of these relations, not as the only seat of power.

Use and limit

- The concept explains why rights on paper can coexist with disciplinary institutions, a point relevant to prison and asylum jurisprudence under **Article 21**.
- **It does not replace Rawls or Mill on justification:** **Foucault** describes how subjects are formed, he does not give a full theory of when power is legitimate.
- Read with **Easton**, allocation still happens; **Foucault** asks through which knowledge and bodies it happens.

Flow diagram

Foucault power -> Disciplinary
Foucault power -> Bio-power
Foucault power -> Power-knowledge
Hobbes Dahl -> Sovereign and decisions
Foucault power -> Not only the sword

Conclusion

Foucault's concept of power is productive, capillary, and joined to knowledge. It extends Hobbes's sword and Dahl's decisions into discipline and bio-power. It is a method for studying government, not a complete theory of justice.

Open WRAP page — <https://wrapexams.com/upsc/mains-answers/psir-gs-1/2023/foucaults-concept-of-power/>

Q1(e) · 10 marks

Decline of political theory.

PSIR GS 1 · 2023 · Political Theory

Revision summary

Decline of political theory was a mid-century claim that systematic normative argument had stopped.

Laslett, Cobban, positivism, and Easton's behavioural programme were the main sources of that claim.

Easton's 1969 credo of relevance and Rawls's 1971 book reopened normative theory.

Sandel, Walzer, Berlin, Arendt, and Foucault continued theory under other names.

The thesis described a university mood, not the end of political thought in India or elsewhere.

Introduction

- **The phrase decline of political theory named a mid-twentieth-century diagnosis:** that systematic argument about the good regime had given way to history of ideas, ideology, or behavioural science. The diagnosis was later revised when Rawls and others rebuilt normative theory.

Body

What was said to decline

- **Peter Laslett** wrote in 1956 that political philosophy was dead for the moment, because no one was doing the old systematic work.
- **Alfred Cobban** and others blamed ideology, war, and a retreat into historical scholarship.
- **David Easton** in 1951 criticised traditional political theory as unscientific and called for a behavioural science of systems.
- Logical positivism treated value statements as not empirically meaningful, which starved normative argument.
- The result, on this account, was either empty legalism or survey research without justice.

What returned

- Easton's own 1969 post-behavioural address demanded relevance, which reopened values as a public problem.
- **John Rawls's** A Theory of Justice (1971) restored contract argument at a high analytic level.
- **Berlin, Arendt, Oakeshott**, and later **Sandel** and **Walzer** showed that concepts of liberty, action, and community were still live.
- **Foucault** and post-colonial writers shifted the object of theory to power and empire rather than ending theory.
- Indian constitutional argument after **Kesavananda Bharati** (1973) continued a public theory of limits on power.

How to read "decline"

- Decline named a professional mood in Anglo-American universities, not the end of political thought in the world.
- **Ambedkar, Gandhi**, and **Aurobindo** were already doing political theory in another idiom while the decline thesis was written in England.

- The accurate statement is interruption and specialisation, then revival, not a completed death.

Flow diagram

Decline thesis -> Laslett Cobban

Decline thesis -> Easton behavioural

Revival -> Rawls 1971

Revival -> Sandel Walzer

Easton behavioural -> 1969 relevance

Conclusion

Decline of political theory referred to a mid-century gap between behavioural science and systematic normative argument. Easton first widened the gap and then asked for relevance. **Rawls**, communitarians, and constitutional courts show that the gap did not remain.

Open WRAP page — <https://wrapexams.com/upsc/mains-answers/psir-gs-1/2023/decline-of-political-theory/>

Q2(a) · 20 marks

Success of contemporary democracies lies in the State limiting its own power. Explain

PSIR GS 1 · 2023 · Political Theory

Revision summary

Democratic success is majority rule under rules that bind the state itself.

Locke's trust, Mill's liberty, and Dahl's polyarchy name those limits in theory.

India institutionalises them in Part III, Articles 32 and 226, federal distribution, and Kesavananda's basic structure.

The Emergency showed that elections without those limits do not preserve democracy.

Limitation targets arbitrary power, not the state's lawful capacity to tax, defend, and provide welfare.

Introduction

Contemporary democracy is not only majority election. It is majority election inside rules that bind the state itself. The claim is that those democracies last when public power is legally limited, contestable, and removable, not when the state can do anything a winning coalition wants.

Body

What limitation means

- **Locke** treated government as a trust for life, liberty, and estate, not as **Hobbes**'s unlimited sword once authorised.
- **J. S. Mill** required representative government plus liberty of thought, so that the state cannot close discussion.
- **Robert Dahl** defined polyarchy by inclusive contestation: elections, opposition, and associational freedom, which are limits on monopoly.
- **Constitutionalism writes those limits:** a higher law, an independent court, a fixed term, and a public budget.
- Limitation is of arbitrary power. It is not a claim that the state must be weak in capacity to tax, defend, or run welfare.

How contemporary democracies institutionalise the limit

- A written or conventional constitution separates offices so that the same person does not make, execute, and judge the law in one act.
- Fundamental rights, in India Part III, and writs under Articles 32 and 226, let persons sue the state.
- **Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala** (1973) held that Parliament cannot destroy the Constitution's basic structure, which is a limit on the amending state itself.
- Independent election authorities, a free press, and opposition parties make removal of rulers possible without civil war.
- Federal distribution, as in Articles 245 to 263, and local bodies after the 73rd and 74th Amendments, split power so that one centre does not hold every function.

Why success depends on this

- Unchecked executive power produces emergency rule, as in 1975-77, which showed that elections alone do not keep a democracy if the state can suspend the conditions of opposition.
- **Foucault**'s disciplinary power shows that limitation must reach police, prison, and surveillance practice, not only the statute book.
- **Easton**'s systems language still applies: support collapses when outputs are experienced as predation rather than as authoritative allocation under rules.
- **Comparative failure of electoral autocracies shows the same:** ballots without limits on the incumbent are not a successful democracy.

What the statement does not say

- A developmental or welfare state can be strong in resources and still limited in procedure, which is **Rawls**'s well-ordered society rather than a night-watchman minimum.
- Communitarian writers such as **Sandel** and **Walzer** warn that a state limited only for unencumbered individuals may ignore social goods; that is a debate about the content of limits, not a licence for unlimited power.
- **Granville Austin** described the Indian Constitution as a seamless web of democracy, social revolution, and unity; each strand requires a state that can act and a state that can be refused.
- Success therefore lies in self-limitation as law, not in the disappearance of public power.

Flow diagram

Democratic success -> State limits itself
 State limits itself -> Rights and writs
 State limits itself -> Contestation Dahl
 State limits itself -> Basic structure
 State limits itself -> Federal and local split

Conclusion

Contemporary democracies succeed when the state binds its own power by rights, contestation, federal splits, and higher-law review. **Locke**, Mill, and Dahl state the theory. Indian **Articles 32 and 226** and Kesavananda state the practice. Capacity for welfare is compatible with that limit; arbitrary concentration is not.

Open WRAP page — <https://wrapexams.com/upsc/mains-answers/psir-gs-1/2023/success-of-contemporary-democracies-lies-in-the-state-limiting-its-own-power-explain/>

Q2(b) · 15 marks

Rawls' idea of the 'liberal self' is too individualistic. Explain, in this context, the communitarian critique of Rawls' theory of justice

PSIR GS 1 · 2023 · Justice

Revision summary

Rawls' original position models persons as free and equal choosers who do not know their social identities.

Sandel calls this an unencumbered self that cannot explain unchosen obligations.

Walzer, MacIntyre, and Taylor add social meanings, narrative, and recognition.

Political Liberalism replies that the self of justice is political, not a full metaphysics of the person.

Indian group rights and **Ambedkar's** civil equality show both the force and the limit of the communitarian critique.

Introduction

John Rawls models persons in the original position as free and equal, choosing principles of justice behind a veil of ignorance. Communitarian critics say that this 'liberal self' is too individualistic because it strips away the communities, histories, and goods that actually make a person who she is.

Body

Rawls's liberal self

- In *A Theory of Justice* (1971), parties in the original position do not know their class, talent, sex, or conception of the good.
- They choose equal basic liberties, fair equality of opportunity, and the difference principle, which permits inequality only if it benefits the least advantaged.
- **The self is prior to its ends:** persons can revise their plans of life, so the state should not impose a single comprehensive good.
- **Mill's** individuality is an ancestor of this picture; **Hobbes's** atom of fear is not, because **Rawls's** persons are reasonable, not only self-preserving.

Communitarian critique

- **Michael Sandel** in *Liberalism and the Limits of Justice* argued that the unencumbered self cannot account for obligations of membership, gratitude, and shared identity that we do not choose in a bargain.
- If the self is prior to its ends, civic republican virtue and constitutive attachments become optional tastes, which Sandel says is false to moral experience.
- **Michael Walzer** rejected a single original-position metric. Justice is internal to social meanings: what a doctor, a citizen, or a religious office may claim is not decided by one veil.
- **Alasdair MacIntyre** treated the liberal self as a person without a narrative, which cannot make sense of desert or tradition.
- **Charles Taylor** added that identity is dialogical and that recognition by others is a condition of freedom, not an extra.

Rawls's later reply and the Indian bearing

- In Political Liberalism, **Rawls** presented the self of justice as a political, not metaphysical, conception: citizens of a constitutional regime, overlapping in a public reason, not unencumbered souls in all of life.
- The reply meets part of Sandel's charge about comprehensive individualism. It does not meet Walzer's claim that goods are sphere-specific.
- Indian personal law, **Articles 25** to 30, and caste as a lived membership show Walzer's point: people are not only veil-of-ignorance choosers.
- **Ambedkar** still required that those memberships not cancel civil liberty, which keeps a Rawlsian priority of equal basic liberties against an unlimited communitarian veto.
- **A fair comment therefore holds both:** **Rawls's** device is too thin as a picture of the whole person, and still useful as a test of the basic structure of a constitutional state.

Flow diagram

Rawls original position -> Unencumbered self

Communitarians -> Sandel membership

Communitarians -> Walzer social meanings

Rawls original position -> Political Liberalism

Political Liberalism -> Basic liberties still first

Conclusion

Communitarians say **Rawls's** liberal self is too individualistic because it abstracts persons from constitutive communities. Sandel, Walzer, MacIntyre, and Taylor state the critique. **Rawls** later recast the self as political. Equal basic liberties remain the limit on any community's claim.

