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UPSC Mains 2019 GS II

Year-wise PYQ pack · WRAP model answers with canonical links

Official UPSC stems in exam order. Each live answer sits on one WRAP URL; this PDF is the year pack, not a second copy of the article. Open the link under a question for the full page.

<https://wrapexams.com/upsc/mains/gs-2/2019/>

Q1 · 10 marks

Do you think that constitution of India does not accept principle of strict separation of powers rather it is based on the principle of 'checks and balance'? Explain.

GS II · 2019 · Separation of Powers

Revision summary

India does not follow a rigid American separation of powers.

Ram Jawaya Kapur (1955) treated the Cabinet as part of a parliamentary legislature.

Articles 13, 32 and 226, charged judicial salaries, and a hard removal process are mutual checks.

Kesavananda and Minerva Mills keep judicial review inside the basic structure.

The design is checks and balances, not sealed branches.

Introduction

A strict separation of powers would keep the legislature, the executive, and the judiciary in sealed boxes, as in a pure reading of Montesquieu. The Constitution of India copies the functions of those three organs, but it also lets each organ check the others. The Supreme Court said this plainly in **Ram Jawaya Kapur v. State of Punjab (1955)**: India does not follow a rigid American separation.

Body

No strict separation

- **Articles 53 and 74** place executive power in the President, who acts on the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers, so the political executive sits inside the legislature through **Articles 75 and 88**.
- Ordinance power under **Article 123**, and the power of the Houses to punish for contempt of themselves, mix law-making with executive and quasi-judicial work.
- **Article 50** asks only for separation of the judiciary from the executive in the public services of the State; it is a Directive Principle, not a wall between all three organs.
- Delegated legislation, parliamentary committees that examine the executive, and judges sitting on commissions show daily overlap of functions.

- Ram Jawaya Kapur held that the Indian design is a parliamentary system in which the Cabinet is a part of the legislature, not a rival sealed branch.

Checks and balances in the text

- **Articles 13, 32, 136, 141, 142 and 226** give courts the power to strike down statutes and executive acts; that is a judicial check on the other two organs.
- **Articles 121 and 211** bar discussion of a sitting judge except on a removal motion; salaries of judges are charged, and removal needs a parliamentary address, so the legislature cannot casually punish the Court.
- Parliament can impeach a judge, create courts under **Articles 124 and 247**, and amend the Constitution under **Article 368**, which is a political check on the judiciary.
- The President and Governors, the Rajya Sabha's share in some appointments, and **Article 356** as read in **S.R. Bommai v. Union of India (1994)** check the Union executive in the federal field.
- **Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala (1973)** placed separation of powers and judicial review inside the basic structure, so even an amendment cannot wipe out the balance.

How the balance works in practice

- **Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Raj Narain and Minerva Mills v. Union of India** show the Court stopping Parliament when it tries to make itself the last judge of elections or of fundamental rights.
- The executive checks the Court through the collegium's need for a Memorandum of Procedure and through the power to appoint after consultation; the failed **National Judicial Appointments Commission** still shows the tension, not a sealed separation.
- **A fair explanation therefore agrees with the question:** India chose checks and balances, not a strict separation of powers.

Flow diagram

Three organs in the text -> Functional overlap
 Three organs in the text -> Checks and balances
 Checks and balances -> Arts 13 32 226 review
 Checks and balances -> Parliament removal and money
 Checks and balances -> Kesavananda basic structure
 Arts 13 32 226 review -> Balanced constitutional government

Conclusion

The Constitution does not accept a strict separation of powers. It assigns functions to three organs and then binds them through judicial review, parliamentary control, charged salaries, and the basic-structure limit. That is the Indian principle of checks and balances.

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Q2 · 10 marks

"The Central Administration Tribunal which was established for redressal of grievances and complaints by or against central government employees, nowadays is exercising its powers as an independent judicial authority." Explain.

GS II · 2019 · Governance and Policy

Revision summary

Article 323A and the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985, created the CAT for Union service disputes.

The original aim was expert, speedy redress instead of a first writ in the High Court.

Sampath Kumar treated a proper tribunal as a substitute forum; Chandra Kumar restored High Court review as basic structure.

The CAT still hears the dispute first, with civil-court powers and reasoned orders.

It is an independent judicial authority of first instance, not a ministry cell and not a sealed final court.

Introduction

The Central Administrative Tribunal was created so that service disputes of Union employees would not clog the High Courts. Article 323A and the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985, gave it that specialised role. Over time, statute, procedure, and Supreme Court rulings have made it sit as a judicial forum, not as a wing of the department it reviews.

Body

Original redressal role

- The Forty-second Amendment inserted Article 323A so that Parliament could set up administrative tribunals for Union and State public-service matters.
- The Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985, established the CAT to hear recruitment and service conditions of persons appointed to public services of the Union, All-India Services, and specified organisations.
- The aim was speedy, inexpensive, and expert disposal of grievances by or against the government as employer, in place of a long writ in the High Court as the first court.
- S.P. Sampath Kumar v. Union of India (1987) treated a well-designed tribunal as a substitute for the High Court's jurisdiction in service matters, which was the original constitutional bargain.
- Benches, a judicial member, and an administrative member were meant to mix law with service experience, so the employee met a specialised forum rather than a general civil court.

Exercise as an independent judicial authority

- The CAT has the powers of a civil court for summoning, discovery, and evidence; its orders bind the department and can be executed.
- Contempt power, open hearings, reasoned orders, and a Chairman drawn from the higher judiciary give it the look and the discipline of a court.
- It is not subject to the day-to-day control of the ministry whose orders it sets aside; that independence is the point of a tribunal under Article 323A.

- **L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India (1997)** held that judicial review under **Articles 226 and 32** is part of the basic structure, so CAT orders can still be examined by a High Court Division Bench, but the CAT remains the court of first instance for the listed service disputes.
- After Chandra Kumar, the CAT is an independent judicial authority in the first round; it is not a departmental enquiry board, and it is not a final court sealed from the High Courts.

Limits that an explanation must record

- Vacancies, delayed benches, and the quality of administrative members can weaken the promise of a real court.
- Independence is statutory and functional; it is not the full constitutional insulation of a High Court under **Articles 214** to 217.
- The way forward is to fill judicial posts on time, publish disposal data, and keep the Chandra Kumar first-instance rule so that employees get a real hearing before any writ.

Flow diagram

Article 323A -> Administrative Tribunals Act 1985
Administrative Tribunals Act 1985 -> CAT first-instance service forum
CAT first-instance service forum -> Court-like independent process
Court-like independent process -> High Court review Chandra Kumar
High Court review Chandra Kumar -> Redress with constitutional check

Conclusion

The CAT was born as a specialised redressal body for Union service grievances under **Article 323A** and the 1985 Act. It now sits as an independent judicial authority of first instance, with court-like process, subject still to High Court review after L. Chandra Kumar.

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Q3 · 10 marks

What are the methods used by the Farmers organizations to influence the policy- makers in India and how effective are these methods?

GS II · 2019 · Governance and Policy

Revision summary

Article 19 speech, assembly and association frame farmers' methods.

Protest, memoranda, elections, media and writs are the main tools.

The 2021 repeal of the three farm laws shows high effectiveness of united, long agitation.

Short and split protests usually win a bonus, not a stable MSP law.

Tenant and women farmers remain poorly reached, so method success is real but uneven.

