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UPSC Mains 2015 GS III

Year-wise PYQ pack · WRAP model answers with canonical links

Official UPSC stems in exam order. Each live answer sits on one WRAP URL; this PDF is the year pack, not a second copy of the article. Open the link under a question for the full page.

<https://wrapexams.com/upsc/mains/gs-3/2015/>

Q1 · 12 marks

The nature of economic growth in India in recent times is often described as a jobless growth. Do you agree with this view? Give arguments in favour of your answer.

GS III · 2015 · Indian Economy

Revision summary

Jobless growth means GDP rises much faster than decent employment.

NSSO-era data showed weak employment elasticity in the 2000s despite high output growth.

Organised manufacturing stayed thin; services and capital-intensive industry added value with few regular jobs.

Construction and informal work absorbed some labour, so the claim is about quality more than a literal zero.

A job-rich path needs labour-intensive factories, skills and easier formal hiring.

Introduction

India's **gross domestic product** rose fast in many years after 1991, yet the extra output did not create a matching number of **regular, productive jobs**. That pattern is called **jobless growth**. The view is largely right for organised manufacturing and for the quality of work. It is too sweeping if it pretends that no extra work appeared at all.

Body

What the view means

- **Jobless growth means** employment elasticity **of GDP is very low**: a one per cent rise in output adds far less than one per cent extra work.
- National Sample Survey rounds showed that in the 2000s, GDP grew much faster than usual work, so the **unemployment rate** could look modest while **underemployment** stayed high.
- A large share of workers remain in **agriculture**, whose slice of GDP has fallen, so average farm work is overcrowded and poorly paid.
- **Organised manufacturing** did not absorb the surplus labour that left, or should have left, the farm.

Arguments in favour

- Growth was led by **capital-intensive services and industry** (information technology, telecom, petroleum, automobiles) that raise value added with few shop-floor hands.
- **Labour laws**, inspection fear, and exit costs pushed firms to stay small, use **contract labour**, or automate rather than hire on the rolls.
- **Skill mismatch** left millions of school leavers unready for the factory or the office that actually grew.
- Female labour-force participation stayed weak, so household income rose more from a few earners than from a broad job boom.
- The **Make in India** diagnosis in 2014 itself admitted a thin manufacturing jobs base.

Qualification

- Construction, trade, transport and **self-employment** did add work, much of it **informal** and without social security.
- Rural non-farm work and **Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act** days are a safety net, not the same as industrial jobs.
- The honest answer is therefore **yes, in quality and in organised hiring**, not a claim that employment was literally zero.
- Job-rich growth needs labour-intensive manufacturing, skilling, easier formal hiring, and a shift of workers into higher-productivity sectors with rights.

Flow diagram

Fast GDP growth -> Low employment elasticity
Low employment elasticity -> Services and capital intensive industry
Low employment elasticity -> Informal and farm overcrowding
Services and capital intensive industry -> Jobless in quality
Informal and farm overcrowding -> Jobless in quality
Jobless in quality -> Skills manufacturing formal hire

Conclusion

- **The jobless-growth view is fair for India in recent decades:** output raced ahead of decent organised jobs. Informal and construction work filled some of the gap. Policy has to raise employment elasticity through factories, skills and formal contracts, not only a higher GDP print.

Open WRAP page — <https://wrapexams.com/upsc/mains-answers/gs-3/2015/the-nature-of-economic-growth-in-india-in-recent-times-is-often-described-as-a-jobless-growth-do-you-agree-with-this-view-give-arguments-in-favour-of-your-answer/>

Q2 · 12 marks

Livestock rearing has a big potential for providing non- farm employment and income in rural areas. Discuss suggesting suitable measures to promote this sector in India.

GS III · 2015 · Indian Economy

Revision summary

Livestock gives year-round cash, especially to small and land-poor rural households.

Dairy cooperatives and NDDB already proved a scalable non-farm income model.

National Livestock Mission, Rashtriya Gokul Mission and the National Dairy Plan are the present Union tools.

Feed, vaccination, insurance and milk-meat markets decide whether animals actually raise income.

Women and landless workers gain most from backyard poultry, goats and dairy if extension reaches them.

Introduction

Livestock - cattle, buffalo, goat, sheep, pig, poultry and fishery-allied backyard stock - is the main **non-crop** livelihood in many Indian villages. Milk, meat, eggs, hide and draught power spread income through the year, including for women and land-poor households. The potential is large; the constraint is weak **breed, feed, veterinary care and markets**.

Body

Why the potential is large

- Livestock contributes a large share of **agricultural gross domestic product** and a smaller but useful share of national GDP, with less monsoon risk than a single crop.
- **Dairying** under cooperatives (Amul pattern, National Dairy Development Board) already showed that smallholders can earn daily cash without owning much land.
- Goats, sheep and backyard poultry suit **landless and women** workers and need less capital than a tractor.
- Demand for milk, eggs and meat rises with income and urbanisation, so the market is not only a monsoon mandi.
- Manure and biogas link livestock to **soil health and household energy**.

Measures to promote the sector

- **National Livestock Mission (2014-15)** should be used for fodder, breed improvement, and extension rather than left as a budget line.
- **Rashtriya Gokul Mission (2014)** and progeny testing can raise indigenous and crossbred productivity without reckless exotic import.
- **National Dairy Plan** and dairy cooperatives plus producer companies should reach eastern and rainfed districts, not only the old milk-sheds.
- Universal **vaccination** (foot-and-mouth disease, peste des petits ruminants, brucellosis) and more field veterinarians cut the biggest income shock: animal death.
- **Feed and fodder:** denotified wasteland for silage, mineral mixture, and crop-residue management so the cow is not competing with the stove.

- Credit, **livestock insurance**, and Kisan Credit Card coverage for animals, plus organised mandis and cold chain for milk and meat, so the farmer is not stuck with a village trader.
- Strict **food-safety and slaughter** hygiene with FSSAI so domestic and export demand is not lost to disease scares.

Flow diagram

Livestock potential -> Dairy cooperatives NDDB
Livestock potential -> Small stock poultry goat
Dairy cooperatives NDDB -> Rural non farm income
Small stock poultry goat -> Rural non farm income
Rural non farm income -> Mission breed feed vet credit market

Conclusion

Livestock is already India's widest rural non-farm enterprise. It will yield jobs and income if breed, fodder, veterinary cover, dairy institutions and fair markets move together. A scheme on paper without a vaccinator and a milk route will not change the village.

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Q3 · 12 marks

In the view of the declining average size of land holdings in India which has made agriculture non - viable for a majority of farmers should contract farming and land leasing be promoted in agriculture? critically evaluate the pros and cons.

GS III · 2015 · Crops, Irrigation and Marketing

Revision summary

Average holdings near 1.15 hectares make many farms too small to cover cost and risk.

Contract farming can bring price, seed and offtake, as the **Model APMC Act 2003** envisaged.