Open WRAP page — <https://wrapexams.com/upsc/mains-answers/psir-gs-1/2023/rawls-idea-of-the-liberal-self-is-too-individualistic-explain-in-this-context-the-communitarian-critique-of-rawls-theory-of-justice/>

Q2(c) · 15 marks

'Credo of Relevance' in post-behaviouralism advocates the importance of action science. Analyze

PSIR GS 1 · 2023 · Political Theory

Revision summary

Post-behaviouralism is Easton's 1969 turn from technique-first behaviouralism to a science of public problems.

The Credo of Relevance puts substance before technique and accepts professional responsibility for the use of knowledge.

Action science means inquiry organised to change problems, joining data to explicit values.

The turn corrects value-neutrality as evasion; it fails if it drops method for slogans.

Indian policy and rights research is action science when it evaluates institutions, not only when it reports attitudes.

Introduction

Post-behaviouralism is **David Easton's** 1969 correction of the behavioural revolution. The Credo of Relevance says that political science must speak to the urgent problems of the time and must become an applied, problem-solving science of action, not only a value-neutral catalogue of regularities.

Body

From behaviouralism to the credo

- Behaviouralism, which Easton had promoted, sought observable attitudes, systems of demand and support, and cumulative theory.
- **Robert Dahl's** decision studies and Almond and Verba's civic culture were products of that programme.
- By 1969, war, racial conflict, and urban crisis in the United States made a purely technical science look evasive.
- **Easton's American Political Science Association address stated a credo:** substance must precede technique; the needs of the day must set the agenda; science should not hide behind facts when the facts are of suffering.
- Relevance meant that the profession accepts responsibility for the use of knowledge.

Action science

- Action science, in this setting, is inquiry organised to change a public problem, not only to describe it.
- **It joins empirical tools to explicit values:** peace, racial equality, poverty, and later environment and gender.
- The analyst is not a spectator. She designs institutions, evaluates policy, and accepts that intervention is part of the knowledge process.
- This is closer to **Marx's** thesis on changing the world, and to policy analysis, than to a laboratory model of detached observation.
- **Foucault** would later warn that sciences of action also govern; Easton's credo still assumed that relevant science could serve human ends.

Analysis of the advocacy

- The credo correctly ended the pretence that **Easton's** own systems theory had no value premises.
- It risked turning the discipline into short-term advocacy without the very methods that make action competent.
- A balanced post-behaviouralism therefore keeps measurement and comparison, and then asks, with **Rawls**, which action is just, and with **Mill**, which action leaves liberty standing.
- Indian political science that studies implementation of Parts III and IV, panchayats, and welfare statutes is action science in Easton's sense when it evaluates and proposes, not only when it counts votes.
- The credo does not abolish theory. It forbids a theory that will not meet the world in which allocation, in Easton's own definition, already happens.

Flow diagram

Behavioural science -> Easton 1969
Easton 1969 -> Credo of Relevance
Credo of Relevance -> Action science
Action science -> Problem-solving
Action science -> Explicit values

Conclusion

- **The Credo of Relevance made post-behavioural political science an action science:** empirically informed, value-explicit, and responsible for public problems. Easton corrected his own behavioural programme. The analysis holds if action remains disciplined by method and by a public theory of justice, not if relevance becomes only a slogan.

Open WRAP page — <https://wrapexams.com/upsc/mains-answers/psir-gs-1/2023/credo-of-relevance-in-post-behaviouralism-advocates-the-importance-of-action-science-analyze/>

Q3(a) · 20 marks

Fascism displays an ambivalent stance towards parliamentary democracy. Explain

PSIR GS 1 · 2023 · Indian Nationalism

Revision summary

Fascism rejects liberal parliament as talk, class division, and weak decision.

It still uses elections, ministries, and plebiscites as a road to monopoly.

Schmitt and Gentile supply the anti-parliamentary doctrine; Mill and Dahl supply the democratic criterion that is abolished.

Enabling acts and emergency power convert a majority into a regime without removable opposition.

Post-war rights and basic-structure limits are designed against that ambivalence.

Introduction

Fascism did not treat parliamentary democracy as a partner in a mixed constitution. It used parliament, elections, and mass mobilisation to capture the state, and then emptied those forms of opposition, rights, and limited government. The stance is ambivalent because the movement both exploited democratic devices and defined itself against liberal parliament.

Body

What fascism opposed in parliament

- Liberal parliament, in **Mill** and in **Dahl**'s polyarchy, is a place of contest, publicity, and removable rulers.
- Fascist theory, in **Giovanni Gentile** and in **Mussolini**'s doctrine, treated the individual as real only inside the state, which cancels Mill's harm-limited liberty.
- **Carl Schmitt** attacked parliament as endless talk that cannot decide in an emergency, and he praised acclamation over discussion.
- Multi-party bargaining was named as weakness, class conflict, and national humiliation after war and economic crisis.
- The fascist alternative was a single movement, a leader, and a corporatist organisation of labour and capital under the state.

How fascism used democratic forms

- Italian Fascists and German National Socialists contested elections, sat in chambers, and formed ministries by constitutional appointment before they destroyed the same constitution.
- Plebiscites and managed acclamation produced a show of popular unity without an opposition that could win.
- Mass suffrage was not rejected as a number. It was recoded as the leader's identity with the people, which is the opposite of **Locke**'s trust and of **Rawls**'s public reason.
- Emergency decrees, enabling acts, and violence against rivals converted a parliamentary majority into a monopoly.
- **The ambivalence is therefore tactical and ideological at once:** parliament is useful as a ladder and illegitimate as a continuing limit.

Why the ambivalence matters for democratic theory

- A democracy that does not limit its own power, the theme of **Hobbes** versus constitutionalism, can vote in its own replacement.
- **Foucault**'s work on how bodies and populations are governed helps explain fascist spectacle, youth organisations, and racial statistics as power, not only as ideology.
- **Easton**'s support can be mobilised by propaganda so that outputs look authoritative while opposition inputs are closed.
- Post-war constitutions, including India's Part III, militant democracy in some European texts, and **Kesavananda**'s basic structure, are replies to that ambivalence: some devices of popular government are not available to abolish the regime of rights.
- The explanation is complete only if it names both the anti-parliamentary doctrine and the parliamentary road to dictatorship.

Limits of the explanation

- Not every strong executive is fascist. The test is the destruction of organised opposition, independent courts, and equal citizenship, often with a myth of national rebirth and enemies within.
- Parliamentary democracy can fail for other reasons, including colonial exclusion and caste, which **Ambedkar** named; those failures are not identical with fascism.
- Ambivalence is not sympathy. It is the combination of use and destruction.

Flow diagram

Fascism -> Uses elections and chambers
 Fascism -> Destroys opposition and rights
 Parliament -> Mill Dahl contest
 Destroys opposition and rights -> Leader-state identity
 Uses elections and chambers -> Destroys opposition and rights

Conclusion

Fascism is ambivalent toward parliamentary democracy because it uses elections and chambers to take power and then abolishes contest, rights, and limited government. Mill, Dahl, and constitutional basic structure name what is destroyed. Schmitt and Gentile name the doctrine that justifies the destruction.

Open WRAP page — <https://wrapexams.com/upsc/mains-answers/psir-gs-1/2023/fascism-displays-an-ambivalent-stance-towards-parliamentary-democracy-explain/>

Q3(b) · 15 marks

Affirmative Action Policies draw as much strong criticism as strong support. Analyze this statement in the context of equality

PSIR GS 1 · 2023 · Equality

Revision summary

Affirmative action is a classification for historic disadvantage, authorised in India by **Articles 15(4), 15(5), and 16(4)**.

Support reads equality as equal protection and as **Ambedkar's** social democracy.

Criticism reads equality as identical individual treatment and points to merit, capture, and frozen identities.

Indra Sawhney, Nagaraj, and the EWS amendment show the courts and Parliament working inside that split.

A complete analysis of equality must hold both the case for correction and the case for review.

Introduction

Affirmative action is a set of public measures that allocate seats, jobs, or resources to groups defined by historic disadvantage. In the context of equality, support treats those measures as a means to equal citizenship. Criticism treats them as a departure from equal treatment of individuals.

Body

Equality that supports the policy

- Formal equality under **Article 14** is equality before the law and equal protection. Equal protection has been read to allow reasonable classification.
- **Articles 15(4), 15(5), and 16(4)** expressly authorise special provisions for backward classes in education and public employment.
- **Ambedkar** argued that political democracy fails if social and economic inequality is left untouched; reservation was a time-bound instrument of that argument.
- **John Rawls's** fair equality of opportunity and difference principle support correcting unearned disadvantage, though **Rawls's** unit is the individual in a well-ordered society, not a caste as such.
- **Indra Sawhney v. Union of India** (1992) upheld OBC reservation, imposed a 50 per cent ceiling as a general rule, and excluded the creamy layer from OBC lists, which is equality as both group repair and individual fairness inside the group.

Equality that criticises the policy

- Critics say equality means colour-blind or caste-blind treatment of persons, in the spirit of a strict reading of **Mill's** individuality and of equal protection without group ranks.
- Reverse discrimination, stagnation of merit, and capture by the better-off inside a listed class are the main charges.
- **M. Nagaraj v. Union of India** (2006) required the state to show backwardness, inadequacy of representation, and administrative efficiency before Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe promotion quotas, a judicial attempt to keep equality of opportunity in service.
- The Constitution (One Hundred and Third Amendment) Act, 2019, and **Janhit Abhiyan v. Union of India** (2022) added an economically weaker section quota, which supporters call another equality tool and critics call a further departure from a single open competition.

- Communitarian writers such as **Walzer** can support group shares in some spheres and still worry that a caste census of every office freezes identities that justice should loosen.

Analysis

- The clash is between equality as identical treatment and equality as equal results or equal starting points.
- Support is strongest where exclusion was legal and social, as with **Article 17** and untouchability, and where data show under-representation.
- Criticism is strongest where the policy has no review, no creamy-layer principle, and no companion work on schooling quality.
- A consistent equality argument keeps affirmative action, reviews lists, and protects open competition as a remaining sphere, rather than treating any one reading of equality as the whole.

Flow diagram

Equality -> Formal equal treatment

Equality -> Substantive equal protection

Substantive equal protection -> Affirmative action

Formal equal treatment -> Criticism: merit and reverse discrimination

Affirmative action -> Indra Sawhney creamy layer

Conclusion

Affirmative action is criticised and supported because equality itself is split between identical treatment and corrective equal protection. **Ambedkar**, **Rawls**, and **Articles 15 and 16** support correction. Individual-merit criticism and creamy-layer doctrine name the costs. The analysis is of that split, not of a single slogan of equality.