Introduction

Farmers' organisations try to move the Union and the States on prices, credit, power, water, and trade. They use the rights of speech, assembly, and association in **Article 19**, and they use elections, courts, and the street. Effectiveness depends on unity, duration, and whether the demand can be written into a statute or a budget line.

Body

Methods of influence

- Peaceful protest, sit-ins, rail and highway blockades, and long marches put a visible cost on governments; the 2020-21 farm-law agitation around Delhi is the largest recent example.
- Unions such as the Bharatiya Kisan Union, All India Kisan Sabha, and later coalitions submit memoranda, meet ministers, and depose before parliamentary standing committees.
- Election-time voting blocs in States with a strong kisan identity, and support or boycott of parties, turn rural numbers into a whip on policy-makers.
- Public-interest litigation, challenges to land-acquisition notifications, and petitions on drought or sugarcane arrears move the dispute into **Articles 32 and 226**.
- Media campaigns, social media, and alliance with traders or labour unions widen the issue beyond the village.
- Expert reports - the **National Commission** on Farmers chaired by M.S. Swaminathan, and later committee talks on minimum support price - give organisations a technical file to hand to the ministry.

How effective they are

- **Sustained, united protest can change statute:** the Farmers' Produce Trade and Commerce (Promotion and Facilitation) Act, 2020, and the two companion farm laws were repealed in 2021 after months of mobilisation.
- Methods work better on a single, national, easy-to-name demand (repeal, loan waiver, a price announcement) than on slow reforms of marketing, storage, and tenancy.
- Fragmented unions, caste and crop splits, and short harvest-season protests often win a one-time bonus or a delayed payment, not a stable MSP statute or a full Swaminathan cost-plus formula.
- Litigation can stay a notification, but courts do not run procurement; the Food Corporation of India and State agencies still decide who actually sells at MSP.

- Small and tenant farmers, and women in agriculture, are weakly organised, so methods that look effective on television can miss those who need the **National Food Security Act, 2013**, and MGNREGA the most.

Short way forward

- Institutionalise consultation through a standing farmers' council linked to the Ministry of Agriculture, so protest is not the only channel.
- Protect **Article 19** protest while keeping essential services, and publish a time-bound reply to committee depositions.
- Tie MSP, PM-KISAN, and crop-insurance talk to tenant and women farmers, not only to title-holding union members.

Flow diagram

Farmers organisations -> Protest lobbying votes
Farmers organisations -> Committees and courts
Protest lobbying votes -> Policy-makers Union and States
Committees and courts -> Policy-makers Union and States
Policy-makers Union and States -> Repeal MSP waiver or delay
Repeal MSP waiver or delay -> Uneven reach to small tenants

Conclusion

Farmers' organisations influence policy through protest, lobbying, votes, media, and courts. Those methods are highly effective when unity lasts long enough to threaten a national law or an election; they are weak at delivering slow, inclusive agricultural reform for the least organised cultivators.

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Q4 · 10 marks

From the resolution of contentious issues regarding distribution of legislative powers by the courts, 'Principle of Federal Supremacy' and 'Harmonious Construction' have emerged. Explain.

GS II · 2019 · Federal Structure and Devolution

Revision summary

Legislative disputes are resolved by pith and substance, colourable-legislation tests, and repugnancy analysis.

Harmonious construction reads Union and State entries so both retain meaning.

If both cannot be obeyed, [Article 254](#) makes the Union Concurrent law prevail.

[Article 254\(2\)](#) is a limited, President-assented exception until Parliament occupies the field again.

Federal supremacy is the residual rule after harmony fails, not the first strike against every State statute.

Introduction

[Articles 245 and 246](#) and the three Lists in the [Seventh Schedule](#) divide law-making between the Union and the States. When two laws or two entries appear to clash, the Supreme Court has not always struck one down at once. It first tries to let both live (harmonious construction). If a real conflict remains, Union law prevails (federal supremacy), especially under [Article 254](#) on the Concurrent List.

Body

How courts resolve legislative conflict

- Pith and substance looks at the true subject of a statute, so a State law is not void merely because it has some incidental Union effect.
- Colourable legislation asks whether the legislature has done indirectly what the List forbids directly.
- Occupied field and repugnancy tests apply when Union and State both legislate on a Concurrent entry.
- These tools came out of cases such as *In re C.P. and Berar Motor Spirit*, [State of Bombay v. F.N. Balsara](#), and later [Hoechst Pharmaceuticals and State of West Bengal v. Union of India](#).

Harmonious construction of entries

- Harmonious construction means reading two entries or two statutes so that both have meaning, rather than destroying one by a wide reading of the other.
- **Union and State lists are construed to avoid overlap:** a State tax entry is not stretched to cover a Union duty, and a Union entry is not stretched to empty a State field.
- On the Concurrent List, courts ask whether obedience to both laws is possible; if it is, there is no repugnancy and both operate.
- The method protects the federal bargain in the [Seventh Schedule](#) and matches the idea that federalism is part of the basic structure after *Kesavananda Bharati* and *S.R. Bommai*.
- Harmonious reading is the first duty; supremacy is the residual rule when harmony fails.

Principle of federal supremacy

- **Article 246(1)** gives Parliament exclusive power on the Union List; in a direct clash with a State law on that occupied Union field, the Union law stands.
- **Article 254(1)** says that if a State law on a Concurrent subject is repugnant to a Union law, the Union law prevails, and the State law is void to the extent of repugnancy.
- **Article 254(2)** allows a reserved State law to operate in that State if the President has assented, until Parliament legislates again - a controlled exception, not a denial of supremacy.
- Federal supremacy here is supremacy of the Constitution's allocation, usually in favour of the Union when conflict is irreconcilable, not a political claim that States have no lists.
- **Later Goods and Services Tax amendments show the same logic:** once a Union-and-State scheme occupies a tax field by constitutional text, State power is read in harmony with that text, not against it.

Short way forward

- Use pith and substance and harmony first, so cooperative federalism is not killed by a mechanical Union veto.
- Keep **Article 254(2)** and Inter-State Council consultation for genuine Concurrent experiments.

Flow diagram

Seventh Schedule Arts 245-246 -> Harmonious construction
Harmonious construction -> Both laws can operate
Harmonious construction -> Irreconcilable clash
Irreconcilable clash -> Federal supremacy Art 254
Federal supremacy Art 254 -> Union law prevails to that extent

Conclusion

Courts first apply harmonious construction so that Union and State entries both survive. If a true conflict remains, the Principle of Federal Supremacy - **Articles 246 and 254** - gives the Union law the last word to the extent of repugnancy, which is how the distribution of legislative powers is kept workable.

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Q5 · 10 marks

What can France learn from the Indian Constitution's approach to secularism?

GS II · 2019 · Indian Constitution

Revision summary

Articles 25 to 28, 15, 16, 27 and 30 frame Indian secularism as liberty plus non-discrimination plus minority schools.

Article 25(2) lets the State reform secular aspects of religion.

S.R. Bommai made secularism a basic feature of the Constitution.

France can learn accommodation, minority education and reform for equality, not hostility to visible faith.

India's communal violence is a caution, not a model to export.

Introduction

French laïcité grew from a republican fight to keep the Catholic Church out of the public school and the State. Indian secularism grew from a multi-religious society that needed both freedom of faith and a State able to reform and to protect. France can learn from that positive, equal-distance model without copying India's communal failures.