Unequal bargaining, quality rejection and monoculture are the main contract risks.

Legal leasing can assemble scale and open credit while the owner keeps title; informal tenancy already exists.

Both tools need written terms, FPOs and clean records, not a free hand for sponsors.

Introduction

The **Agriculture Census** shows the average operational holding in India is now around **1.15 hectares**, and a majority of farmers are **marginal**. A plot that small cannot always feed a family or repay a machine loan. **Contract farming** and **land leasing** are two ways to restore scale without forcing sale of title. Both help only if the weak party is protected.

Body

Why holdings have become non-viable

- Inheritance splits land; **ceiling and tenancy fears** also keep plots fragmented and unrecorded.
- A tiny plot cannot use a tube well, harvester or warehouse efficiently, so **unit cost** stays high.
- Marketable surplus is small, so the farmer sells in distress and stays out of institutional credit.
- Leaving land idle while the owner works in a city wastes soil that a tenant could crop - if the law allowed a clean lease.

Contract farming: pros and cons

- **Pros:** a written offtake and price, seed and extension from the sponsor, and a door into processing and export that the village trader does not offer.
- The **Model APMC Act, 2003** already asked States to allow contract farming outside the old mandi monopoly.
- **Cons:** the sponsor sets quality specs and can reject produce; bargaining power is unequal; water and soil can be mined for a single crop; and dispute forums are far from the village.
- Without **Farmer Producer Organisations** aggregating small plots, the contract is often with a middleman, not the tiller.

Land leasing: pros and cons

- **Pros:** a legal lease lets a skilled tiller assemble a viable unit; the owner keeps title and can work off-farm; the tenant can then show the lease for **credit and insurance**.
- Informal tenancy is already widespread; hiding it hurts the actual cultivator.

- **Cons:** poorly designed law can enable **reverse tenancy** and pressure on poor owners; some States still fear that tenants will claim occupancy rights, so owners leave land fallow instead.
- Land records must name the cultivator without threatening the owner's title.

Critical balance

- Promote both, with **model contracts**, price and quality transparency, State dispute cells, and a **liberal, recorded lease** that is time-bound and does not transfer ownership.
- Do not treat them as a substitute for public irrigation, extension and MSP where it actually operates.

Flow diagram

Tiny holdings -> Non viable farms
Non viable farms -> Contract farming offtake
Non viable farms -> Legal land leasing scale
Contract farming offtake -> Safeguards FPO disputes
Legal land leasing scale -> Safeguards FPO disputes
Safeguards FPO disputes -> Viable tiller keeps title

Conclusion

Tiny holdings have made many farms non-viable. Contract farming and legal leasing can restore scale and offtake if contracts are fair and leases are recorded without stealing title. Unregulated contracts and hidden tenancy will only shift risk onto the small farmer.

Open WRAP page — <https://wrapexams.com/upsc/mains-answers/gs-3/2015/in-the-view-of-the-declining-average-size-of-land-holdings-in-india-which-has-made-agriculture-non-viable-for-a-majority-of-farmers-should-contract-farming-and-land-leasing-be-promoted-in-agriculture-critically-evaluate/>

Q4 · 12 marks

How can the Digital India program help farmers to improve farm productivity and income? What step has the government taken in this regard?

GS III · 2015 · Crops, Irrigation and Marketing

Revision summary

Digital India (1 July 2015) is the public digital stack for broadband, identity and e-services.

Farmers can use it for weather, soil advice, credit identity and market prices.

Soil Health Card, mKisan, Kisan Call Centre 1551, AGMARKNET and NeGP-A are the agri tools already in play.

DILRMP land records, Aadhaar and CSCs support credit, subsidy and applications.

Last-mile connectivity and mandi rules still decide whether the portal becomes income.

Introduction

Digital India, launched on **1 July 2015**, is a Union programme to take broadband, identity and e-services to every citizen. For farmers, the same rails can carry **weather, soil, advice, prices and payments**. Productivity rises when the decision is timely; income rises when the sale is informed and the subsidy is not stolen.

Body

How **Digital India** helps productivity

- **Broadband and mobile** (BharatNet / National Optical Fibre Network, cheap data) put weather warnings and pest alerts on the phone before the crop is lost.
- **Soil Health Card** (rolled out 2015) plus lab data on a portal tell the farmer which nutrient to apply, which cuts waste of urea and raises yield.
- **Kisan Call Centre (1551)** and **mKisan** SMS/IVRS give agronomy in local language without waiting for a scarce village officer.
- Digitised **land records (DILRMP)** and Aadhaar-linked identity make credit and insurance less of a tout's business.
- Precision tools - remote sensing for drought, future drone and sensor use - sit on the same public digital stack.

How it helps income

- **AGMARKNET** and other price portals reduce the information gap versus the arhatiya.
- Direct Benefit Transfer of subsidy and crop-insurance premium, using **Jan Dhan-Aadhaar-mobile**, can put cash in the farmer's account.
- **Common Service Centres** can file applications, print soil cards and book mandi or warehouse services without a trip to the district town.
- E-commerce and electronic mandi ideas can widen the buyer set once States open markets; **Digital India** supplies the identity and payment layer.

Steps already taken

- **Digital India** pillars relevant to farms: **broadband highways, public internet access, e-Kranti** (electronic delivery of services), and information for all.

- **National e-Governance Plan - Agriculture (NeGP-A)** funds State agri portals and service centres.
- Soil Health Card Mission, mKisan, Kisan Call Centres, AGMARKNET, and computerisation of land records pre-date or accompany the 2015 launch.
- **Aadhaar** seeding of welfare and fertiliser pilots is the targeting layer under the same digital push.
- **Gaps remain:** last-mile fibre, language, women's access to the household phone, and mandi laws that still block electronic sale.

Flow diagram

Digital India 2015 -> Broadband CSC
Digital India 2015 -> Advice soil mKisan KCC
Digital India 2015 -> Prices AGMARKNET payments
Broadband CSC -> Higher productivity
Advice soil mKisan KCC -> Higher productivity
Prices AGMARKNET payments -> Higher farm income

Conclusion

Digital India can raise farm yield through timely advice and soil data, and raise income through prices, payments and less leakage. The government has already laid Soil Health Cards, mKisan, AGMARKNET, NeGP-A and land-record computerisation on that stack. The farmer gains when the village actually has signal, a working CSC, and a market that honours the electronic price.

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Q5 · 12 marks

In what way could replacement of price subsidy with direct benefit Transfer (DBT) change the scenario of subsidies in India? Discuss.

GS III · 2015 · Farm Subsidies and PDS

Revision summary

Price subsidy cheapens a commodity for whoever buys it and invites diversion.

DBT credits the eligible person so the good can sell nearer market price.

JAM (Jan Dhan, Aadhaar, mobile) is the delivery pipe; PAHAL is the working LPG example.

Gains are targeting, less leakage, household choice and a clearer Budget cost.