Open WRAP page — <https://wrapexams.com/upsc/mains-answers/psir-gs-1/2023/affirmative-action-policies-drawn-as-much-strong-criticism-as-strong-support-analyze-this-statement-in-the-context-of-equality/>

Q3(c) · 15 marks

Eurocentrism is both the target and the motive force of the post-colonial political theory. Discuss

PSIR GS 1 · 2023 · Theories of the State

Revision summary

Eurocentrism treats European political experience as the universal measure.

Post-colonial theory attacks that measure through Said, Fanon, and Chatterjee, and through recovery of **Gandhi**, **Aurobindo**, and **Ambedkar**.

The same theory is motivated by European problems of the state, nation, and rights that empire made inescapable.

Chakrabarty's formula is that Europe is indispensable and inadequate.

The discussion is of that double relation, not of a simple rejection of all European thought.

Introduction

Post-colonial political theory studies how empire organised knowledge, the state, and the self. Eurocentrism is its target because European experience was treated as the universal measure of the political. Eurocentrism is also a motive force because the theory still works by answering, reversing, and using European categories.

Body

Eurocentrism as target

- Eurocentrism is the practice of taking European state, reason, and progress as the standard, and treating other histories as lack or delay.
- **Edward Said**'s Orientalism showed that academic and literary knowledge of the East was a form of power, which meets **Foucault**'s power-knowledge thesis in an imperial setting.
- **Frantz Fanon** analysed colonial violence and the colonised mind; political theory that ignored that scene was incomplete.
- **Partha Chatterjee** argued that anti-colonial nationalism often copied the modular European nation and then claimed difference in the inner domain of culture.
- Indian materials that the decline-of-political-theory literature ignored - **Gandhi**'s Hind Swaraj, **Aurobindo**'s swaraj, **Ambedkar**'s constitutionalism - are recovered as theory, not as local colour.

Eurocentrism as motive force

- The questions of sovereignty, rights, the state, and civil society remain **Hobbes**, **Locke**, **Mill**, **Marx**, and **Rawls** questions even when the answer is no.
- **Dipesh Chakrabarty**'s provincializing Europe states the bind: Europe is indispensable and inadequate.
- Post-colonial writers use historicist time, the nation, and the archive that empire built, even while they criticise them.
- Subaltern studies sought a subject outside elite nationalism and still used Gramscian and Marxist tools.
- Motive force here means that without the European canon as antagonist and resource, the field would not have its present shape.

A balanced discussion

- If post-colonial theory only inverts Europe, it remains Europe-centred in a negative form.
- If it ignores rights, **Dahl**'s contestation, and **Ambedkar**'s law, it can romanticise community in the way **Sandel** and **Walzer** warn against when community is uncriticised.
- The productive path is to treat Indian, African, and Caribbean political thought as argument in its own right, and still to use European tools where they explain the colonial state that actually existed.
- Eurocentrism is therefore both what the theory attacks and what continues to organise its problems.

Flow diagram

Post-colonial theory -> Target: Eurocentrism

Post-colonial theory -> Motive: European categories

Target: Eurocentrism -> Said Fanon Chatterjee

Motive: European categories -> Hobbes Mill Marx Rawls

Post-colonial theory -> Gandhi Aurobindo Ambedkar

Conclusion

Post-colonial political theory targets Eurocentrism as a false universal. It is also moved by European categories of state, nation, and rights that it must answer. Said, Fanon, Chatterjee, and Chakrabarty show that double relation. **Gandhi**, **Aurobindo**, and **Ambedkar** are the non-European arguments that the field must actually read.

Open WRAP page — <https://wrapexams.com/upsc/mains-answers/psir-gs-1/2023/eurocentrism-is-both-the-target-and-the-motive-force-of-the-post-colonial-political-theory-discuss/>

Q4(a) · 20 marks

Buddhist thought on Dhamma facilitates the emancipation of political action. Explain

PSIR GS 1 · 2023 · Indian Political Thought

Revision summary

Dhamma is a public ethic of right conduct, non-injury, and welfare, not a priestly monopoly.

It measures kingship by protection of the weak rather than by sacrifice or by Hobbesian war.

The sangha's procedures and Ashoka's edicts treat political action as morally accountable.

Ambedkar restated Dhamma as liberty, equality, and fraternity against caste.

Emancipation is of political action from birth-rank and from force as the only law; it is not a claim that Buddhist states never used force.

Introduction

In Buddhist usage, Dhamma is the teaching of right conduct, non-injury, and the ending of craving. The claim of the question is that this teaching frees political action from ritual kingship, caste rank, and the war of unrestrained self-preservation. Emancipation here means that public action can be judged by a moral law that is not the same as a priest's monopoly or a sovereign's sword.

Body

Dhamma as a public standard

- Early Buddhist teaching placed intention, non-violence, and the Middle Path above birth as a measure of worth, which undercuts hereditary rank as a political title.
- **The king is asked to rule by Dhamma:** protection of the weak, just punishment, and welfare, rather than by sacrifice alone.
- Ashoka's edicts after the Kalinga war state repentance, public works, and moral instruction as the business of rule, which is political action measured by Dhamma.
- This is not a theocracy. It is a lay public ethic that officials and householders can practise without a Vedic intermediary.

Emancipation of political action

- Against Hobbes, political action need not begin from a state of war of all against all; Dhamma names fear, hatred, and greed as the causes to be reduced, not as the nature to be armed.
- Against a closed ritual order, action in the assembly, the sangha's own procedural rules of debate, and the king's welfare work become legitimate public acts.
- **B. R. Ambedkar's** The Buddha and His Dhamma and the 1956 conversion treated Dhamma as a religion of liberty, equality, and fraternity for those excluded by caste.
- Ambedkar's triad Educate, Agitate, Organise is political action emancipated from waiting for upper-caste conscience, and he presented Navayana Buddhism as its ethical ground.
- Article 17 and the constitutional language of liberty, equality, and fraternity are the legal form of that emancipation in the republic.

Limits and comparisons

- Buddhist kingship could still wage war and collect tax; Dhamma is a criterion, not a guarantee of pacific history.

- **Gandhi's** ahimsa and satyagraha overlap with Dhamma in non-injury, but **Gandhi** kept a Hindu social vocabulary that **Ambedkar** rejected as insufficient for civil liberty.
- **Aurobindo's** spiritual swaraj is another Indian path of inner freedom; Buddhist Dhamma is more this-worldly in its attention to suffering and institutional sangha procedure.
- **Rawls's** public reason and **Mill's** harm principle can converse with Dhamma as a public ethic, without baptising the state as a church.
- **Foucault** would note that moral instruction is also a government of conduct; emancipation is therefore unfinished if Dhamma becomes only a new discipline.

What the explanation must conclude

- Dhamma emancipates political action by giving it a standard of non-injury, welfare, and equal moral worth independent of birth and of pure force.
- In India that standard was restated by **Ashoka** and by **Ambedkar** as a programme of civil liberty, not as withdrawal from politics.

Flow diagram

Dhamma -> Non-injury and welfare
Dhamma -> Worth not by birth
Worth not by birth -> Emancipated political action
Emancipated political action -> Ashoka edicts
Emancipated political action -> Ambedkar Navayana

Conclusion

Buddhist Dhamma frees political action from war-as-nature, from birth-rank, and from ritual monopoly, by measuring rule against non-injury and welfare. **Ashoka** and **Ambedkar** are the two Indian public statements of that emancipation. The republic's equality clauses are its legal residue.

Open WRAP page — <https://wrapexams.com/upsc/mains-answers/psir-gs-1/2023/buddhist-thought-on-dhamma-facilitates-the-emancipation-of-political-action-explain/>

Q4(b) · 15 marks

"The legal subordination of one sex to another is wrong in itself, and now one of the chief hindrances to human development." (J. S. Mill). Comment

PSIR GS 1 · 2023 · Political Theory

Revision summary

Mill held that legal subordination of women is unjust as a right and damaging to human development.

The liberty principle puts the burden on those who would legally confine a sex.

Indian [Articles 14, 15](#), and 16 reject sex as a caste of public law.

Vishaka, Shayara Bano, and Joseph Shine removed specific legal subordinations.

Personal law and household inequality show that development is still hindered where legal rank remains.

Introduction

J. S. Mill in *The Subjection of Women* (1869) argued that the legal inferiority of women is unjust as a matter of right and harmful as a matter of social progress. The comment must take both clauses: wrong in itself, and a hindrance to development.

Body

Wrong in itself

- **Mill applied the liberty principle of On Liberty:** the burden of proof lies on those who would restrict a person, not on the person who would act.
- Legal subordination in marriage, property, custody, and public office treated women as a class under men, which Mill said no custom could justify once the argument was opened.
- **The claim is deontological in force even though Mill is a utilitarian:** some legal relations are unjust before one counts national output.
- **Rawls** later required equal basic liberties for all persons; sex as a legal rank fails that test.
- **Ambedkar** and the Constituent Assembly wrote [Articles 14, 15](#), and 16 so that the state may not maintain sex as a caste of law, while [Article 15\(3\)](#) allows special provisions for women.

Hindrance to human development

- Mill's development is the unfolding of capacities through freedom of thought, occupation, and association.
- Half the population legally confined wastes talent and corrupts the men who hold the privilege, which is a utilitarian and a moral-psychological claim.
- Education, property, and the vote were the instruments he named; later labour law, equal pay under [Article 39\(d\)](#), and political reservation in [Articles 243D and 243T](#) extend the same logic.
- **Joseph Shine v. Union of India** (2018) struck down the adultery offence as a denial of women's equal status; **Shayara Bano v. Union of India** (2017) set aside instant triple talaq as arbitrary.
- **Vishaka v. State of Rajasthan** (1997) treated workplace sexual harassment as a constitutional injury pending a statute, which is development as the removal of a legal and social bar.

Limits of Mill and of the comment

- Mill still wrote inside a household picture that later feminists, and **Carole Pateman**, showed was itself a political contract of male sex-right.
- Legal equality does not by itself end unpaid care or violence; **Sandel**'s unencumbered self is not the whole of gendered life, yet Mill's legal point remains the first public step.
- Personal law pluralism under **Articles 25** to 30 continues to produce sex-unequal civil status in some domains, which is exactly the subordination Mill named.
- The 106th Amendment's future reservation for women in legislatures is a delayed institutional reply to the second clause, development through voice.