Body

Indian constitutional secularism

- Articles 25 to 28 guarantee freedom of conscience and religion, including the right to manage religious affairs, subject to public order, morality, health, and other fundamental rights.
- Article 15 and Article 16 bar religion-based discrimination by the State in public life and public employment; Article 27 bars a tax solely to promote a particular religion.
- Article 30 protects minority educational institutions, which is an accommodation France's strict school-neutrality model often refuses.
- The State may regulate economic, financial, and secular activity associated with religion (Article 25(2)), which allowed Hindu-law reform and later debates on a Uniform Civil Code under Article 44.
- S.R. Bommai v. Union of India (1994) held that secularism is part of the basic structure; religion cannot be the official basis of State power.
- Indian practice is often called **principled distance**: the State can help a pilgrimage, run a waqf or a temple board, and still claim not to establish a church.

What France can learn

- France can learn that public peace in a diverse society may need visible religious liberty in schools and streets, not only a ban on signs, as in the 2004 and 2010 French laws on conspicuous symbols and face covering.
- It can learn minority-institution space of the Article 30 type, so religious and linguistic groups educate without being treated as enemies of the Republic.
- It can learn that a secular State may still reform religious personal law in the name of equality, as India did in Hindu law, instead of leaving inequality untouched in the name of non-interference.

- It can learn Bommai's rule that parties and governments must not make religion the test of citizenship, which is a lesson against both communal majoritarianism and against treating one immigrant faith as a security class.
- It can learn festival accommodation and optional religious instruction in the Indian public culture, which reduces the feeling that the Republic is at war with believers.

What France need not copy

- India has communal riots, politicised personal-law fights, and uneven reform of non-Hindu codes; those are warnings, not exports.
- Kesavananda protects secularism as basic structure; the lesson is constitutional lock-in of equal citizenship, not a licence for vote-bank bargains.
- The way forward for a French reader is principled distance plus gender equality, not either hostile *laïcité* or uncritical Indian practice.

Flow diagram

Indian secularism Arts 25-28 -> Principled distance
Principled distance -> Freedom and reform Art 25-2
Principled distance -> Minority institutions Art 30
Principled distance -> Bommai basic structure
Freedom and reform Art 25-2 -> Lessons for French *laïcité*
Minority institutions Art 30 -> Lessons for French *laïcité*

Conclusion

The Indian Constitution treats secularism as equal religious liberty, non-discrimination, and a State that may both reform and accommodate. France can learn that model of principled distance and minority education, while keeping its own republican equality and avoiding India's communal wounds.

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Q6 · 10 marks

Despite Consistent experience of High growth, India still goes with the lowest indicators of human development. Examine the issues that make balanced and inclusive development elusive.

GS II · 2019 · Governance and Policy

Revision summary

Post-1991 growth raised averages more than health, learning and equality.

HDI lags because public health and education spends stayed thin.

Informal jobs, gender gaps, caste and regional skew stop inclusion.

NHM, RTE, NFSA and MGNREGA are the conversion tools that were under-used as growth policy.

District outcome scorecards can make balanced development a measured target, not a slogan.

Introduction

India's national income rose fast after 1991, yet United Nations Human Development Index ranks stayed low because income is only one of three HDI limbs. Health, schooling, nutrition, and equality did not rise at the same speed. Balanced and inclusive development remains elusive where growth is job-poor, regionally skewed, and weakly converted into public services.

Body

The growth and HDI gap

- High GDP growth can sit beside stunting, anaemia, learning poverty, and a large informal workforce, which is why HDI, National Family Health Survey, and Annual Status of Education Report numbers lag headline growth.
- Public spending on health and education stayed far below the needs set by the National Health Policy and later the National Education Policy target of 6 per cent of GDP.
- Female labour-force participation stayed weak, so half the population did not share growth through wages.

Issues that block balance and inclusion

- **Jobless or informal growth:** manufacturing and organised services did not absorb the workforce leaving farms, so Gini and consumption gaps widened even when averages rose.
- **Health and nutrition:** the National Health Mission improved rural facilities, yet specialist gaps, out-of-pocket costs, and poor sanitation kept life-expectancy and child-nutrition gains slow.
- **Schooling without learning:** the Right of Children to **Free and Compulsory Education Act, 2009**, raised enrolment; grade-level reading and maths did not follow in many States.
- **Social identity:** caste, tribe, disability, and minority location still shape access to land, credit, and public jobs, so growth at the top does not trickle as inclusion.
- **Regional and rural-urban skew:** coastal and metro districts captured investment; rain-fed and forest districts stayed on MGNREGA and distress migration.
- **Environmental and agrarian stress:** farm incomes lagged, which is why NFSA grain and MGNREGA wages remain the real safety net rather than a shared growth story.

What would make development less elusive

- Fund the National Health Mission and primary care so growth is not eaten by medical bills.
- Deliver foundational literacy under **Samagra Shiksha and the RTE Act**, not only school buildings.
- Use MGNREGA, NFSA, and a tighter PM-KISAN-credit net as floors, while industrial policy and skilling create the next rung of work.
- Publish district HDI-type scorecards and tie **Finance Commission** and **NITI Aayog** incentives to nutrition, learning, and female work, not only to GSDP growth.

Short way forward

- **Treat human development as the test of growth:** jobs, NHM, NFSA nutrition, and RTE learning must move with GDP, or inclusion will stay elusive.

Flow diagram

High GDP growth -> Weak conversion
Weak conversion -> Thin NHM and nutrition
Weak conversion -> Enrolment not learning
Weak conversion -> Informal jobless pattern
Thin NHM and nutrition -> Low HDI inclusion
Enrolment not learning -> Low HDI inclusion
Informal jobless pattern -> Low HDI inclusion

Conclusion

High growth did not automatically raise human-development indicators because jobs, health, learning, gender, and regions did not share that growth. Balanced development becomes possible only when NHM, RTE schooling, NFSA, and MGNREGA, plus decent work, are funded as core economic policy, not as leftover welfare.

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Q7 · 10 marks

There is a growing divergence in the relationship between poverty and hunger in India. The shrinking of social expenditure by the government is forcing the poor to spend more on Non-Food essential items squeezing their food - budget.- Elucidate.

GS II · 2019 · Poverty and Hunger

Revision summary

Headcount poverty can fall while stunting, anaemia and calorie quality stay poor.

That is the poverty-hunger divergence.

Thin public health and schooling force private non-food spending.

Food is the residual head, so hunger survives a better poverty line.

NFSA, NHM, RTE meals, ICDS and MGNREGA must rise in real terms to protect the food budget.

Introduction

Income poverty lines can fall while hunger and undernutrition stay high. That divergence appears when households earn a little more, or receive a little more cash, but must spend it on health, schooling, housing, fuel, and transport because the State has stepped back. The food share of the budget then shrinks even if the stomach is not full.

Body

Divergence of poverty and hunger

- Official poverty ratios declined over the 2000s and 2010s on Tendulkar and later estimates, yet National Family Health Survey rounds still showed high stunting, wasting, and anaemia.
- Global Hunger Index-type measures, calorie-intake puzzles in National Sample Survey data, and hidden hunger of protein and micronutrients can worsen even when the headcount ratio improves.
- A household may cross a money poverty line after a construction wage or a transfer, and still skip meals, which is why poverty and hunger are related but no longer move as one line.