Risks are exclusion, weak banking, and a hard shift for fertiliser and food where markets fail.

Introduction

A **price subsidy** cheapens the bag of urea, the cylinder or the kerosene litre for everyone who buys it. **Direct Benefit Transfer (DBT)** pays the eligible person in a bank account and lets the good sell nearer to market price. India's **JAM** (Jan Dhan, Aadhaar, mobile) stack, highlighted in the **Economic Survey 2014-15**, is the pipe for that shift. The scene of subsidies changes only if the pipe actually reaches the poor.

Body

How price subsidy works today

- The State keeps **urea, some foodgrain, kerosene and LPG** cheap at the counter, which invites **diversion** to industry, smugglers or better-off households.
- Dual pricing needs a huge agency (fertiliser firms, oil companies, fair-price shops) and hides the true fiscal cost.
- The poor often still pay a tout, or receive a diluted bag, because the subsidy sits on the **commodity**, not on the person.

How DBT can change the scenario

- **PAHAL (Direct Benefit Transfer for LPG)** already showed that the subsidy can follow the Aadhaar-linked consumer, which cut duplicate connections.
- **Targeting improves:** the transfer can be limited to **priority households**, and the well-off can be excluded (as in giving up LPG subsidy).
- Leakage falls when the shop sells at market price and the farmer or housewife gets **cash or a bank credit**, so there is less incentive to divert the cheap bag.
- **Households gain choice:** they may buy a cleaner fuel or a different nutrient mix rather than only the subsidised item.
- The fiscal bill becomes **transparent** and can be capped; **Economic Survey** logic was that JAM reduces ghost beneficiaries.
- For food, DBT or cash in place of cheap grain is more contested, because price risk and weak rural markets can leave the family hungry if cash is delayed.

Limits

- **Exclusion error:** a failed Aadhaar match or a distant bank can cut off a genuine poor household.

- Fertiliser DBT is harder than LPG because **urea use is seasonal**, soil needs differ, and last-mile dealers are political.
- Without last-mile banking and mobile literacy, DBT becomes another queue.
- Price subsidy on merit goods (some food, some kerosene where LPG has not arrived) cannot be switched off overnight.

Flow diagram

Price subsidy on good -> Leakage diversion
JAM stack -> DBT to account
DBT to account -> Better targeting
DBT to account -> Choice and transparent fiscal cost
DBT to account -> Exclusion last mile risk

Conclusion

Replacing price subsidy with DBT can cut ghosts, diversion and an opaque fiscal leak, as PAHAL showed for LPG. It changes the subsidy from a cheap bag to a targeted transfer. It will not by itself feed or fertilise India unless banking, Aadhaar and markets work for the last household, and unless food security is not reduced to a failed ping.

Open WRAP page — <https://wrapexams.com/upsc/mains-answers/gs-3/2015/in-what-way-could-replacement-of-price-subsidy-with-direct-benefit-transfer-dbt-change-the-scenario-of-subsidies-in-india-discuss/>

Q6 · 12 marks

What are the impediments in marketing and supply chain management in developing the food processing industry in India? Can e-commerce help in overcoming this bottleneck?

GS III · 2015 · Food Processing

Revision summary

Food processing needs a reliable farm-to-plant chain, which India still lacks at scale.

APMC rules, many intermediaries, 25-30 per cent horticulture wastage and thin cold chain are the main impediments.

Standards, roads, working capital and Mega Food Park last-mile links also lag.

E-commerce helps price discovery, orders and payments, and branded retail reach.

Physical cold logistics and market-law reform remain necessary; an app is not a pack-house.

Introduction

India grows a large **horticulture and milk surplus**, yet **food processing** stays thin because the crop does not travel as a graded, cold, legally saleable input. The bottleneck is **marketing and supply-chain management**: mandi rules, many intermediaries, weak cold chain, and poor standards. **E-commerce** can shorten information and payment hops. It cannot by itself build a reefer truck or change an APMC yard.

Body

Impediments in marketing and supply chain

- **Fragmented farms** give small, mixed lots that a processor cannot run a plant on without an aggregator.
- **APMC monopoly**, high mandi fees and stocking limits in many States block direct purchase from the farm gate.
- A long chain of aggregators and commission agents adds margin and delay; **wastage** of fruits and vegetables is often put in the 25-30 per cent range after harvest.
- **Cold chain** (pack-houses, reefer vans, ripening chambers) is scarce outside a few corridors; power cuts spoil the chain.
- **Standards and FSSAI** compliance, testing labs and traceability are weak, so organised retail and export reject lots.
- Rural roads, rail perishable wagons, and warehouse receipt finance do not match harvest peaks.
- Processors face **working-capital** stress when farmers must be paid cash and buyers pay late.
- The Ministry of Food Processing's **Mega Food Parks** and cold-chain scheme try to cluster this infrastructure, but last-mile linking of farms remains slow.

Can e-commerce help?

- **Yes, partly**: portals can **discover price**, place orders, and pay the farmer or FPO without a physical arhatiya.
- Inventory software and demand data let a processor or retailer **plan offtake**, which is the core of supply-chain management.

- Consumer e-commerce for packaged food widens the market for branded processed goods and can pull investment into plants.
- Farm-to-home grocery apps still need **physical cold logistics**; a click does not replace a pack-house.
- Digital divide, COD cash, returns of perishables, and **State mandi laws** still bind what an app may legally buy.
- E-commerce therefore eases the **information, matching and payment** bottleneck. It does not erase the **physical and legal** bottleneck.

Flow diagram

Farm lot -> Mandi and many hops
Mandi and many hops -> Waste and thin processing
Farm lot -> E-commerce match and pay-commerce match and pay
E-commerce match and pay -> Still needs cold chain APMC reform
Still needs cold chain APMC reform -> Stronger food processing

Conclusion

Food processing is held back by fragmented lots, APMC frictions, missing cold chain and weak standards. E-commerce can cut information and payment delays and help branded processed food reach buyers. It works as a complement to Mega Food Parks, FPOs and market-law reform, not as a substitute for trucks and lawful farm-gate purchase.

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Q7 · 12 marks

Craze for gold in Indian has led to surge in import of gold in recent years and put pressure on balance of payments and external value of rupee. In view of this, examine the merits of Gold Monetization scheme.

GS III · 2015 · Indian Economy

Revision summary

India's gold demand is met largely by imports, which widen the current account deficit and can weaken the rupee.

Most domestic gold sits idle as jewellery rather than as a financial asset.

Gold Monetisation Scheme 2015 pays interest on deposited gold and can supply jewellers from that stock.

It replaces the older Gold Deposit Scheme and sits with Sovereign Gold Bonds and the Indian Gold Coin.

Trust in assay and cultural preference for jewellery will decide actual deposits.

Introduction

Households and temples in India hold a huge stock of **gold as jewellery and bars**. When prices or festivals rise, **imports** surge. That gold is largely **unproductive**: it sits in lockers while the **current account deficit** and the **rupee** take the hit. The **Gold Monetisation Scheme (November 2015)** tries to pull idle metal into banks and refiners.