Flow diagram

Mill 1869 -> Wrong in itself
Mill 1869 -> Hindrance to development
Wrong in itself -> Arts 14 15 16
Hindrance to development -> Vishaka Joseph Shine
Hindrance to development -> Political voice

Conclusion

- **Mill's sentence stands:** legal sex-subordination is unjust in itself and it blocks the development of women and of society. **Articles 14** to 16, Vishaka, Shayara Bano, and Joseph Shine are the Indian legal working-out. Remaining personal-law and household inequalities show that the hindrance is not fully removed.

Open WRAP page — <https://wrapexams.com/upsc/mains-answers/psir-gs-1/2023/the-legal-subordination-of-one-sex-to-another-is-wrong-in-itself-and-now-one-of-the-chief-hindrances-to-human-development-j-s-mill-comment/>

Q4(c) · 15 marks

Sri Aurobindo's idea of Swaraj has deep significance in the Indian social, political and cultural history. Analyze

PSIR GS 1 · 2023 · Equality

Revision summary

Aurobindo defined swaraj as complete self-rule, not only a change of officials.

Politically it meant independence through national will, boycott, and national education after 1905.

Socially and culturally it meant release from caste rigidity and from Europe as the measure of the good.

The idea shaped extremist Congress politics and parallels **Gandhi's** civilisational swaraj by another method.

Ambedkar and later constitutionalism require that cultural swaraj still answer equal civil liberty.

Introduction

Sri Aurobindo treated swaraj as complete self-rule: political independence, social reconstruction, and a cultural-spiritual recovery of India. The idea is significant because it widened swaraj beyond a transfer of the colonial office, and because it shaped extremist politics before **Gandhi's** mass satyagraha became the dominant method.

Body

Political swaraj

- In the Bande Mataram period after the 1905 Partition of Bengal, **Aurobindo** stated swaraj as the goal of national work, not colonial reform bit by bit.
- Passive resistance, boycott, and national education were instruments of a political will to self-rule.
- This differed from moderate constitutionalism, and it also differed from **Hobbesian** order under an alien sword: the nation was to be the unit of authority.
- Later, in Pondicherry, he stepped back from party office, but he did not withdraw the claim that India must be politically free.

Social and cultural swaraj

- Political freedom without social freedom would be incomplete. Caste rigidity and cultural imitation of Europe were named as inner bonds.
- Swaraj included a recovery of Indian spiritual resources, not as museum piety, but as a basis for a new public life.
- **Aurobindo's** integral yoga treated the individual and the nation as fields of self-exceeding, which is a cultural theory of freedom, not only a legal one.
- **Post-colonial theory's attack on Eurocentrism finds an early Indian statement here:** Europe is not the measure of the political good.
- Compared with **Mill's** individuality, **Aurobindo's** person is spiritual and civilisational, not only a chooser of tastes.

Historical significance and limits

- The idea fed the extremist stream of the Congress, national education, and the language of complete independence before 1929's Lahore resolution made purna swaraj the Congress creed.
- **Gandhi's** Hind Swaraj (1909) also rejected a merely English swaraj of railways and parliaments; both men tied freedom to civilisation, by different methods.
- **Ambedkar** judged spiritualised nation-talk against the civil liberty of the depressed classes; **Aurobindo's** cultural swaraj does not by itself abolish graded inequality.
- **Rawls** and **Dahl** would still require rights and contestation inside any spiritually described nation, or swaraj becomes only a new centre of unaccountable power.
- The analysis therefore grants depth in anti-colonial political culture, and it requires constitutional limits that **Aurobindo's** early nationalism did not fully specify.

Flow diagram

Aurobindo Swaraj -> Political independence
Aurobindo Swaraj -> Social reconstruction
Aurobindo Swaraj -> Cultural-spiritual recovery
Political independence -> Extremist nationalism
Cultural-spiritual recovery -> Gandhi Hind Swaraj parallel

Conclusion

- **Aurobindo's swaraj is significant as a three-fold claim:** political independence, social reconstruction, and cultural-spiritual self-rule. It marked extremist nationalism and later Indian self-understanding. **Gandhi** shared the civilisational widening; **Ambedkar** and constitutional democracy supply the civil-liberty test it still needs.

Open WRAP page — <https://wrapexams.com/upsc/mains-answers/psir-gs-1/2023/sri-aurobindos-idea-of-swaraj-has-deep-significance-in-the-indian-social-political-and-cultural-history-analyze/>

Q5(a) · 10 marks

Imprint of the British Constitution on the Indian Constitution.

PSIR GS 1 · 2023 · Making of the Indian Constitution

Revision summary

India took parliamentary cabinet government, Westminster procedure, and much 1935 institutional design from Britain.

Dicey's rule of law influenced **Article 14**, but India wrote rights and judicial review into the text.

Federal lists, the Governor, and emergencies also travel from the 1935 Act.

Austin's cornerstone argument treats this as a new nation's charter, not a colonial statute continued.

Parliamentary sovereignty in the British sense was refused.

Introduction

The Constitution of India is a written republican charter, not an unwritten British one. The imprint of the British Constitution is still clear in parliamentary government, cabinet responsibility, and several offices copied from Westminster and from the **Government of India Act, 1935**.

Body

What was taken

- **A parliamentary executive:** the President is a constitutional head, and the Council of Ministers is collectively responsible to the Lok Sabha, which follows the British cabinet model.
- Rule of law, in **A. V. Dicey's** sense of regular law and official liability, informed equality before the law in **Article 14**, even though India added a written bill of rights that Britain then lacked.
- A bicameral Union Parliament, a Speaker, questions, and an opposition are Westminster forms.
- The Comptroller and Auditor General, the public service commission, and the single integrated judiciary's common-law method continue colonial and British institutional habits.
- The **Government of India Act, 1935**, supplied federal lists, office-of-governor, and emergency provisions that the Constituent Assembly adapted.

What was refused

- India is a republic with a written constitution, judicial review, and fundamental rights, which **Granville Austin** treated as the legal basis of a new nation, not as a statute of the Crown.
- Federalism, adult franchise from the first general election, and social-revolution Directives are not British parliamentary essentials.
- **Ambedkar** said the Constitution could work if people who ran it were good; the text itself rejected an unwritten convention as the only guarantee.
- Basic structure after **Kesavananda Bharati** (1973) is a judicial limit unknown to Dicey's parliamentary sovereignty.

How to state the imprint

- The imprint is strongest in daily parliamentary practice and in 1935 institutional furniture.
- **The identity of the Constitution is still Indian:** written limits, rights, and a social programme that Westminster in 1950 did not enact as higher law.

Flow diagram

British imprint -> Cabinet responsibility
British imprint -> Dicey rule of law
British imprint -> 1935 Act furniture
Indian identity -> Republic rights federalism
Indian identity -> Kesavananda limits

Conclusion

British imprint on the Indian Constitution is parliamentary cabinet government, rule-of-law language, and 1935 offices. The Indian text adds a republic, rights, federalism, and judicially enforced limits that Dicey's sovereign parliament did not know.

Open WRAP page — <https://wrapexams.com/upsc/mains-answers/psir-gs-1/2023/imprint-of-the-british-constitution-on-the-indian-constitution/>

Q5(b) · 10 marks

Environmentalism of the poor.

PSIR GS 1 · 2023 · Indian Nationalism

Revision summary

Environmentalism of the poor defends land, forest, and water as the economy of survival, not as a recreation good.

Guha and Martinez-Alier distinguished it from Northern wilderness environmentalism.

Chipko, Narmada, and Niyamgiri are Indian illustrations.

Articles 21, 48A, and 51A(g) and the Forest Rights Act give it a legal language.

The type names a pattern of struggle; it does not claim that poverty automatically conserves nature.

Introduction

Environmentalism of the poor is the name **Ramachandra Guha** and **Joan Martinez-Alier** give to struggles in which livelihood, not wilderness recreation, is the first environmental claim. Poor users of land, forest, and water defend those resources because their survival is attached to them.

Body

The idea

- Northern environmentalism often began as protection of wild nature from industry and as a middle-class amenity.
- Environmentalism of the poor begins from displacement, pollution of working bodies, and loss of commons.
- Chipko in the Garhwal Himalaya, the Narmada Bachao Andolan, and Dongria Kondh resistance at Niyamgiri are Indian cases of this pattern.
- The claim is not that the poor are naturally conservationist. It is that their political action often has an ecological content because the economy of the poor is resource-based.

Constitutional and theoretical links

- **Article 21** has been read to include a habitable environment; **Articles 48A and 51A(g)** state environment as a state task and a citizen duty.
- **Gram Sabha** consent under the **Forest Rights Act, 2006**, and the Niyamgiri gram sabha votes after the Supreme Court's directions, give a local legal form to this environmentalism.
- **Gandhi's** critique of industrial civilisation in Hind Swaraj and the constructive village programme supply an Indian intellectual ancestor, without making every livelihood struggle Gandhian.
- **Foucault's** government of populations helps describe how dams, mines, and forest law classify people as illegal users.
- **Walzer's** spheres of justice fits the point that land and water are not only market goods.

Limit

- Livelihood defence can still degrade a resource. Public ecology still needs science, not only protest.
- The phrase is a political-theory type, not a census of all poor persons' beliefs.

Flow diagram

Environmentalism of the poor -> Livelihood
Environmentalism of the poor -> Commons forest water
Northern wilderness -> Amenity and wild nature
Environmentalism of the poor -> Chipko Narmada Niyamgiri

Conclusion

Environmentalism of the poor is livelihood-based ecological politics of forest, land, and water users. Guha and Martinez-Alier named it. Indian movements and **Article 21** jurisprudence are its public form.

Open WRAP page — <https://wrapexams.com/upsc/mains-answers/psir-gs-1/2023/environmentalism-of-the-poor/>

Q5(c) · 10 marks

Functions of District Planning Committee.

PSIR GS 1 · 2023 · Indian Nationalism

Revision summary

Article 243ZD creates a District Planning Committee in every district.

Its function is to consolidate panchayat and municipality plans and to prepare a draft district development plan.

The draft must consider common rural-urban interests, infrastructure, environment, and resources.

Four-fifths of members are elected from local bodies in rural-urban proportion.

The chairperson forwards the plan to the State; weak practice often leaves the function on paper.

Introduction

The District Planning Committee is a constitutional body under Article 243ZD, inserted by the Constitution (Seventy-fourth Amendment) Act, 1992. Its function is to consolidate rural and urban local plans into one draft district development plan.