Shrinking social expenditure and non-food squeeze

- When public clinics, the National Health Mission's last mile, and insurance coverage are thin, out-of-pocket medicine and private hospitals take the first rupees after rent.
- When neighbourhood schools under the RTE Act are weak, fees, coaching, and transport become non-food essentials that compete with grain and milk.
- Fuel, urban rent, and water tanker costs rose faster than many poor budgets; if subsidies and public provision shrink, these heads are inelastic and food becomes the residual.
- Rural households then rely more on the **National Food Security Act, 2013**, PDS, midday meals, and ICDS; if those leak or shrink in real per-person terms, hunger persists beside a better poverty statistic.
- MGNREGA delays or capped person-days cut the cash that would have bought vegetables and pulses after PDS rice and wheat.

Why the food budget yields

- Food can be stretched by cheaper calories; a hospital bill or a school fee cannot. That is the squeeze the question names.
- Women's unpaid care and intra-household inequality mean children and women absorb the hunger first, which NFHS anaemia numbers record.

Short way forward

- Protect and raise real social expenditure on NHM primary care, RTE quality, and PDS-NFSA nutrition, including pulses and millets, so non-food essentials are not privatised onto the poor.
- Keep MGNREGA as timely wage, and treat school meals and ICDS as hunger policy, not as optional welfare.
- Measure success by NFHS nutrition and dietary diversity, not only by a lower poverty headcount.

Flow diagram

Falling money poverty -> Divergence
Thin social expenditure -> Health school rent fuel
Health school rent fuel -> Squeezed food budget
Squeezed food budget -> Persistent hunger NFHS
Divergence -> Persistent hunger NFHS

Conclusion

Poverty and hunger diverge when money poverty falls but public health, schooling, and utilities do not. Shrinking social expenditure pushes the poor toward private non-food bills, and the food budget is what gives way. NFSA, NHM, RTE meals, and MGNREGA are the instruments that can close that gap.

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Q8 · 10 marks

Implementation of information and Communication Technology (ICT) based Projects / Programmes usually suffers in terms of certain vital factors. Identify these factors, and suggest measures for their effective implementation.

GS II · 2019 · Governance and Policy

Revision summary

ICT projects fail on last-mile access, language, unreformed files, silos, weak staff, vendor lock-in and poor privacy.

Counting portals is not the same as a delivered service.

Re-engineer process first, then code.

Use CSC, local language, DBT exception paths and statutory fallbacks for NFSA and MGNREGA.

Audit vendors and measure time-to-service and exclusion, not downloads.

Introduction

Information and Communication Technology can speed services, payments, and records, as **Digital India**, Common Service Centres, and Direct Benefit Transfer have shown. Projects still fail when the machine is put before the process, when the last mile is dark, and when the citizen cannot read the screen. Effective implementation treats those vital factors as design conditions, not as later complaints.

Body

Vital factors that cause failure

- Last-mile connectivity, electricity, and device access remain weak in many blocks, so a portal is not a service for the intended user.
- Language, literacy, disability, and gender gaps recreate a kiosk middleman; the **Second Administrative Reforms Commission** warned that e-governance without inclusion becomes a new queue.
- **Process is not re-engineered:** paper files are scanned without changing approvals, so delay is digitised.
- Inter-department silos, unmatched data, and no unique process owner split one citizen life across unlinked databases.
- Capacity of Block and municipal staff is thin; vendors then run the project and lock the government in.
- Privacy, consent, and cyber security are afterthoughts, so leaks and downtime destroy trust.
- Monitoring counts logins and camps, not reduced visits, speaking orders, or grievance closure; political launch outruns maintenance budgets.

Measures for effective implementation

- Design offline and assisted modes through Common Service Centres and BharatNet, with local-language interfaces, before making a scheme app-only.
- Re-engineer the approval chain first, then write software, as the National e-Governance Plan and later **Digital India** mission mode projects were meant to do.

- Use the Jan Dhan-Aadhaar-mobile rail for payments only with a recorded exception path, so exclusion errors can be corrected the way DBT circulars already allow in principle.
- Name a process owner, publish service standards, and audit vendors; do not treat ICT as a one-time capital scheme.
- Train local staff and para-operators; pay for operations, not only for launch hardware.
- Keep a paper or token fallback for entitlements under NFSA, MGNREGA, and pensions, so a server outage does not cancel a statutory right.
- Log access to personal data, disclose the rule and the fee on the same screen, and measure success by time-to-service and appeals allowed, not by app downloads.

Short way forward

- Fund connectivity and literacy as part of the project cost, bind vendors to open standards, and put every ICT mission under a public dashboard of exclusion and downtime.

Flow diagram

Vital failure factors -> Access language process
 Vital failure factors -> Silos vendors no privacy
 Re-engineer then software -> CSC BharatNet DBT
 Re-engineer then software -> Owner audit fallback
 CSC BharatNet DBT -> Effective ICT service
 Owner audit fallback -> Effective ICT service

Conclusion

ICT programmes suffer on access, language, unreformed process, silos, staff capacity, privacy, and vanity monitoring. They work when **Digital India** tools follow a redesigned service, an assisted last mile, and a legal fallback so that NFSA or MGNREGA rights do not depend on a live server alone.

Open WRAP page — <https://wrapexams.com/upsc/mains-answers/gs-2/2019/implementation-of-information-and-communication-technology-ict-based-projects-programmes-usually-suffers-in-terms-of-certain-vital-factors-identify-these-factors-and-suggest-measures-for-their-effective-implementation/>

Q9 · 10 marks

'The time has come for India and Japan to build a strong contemporary relationship, one involving global and strategic partnership that will have a great significance for Asia and the world as a whole.' Comment.

GS II · 2019 · Governance and Policy

Revision summary

The quote matches the later Special Strategic and Global Partnership.

Japan's capital and technology meet India's infrastructure and market scale.

Maritime security and the Quad give the pair Asian and global weight.

Quality infrastructure is an alternative connectivity offer for Africa and ASEAN.

Delivery of rail and defence files is the test that joint statements still owe.

Introduction

The quoted line set the tone for a relationship that moved from aid and nostalgia to a Special Strategic and Global Partnership. India and Japan are two Asian democracies with complementary economies, a shared interest in a free Indo-Pacific, and no serious bilateral territorial dispute. A comment that is fair must show both the strategic logic and the slow delivery of projects.

Body

Why a strong contemporary relationship

- Japan's official development assistance, technology, and quality infrastructure meet India's need for capital in railways, metros, industrial corridors, and the Mumbai-Ahmedabad high-speed rail project.
- India offers Japan a large market, a young workforce, and a strategic partner that is not a US ally in treaty form but is willing to balance in Asia.
- Defence and security talks, including 2+2 dialogue, maritime exercises, and later logistics support, turn the relationship from commerce into strategy.
- People-to-people ties, Japanese language, and skill internships support a contemporary bond that older Colombo Plan images cannot carry.

Significance for Asia and world

- A stable India-Japan pair supports a multipolar Asia against any single-power maritime dominance in the Indian Ocean and the East China Sea, which is why both join the Quad with Australia and the United States.
- Quality infrastructure and the Asia-Africa Growth Corridor idea offer an alternative style of connectivity to debt-heavy models, which matters for ASEAN, Africa, and the Pacific islands.
- Cooperation on UN Security Council reform, climate technology, and resilient supply chains (including later semiconductor and critical-minerals talk) is a global public good, not only a bilateral file.
- Nuclear-energy cooperation after India's civil nuclear understandings with Japan, and alignment on a rules-based trade order, widen the partnership beyond Asia's shoreline.