Body

Why gold imports hurt the external account

- India is among the world's largest gold importers; the metal is a big line in the **merchandise import bill** after oil.
- The **2013 taper-tantrum** period showed how gold imports can widen the current account deficit and pressure the rupee.
- Policy already used **import duty**, the **80: 20** export-import rule, and curbs on credit for gold - which treat the symptom, not the stock in homes.
- If even a fraction of domestic gold is **monetised**, import demand for the same jewellery and industrial use can fall.

Merits of the Gold Monetisation Scheme

- Depositors can tender gold to **banks**; after assay, they earn **interest** on the metal and may take back gold or rupees at maturity (short, medium and long tenors).
- Medium- and long-term deposits can be on-lent to **jewellers and refiners**, so the gems and jewellery industry uses domestic metal instead of fresh imports.
- The scheme replaces the weakly used **Gold Deposit Scheme (1999)** with clearer interest, tax treatment and a role for refiners and collection centres.
- **Fiscal and external merit**: lower import volume eases the current account and supports the rupee, without asking households to sell family gold forever.
- Temples and institutions with large holdings can earn a return instead of paying locker and security costs.

- Complementary **Sovereign Gold Bond** and **Indian Gold Coin** (2015) give paper or official coin substitutes so future demand need not all be imported bars.

Limits

- Cultural attachment to **karat jewellery**, distrust of assay, and low interest versus making charges will slow deposits.
- Branch and refinery **infrastructure** must be trusted or the scheme stays a press note.
- Monetisation does not by itself end festival demand; it only recycles existing metal.

Flow diagram

Household temple gold -> Fresh imports
Fresh imports -> CAD and rupee pressure
Household temple gold -> Gold Monetisation Scheme
Gold Monetisation Scheme -> Interest and refiner supply
Interest and refiner supply -> Lower import need

Conclusion

Gold imports have repeatedly strained India's balance of payments and the rupee because idle household metal is preferred to bank returns. The Gold Monetisation Scheme's merit is to pay interest, feed jewellers from domestic stock, and cut the import bill. It will work only with trusted assay, fair interest and the bond-and-coin substitutes that absorb new demand.

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Q8 · 12 marks

"Success of make in India program depends on the success of Skill India programme and radical labour reforms." Discuss with logical arguments.

GS III · 2015 · Indian Economy

Revision summary

Make in India needs actual factories that meet export quality and hire at scale.

Skill India, PMKVY, NSDC and NSQF are meant to supply shop-floor skills and apprentices.

Without skills, India stays a cheap-assembly site; without jobs, skilling is wasted.

Rigid Industrial Disputes and inspector overlap push firms toward contract labour or no hire.

Labour reform must simplify law and allow adjustment while keeping portable social security.

Introduction

Make in India (September 2014) asks firms to design, make and export from India in 25 sectors. A factory does not appear from a logo. It needs **workers who can run machines** and **labour law that lets a firm hire, redeploy and, when needed, close** without a year in court. **Skill India** (15 July 2015) and **labour reforms** are therefore not side slogans. They are conditions for the programme to succeed.

Body

Make in India without skills fails

- Global firms compare India with Vietnam and China on **unit labour cost and quality**, not only on cheap wages.
- A large youth cohort with weak **shop-floor, numerical and soft skills** cannot staff electronics, auto, textiles or defence lines at export quality.
- **Skill India**, Pradhan Mantri Kaushal Vikas Yojana, National Skill Development Corporation and the National Skills Qualifications Framework are meant to certify those skills at scale.
- Apprenticeship reform (amended **Apprentices Act**) links the classroom to the factory; without it, **Make in India** stays at assembly of imported kits.
- Skill without a factory job is wasted; a factory without skill stays low-value. The two programmes must **pull each other**.

Why radical labour reforms matter

- India still runs a thicket of **central labour laws** (Factories, Industrial Disputes, Contract Labour, and others) with inspector overlap and criminal penalties for routine slips.
- **Chapter V-B** of the **Industrial Disputes Act** makes lay-off, retrenchment and closure in larger units subject to prior government permission, which deters hiring on the rolls.
- Firms respond with **contract labour**, micro size below thresholds, or capital in place of people - which is the jobless-growth story.
- **Rajasthan (2014)** and some other States raised thresholds and simplified compliance; the Union's **Shram Suvidha** portal and unified returns are a start, not a finished code.
- Radical reform means **rationalisation into fewer codes**, easier compliance, and freedom to adjust workforce with **notice and social security**, not a race to fire without cause.

Logical link

- Investors will not **Make in India** if they cannot find certified workers or if every extra hire is a legal hostage.
- Workers will not accept flexibility unless **EPFO, ESI and portable benefits** travel with the job.
- **Success is therefore** joint: **Skill India** fills the quality gap; labour reform fills the quantity and formality gap.

Flow diagram

Make in India -> Skill India PMKVY NSDC
Make in India -> Labour law rationalisation
Skill India PMKVY NSDC -> Export quality factory jobs
Labour law rationalisation -> Export quality factory jobs
Export quality factory jobs -> Formal hire not only contract

Conclusion

Make in India succeeds only if plants can staff quality lines and adjust employment lawfully. **Skill India** supplies the first; radical but fair labour reform supplies the second. One without the other leaves either empty certificates or empty factories.

Open WRAP page — <https://wrapexams.com/upsc/mains-answers/gs-3/2015/success-of-make-in-india-program-depends-on-the-success-of-skill-india-programme-and-radical-labour-reforms-discuss-with-logical-arguments/>

Q9 · 12 marks

To what factors can be the recent dramatic fall in equipment cost and tariff of solar energy be attributed? What implications does the trend have for thermal power producers and related industry?

GS III · 2015 · Infrastructure

Revision summary

Solar module and balance-of-system costs fell with Chinese scale and technology learning.

India's National Solar Mission used reverse bidding, which passed those cost drops into lower tariffs.

Zero fuel cost and cheaper finance also cut the levelised tariff.

Thermal plants risk lower plant load factor and stranded high-cost capacity in daylight hours.

Coal, BHEL-type equipment and DISCOM PPAs must adjust; flexible thermal and storage remain necessary after sunset.

Introduction

Solar power in India moved in a few years from a costly niche to **tariffs** that began to undercut new **thermal** plants in some bids. The drop was not a miracle. It came from cheaper **modules worldwide**, scale in **China**, and **reverse auctions** under the **Jawaharlal Nehru National Solar Mission**. That trend rewrites the business of coal plants and their suppliers.