Body

Constitutional functions

- Article 243ZD requires every State to constitute a District Planning Committee at the district level.
- The Committee consolidates the plans prepared by panchayats and municipalities in the district.
- It prepares a draft development plan for the district as a whole.
- In preparing that draft, it must have regard to matters of common interest between panchayats and municipalities, including spatial planning, sharing of water and other physical and natural resources, integrated development of infrastructure, and environmental conservation.
- It must also have regard to the extent and type of available resources, whether financial or otherwise.

Composition and onward path

- Four-fifths of members are elected by, from, and among the elected members of the district's panchayats and municipalities, in proportion to the rural-urban population.
- The rest are appointed as the State may provide; the chairperson is also as the State may provide.
- The chairperson forwards the development plan to the State government.
- Metropolitan areas have a separate Metropolitan Planning Committee under Article 243ZE.

Practice

- Where the Committee is late, nominated, or starved of data and funds, district planning remains a departmental list, which is why the 74th Amendment is often called an unfulfilled institutional promise.
- The function is planning integration, not a substitute for the elected council's own executive powers under the Eleventh and Twelfth Schedules.

Flow diagram

Panchayat plans -> Article 243ZD Article 243ZD DPC

Municipal plans -> Article 243ZD DPC

Article 243ZD DPC -> Draft district plan

Draft district plan -> State government

Conclusion

The **District Planning Committee**'s function is to join panchayat and municipal plans into one draft district plan, with regard to shared resources, infrastructure, environment, and available means, and to send that draft to the State. **Article 243ZD** states the duty; State practice decides whether it is real.

Open WRAP page —

<https://wrapexams.com/upsc/mains-answers/psir-gs-1/2023/functions-of-district-planning-committee/>

Q5(d) · 10 marks

Satyagraha and Indian Nationalism.

PSIR GS 1 · 2023 · Indian Nationalism

Revision summary

Satyagraha is **Gandhi's** insistence on truth through non-violent non-cooperation and civil disobedience.

It turned Indian nationalism from elite petition into mass movements from Champaran to Quit India.

The constructive programme was the social side of the same nationalism.

Aurobindo's swaraj supplied an earlier complete-independence goal; **Gandhi** supplied the mass method.

Ambedkar held that civil liberty for Dalits needed law and organisation, not only satyagraha of conscience.

Introduction

M. K. Gandhi made satyagraha the mass method of Indian nationalism: insistence on truth through non-violent non-cooperation and civil disobedience. Nationalism in this form was a claim to swaraj that sought to include the village poor, not only a petition of lawyers.

Body

Satyagraha as method

- Satyagraha treats the opponent as a moral agent who can be converted, not only as an enemy to be destroyed, which rejects **Hobbes's** war as the default of politics.
- **Champaran (1917)**, **Kheda (1918)**, the Non-Cooperation Movement (1920-22), the Civil Disobedience Movement (1930-34), and the **Quit India Movement (1942)** were national applications of the method.
- The constructive programme - khadi, village sanitation, Hindu-Muslim unity, abolition of untouchability - was the social content of the same nationalism.
- Hind Swaraj (1909) tied the method to a critique of modern industrial civilisation, so nationalism was not only capture of the colonial state.

What it did to Indian nationalism

- It widened the nation from elite constitutionalism to peasants, workers, and women in public action.
- It gave Indian nationalism a distinctive public ethic that later informed **Article 51A** duties and the language of non-violence in political culture.
- **Aurobindo** had already named complete swaraj; **Gandhi** supplied a mass technique and a village social programme.

Limits named in theory and in history

- **Ambedkar** argued that satyagraha of upper-caste conscience did not by itself secure civil liberty for the depressed classes; law, separate political safeguards, and Educate, Agitate, Organise were required.
- Revolutionary nationalists rejected the method as slow; Partition showed that moral conversion did not settle every communal conflict.

- Satyagraha still remains the main explanation of how Indian nationalism became a mass, mostly non-violent, anti-colonial movement.

Flow diagram

Satyagraha -> Non-violent mass action
Satyagraha -> Constructive programme
Non-violent mass action -> Mass Indian nationalism
Ambedkar -> Civil liberty limit

Conclusion

Satyagraha made Indian nationalism a mass non-violent claim to swaraj, joined to a constructive social programme. **Gandhi** designed the method. **Ambedkar**'s civil-liberty critique and Partition mark its limits without cancelling its historical role.

Open WRAP page —

<https://wrapexams.com/upsc/mains-answers/psir-gs-1/2023/satyagraha-and-indian-nationalism/>

Q5(e) · 10 marks

National Commission for Minorities.

PSIR GS 1 · 2023 · Statutory Institutions/Commissions

Revision summary

The **National Commission** for Minorities is a statutory body under the 1992 Act, not an **Article 338** constitutional commission.

It covers Union-notified religious minorities, including Jains after later notification.

Functions are evaluation of safeguards, complaints, studies, and reports to the Central Government for Parliament.

Articles 29 and 30 are the core constitutional backdrop.

Enforcement of rights remains primarily with governments and courts.

Introduction

The **National Commission** for Minorities is a statutory body under the **National Commission** for Minorities Act, 1992. It evaluates the safeguards of notified religious minorities at the Union level. It is not a constitutional commission on the model of **Article 338**.

Body

Legal basis and who is covered

- The Act reconstituted an earlier 1978 executive commission as a statutory authority.
- The Union has notified Muslims, Christians, Sikhs, Buddhists, Zoroastrians (Parsis), and Jains as minority communities for this Commission.
- **Articles 29 and 30** of the Constitution are the main cultural and educational safeguards the Commission watches.
- A **National Commission** for Minority Educational Institutions exists separately under a 2004 Act for **Article 30** disputes.

Functions

- The Commission evaluates the progress of minority development and of constitutional and legal safeguards.
- It monitors the working of those safeguards and looks into specific complaints of deprivation of rights.
- It causes studies, recommends effective implementation, and presents annual and special reports to the Central Government, which places them before Parliament.
- It can take up matters with the appropriate government and, for some inquiries, uses civil-court powers as the Act provides.

Assessment

- Statutory status, recommendatory reports, and dependence on the Union limit its teeth compared with a constitutional rights court.
- **T. M. A. Pai** and later minority-education cases show that the real enforcement of **Articles 29 and 30** is still judicial.
- **Walzer's** and **Kymlicka's** group-rights arguments explain why such a body exists; **Ambedkar's** warning is that minority protection must not become a substitute for equal citizenship.

- State minority commissions vary, so the national body is a Union watchdog, not a substitute for State politics.

Flow diagram

NCM Act 1992 -> Safeguards Arts 29 30

NCM Act 1992 -> Reports to Union

NCM Act 1992 -> Complaints and studies

Safeguards Arts 29 30 -> Courts still enforce

Conclusion

The **National Commission** for Minorities is a 1992 statutory watchdog of notified religious minorities' safeguards under **Articles 29 and 30**. It inquires, recommends, and reports. Courts and governments still decide; the Commission does not replace them.

Open WRAP page —

<https://wrapexams.com/upsc/mains-answers/psir-gs-1/2023/national-commission-for-minorities/>

Q6(a) · 20 marks

Discuss the major provisions of the 74th Constitutional Amendment Act. Do you think that the Act remains an 'unfulfilled dream'? Argue your case

PSIR GS 1 · 2023 · Federalism

Revision summary

The 74th Amendment inserted Part IXA and the **Twelfth Schedule** of eighteen municipal functions.

It requires regular elections, reservations including for women, a **State Finance Commission**, and district and metropolitan planning committees.

Devolution of functions, funds, and functionaries remains a State choice, so parastatals and commissioners often still run the city.

Constitutional status of municipalities is achieved; self-government in daily urban services is not.

- **The Act is therefore a partially fulfilled design:** constitutional status exists, and a completed third tier of functions and funds does not.

Introduction

The Constitution (Seventy-fourth Amendment) Act, 1992, inserted Part IXA and made municipalities a third tier of government. The major provisions are institutional: elections, functions, finance commissions, and district planning. **Whether the Act** is an unfulfilled dream depends on whether States actually transferred functions, funds, and functionaries listed in the **Twelfth Schedule**.

Body

Major provisions

- **Part IXA (Articles 243P to 243ZG) defines municipalities:** Nagar Panchayat, Municipal Council, and Municipal Corporation, according to the size and nature of the urban area.
- Regular elections under a **State Election Commission**, a five-year term, and a bar on prolonged supersession are meant to end administrator rule as the normal form.
- **Article 243T** reserves seats for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes in proportion to population, and not less than one-third of seats (including offices of chairpersons, as the State provides) for women.
- **Article 243W** read with the **Twelfth Schedule** lists eighteen functions that the State legislature may endow, including urban planning, land use, water, public health, fire services, and slum improvement.
- **Articles 243X and 243Y** provide for municipal taxes, duties, tolls and fees, and for a **State Finance Commission** to review the financial position of municipalities.
- **Article 243ZD** and **243ZE** create **District Planning Committees** and **Metropolitan Planning Committees** to integrate rural and urban plans.
- **Article 243ZG** bars courts from interfering in electoral matters except by election petition, on the model of panchayat elections.

The unfulfilled-dream argument

- The Amendment is a framework. Devolution of the **Twelfth Schedule** is left to State legislatures, so parastatal development authorities, water boards, and State-appointed commissioners still hold the functions the Schedule names.
- Property-tax ceilings, delayed **State Finance Commission** awards, and poor own-revenue keep municipalities grant-dependent.
- Mayor-commissioner splits, delayed elections, and nominated local bodies in practice contradict the five-year elected term.
- **District Planning Committees** often exist on paper, which empties the spatial-planning promise of **Article 243ZD**.
- **Granville Austin's** social-revolution strand of the Constitution is incomplete in cities if elected councils cannot run water, planning, and housing.

The contrary case, and a judgment

- **The dream is not empty:** reserved women councillors, **State Election Commissions**, and the legal duty to constitute municipalities are real.
- The 74th Amendment created a justiciable expectation of local democracy that did not exist as higher law before 1993.
- **Dahl's** polyarchy at the municipal scale still requires contestation plus capacity; India built the first more than the second.
- **The accurate judgment is that the Act is a partially fulfilled design:** constitutional status is achieved, functional and financial self-government is not.
- Fulfilment now depends on State conformity laws that transfer the Schedule, fix a powerful elected executive, and publish devolution data, not on another Union slogan.