Limits a comment must record

- Project delays, India's procurement pace, and Japan's caution on defence exports still cap the headline.
- Neither country will fight the other's wars; the partnership is diplomatic, economic, and maritime, not a NATO-type alliance.
- China is the unspoken third party; the relationship is strongest when it is for something (connectivity, law of the sea) and not only against someone.

Short way forward

- Finish flagship rail and corridor projects on time, deepen maritime domain awareness, and keep Quad and ASEAN-centred forums in step so the 2006-14 vision becomes daily strategy.

Flow diagram

Quoted contemporary relationship -> Special Strategic Global Partnership
Special Strategic Global Partnership -> ODA rail technology
Special Strategic Global Partnership -> Maritime Quad Indo-Pacific
ODA rail technology -> Significance for Asia and world
Maritime Quad Indo-Pacific -> Significance for Asia and world
Significance for Asia and world -> Rules-based multipolar order

Conclusion

- **The statement is sound:** India and Japan need a contemporary strategic and global partnership, not a narrow aid tie. For Asia and the world that partnership supports a free Indo-Pacific, quality infrastructure, and democratic balancing - if projects and defence talk catch up with the joint statements.

Open WRAP page — <https://wrapexams.com/upsc/mains-answers/gs-2/2019/the-time-has-come-for-india-and-japan-to-build-a-strong-contemporary-relationship-one-involving-global-and-strategic-partnership-that-will-have-a-great-significance-for-asia-and-the-world-as-a-whole-comment/>

Q10 · 10 marks

'Too little cash, too much politics, leaves UNESCO fighting for life.' Discuss the statement in the light of US' withdrawal and its accusation of the cultural body as being 'anti-Israel bias'

GS II · 2019 · India and its Neighbourhood

Revision summary

UNESCO depends on assessed contributions; the US share was critical.

After Palestine's 2011 membership, Washington froze funds and left in 2018 with Israel.

Too little cash followed too much Israel-Palestine politics in a cultural forum.

The anti-Israel-bias charge pointed to real drafting fights, but withdrawal also hit education and heritage.

Survival needs a wider funding base and a tighter technical mandate.

Introduction

UNESCO is the United Nations' cultural, education, and heritage body. It lives on assessed contributions and on a reputation for technical work. When the largest payer walks out, and when votes on Palestine and Israel dominate headlines, both the cash problem and the politics problem become the same crisis.

Body**Too little cash**

- The United States had long been among UNESCO's biggest assessed contributors; Washington froze funds after UNESCO admitted Palestine as a member in 2011, and then gave notice of withdrawal that took effect in 2018, with Israel also leaving.
- Loss of that share, plus earlier arrears, cut programmes in literacy, World Heritage, ocean science, and press-freedom monitoring.
- Other members did not fully replace the hole; extra-budgetary projects then follow donor politics, which is still a cash problem with a political face.
- A specialised agency that cannot pay field offices or heritage missions is, in that sense, fighting for life.

Too much politics and the anti-Israel charge

- UNESCO's Executive Board and General Conference became a second stage for Israel-Palestine disputes: occupied-territory language, Jerusalem heritage files, and resolutions that Israel and the United States read as denying Jewish historical ties.
- The US accusation of anti-Israel bias was the public reason for leaving; critics of that exit said the United States was punishing a majority vote rather than reforming procedure.
- **Politicisation is older than one file:** Cold War media debates, and later culture-war votes, also pulled UNESCO off classrooms and conservation.
- When a cultural body issues territorial-sounding texts, losers call it bias and freeze cheques; that is the loop the statement names.

A balanced discussion

- Some resolutions were one-sided in drafting; that is a real governance failure, not only an American talking point.

- Walking out also weakens US influence inside the house and hurts apolitical work on girls' education and illicit trafficking of artefacts.
- India remained a member and has used UNESCO for heritage listings and education coordination; the lesson is to stay, pay, and argue, rather than to empty the till.
- The later US debate on rejoining shows that cash and politics are reversible if members ring-fence technical votes from capital-by-capital conflict.

Short way forward

- Protect World Heritage and education votes from bloc amendments where possible, publish drafting history, and widen the contributor base so one walkout cannot starve the agency.
- Keep Israel-Palestine issues in the political UN organs that own peace files, and let UNESCO staff run schools, science, and sites.

Flow diagram

Palestine membership 2011 -> US funding freeze
US funding freeze -> US Israel withdrawal 2018
US Israel withdrawal 2018 -> Too little cash
Israel-Palestine resolutions -> Bias accusation
Bias accusation -> US Israel withdrawal 2018
Too little cash -> Programmes at risk

Conclusion

UNESCO was fighting for life because the US withdrawal removed cash after a political clash over Israel and Palestine. The bias charge had a basis in heated resolutions, but exit punished literacy and heritage too. The agency survives if members fund it and put culture back above campus geopolitics.

Open WRAP page — <https://wrapexams.com/upsc/mains-answers/gs-2/2019/too-little-cash-too-much-politics-leaves-unesco-fighting-for-life-discuss-the-statement-in-the-light-of-us-withdrawal-and-its-accusation-of-the-cultural-body-as-being-anti-israel-bias/>

Q11 · 15 marks

On what grounds a people's representative can be disqualified under the Representation of People Act, 1951? Also mention the remedies available to such person against his disqualification.(15).

GS II · 2019 · Governance and Policy

Revision summary

Articles 102 and 191 plus the Representation of the People Act, 1951, set the disqualification regime for MPs and MLAs.

Section 8 (conviction), 8A (corrupt practice), 9, 9A, 10 and 10A are the main statutory grounds.

Lily Thomas (2013) struck down Section 8(4); sitting members are no longer shielded for three months after conviction.

The Tenth Schedule and office of profit sit beside the 1951 Act, not inside Section 8.

Remedies are stay of conviction, Section 116A appeals, writs, and limited review of Speaker or Presidential decisions.

Introduction

A people's representative - a Member of Parliament or of a State legislature - holds office under the Constitution and under the Representation of the People Act, 1951. Disqualification is the statutory and constitutional method of keeping that office free of crime, corrupt practice, and conflicting interest. The 1951 Act lists several grounds; Articles 102 and 191 and the Tenth Schedule add others; Lily Thomas v. Union of India (2013) closed a sitting-member shield. Remedies exist, but they are appeals, stays, and review, not a second election by default.

Body

Constitutional frame that the 1951 Act fills

- Article 102 (Parliament) and Article 191 (State legislatures) disqualify a person who holds an office of profit, is of unsound mind, is an undischarged insolvent, is not a citizen, or is disqualified by or under any law made by Parliament.
- The Representation of the People Act, 1951, is that law for most electoral bars; the Tenth Schedule (anti-defection) is a separate constitutional bar under Articles 102(2) and 191(2).
- Election Commission of India, under Article 324 and the 1951 Act, conducts polls and also decides some disqualifications (notably Section 10A). The President or Governor, with the Election Commission's opinion, decides office-of-profit and allied constitutional questions (Articles 103 and 192).

Grounds under the Representation of the People Act, 1951

- Section 8 disqualifies a person convicted of specified offences (including the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, certain Indian Penal Code offences, and other listed statutes) if the sentence meets the Act's thresholds; for many serious offences even a sentence of two years or more attracts a six-year bar after release.
- Lily Thomas v. Union of India (2013) struck down Section 8(4), which had allowed a sitting member three months to appeal before the disqualification took effect; conviction now operates

at once for sitting and aspiring members alike.