Body

Why equipment cost and tariffs fell

- **Crystalline silicon** module prices collapsed as global capacity, especially in China, outran demand; polysilicon and wafer costs followed.
- **Balance-of-system** costs (inverters, mounting, cables, land use) fell with standardisation and larger park size.
- India's **JNNSM** and State policies used **competitive reverse bidding**, so developers bid down the tariff to win the power-purchase agreement.
- Cheap global **finance** after the financial crisis, and later dollar liquidity, lowered the cost of capital for solar, which is almost all upfront capex and **zero fuel**.
- **Accelerated depreciation** and renewable purchase obligations created a domestic buyer; solar parks cut land and evacuation delay.
- Oil and LNG price falls after 2014 did not cause the solar drop, but they changed the relative politics of energy; solar's driver remained **technology and auction design**.

Implications for thermal power and related industry

- New **coal plants** face a shrinking room in the merit order when solar runs in daylight; **plant load factor** of thermal units can fall.
- Existing plants with high fixed costs and take-or-pay coal or gas contracts risk becoming **stranded assets** if DISCOMs prefer cheaper solar daytime power.
- **Coal India**, washeries, and rail-coal logistics see slower growth in domestic thermal coal demand than old plans assumed.
- **Bharat Heavy Electricals** and private boiler-turbine makers lose orders if capacity addition shifts from supercritical coal to solar modules (many of them imported).

- The grid still needs **flexible thermal, hydro and, later, storage** to back solar after sunset; a simple shutdown of coal is not the implication.
- DISCOMs must redesign **PPAs** and forecasting or they will pay for idle thermal capacity and cheap solar at once.
- Domestic module manufacturing lags China, so the tariff gain can widen the **import bill** unless local cell-module capacity is built.

Flow diagram

Cheaper global modules -> Reverse auctions JNNSM

Reverse auctions JNNSM -> Low solar tariffs

Low solar tariffs -> Thermal PLF and new orders fall

Low solar tariffs -> Grid still needs flexible backup

Conclusion

Solar equipment and tariffs fell because modules got cheaper worldwide and India bought them through reverse auctions, not because coal suddenly vanished. Thermal producers face lower utilisation and fewer new orders; they remain needed for night and peak. Policy must pair cheap solar with a flexible coal-and-storage mix and with domestic manufacturing if the trend is not to export India's equipment jobs.

Open WRAP page — <https://wrapexams.com/upsc/mains-answers/gs-3/2015/to-what-factors-can-be-the-recent-dramatic-fall-in-equipment-cost-and-tariff-of-solar-energy-be-attributed-what-implications-does-the-trend-have-for-thermal-power-producers-and-related-industry/>

Q10 · 12 marks

There is a clear acknowledgement that Special Economic Zones (SEZs) are a tool of industrial development, manufacturing and exports. Recognising this potential, the whole instrumentality of SEZs require augmentation. Discuss the issue plaguing the success of SEZs with respect to taxation, governing laws and administration.

GS III · 2015 · Indian Economy

Revision summary

The **SEZ Act 2005** promised duty-free, well-served export enclaves for manufacturing.

MAT on SEZ units and developers from 2011-12 and DDT on developers cut the original tax bargain.

Uncertain direct-tax reform talk further discouraged long-gestation factories.

State land, labour and local laws, plus the 2013 land acquisition regime, still bind most zones.

Administration remains multi-agency; many SEZs are IT-heavy or vacant rather than new manufacturing.

Introduction

Special Economic Zones were meant to be duty-free enclaves for **export manufacturing**, with world-class infrastructure and simpler rules. The **SEZ Act, 2005** and Rules, 2006 created that instrument. In practice many zones filled with **IT-ITES** and vacant land, not new factories. Taxation surprises, overlapping laws and heavy administration are the core sores that now need augmentation.

Body

Tax issues

- Units enjoyed a **phased income-tax holiday** (100 per cent then 50 per cent) on export profit under the SEZ code, which was the original bargain for locating inside the fence.
- **Minimum Alternate Tax** was levied on SEZ developers and units from **financial year 2011-12**, which cut the effective holiday and angered investors who had sunk capital on the old promise.
- **Dividend Distribution Tax** on SEZ developers from around **2011** further reduced the post-tax return.
- Talk of a **Direct Taxes Code** and periodic Budget tinkering created **policy uncertainty**; export units cannot plan a ten-year plant if the tax deal moves in year three.
- **Indirect tax** and duty-drawback interaction with the domestic tariff area (DTA) sales cap, and later GST design, add another layer of friction for firms that must sell some output inland.
- Instability of incentives pushed developers toward **real estate and IT parks** rather than long-gestation manufacturing.

Governing laws

- An SEZ still faces **State labour, environment, land and local-body** laws; the single-window claim is incomplete.

- **Land acquisition** after the 2013 Act made large contiguous manufacturing zones harder and costlier; several notified SEZs never became operational.
- **WTO** subsidy and export-contingent incentive concerns, plus free-trade-agreement rules of origin, limit how aggressive India can be on tax holidays.
- **Dual control: SEZ Act versus Customs, FEMA, company law and State industrial lock-in** produces conflicting circulars.

Administration

- The **Development Commissioner** and Board of Approval process is still paper-heavy for expansions, DTA access and service approvals.
- Coordination with State governments on water, power and road **outside the fence** is weak, so the zone is an island.
- Many SEZs are **too small or too IT-heavy**; they relocate existing exporters instead of creating new manufacturing.
- Augmentation needs a **stable tax covenant**, true single window, plug-and-play infrastructure, and a manufacturing-and-export test rather than vacant notified land.

Flow diagram

SEZ Act 2005 -> Export manufacturing aim
 Export manufacturing aim -> Tax holiday then MAT DDT
 Export manufacturing aim -> Land labour State laws
 Export manufacturing aim -> DC and multi agency delay
 Tax holiday then MAT DDT -> Weak manufacturing outcome
 Land labour State laws -> Weak manufacturing outcome
 DC and multi agency delay -> Weak manufacturing outcome

Conclusion

SEZs can still be a tool for manufacturing and exports, but MAT, DDT and shifting tax promises broke investor trust. Overlapping State and Union laws and slow **Development Commissioner** administration did the rest. Augmentation means a stable fiscal deal, real single window, and zones that actually make goods, not only park IT firms on cheap land.

Open WRAP page — <https://wrapexams.com/upsc/mains-answers/gs-3/2015/there-is-a-clear-acknowledgement-that-special-economic-zones-sezs-are-a-tool-of-industrial-development-manufacturing-and-exports-recognising-t-his-potential-the-whole-instrumentality-of-sezs-require-augmentation-discuss/>

Q11 · 12 marks

What do you understand by "Standard Positioning System" and "Precision positioning system" in the GPS era? Discuss the advantage India perceives from its ambitious IRNSS programme employing just seven satellites.

GS III · 2015 · Indian Economy

Revision summary

GPS SPS is the open civil positioning service; PPS is the encrypted military service with better integrity.

India does not control GPS and can face denial, jamming, or a time outage in a crisis.

IRNSS uses seven GEO and geosynchronous satellites to cover India and a 1,500 km belt.