Flow diagram

74th Amendment -> Part IXA municipalities
 74th Amendment -> Twelfth Schedule
 74th Amendment -> SFC and SEC
 74th Amendment -> DPC and MPC
 Twelfth Schedule -> Unfulfilled: parastatals and funds

Conclusion

The 74th Amendment's major provisions are Part IXA, the **Twelfth Schedule**, reserved councils, State Finance and **Election Commissions**, and district and metropolitan planning. It remains an unfulfilled dream in functions and funds, and a fulfilled one in constitutional status. The remaining work is State devolution, not the absence of a text.

Open WRAP page — <https://wrapexams.com/upsc/mains-answers/psir-gs-1/2023/discuss-the-major-provisions-of-the-74th-constitutional-amendment-act-do-you-think-that-the-act-remains-an-unfulfilled-dream-argue-your-case/>

Q6(b) · 15 marks

How does NITI Aayog as a 'policy think tank with shared vision' visualize the reorganization of planning in India? Justify your answer

PSIR GS 1 · 2023 · Statutory Institutions/Commissions

Revision summary

NITI Aayog replaced the **Planning Commission** in 2015 as a Union policy think tank chaired by the Prime Minister.

Shared vision is institutionalised in a Governing Council of Chief Ministers, not in approval of State Plans.

Planning is recast as a fifteen-year vision, seven-year strategy, and three-year action agenda, plus competitive indices.

Allocative Plan grants ended; the **Finance Commission** and ministries now move money.

The reorganisation is justified as cooperative-federal honesty, and limited if States lose a bargaining forum over resources.

Introduction

NITI Aayog, created by Union Cabinet resolution in 2015, replaced the **Planning Commission**. As a policy think tank with a shared vision, it visualises planning as cooperative federal discussion, evidence, and strategy, not as a central body that allocates Plan funds and approves State plans.

Body

What was reorganised

- The **Planning Commission** (1950) combined five-year plans, the National Development Council, and discretionary Plan assistance, which States experienced as a second finance ministry.
- **NITI Aayog's** Governing Council of Chief Ministers and Lieutenant Governors is the shared-vision forum that replaced the NDC's plan-approval theatre.
- A Vice-Chairperson, full-time members, and a CEO serve the Prime Minister as Chairperson; Regional Councils can be formed for groups of States.
- The body has no constitutional status and no statutory grant-giving power; **Finance Commission** transfers and Union ministry schemes now carry the money.

Shared vision as the new planning idea

- NITI's documents speak of a fifteen-year vision, a seven-year strategy, and a three-year action agenda, instead of a single five-year command plan.
- **Cooperative and competitive federalism:** indices, ranking of States, and hand-holding on reform, rather than one-size Plan allocations.
- **Think-tank functions:** policy papers, modelling, Atal Innovation Mission, and monitoring of selected programmes, which is **Easton's** outputs watched as feedback, not as Gosplan.
- Team India language treats States as partners in a national development agenda, which **Granville Austin's** unity strand would recognise as political, not only technical, planning.
- **The visualisation is therefore:** Centre as catalyst and knowledge hub; States as laboratories; markets and local bodies as implementers.

Justification and limits

- The reorganisation is justified where the old Plan-grant political bargain distorted State priorities and duplicated the **Finance Commission**.
- It is weakly justified if shared vision means Union indices without a bargaining table that can move money, which many States say has happened.
- **Dahl's** polyarchy at the federal scale needs contestable resources; a think tank cannot replace that contest.
- District planning under **Article 243ZD** was never the **Planning Commission's** strong suit and is still not NITI's completed substitute.
- **The accurate justification is institutional honesty:** India moved from allocative planning to indicative, federal, think-tank planning. Whether that is better depends on **Finance Commission** fairness and on Union respect for State lists, not on NITI's slogan alone.

Flow diagram

Planning Commission -> Plan grants and five-year plans
NITI Aayog -> Think tank
NITI Aayog -> Governing Council shared vision
NITI Aayog -> Indicative strategy and indices
Plan grants and five-year plans -> Ended 2014-15

Conclusion

NITI Aayog visualises planning as a shared-vision think tank of cooperative federalism, multi-horizon strategy, and evidence, after the end of Plan grants. The reorganisation is real. It is justified as an end to allocative tutelage, and incomplete as a federal bargain over resources.

Open WRAP page — <https://wrapexams.com/upsc/mains-answers/psir-gs-1/2023/how-does-niti-aayog-as-a-policy-think-tank-with-shared-vision-visualize-the-reorganization-of-planning-in-india-justify-your-answer/>

Q6(c) · 15 marks

The Constitution of India is the 'cornerstone of a nation'. (Granville Austin). Analyze

PSIR GS 1 · 2023 · Indian Nationalism

Revision summary

Austin called the Constitution the cornerstone of the Indian nation because it legally founded democracy, social revolution, and unity together.

He described those three as a seamless web produced by Assembly consensus, with Ambedkar as Drafting chair.

Adult franchise, Parts III and IV, and a strong Union are the institutional content of that claim.

Kesavananda's basic structure is a later judicial defence of the same identity.

The claim holds as founding analysis; Emergency, incomplete equality, and centralisation are later tests.

Introduction

Granville Austin in *The Indian Constitution: Cornerstone of a Nation* (1966) argued that the Constituent Assembly wrote a document that would hold a new people together. The Constitution is a cornerstone because it joins democracy, social revolution, and national unity in one legal structure, which Austin called a seamless web.

Body

What Austin meant

- Austin's title means that without this text the post-1947 political community had no agreed legal foundation.
- The Assembly's consensus, led by the Congress and including Ambedkar as Drafting Committee chair, produced adult franchise, fundamental rights, Directive Principles, and a Union strong enough to keep the territory together.
- Social revolution meant using law against caste, poverty, and landlord power, not waiting for custom to change.
- Democracy meant parliamentary government and justiciable rights, an imprint of British forms inside a written republic.
- Unity meant a strong Centre, single citizenship, and emergency powers, after Partition.

Why the claim still analyses well

- **Kesavananda Bharati** (1973) treated the Constitution's identity as not wholly at the mercy of a temporary majority, which is a judicial restatement of the cornerstone idea.
- Ambedkar's constitutional morality is the habit that makes a cornerstone work in a hierarchical society.
- Linguistic States, the 73rd and 74th Amendments, and GST still use the same text as the site of bargain, which is nation-making through law.
- Compared with **Hobbes**, the cornerstone is not only a sword. Compared with **Rawls**, it is a public basic structure of liberties and of social Directives.

Limits of the claim

- Austin wrote before the Emergency, before Mandal, and before the full rise of regional parties; later history tests the web.
- **Social revolution remains incomplete:** Article 17 is law, atrocity and labour informality continue.
- A cornerstone can be used to centralise beyond federal fairness, which is the subject of the next question on Indian federalism.
- The analysis therefore accepts Austin's founding claim and adds that a cornerstone is only as real as the practice of limits, rights, and federal bargain.

Flow diagram

Austin cornerstone -> Seamless web
Seamless web -> Democracy
Seamless web -> Social revolution
Seamless web -> National unity
Seamless web -> Basic structure later

Conclusion

Austin's phrase is an analysis of the Constitution as the legal foundation of Indian nationhood: democracy, social revolution, and unity in one text. Ambedkar's drafting and later basic structure confirm the claim. Incomplete social revolution and centralising practice are stresses on the stone, not a reason to deny that it still bears the public order of the republic.

Open WRAP page — <https://wrapexams.com/upsc/mains-answers/psir-gs-1/2023/the-constitution-of-india-is-the-cornerstone-of-a-nation-granville-austin-analyse/>

Q7(a) · 20 marks

Does the actual working of Indian federalism conform to the centralizing tendencies in Indian polity? Give reasons for your answer

PSIR GS 1 · 2023 · Principal Organs of the Union Government

Revision summary

- **The Constitution designs a strong Union:** Article 3, residuary power, All-India Services, and emergency including Article 356.

Actual working has often followed that design through President's Rule, centrally sponsored schemes, and Governors.

S. R. Bommai (1994) and coalition politics after 1989 are the main federal counter-forces.

Finance Commission devolution after the Planning Commission reduced one allocative lever of the Centre.

The working is therefore Union-heavy federalism with cyclical State assertion, not either pure unitarism or dual federalism.

Introduction

Indian federalism is a constitutional division of power with a strong Union. The actual working often conforms to centralising tendencies that the text itself contains. The same working also shows State assertion through parties, the Finance Commission, and the Supreme Court's limits on President's Rule. The answer is therefore yes, with important counter-movements.

Body

Centralising design in the text

- K. C. Wheare called India quasi-federal. Granville Austin called the practice cooperative, but the Union remains the heavier partner.
- Article 3 allows Parliament to form and alter States; the Union is not a compact of indestructible States.
- The Union List, residuary power in Article 248, All-India Services, and Articles 256, 257, 355, 356, and 365 give the Centre tools of direction, protection, and takeover.
- Emergency provisions and a unified integrated judiciary pull interpretation toward national power.
- Single citizenship and a national election commission are nation-making centralisms that Austin's cornerstone required after Partition.

Actual working that conforms to that design

- President's Rule was used frequently until S. R. Bommai v. Union of India (1994) subjected it to judicial review and to the floor-test principle.
- Centrally sponsored schemes, the Planning Commission's old Plan grants, and now Union indices and agencies still steer State policy in List II subjects such as health and urban development.
- Governors, the Lieutenant Governor in Union Territories, and central investigating agencies are recurrent sites of Union weight.
- GST created a shared tax but also a Council in which the Union's voice and the need for a common rate structure limit State tax autonomy.

- During national crises, as in internal emergency 1975-77, the polity worked as a unitary command.

Counter-working that does not fully conform

- After 1989, regional parties and coalition governments federalised the Union cabinet itself, which **Dahl** would read as contestation inside the Centre.
- The **Finance Commission**'s rise after Plan grants ended, and the **Fourteenth Finance Commission**'s higher tax devolution, moved money by formula rather than by Plan bargaining.
- Linguistic States, **Article 370**'s long special status until 2019, and the 73rd and 74th Amendments created other power centres.
- **Bommai, Kesavananda**, and inter-state water benches are judicial federalism, not only Union will.
- **Ambedkar** had said the Constitution can be both federal and unitary as conditions require; the question is whether conditions or convenience drive the shift.