- **Section 8A** disqualifies a person found guilty of a corrupt practice in an election petition; the President decides the period, on the **Election Commission's** opinion.
- **Section 9** disqualifies a person dismissed from government service for corruption or disloyalty.
- **Section 9A** disqualifies a person with a subsisting government contract for goods or works in the course of trade or business.
- **Section 10** disqualifies a person who is a managing agent, manager or secretary of a company or corporation in which the government holds a prescribed share.
- **Section 10A** disqualifies a person who fails to lodge the account of election expenses within time and in the manner required, unless the **Election Commission** is satisfied that the failure was for good reason.
- **Related bars that often travel with the 1951 Act in answers:** **Section 11A (disqualification for certain corrupt practices and for conviction for promoting enmity)**, and the constitutional office-of-profit and defection grounds that a representative actually faces in office.

What the Act does not do by itself

- Undertrial detention is not a **Section 8** conviction. After the Supreme Court's 2013 custody-and-vote line, Parliament amended the 1951 Act so that a person in custody is not, for that reason alone, barred from contesting; conviction remains the hard statutory line.
- Party whip and defection are **Tenth Schedule** questions for the Speaker or Chair, not **Section 8** questions, though both empty a seat.

Remedies against disqualification

- **Against a criminal conviction:** appeal to the Sessions Court, High Court or Supreme Court as the criminal procedure allows; a stay of conviction (not merely of sentence) is what keeps the seat, after Lily Thomas, until the appellate court says otherwise.
- **Against an election-petition finding of corrupt practice:** appeal to the Supreme Court under **Section 116A** of the 1951 Act from the High Court's order on the petition.
- **Against an Election Commission order under Section 10A:** writ jurisdiction of the High Court under **Article 226**, and further appeal as the Constitution allows.
- **Against a Presidential or gubernatorial decision under Articles 103 and 192:** the opinion of the **Election Commission** is the statutory process; courts have reviewed the decision on limited grounds of mala fides, patent error, or violation of natural justice (as in office-of-profit litigation).
- **Against a Tenth Schedule ruling:** judicial review after **Kihoto Hollohan v. Zachillhu (1992)**, which treated the Speaker's order as a tribunal order subject to review.
- A disqualified person may also seek a fresh electoral mandate only after the statutory bar expires or is lifted; there is no automatic restoration of the vacated seat.

Flow diagram

RPA 1951 1951 -> Sec 8 conviction
RPA 1951 -> Sec 8A corrupt practice
RPA 1951 -> Secs 9 9A 10 10A
Lily Thomas 2013 -> Sec 8 conviction
Sec 8 conviction -> Stay of conviction appeal
Sec 8A corrupt practice -> Sec 116A SC appeal
Secs 9 9A 10 10A -> Art 226 writ

Conclusion

The 1951 Act disqualifies a people's representative for conviction, corrupt practice, dismissal for corruption, government contract, specified company office, and failure to file election expenses, sitting beside **Articles 102, 191** and the **Tenth Schedule**. Lily Thomas made conviction bite at once. Remedies are stay of conviction, election-petition appeal under **Section 116A**, writs against the **Election Commission**, and review of Speaker or Presidential decisions - not a right to remain in the House while the bar stands.

Open WRAP page — <https://wrapexams.com/upsc/mains-answers/gs-2/2019/on-what-grounds-a-peoples-representative-can-be-disqualified-under-the-representation-of-people-act-1951-also-mention-the-remedies-available-to-such-person-against-his-disqualification-15/>

Q12 · 15 marks

"Parliament's power to amend the Constitution is a limited power and it cannot be enlarged into absolute power." In the light of this statement explain whether Parliament under Article 368 of the Constitution can destroy the Basic Structure of the Constitution by expanding its amending power?(15).

GS II · 2019 · Parliament and State Legislatures

Revision summary

Article 368 is a conferred, procedural amending power, not an extra-constitutional sovereign.

Kesavananda Bharati (1973) held that Parliament cannot damage or destroy the basic structure.

Minerva Mills (1980) struck down Forty-second Amendment clauses that tried to make amending power unlimited and non-justiciable.

Limited amending power is itself part of the basic structure, so **Article 368** cannot bootstrap itself into absolute power.

Judicial review, democracy, secularism and federalism remain beyond destructive amendment.

Introduction

Article 368 is the amending clause, not a licence to write a new **Constitution**. **Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala (1973)** held that the power is limited by the Constitution's basic structure. Expanding **Article 368** itself - as the Forty-second Amendment tried to do - cannot lawfully destroy that structure, because a limited power cannot, by using itself, become unlimited.

Body

What **Article 368** confers

- **Article 368 sets the procedure for constitutional amendment:** special majority, and ratification by half the States for specified federal provisions.
- It is a constituent power in the sense that it changes the Constitution, but it is still a power conferred by the Constitution, not a power that stands above it.
- **I.C. Golaknath v. State of Punjab (1967)** had treated amendments as "law" under **Article 13** and frozen fundamental rights; the Twenty-fourth Amendment restored Parliament's express power to amend Part III. Kesavananda accepted the restoring of amending power and then limited its reach.

The basic-structure limit

- The thirteen-judge Bench in Kesavananda held that Parliament cannot alter the basic structure or framework of the Constitution.
- Illustrative features later named in the case law include supremacy of the Constitution, republican and democratic form, secularism, separation of powers, federalism, judicial review, and the essence of fundamental rights.
- **Minerva Mills Ltd. v. Union of India (1980)** struck down the Forty-second Amendment's attempt to give Directive Principles an unlimited trump over fundamental rights and to insert **Section 4** and **Section 55** language that made amending power total; the Court held that limited

amending power is itself part of the basic structure.

- **Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Raj Narain (1975)** applied basic structure to a validation-and-election clause; later **I.R. Coelho v. State of Tamil Nadu (2007)** held that even **Ninth Schedule** laws after 24 April 1973 are open to basic-structure review.

Can expansion of **Article 368** destroy basic structure?

- The Forty-second Amendment inserted clauses in **Article 368** claiming that there shall be no limitation on the constituent power and that an amendment shall not be called in question in any court. **Minerva Mills** held those clauses void.
- A power that is limited cannot enlarge itself into an absolute power by amending the clause that confers it: that would be bootstrap, which the Court rejected.
- **Waman Rao, L. Chandra Kumar (1997)** on judicial review of tribunals, and later benches, treated judicial review as a basic feature that **Article 368** cannot take away by a clever rewording of the amending article.
- Parliament can still amend widely - including Part III, the **Seventh Schedule**, and the amending procedure itself - so long as identity features survive. Destruction is the prohibited act, not every large reform (for example the Goods and Services Tax amendments, or the 73rd and 74th Amendments, were not treated as destroying the structure).

The statement in one line

- **The quoted statement is the law after Kesavananda and Minerva Mills: Article 368** is limited; it cannot be enlarged into absolute power; therefore Parliament cannot destroy the basic structure by expanding its amending power.

Flow diagram

Article 368 amending power -> Kesavananda basic structure
Kesavananda basic structure -> Minerva Mills limited power is basic
42nd Amendment absolute clause -> Minerva Mills limited power is basic
Minerva Mills limited power is basic -> Cannot destroy structure by expanding 368

Conclusion

Parliament under **Article 368** cannot destroy the basic structure by expanding that Article. Kesavananda imposed the limit; Minerva Mills held that limited amending power is itself a basic feature and struck down the Forty-second Amendment's attempt to make **Article 368** unquestionable. Expansion of the clause cannot lawfully swallow the Constitution that created it.