It offers an Indian open service and a Restricted Service for authorised users.

Gains are strategic autonomy, defence use, disaster and transport applications, and indigenous timing for critical infrastructure.

Flow diagram

GPS constellation -> SPS civil open civil open
GPS constellation -> PPS military encrypted military encrypted
IRNSS seven satellites -> Indian open SPS civil open
IRNSS seven satellites -> Restricted Service
Indian open SPS -> Sovereign PNT over India
Restricted Service -> Sovereign PNT over India

Conclusion

- Finish and replenish the seven-satellite fleet, keep spare launches, and harden ground stations against cyber and physical attack.
- Mandate NavIC in public vehicles, phones sold in India, and disaster sirens so the civil SPS is actually used, not only demonstrated.
- Pair NavIC with **GAGAN** and later multi-GNSS chipsets so users are not blind if one system fails.

SPS is the open civil GPS fix; PPS is the encrypted military fix. IRNSS copies that split on seven regional satellites that stay over India. The advantage is not beating GPS worldwide. It is an Indian signal, Indian time, and an Indian restricted service when a foreign owner could deny or degrade GPS.

Open WRAP page — <https://wrapexams.com/upsc/mains-answers/gs-3/2015/what-do-you-understand-by-standard-positioning-system-and-precision-positioning-system-in-the-gps-era-discuss-the-advantage-india-perceives-from-its-ambitious-irNSS-programme-employing-just-seven-satellites/>

Q12 · 12 marks

What are the areas of prohibitive labour that can be sustainably managed by robots? Discuss the initiatives that can propel the research in premier research institutes for substantive and gainful innovation.

GS III · 2015 · Indian Economy

Revision summary

Prohibitive labour is hazardous, dirty, dull, or extreme work in mines, radiation, explosives, fire, underwater, space, furnaces, and isolation wards.

Robots can take that load if power, parts, safety, and worker reskilling are funded.

Premier institutes need mission testbeds, DRDO-ISRO-CSIR problem statements, and long chairs, not one-year gadgets.

Industry must buy qualified Indian machines so research has a market.

Score labs on field deployment with users such as NDRF and hospitals.

Flow diagram

Prohibitive labour -> Robots in field
Robots in field -> Power spares safety reskill
IIT IISc missions -> Substantive innovation
DRDO ISRO industry -> Substantive innovation
Substantive innovation -> Robots in field

Conclusion

- Pick five national use-cases - mine rescue, bomb disposal, sewer, hospital isolation, and farm spraying - and score institutes on field hours, not papers alone.
- Create a public **robotics proving ground** and a fast import window for research parts that now sit in customs.
- Tie fellowships to deployment with a user (NDRF, a mine, a hospital), then let the team spin out a firm.
- **Robots should take work that kills, poisons, or wears people out:** mines, radiation, bombs, fire, deep water, space, furnaces, and contagion. That is sustainable only with maintenance, safety law, and reskilling. Premier institutes will innovate if missions, testbeds, defence and industry buyers, and long fellowships replace short imported demos.

Open WRAP page — <https://wrapexams.com/upsc/mains-answers/gs-3/2015/what-are-the-areas-of-prohibitive-labour-that-can-be-sustainably-managed-by-robots-discuss-the-initiatives-that-can-propel-the-research-in-premier-research-institutes-for-substantive-and-gainful-innovation/>

Q13 · 12 marks

Discuss the advantage and security implication of cloud hosting of servers vis-a-vis in house machine based hosting for government business.

GS III · 2015 · Indian Economy

Revision summary

Cloud hosting cuts idle hardware cost and makes scale, patching, and disaster recovery easier for ordinary government work.

In-house hosting still fits air-gapped and highly classified systems.

Cloud risks are multi-tenancy, key control, data location, provider insiders, and lock-in.

In-house risks are unpatched boxes, weak rooms, and no second copy.

Use GI Cloud with government keys for most data; keep secrets on dedicated government infrastructure.

Flow diagram

Government business -> Empanelled cloud
Government business -> In-house rack
Empanelled cloud -> Scale backup opex
In-house rack -> Physical control secrets
Keys location CERT contract -> Empanelled cloud
Patches backup access -> In-house rack

Conclusion

- **Classify data: public and ordinary personal data** on empanelled GI Cloud; **secret and above** on dedicated government cloud or in-house with NIC-grade ops.
- Use **MeghRaj**, encryption with government-held keys, and Indian legal jurisdiction for citizen databases.
- Ban unapproved public foreign clouds for official files; allow them only for open websites if policy says so.
- Train a small **cloud security cadre** and run annual drills with CERT-In.

Cloud hosting gives government elasticity, professional backup, and lower idle capital. In-house hosting gives physical control for the most secret work. Security is not automatic in either room: cloud needs keys, location, and contracts; in-house needs patches and backups. A classified split on MeghRaj-class clouds is safer than every ministry running its own forgotten tower.

Open WRAP page — <https://wrapexams.com/upsc/mains-answers/gs-3/2015/discuss-the-advantage-and-security-implication-of-cloud-hosting-of-servers-vis-a-vis-in-house-machine-based-hosting-for-government-business/>

Q14 · 12 marks

India's Traditional Knowledge Digital Library (TKDL) which has a database containing formatted information on more than 2 million medicinal formulations is proving a powerful weapon in country's fight against erroneous patents. Discuss the pro and cons of making the database available publicly available under open source licensing.

GS III · 2015 · Indian Economy

Revision summary

TKDL formats over two million Indian medicinal entries so patent offices can see prior art and reject biopiracy claims.

Open-source public release would widen research, audit, and prior-art reach.

It would also let firms copy recipes without filing a patent, weaken community consent, and risk unsafe self-medication.

A middle path is open metadata and a licensed full-text track with benefit-sharing.

The library should stay a defensive tool, not an ungoverned dump of living traditions.

Flow diagram

Traditional texts practice -> TKDL formatted database formatted database

TKDL formatted database -> Patent offices reject bad claims

Full open dump -> More research transparency

Full open dump -> Copy without patent ABS gap

Open metadata controlled full text -> Defence plus consent

Conclusion

- Do not confuse "open to patent offices" with "open to every scraper".
- Strengthen TKDL in more languages and in oral, community-verified entries with consent.
- Pair the library with faster **pre-grant opposition** and Indian Patent Office examiner training so the weapon is used.

TKDL already works as a closed, formatted shield against wrong patents. Full public open-source licensing would help researchers and catch more claims, but it would also ease copying that never goes to a patent office and could ignore community rights. A split - open metadata, controlled full formulations, and benefit-sharing for commercial use - keeps the weapon without giving away the store.

Open WRAP page — <https://wrapexams.com/upsc/mains-answers/gs-3/2015/indias-traditional-knowledge-digital-library-tkdl-which-has-a-database-containing-formatted-information-on-more-than-2-million-medicinal-formulations-is-proving-a-powerful-weapon-in-countrys-fight-against-erroneous/>

Q15 · 12 marks

Discuss the Namami Gange and National Mission for Clean Ganga (NMCG) programmes and causes of mixed results from the previous schemes. What quantum leaps can help preserve the river Ganga better than incremental inputs?