Reasoned answer

- Yes, actual working still conforms in large part to centralising tendencies, because the text invites them and because Union politics uses them.
- No, not as a completed unitarism, because States, parties, and courts regularly force bargains.
- The accurate political-science statement is a strong-Centre federation whose centralising tilt is structural, and whose federal practice is cyclical with the party system.

Flow diagram

Constitutional design -> Centralising tools
 Centralising tools -> Arts 3 248 356
 Actual working -> Centralising tools
 Actual working -> Bommai coalitions FC
 Bommai coalitions FC -> Bargain not unitarism

Conclusion

Indian federalism's working does conform to centralising tendencies built into **Articles 3, 248, 256**, and 356 and into schemes, Governors, and emergencies. Bommai, coalitions, and **Finance Commission** devolution are the main limits. The polity remains a Union-heavy federation, not a compact of equal States.

Open WRAP page — <https://wrapexams.com/upsc/mains-answers/psir-gs-1/2023/does-the-actual-working-of-indian-federalism-conform-to-the-centralizing-tendencies-in-indian-polity-give-reasons-for-your-answer/>

Q7(b) · 15 marks

The main goal of the Fundamental Duties in the Indian Constitution is to generate civic responsibility among the citizens. Explain

PSIR GS 1 · 2023 · Salient Features of the Indian Constitution

Revision summary

Article 51A, added in 1976, states Fundamental Duties of citizens.

The main goal is civic responsibility to match Part III rights, in the line of **Ambedkar's** constitutional morality.

The list covers respect for the Constitution, unity, harmony, environment, scientific temper, public property, and, after the 86th Amendment, children's education.

Duties are mostly non-justiciable but guide interpretation and civic education.

They must not be used to cancel protest and liberty under Part III.

Introduction

Fundamental Duties in **Article 51A**, inserted by the Constitution (Forty-second Amendment) Act, 1976, on the **Swaran Singh Committee's** line, tell citizens what the republic asks of them. Their main goal is civic responsibility: a habit of public obligation to match the justiciable rights in Part III.

Body

What civic responsibility means here

- Rights without duties produce a claimant who will not sustain the institutions that make rights possible, which is **Ambedkar's** constitutional morality in a duties register.
- **Article 51A lists obligations:** to abide by the Constitution and respect its ideals and institutions, the National Flag, and the National Anthem; to cherish noble ideals of the freedom struggle; to uphold sovereignty and unity; to defend the country; to promote harmony and renounce practices derogatory to women's dignity; to protect the environment; to develop scientific temper; to safeguard public property; and to strive toward excellence.
- **The 86th Amendment added 51A(k):** a parent or guardian shall provide education opportunities to a child between six and fourteen, pairing **Article 21A**.
- **Civic responsibility is republican more than Mill's purely negative liberty:** the citizen is a member who owes the public realm, in the sense **Sandel** defends against an unencumbered self.
- **Gandhi's** constructive programme is an Indian ancestor: swaraj as duty in sanitation, spinning, and communal peace, not only as a right against the Raj.

How the Constitution generates that responsibility

- Duties are not generally justiciable as a sword against the citizen in the same way as Part III is a sword against the state.
- Courts still use **Article 51A** to interpret statutes and to uphold reasonable restrictions, as in environmental and flag cases, which educates through law.
- Education, the Flag Code, and civic textbooks are the administrative means; 51A is the higher-law statement of the goal.

- **Austin's** nation-as-cornerstone needs citizens who will not treat the text as only a catalogue of claims against the Union.

Limits

- Duties can be rhetorically used to shame protest that is itself a constitutional right under **Articles 19 and 21**.
- **Foucault** would note that civic duty is also a government of conduct; the explanation must keep Part III as the limit on that government.
- Generating responsibility succeeds only if the state itself keeps duties of legality; hypocrisy of officials empties **Article 51A** as civic education.
- The main goal remains civic responsibility. The test is whether citizens protect public goods and equal dignity, not whether dissent is silenced.

Flow diagram

Article 51A -> Civic responsibility

Civic responsibility -> Institutions flag unity

Civic responsibility -> Environment education scientific temper

Part III rights -> Limit on using duties against dissent

Conclusion

- **Fundamental Duties aim to generate civic responsibility:** respect for the Constitution, unity, scientific temper, environment, women's dignity, and education of children. They complete **Ambedkar's** and Austin's citizen, beside Mill's liberty. They must not be read as a cancellation of Part III.

Open WRAP page — <https://wrapexams.com/upsc/mains-answers/psir-gs-1/2023/the-main-goal-of-the-fundamental-duties-in-the-indian-constitution-is-to-generate-civic-responsibility-among-the-citizens-explain/>

Q7(c) · 15 marks

Dr. Ambedkar's clarion call, "Educate, Agitate and Organize", strategizes the Dalit movement towards achieving civil liberty. Discuss

PSIR GS 1 · 2023 · Indian Nationalism

Revision summary

- **Ambedkar's call is a three-step strategy:** education for capacity, agitation for public claim, organisation for lasting power.
- **The end is civil liberty:** equal law, public access, and a share in the state, stated in **Article 17** and in political reservation.

He rejected dependence on upper-caste moral reform as the engine of that liberty.

Mahad, parties from the Independent Labour Party to the SCF, and the 1956 conversion are applications of the three terms.

- **The strategy fails if any one term is dropped:** schooling without power, protest without organisation, or office without liberty.

Introduction

B. R. Ambedkar's call to educate, agitate, and organise is a strategy of civil liberty for those excluded by caste. Civil liberty here means equal public standing: movement, occupation, representation, and protection of law, not a favour from a religious majority.

Body

The three terms as strategy

- **Educate:** caste exclusion works through denial of letters, temples, and offices. Schools, colleges, and a public literature of rights create the person who can use liberty. **Ambedkar's** own education was the proof of the first term.
- **Agitate:** public protest, temple-entry satyagraha at Mahad and Nashik, and the burning of the Manusmriti made humiliation a political fact, not a private sorrow.
- **Organise:** the Bahishkrit Hitakarini Sabha, Independent Labour Party, Scheduled Castes Federation, and later the Republican Party turned numbers into a bargaining agent, which **Dahl** would recognise as an interest that can prevail on some decisions.
- The order is not a slogan of spontaneity. Without education, agitation is noise; without organisation, agitation is a moment.

Civil liberty as the end

- Civil liberty for **Ambedkar** is **Article 17**, equal protection, access to water and temples, and a share in the state through reservation and adult franchise.
- He did not treat **Gandhi's** harijan moral reform as a sufficient strategy, because liberty that depends on the conscience of the dominant caste is not a right.
- The Poona Pact (1932) showed the conflict between separate electorates as a tool of organisation and **Gandhi's** fast; **Ambedkar** still kept organisation inside the joint electorate plus reserved seats.
- The 1956 conversion to Buddhism, with Dhamma as equal worth, was education and organisation in a religious key, an emancipation of political action discussed in Q4(a).

- **Constitutional morality, in his Assembly speeches, is the civic form of the same liberty:** procedure against popular prejudice.

Discussion of limits

- Education without agitation can produce a small class that exists without moving the mass, the creamy-layer problem in another language.
- Agitation without organisation is absorbed as riot or as charity.
- Organisation can become only office-seeking unless civil liberty remains the test.
- The strategy still organises Dalit parties, student groups, and legal mobilisation under the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989.
- Compared with **Rawls**, it is a historically situated path to the equal basic liberties that the original position assumes too quickly.

Flow diagram

Educate -> Agitate
Agitate -> Organize
Organize -> Civil liberty
Civil liberty -> Article 17 and political share
Gandhi conscience -> Not sufficient as strategy

Conclusion

- **Educate, Agitate, Organise is Ambedkar's sequence for Dalit civil liberty:** capacity, public claim, and lasting power. It strategises a movement that does not wait on Gandhian conscience. **Article 17** and political organisation are its constitutional and party forms.

Open WRAP page — <https://wrapexams.com/upsc/mains-answers/psir-gs-1/2023/dr-ambedkars-clarion-call-educate-agitate-and-organize-strategizes-the-dalit-movement-towards-achieving-civil-liberty-discuss/>

Q8(a) · 20 marks

The rise of caste politics is to be attributed to both regional aspirations and electoral manifestations. Comment

PSIR GS 1 · 2023 · Federalism

Revision summary

Caste politics is the public organisation of caste for power.

Regional aspirations after linguistic States and in Dravidian and OBC movements gave caste a territorial and dignity language.

Electoral manifestations - adult franchise, first-past-the-post, Mandal, and State parties - turned numbers into cabinets.

- **The two causes work together:** region supplies the map, elections supply the incentive.

Caste politics is not the whole of Indian voting, and it can freeze identities that civil liberty aims to equalise.

Introduction

Caste politics in India is the organisation of caste identities for public power. The comment that its rise comes from regional aspirations and from electoral manifestations is right if both are treated as causes that work together, not as rival slogans.

Body

Regional aspirations

- After linguistic States, politics moved into regional arenas where locally dominant peasant and intermediate castes could seek the state that the Congress system had kept more national and upper-caste in its early leadership.
- Dravidian mobilisation in Tamil Nadu joined anti-Brahmin social justice to a Tamil regional self, which is caste politics as regional aspiration.
- Other Backward Classes politics in the Hindi belt, after **Karpoori Thakur** and then Mandal, sought a regional social majority inside Uttar Pradesh and Bihar, not only a national quota.
- Adivasi and Dalit claims in Jharkhand, Chhattisgarh, and Maharashtra mixed region, resource, and caste-tribe lists.
- **Ambedkar** had already tied Dalit liberty to organisation; regional federalism after **Article 3's** new States gave that organisation a territory.

Electoral manifestations

- Adult franchise made numbers count. **Rajni Kothari** described a Congress system that later opened to caste coalitions as the vote expanded.
- First-past-the-post rewards geographically concentrated caste blocs and alliance arithmetic more than a single national class party.
- The **Mandal Commission** report's implementation in 1990, the rise of the Bahujan Samaj Party, Samajwadi Party, Rashtriya Janata Dal, and many State parties are electoral forms of caste.
- Reservation in panchayats after the 73rd Amendment created a local electoral career for caste and gender lists together.
- **Dahl's** polyarchy predicts that excluded groups will organise where contestation is open; Indian elections were that opening.