Open WRAP page — <https://wrapexams.com/upsc/mains-answers/gs-2/2019/parliaments-power-to-amend-the-constitution-is-a-limited-power-and-it-cannot-be-enlarged-into-absolute-power-in-the-light-of-this-statement-explain-whether-parliament-under-article-368-of-the-constitution-can-destroy-the/>

Q13 · 15 marks

"The reservation of seats for women in the institutions of local self- government has had a limited impact on the patriarchal character of the Indian Political Process." Comment.(15).

GS II · 2019 · Governance and Policy

Revision summary

The 73rd and 74th Amendments reserve at least one-third of local seats and chairperson offices for women.

Presence and some local agenda change are real; millions of women have held office.

Patriarchy continues through proxy sarpanch-pati practice, party nomination, finance and violence.

In 2019 there was still no constitutional reservation in Assemblies and the Lok Sabha, so the pipeline stopped at the third tier.

The comment is true as a limit on the political process, not as a verdict that local reservation was pointless.

Introduction

Articles 243D and 243T reserve not less than one-third of seats, and of offices of chairpersons, for women in Panchayats and municipalities, including seats within the Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe quotas. That is the largest affirmative political experiment in the world. The patriarchal character of the Indian political process - party tickets, money, violence, and the household as the real office - has only partly bent. The statement is therefore largely true, with important local exceptions.

Body

What reservation did change

- The 73rd and 74th Constitutional Amendments, 1992, created a constitutional third tier and a guaranteed presence of women in gram panchayats, panchayat samitis, zila parishads, and urban local bodies.
- Many States later raised the reservation to 50 per cent. Millions of women have been elected; a first generation of sarpanches and councillors now exists who would not have received a party ticket for the Assembly.
- **Presence has shifted some agendas:** drinking water, anganwadis, toilets, and school attendance appear more often where women sit, which the Ministry of Panchayati Raj and several State studies have recorded.
- Rotation of reserved seats, though disruptive, forced parties to find women candidates rather than recycle only male incumbents in those wards.

Why the impact on patriarchy remains limited

- **Sarpanch-pati and proxy chairpersons remain common:** the husband or a male kin attends the block office, signs, and bargains, while the elected woman is the name on the form. This is patriarchy using the reserved seat, not yielding it.
- Political process above the third tier is still male-dominated. In 2019 the Lok Sabha and most Assemblies had no constitutional women's reservation; the Women's Reservation Bill (then the 108th Amendment proposal) had not become law. Local reservation therefore did not

automatically become a pipeline into State and national law-making.

- Parties control nomination, campaign finance, and booth violence. Reservation at the ward does not rewrite those gates; it often parks women in the reserved seat and keeps general seats for men.
- **Caste and class cut the category "women"**: a reserved woman chairperson may still face dominant-caste panchas, or may herself reproduce caste exclusion.
- Training, mobility, and safety are thin. Without childcare, transport, and protection against booth-level intimidation, formal office does not become effective office.
- Rotation can prevent a woman from building a second-term record, which patriarchy then cites as "inexperience".

Committees and the unfinished political process

- The Balwantrai Mehta (1957) and **Ashok Mehta (1978)** committee lineage argued for democratic local bodies; the 73rd Amendment wrote gender into that design.
- The **National Commission** for Women and several State commissions have documented proxy representation and demanded training and two-child-norm reviews that otherwise hit women harder.
- The statement is a comment on the political process as a whole - parties, legislatures, campaigns - not only on the gram sabha. Local reservation changed the third tier more than it changed that whole process.

A fair comment

- Agree that impact is limited if the test is patriarchy in parties and Assemblies.
- **Do not agree that reservation failed**: presence, some issue-shift, and a leadership pool are real. The limit is design (rotation, no Assembly reservation in 2019) and social structure, not the constitutional idea of **Articles 243D and 243T**.

Flow diagram

Arts 243D 243T -> Women in local bodies
 Women in local bodies -> Some agenda shift
 Women in local bodies -> Sarpanch-pati proxies
 Party tickets money tickets money -> Limited effect on patriarchy
 Sarpanch-pati proxies -> Limited effect on patriarchy
 No Assembly reservation 2019 -> Limited effect on patriarchy

Conclusion

Women's reservation in local self-government created presence and a leadership school, but sarpanch-pati, party gatekeeping, and the absence in 2019 of Assembly and Lok Sabha reservation kept the wider political process patriarchal. The statement is a fair comment on limited impact, not a case for repealing **Articles 243D and 243T**.

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Q14 · 15 marks

"The Attorney-General is the chief legal adviser and lawyer of the Government of India." Discuss.(15).

GS II · 2019 · Governance and Policy

Revision summary

Article 76 creates the Attorney-General as the Union's highest law officer, qualified to be a Supreme Court judge.

The office advises the government and represents it in major litigation; **Article 88** gives a voice in Parliament without a vote.

Tenure is during the President's pleasure; private practice is allowed subject to no conflict with the Union.

The Solicitor-General and Additional Solicitors-General share court work; Advocates-General serve States under **Article 165**.

The quoted statement is right on function and incomplete on independence, tenure and the duty to the Court.

Introduction

- **Article 76 of the Constitution creates the Attorney-General for India:** the Union's highest law officer, appointed by the President, qualified to be a Supreme Court judge. The quoted statement is accurate as a description of function. It is incomplete as a description of status, because the Attorney-General is not a minister, not a full-time government servant in the ordinary sense, and not the government's only lawyer.

Body

Constitutional office and advice

- **Article 76(2)** requires the Attorney-General to give advice on legal matters referred by the President, and to perform other legal duties that the President assigns, and to discharge functions conferred by the Constitution or any other law.
- In practice the reference comes through the Union government; the Attorney-General is therefore the chief legal adviser of the Government of India, not a personal counsel of the President in a political sense.
- **Article 88** gives the Attorney-General the right to speak and to take part in the proceedings of either House, a joint sitting, and any parliamentary committee of which he may be named a member, but without a vote. That is how the government's lawyer enters the legislature without becoming a member.

The government's lawyer in court

- The Attorney-General appears for the Union in the Supreme Court and in High Courts in cases of constitutional importance; the office is the Union's first brief when the Republic is a party.
- The Solicitor-General and Additional Solicitors-General, created by executive arrangement rather than by **Article 76**, share the litigation load. The Law Officers (Conditions of Service) Rules and the Allocation of Business Rules locate them in the Department of Legal Affairs.
- The Attorney-General may take private practice, with the convention that it must not conflict with the government's interest, and may not advise or hold a brief against the Union. That private-practice space is why the office is "lawyer of the government" without being a salaried department counsel in the ordinary civil-service sense.

- Removal is at the pleasure of the President (**Article 76(4)**); there is no impeachment. Independence is therefore professional convention plus the dignity of a constitutional office, not security of tenure like a judge.

What the statement gets right

- No other Union law officer outranks the Attorney-General in the Constitution.
- Advice on bills, treaties, interstate disputes, and Presidential references under **Article 143** often goes through this office, even when the Ministry of Law and Justice does the daily drafting.

What the statement must not hide

- The Attorney-General does not control the government's political decisions; ministers may still reject advice, as they may reject any professional opinion.
- **Public interest and the Constitution bind the office:** in some hearings the Court has reminded law officers that they assist the Court as well as the client, especially where liberty and federalism are at stake.
- State Advocates-General under **Article 165** are the parallel for States; they are not subordinates of the Attorney-General. Federal litigation can therefore see two constitutional law officers on opposite sides.
- The Comptroller and Auditor General, the **Election Commission**, and other constitutional bodies take their own counsel; the Attorney-General is the Union government's lawyer, not the lawyer of every constitutional authority.