GS III · 2015 · Indian Economy

Revision summary

Namami Gange is the integrated Ganga flagship; NMCG is the body that funds and monitors the works.

Ganga Action Plan mixed results because treatment plants lacked sewers, operations money, industrial enforcement, and lean-season flow.

Tributaries, solid waste, and split accountability also beat the old schemes.

Quantum leaps are full drain interception, legal environmental flow, zero liquid discharge, and a basin authority with power.

Success is bathing quality and living tributaries, not rupees spent on ghats alone.

Flow diagram

GAP mixed results -> Plants without sewers flow
 Namami Gange NMCG -> Integrated projects
 Quantum leaps -> E-flow full interception ZLD
 Quantum leaps -> Basin authority dashboards
 E-flow full interception ZLD -> Aviral Nirmal Ganga
 Basin authority dashboards -> Aviral Nirmal Ganga

Conclusion

- Fund **operations and electricity** as seriously as new plants.
- Treat Yamuna and other tributaries as Ganga, or the main stem will always look "mixed".
- Measure success as **bathing-quality stretches and fish return**, not as rupees sanctioned.
- **Namami Gange and NMCG try to unify what GAP scattered:** sewage, industry, ghats, and people. Old schemes mixed results because plants without sewers, flow, enforcement, or operators cannot clean a basin. Quantum leaps are full drain interception, legal e-flow, industrial zero discharge, a powerful basin authority, and tributary-plus-wetland restoration - not another small scheme on the same broken pipe.

Open WRAP page — <https://wrapexams.com/upsc/mains-answers/gs-3/2015/discuss-the-namami-gange-and-national-mission-for-clean-ganga-nmcg-programmes-and-causes-of-mixed-results-from-the-previous-schemes-what-quantum-leaps-can-help-preserve-the-river-ganga-better-than-incremental-inputs/>

Q16 · 12 marks

The frequency of earthquakes appears to have increased in the Indian subcontinent. However, India's preparedness for mitigating their impact has significant gaps. Discuss various aspects.

GS III · 2015 · Indian Economy

Revision summary

The subcontinent's seismic hazard is old; better instruments and media make shocks more visible.

Risk has risen because more people live in unsafe concrete in the Himalaya, Northeast, and crowded plains.

Codes and NDMA exist; municipal enforcement, hospital retrofit, and lifeline redundancy do not match the maps.

Earthquakes cannot be dated in advance; seconds of P-wave warning and drop-cover-hold still save lives.

The work is inspection, retrofit, and drills, not a new prediction office.

Flow diagram

Plate boundary hazard -> Felt events
Better instruments media -> Felt events
Unsafe dense buildings -> Higher loss
Felt events -> Higher loss
BIS codes NDMA -> Preparedness
Weak enforcement no retrofit -> Higher loss

Conclusion

- Make **occupancy certificates** depend on real seismic inspection, not a file.
- Retrofit hospitals and schools in Zones IV and V on a published timetable.
- Update maps, ban unsafe hill construction, and practise mass casualty with the army and NDRF before the next night-time quake.
- Teach every engineer and mason in the Himalaya the same detailing rules the code already wrote.

Earthquakes have not magically become a new geology; recording, aftershocks, and unsafe growth make them feel more frequent and more deadly. India's gap is enforcement of building codes, retrofit of lifeline buildings, public drills, and seconds-scale warning - not a missing prediction of the next date. Preparedness is masonry and governance, not a press release after each tremor.

Open WRAP page — <https://wrapexams.com/upsc/mains-answers/gs-3/2015/the-frequency-of-earthquakes-appears-to-have-increased-in-the-indian-subcontinent-however-indias-preparedness-for-mitigating-their-impact-has-significant-gaps-discuss-various-aspects/>

Q17 · 12 marks

Human right activists constantly highlight the fact that the Armed forces (Special Powers) Act, 1958 (AFSPA) is a draconian act leading to cases of human right abuses by security forces. What sections of AFSPA are opposed by the activists. Critically evaluate the requirement with reference to the view held by Apex Court.

GS III · 2015 · Indian Economy

Revision summary

Activists oppose AFSPA **Section 3** (open-ended disturbed areas), **Section 4** lethal force and warrantless search and arrest, and **Section 6** sanction for prosecution.

The Supreme Court in 1997 held the Act valid but subject to judicial review, minimum force, and prompt handover to police.

Section 6 does not legalise murder or rape; abuse can still be tried if sanction is not a burial.

Operational need can exist in a live insurgency; permanent, unreviewed AFSPA fails both rights and counter-insurgency legitimacy.

Reform is time-bound maps, audited force, and fast sanction decisions.

Flow diagram

Section 3 disturbed area -> Section 4 fire search arrest
 Section 4 fire search arrest -> Section 6 Central sanction
 Section 6 Central sanction -> Impunity complaint
 Supreme Court 1997 -> Act valid
 Supreme Court 1997 -> Review minimum force no abuse immunity
 Review minimum force no abuse immunity -> Time-bound operational need only

Conclusion

- Follow the 1997 guidelines in the field, not only in affidavits.
- Independent investigation of encounter deaths; fast yes-or-no on prosecution sanction.
- Review disturbed-area maps every six months in Parliament's sight.
- Train troops in minimum force and in recording warnings, so **Section 4(a)** is not a street-execution clause in practice.
- **Activists target Sections 3, 4(a)-(d), and especially 6:** disturbed-area permanence, lethal force, warrantless search and arrest, and Central sanction. The Supreme Court upheld AFSPA but bound it to review, minimum force, and no immunity for abuse. The Act may still be required in a narrow, time-bound insurgency. It is not required as a permanent shield against the criminal law.

Open WRAP page — <https://wrapexams.com/upsc/mains-answers/gs-3/2015/human-right-activists-constantly-highlight-the-fact-that-the-armed-forces-special-powers-act-1958-afspa-is-a-draconian-act-leading-to-cases-of-human-right-abuses-by-security-forces-what-sections-of-afspa-are-opposed-by/>

Q18 · 12 marks

Religious indoctrination via social media has resulted in Indian youth joining the ISIS. What is ISIS and its mission? How can ISIS be dangerous to the internal security of our country.

GS III · 2015 · Cyber Security and Money Laundering

Revision summary

ISIS is a jihadist group that seized land in Iraq and Syria and declared a caliphate in 2014.

Its mission is a border-breaking Islamic State, harsh rule, and global recruitment and attacks.

India's risk is online radicalisation, small modules, lone wolves, communal polarisation, and returnees.

Social media replaced the old physical pipeline for many youth.

Counter it with intelligence, fair law, deradicalisation, and refusal to communalise the whole response.