How the two causes join, and what they do not mean

- Regional aspiration supplies a map and a language of dignity. Electoral rules supply the incentive to turn caste into a party, a ticket, and a cabinet share.
- Neither cause means that caste is only a voting machine. Kinship, marriage, and violence still structure who can use **Mill's** individuality.
- **Walzer's** and **Sandel's** membership help explain why caste is a constitutive identity, not only an electoral label, and why **Rawls's** unencumbered self is a poor description of this field.
- National parties also caste-engineer tickets; regionalism is not the only site.
- **The comment is therefore:** rise of caste politics = federal-regional opportunity + electoral-system incentive, inside a society that **Ambedkar** had already named as graded inequality.

Limit of the comment

- Economic class, religion, and a national Hindu majority politics also organise votes. Caste politics is a major rise, not the only rise.
- Electoral caste can freeze the identity that civil liberty was meant to loosen, which is the standing tension with **Article 17**.

Flow diagram

Regional aspirations -> Caste politics
 Electoral manifestations -> Caste politics
 Regional aspirations -> Linguistic and social justice states
 Electoral manifestations -> FPTP alliances Mandal parties alliances Mandal parties
 Caste politics -> Ambedkar organise

Conclusion

Caste politics rose because regionalised federalism gave locally strong castes a state to capture, and because electoral competition rewarded organised caste numbers. Kothari, **Ambedkar**, and Dahl explain the two sides. The comment holds as a joint attribution, not as a claim that caste is only region or only a ballot.

Open WRAP page — <https://wrapexams.com/upsc/mains-answers/psir-gs-1/2023/the-rise-of-caste-politics-is-to-be-attributed-to-both-regional-aspirations-and-electoral-manifestations-comment/>

Q8(b) · 15 marks

The decade 1989-1999 has created an epochal shift in the Indian party system at the national level. Identify the major national trends in the party system during this era

PSIR GS 1 · 2023 · Party System

Revision summary

1989 ended the expectation of a Congress majority as the normal national result.

- **The decade's governments were minority or coalition:** National Front, Congress minority, United Front, and NDA.

The BJP rose as the second national pole; OBC and State parties became regular Union bargainers.

Kothari's Congress system gave way to a federalised multi-party system.

The shift is epochal at the national level even though later majorities created a further phase.

Introduction

From 1989 to 1999 the national party system moved away from Congress dominance toward a multi-party, coalition, and federalised pattern. The shift is epochal because no single party again formed a full-term majority government in that decade, and because regional parties entered the Union executive as a regular fact.

Body

End of the old Congress system

- **Rajni Kothari's** Congress system - a dominant party with factions and a weak opposition - broke after 1989.
- The 1989 election produced a hung Lok Sabha. V. P. Singh's National Front government depended on outside support, a new national format.
- Congress returned in 1991 as a minority under P. V. Narasimha Rao and completed a term by management, not by restoration of one-party dominance.
- The 1996-98 United Front and the 1998-99 National Democratic Alliance made coalition the normal path to the Union cabinet.

Major national trends

- Hung parliaments and coalition or minority governments at the Centre, instead of a single-party majority as the expected result.
- Rise of the Bharatiya Janata Party as the principal national alternative, from a small 1984 tally to leading the NDA by 1998-99, with the 1992 Ayodhya sequence as a polarising national cleavage.
- **Mandalisation:** OBC parties and the Janata family fragments became national veto and alliance players after 1990 reservation politics.
- **Federalisation of the national party system:** State parties (TDP, DMK, AIADMK, SAD, Shiv Sena, RJD, SP, and others) bargained over Union portfolios and policy.
- Decline of a neat two-party alternative; a bipolar tendency around Congress and BJP still had to pass through regional allies.
- Economic liberalisation after 1991 changed the policy space that parties contested, even when caste and temple remained the mass languages.

- Fragmentation of the Janata tradition and of the Left's national reach, with the Left still decisive in 1996-97 support politics.

Why it is epochal

- **Dahl's** contestation became multi-polar at the Union level, not only a Congress-versus-rest election.
- Centralising Union governments had to share the cabinet, which is a party-system limit on the federal tilt discussed in Q7(a).
- The 1999 NDA full term after the decade's instability confirmed that the new format could also deliver a completed Lok Sabha, still as a coalition.
- The epoch is 1989-99 as the break. Later single-party majorities after 2014 are another phase, not a return of the 1952-64 Congress system.

Flow diagram

1989 -> Hung Lok Sabha
Hung Lok Sabha -> Coalitions and minority
Coalitions and minority -> BJP as national pole
Coalitions and minority -> Regional parties in Union
Coalitions and minority -> Mandal OBC parties

Conclusion

The major national trends of 1989-1999 were the end of Congress dominance, hung Houses, coalition federalism, the BJP's rise, and Mandal's party effects. Together they created a multi-party national system. That is the epochal shift.

Open WRAP page — <https://wrapexams.com/upsc/mains-answers/psir-gs-1/2023/the-decade-1989-1999-has-created-an-epochal-shift-in-the-indian-party-system-at-the-national-level-identify-the-major-national-trends-in-the-party-system-during-this-era/>

Q8(c) · 15 marks

Do you agree that over the years the Supreme Court has become a forum for policy evolution? Justify your answer

PSIR GS 1 · 2023 · Principal Organs of the Union Government

Revision summary

Maneka **Gandhi** and PIL made the Supreme Court a place where social and environmental policy is often first written as rights.

Vishaka guidelines, pollution and food orders, and federal cases such as **Bommai** are policy evolution by judgment.

The Court fills vacuums left by the executive and legislature; that is the empirical basis of the statement.

Electoral democracy still assigns general policy to removable legislatures.

Agreement is therefore yes for rights-based gap-filling, and no for the Court as a general policy government.

Introduction

The Supreme Court of India has become, in important areas, a forum where public policy is shaped through rights litigation, continuing mandamus, and guidelines that operate until Parliament acts. Agreement with the statement should be partial: the Court has evolved policy in gaps, and it is not the authorised legislature.

Body

Why the statement is largely true

- After **Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India** (1978), **Article 21** became a due-process style clause, which opened health, livelihood, environment, and privacy as judicial policy fields.
- Public interest litigation under Justices P. N. Bhagwati and V. R. Krishna Iyer lowered standing and let the Court hear collective injuries.
- **Vishaka v. State of Rajasthan** (1997) laid down workplace sexual-harassment guidelines as law until the 2013 statute, which is policy evolution in a vacuum.
- Environment benches, the right-to-food litigation in PUCL, vehicle and pollution orders, and forest-governance orders have set detailed regimes that look like departmental policy.
- **Kesavananda** and **S. R. Bommai** evolved the policy of constitutional identity and of federal emergency, which bind later governments.
- **Foucault's** governmentality is a warning: courts that manage rations, emissions, and asylums become part of the administrative state, not only its checker.

Why the statement must be qualified

- Policy evolution in a democracy belongs first to legislatures that **Dahl's** polyarchy can remove. Judges are not removable by the same electoral test.
- The Court often acts because the executive left a gap; that is residual policy, not a claim that the Court should write the annual budget.
- Separation of powers, the political-question habit, and later benches that have stepped back on some economic matters show self-check.
- **Austin's** social-revolution Constitution invited judicial partnership with Parts III and IV; it did not repeal **Article 245**.

- **Rawls**'s basic structure is a set of liberties and fair procedures, not a licence for the judiciary to choose every distributive scheme.

Justified answer

- Yes, over the years the Supreme Court has become a forum for policy evolution in rights, environment, gender workplace rules, and constitutional federal limits.
- No, it has not lawfully become the only or the best forum for ordinary economic and administrative policy.
- The justified position is a rights-protecting, gap-filling court inside a parliamentary federation, not a third government of general policy.

Flow diagram

Supreme Court -> Article 21 expansion

Supreme Court -> PIL and continuing mandamus and continuing mandamus

Supreme Court -> Guidelines Vishaka

Parliament -> Statutes and budgets

Supreme Court -> Not a substitute parliament

Conclusion

The Supreme Court has become a forum for policy evolution where rights and institutional vacuums required rules, as in Maneka, Vishaka, environment, and food litigation. Justification stops at general legislation and budgets, which remain Parliament's. The Court is a constitutional policy forum, not a substitute parliament.

Open WRAP page — <https://wrapexams.com/upsc/mains-answers/psir-gs-1/2023/do-you-agree-that-over-the-years-the-supreme-court-has-become-a-forum-for-policy-evolution-justify-your-answer/>

Compiled answer key

Last pages of this pack. Each question links to the WRAP model answer on wrapexams.com.

ask@wrapexams.com · wrapexams.com

Q1(a) 10 marks	Q1(b) 10 marks	Q1(c) 10 marks	Q1(d) 10 marks
Q1(e) 10 marks	Q2(a) 20 marks	Q2(b) 15 marks	Q2(c) 15 marks
Q3(a) 20 marks	Q3(b) 15 marks	Q3(c) 15 marks	Q4(a) 20 marks
Q4(b) 15 marks	Q4(c) 15 marks	Q5(a) 10 marks	Q5(b) 10 marks
Q5(c) 10 marks	Q5(d) 10 marks	Q5(e) 10 marks	Q6(a) 20 marks
Q6(b) 15 marks	Q6(c) 15 marks	Q7(a) 20 marks	Q7(b) 15 marks
Q7(c) 15 marks	Q8(a) 20 marks	Q8(b) 15 marks	Q8(c) 15 marks

Question-wise key

Q1(a) · 10 marks Solution

Q1(b) · 10 marks Solution

Q1(c) · 10 marks Solution

Q1(d) · 10 marks Solution

Q1(e) · 10 marks Solution

Q2(a) · 20 marks Solution

Q2(b) · 15 marks Solution

Q2(c) · 15 marks Solution

Q3(a) · 20 marks Solution

Q3(b) · 15 marks Solution

Q3(c) · 15 marks Solution

Q4(a) · 20 marks Solution

Q4(b) · 15 marks Solution

Q4(c) · 15 marks Solution

Q5(a) · 10 marks Solution

Q5(b) · 10 marks Solution

Q5(c) · 10 marks Solution

Q5(d) · 10 marks Solution

Q5(e) · 10 marks Solution

Q6(a) · 20 marks Solution

Q6(b) · 15 marks Solution

Q6(c) · 15 marks Solution

Q7(a) · 20 marks Solution

Q7(b) · 15 marks Solution

Q7(c) · 15 marks Solution

Q8(a) · 20 marks Solution

Q8(b) · 15 marks Solution

Q8(c) · 15 marks Solution

WRAP Exams · Write. Read. Analyse. Practice. · <https://wrapexams.com/upsc/mains/psir/gs-1/2023/> ·
ask@wrapexams.com · wrapexams.com

WRAP Exams