Flow diagram

ISIS caliphate brand -> Mission state terror recruit

Social media -> Indian youth indoctrination

Indian youth indoctrination -> Travel cells lone wolf

Travel cells lone wolf -> Internal security hit

Intel law deradicalise -> Internal security hit

Conclusion

- Intelligence fusion on travel, money, and channels; fast legal process that still stands in court.
- Community policing and credible **deradicalisation**, especially for the young who were groomed online.
- Platform liability for terror content, with encryption policy that does not blind all investigation.
- Do not answer ISIS with collective blame on a community; that is the recruitment gift the group wants.

ISIS is a jihadist project that claimed a caliphate and a world mission of rule, terror, and recruitment. For India the danger is less an army crossing a border than **inspired youth, small cells, communal aftershocks, and returnees**. Social media is the conveyor. The reply is precise intelligence, law, and community work - not a war on a whole faith.

Open WRAP page — <https://wrapexams.com/upsc/mains-answers/gs-3/2015/religious-indoctrination-via-social-media-has-resulted-in-indian-youth-joining-the-isis-what-is-isis-and-its-mission-how-can-isis-be-dangerous-to-the-internal-security-of-our-country/>

Q19 · 12 marks

The persisting drives of the government for development of large industries in backward areas have resulted in isolating the tribal population and the farmers who face multiple displacements. With Malkangiri and Naxalbari foci, discuss the corrective strategies needed to win the Left Wing Extremism (LWE) doctrine affected citizens back into mainstream of social and economic growth.

GS III · 2015 · Internal Security and Extremism

Revision summary

Naxalbari (1967) began as a land and dignity revolt; Malkangiri shows forest isolation and weak services in an LWE theatre.

Large industry in backward areas often takes land and forest without real gram sabha consent, causing multiple displacement.

That grievance is the political fuel of the LWE doctrine.

Corrective work is lawful security, Forest Rights and PESA, land-for-land, local livelihoods, and basic services.

Success is titles, schools, and panchayats functioning - not only camps and a factory gate.

Flow diagram

Large industry mines dams -> Tribal farmer displacement
Tribal farmer displacement -> LWE recruitment
Naxalbari land spark -> LWE recruitment
Malkangiri forest isolation -> LWE recruitment
PESA FRA local jobs security law -> Mainstream
LWE recruitment -> PESA FRA local jobs security law

Conclusion

- **The 2015 National Policy and Action Plan line is right if it is practised: clear, hold, develop**, with develop meaning **rights**.
- Measure success as **closed anganwadis reopened and titles granted**, not only as insurgents killed.
- Malkangiri needs connectivity and consent; Naxalbari's memory needs land reform honesty. Both need the State as a fair landlord, not as a broker for the next plant.

Naxalbari named a revolt against agrarian injustice; Malkangiri shows how forest geography and neglect keep LWE alive. Mega industry that isolates tribals and farmers feeds the doctrine. Corrective strategy is lawful security, PESA-FRA consent, an end to serial displacement, and local livelihoods and services. Mainstream growth is a title, a school, and a road that the gram sabha asked for - not a plant on a cleared village.

Open WRAP page — <https://wrapexams.com/upsc/mains-answers/gs-3/2015/the-persisting-drives-of-the-government-for-development-of-large-industries-in-backward-areas-have-resulted-in-isolating-the-tribal-population-an>

d-the-farmers-who-face-multiple-displacements-with-malkangiri-and-naxalbari/

WRAP Exams

Q20 · 12 marks

Considering the threats cyberspace poses for the country, India needs a "Digital Armed Forces" to prevent crimes. Critically evaluate the National Cyber Security Policy, 2013 outlining the challenges perceived in its effective implementation.

GS III · 2015 · Cyber Security and Money Laundering

Revision summary

NCSP 2013 sought a secure IT environment, 24×7 response, CERT and critical-infrastructure protection, skills, and public-private sharing.

Those aims match the threat; a policy paper did not automatically fund staff, a chain of command, or modern law.

Private owners of power and finance still need mandatory standards, not only partnership language.

A Digital Armed Forces idea is valid as a trained defence and CI cadre with a fusion centre, not as militarising all cyber crime.

Implementation needs statute, a career service, supply-chain rules, and drills.

Flow diagram

Cyberspace threats -> NCSP 2013
 NCSP 2013 -> CERT-In NCIIPC skills PPP-In NCIIPC skills PPP
 Law command workforce supply chain -> NCSP 2013
 Digital cadre fusion -> Defence CI
 Digital cadre fusion -> CERT-In NCIIPC skills PPP police crime
 Defence CI -> Resilient cyberspace
 CERT police crime -> Resilient cyberspace

Conclusion

- Update the 2013 policy with **binding sectoral regulations**, breach-notification, and supply-chain rules.
- Build the missing **career cyber service** and national range for live-fire drills.
- Clarify encryption and agency lanes so firms are not complying with five contradictory letters.
- Keep citizen security and **privacy** in the same design, or a Digital Armed Force will lose the public it claims to protect.

The National Cyber Security Policy, 2013 correctly named CERT, critical infrastructure, skills, and public-private work. It did not by itself create law, a commander, or a retained workforce, so implementation is the real gap. India needs professional digital forces for defence and critical systems, not a slogan that turns every cyber crime into a military parade. The 2013 map still holds if it is given statute, staff, and drills.

Open WRAP page — <https://wrapexams.com/upsc/mains-answers/gs-3/2015/considering-the-threats-cyberspace-poses-for-the-country-india-needs-a-digital-armed-forces-to-prevent-crimes-critically-evaluate-the-national-cyber-security-policy-2013-outlining-the-challenges-perceived-in-its/>

Compiled answer key

Last pages of this pack. Each question links to the WRAP model answer on wrapexams.com.

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Q1 12 marks	Q2 12 marks	Q3 12 marks	Q4 12 marks
Q5 12 marks	Q6 12 marks	Q7 12 marks	Q8 12 marks
Q9 12 marks	Q10 12 marks	Q11 12 marks	Q12 12 marks
Q13 12 marks	Q14 12 marks	Q15 12 marks	Q16 12 marks
Q17 12 marks	Q18 12 marks	Q19 12 marks	Q20 12 marks

Question-wise key

Q1 · 12 marks Solution

Q2 · 12 marks Solution

Q3 · 12 marks Solution

Q4 · 12 marks Solution

Q5 · 12 marks Solution

Q6 · 12 marks Solution

Q7 · 12 marks Solution

Q8 · 12 marks Solution

Q9 · 12 marks Solution

Q10 · 12 marks Solution

Q11 · 12 marks Solution

Q12 · 12 marks Solution

Q13 · 12 marks Solution

Q14 · 12 marks Solution

Q15 · 12 marks Solution

Q16 · 12 marks Solution

Q17 · 12 marks Solution

Q18 · 12 marks Solution

Q19 · 12 marks Solution

Q20 · 12 marks Solution

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