Discussion

- **The statement is correct:** **Article 76** designs a chief adviser and a lead advocate for the Union.
- A full discussion adds **Article 88**, pleasure-doctrine tenure, co-existence with the Solicitor-General, limited private practice, and the duty to the Court.

Flow diagram

Article 76 AG -> Advice to Union
 Article 76 AG -> Lead counsel in Court
 Article 88 -> Right of audience in Houses
 Solicitor-General -> Lead counsel in Court
 Article 76 AG -> Convention no brief against Union

Conclusion

The Attorney-General is, under **Article 76**, the chief legal adviser and the leading lawyer of the Government of India, with a voice in Parliament under **Article 88**. The office is constitutional, not ministerial; it advises and represents, it does not govern, and it shares the brief with other law officers while remaining first in rank.

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Q15 · 15 marks

Individual Parliamentarian's role as the national lawmaker is on a decline, which in turn, has adversely impacted the quality of debates and their outcome. Discuss.(15).

GS II · 2019 · Parliament and State Legislatures

Revision summary

The **Tenth Schedule** makes a whipped vote a condition of keeping the seat, shrinking the MP as an independent lawmaker.

Private Members' Bills rarely pass; the executive owns the legislative agenda.

Fewer sittings and guillotine of grants cut debate time; skipping standing committees hurts outcome quality.

DRSCs and PAC still give members a scrutiny role off the floor.

- **Correctives:** narrower whip, mandatory committee reference, and a minimum sitting calendar.

Introduction

A national lawmaker in a parliamentary system is both a party member and a representative who speaks, amends, and votes. Over recent decades the individual MP's room has shrunk: the whip, fewer sitting days, guillotined debates, and executive-heavy bills. Debate quality and legislative outcome have suffered where scrutiny moved off the floor and sometimes off the committee as well. The decline is real; it is not the death of Parliament.

Body

Why the individual role has declined

- The **Tenth Schedule** (Constitution (Fifty-second Amendment) Act, 1985) makes defiance of a party whip on a vote a disqualification. An MP cannot, without risking the seat, vote a conscience line on most ordinary legislation.
- Anti-defection was meant to stop horse-trading; its side effect is to turn the lawmaker into a division-bell number once the whip is issued.
- Private Members' Bills almost never pass; the legislative agenda is the government's. Individual initiative survives mainly as questions, zero hour, and adjournment noise.
- Sitting days have fallen compared with the early decades; the Budget is often guillotined, so many Demands for Grants are not debated at all.
- Ordinances, money bills used to limit Rajya Sabha, and tightly whipped Constitution Amendment Bills further reduce the floor as a place of individual amendment.

Effect on debates and outcomes

- Scripted party speeches replace clause-by-clause argument; interruptions rise; recorded debates thin out on technical bills (taxation, Aadhaar-era data, insolvency).
- When bills skip **Departmentally Related Standing Committees**, the individual MP loses the only room where party lines are softer and evidence is heard. The **National Commission** to Review the Working of the Constitution and later presiding officers repeatedly asked that all Bills go to committee.
- **Outcome quality suffers as errors travel into the Gazette and return as amendments:** rushed financial bills and poorly scrutinised criminal-law changes are the pattern, not a single

scandal.

- Representation of constituencies still happens through MPLADS (later paused and restored in cycles) and through questions; that is welfare brokerage, not law-making.

What still supports the individual MP

- Standing committees, the **Public Accounts Committee**, and the Committee on Petitions remain places where an MP can examine a ministry without a whip on every sentence.
- Rajya Sabha's longer tenure and less strict electoral clock sometimes allow a more individual voice, though party discipline exists there too.
- Privileges, the **Ethics Committee**, and the right to vote in a secret Presidential election are remnants of a member's own legal personality.

Committees and correctives

- The **Second Administrative Reforms Commission** on ethics and on organisational structure of government stressed accountability of the executive to Parliament, which needs time and un-whipped committee work.
- **Recommendations long on the table:** narrower application of the whip (only confidence, money, and no-confidence, as some democracies do), a minimum calendar of sittings, mandatory committee reference except in declared urgency, and revival of Private Members' days with a real chance of passage.
- The presiding officer's power to allow more half-hour discussions and to protect Zero Hour is a small internal fix.

Discussion

- **The statement is largely agreed:** anti-defection plus executive dominance has reduced the MP as lawmaker and has hurt debate and drafting.
- Outcome is not only floor rhetoric; committee institutionalisation after 1993 is a partial counter. Decline is of the individual on the floor, not of every parliamentary tool.

Flow diagram

Tenth Schedule whip -> Decline of individual MP
Government agenda -> Decline of individual MP
Fewer sittings guillotine -> Decline of individual MP
Decline of individual MP -> Weaker floor debate
Bills skip Committees -> Weaker floor debate
Committees -> Partial scrutiny remains

Conclusion

The individual parliamentarian's law-making role has declined because the **Tenth Schedule** whip, a government-owned agenda, fewer sittings, and bypassed committees leave little room for a personal amendment. Debates and legislative outcomes have thinned with that decline. Restoring committee reference and narrowing the whip are the practical answers, not nostalgia for an unwhipped golden age that party government never fully was.

Open WRAP page — <https://wrapexams.com/upsc/mains-answers/gs-2/2019/individual-parliamentarians-role-as-the-national-lawmaker-is-on-a-decline-which-in-turn-has-adversely-impacted-the-quality-of-debates-and-their-outcome-discuss-15/>

Q16 · 15 marks

'In the context of neo-liberal paradigm of development planning, multi-level planning is expected to make operations cost effective and remove many implementation blockages.'-Discuss.(15).

GS II · 2019 · Governance and Policy

Revision summary

After 1991 and **NITI Aayog**, planning is steering and schemes, not a central production plan.

Multi-level planning is Union-State-district-local consolidation under **Articles 243ZD** and **243ZE**.

The expected gains are local information, convergence, and fewer last-mile blockages.

District Planning Committees and panchayat capacity are still weak; CSS silos and parallel missions persist.

The theory is sound; cost-effectiveness needs money to follow the consolidated district plan.

Introduction

Neo-liberal development planning after 1991 shrank the old **Planning Commission** licence raj and asked the market and the local body to do more. Multi-level planning - Union, State, district, and panchayat - is the administrative answer: plans made closer to the work are supposed to cost less and stick less in the pipeline. The expectation is sound in design; India's practice still leaks through Centrally Sponsored Schemes, weak **District Planning Committees**, and capacity gaps.

Body

The neo-liberal planning shift

- The 1991 reforms reduced central allocation-by-licence; later the **Planning Commission** gave way to **NITI Aayog (2015)**, which is a think tank and coordinator, not a budget-making Gosplan.
- Neo-liberal here means a larger private role, user charges, public-private partnership, and a State that steers through schemes and regulation more than through production.
- In that paradigm a single New Delhi five-year plan cannot price a rural road or a slum toilet; multi-level plans are how the residual public investment is supposed to stay lean.

What multi-level planning is in the Constitution

- The 73rd and 74th Amendments require States to constitute **District Planning Committees (Article 243ZD)** to consolidate rural and urban plans, and **Metropolitan Planning Committees (Article 243ZE)** in large urban agglomerations.
- The Eleventh and Twelfth Schedules list panchayat and municipal functions; the **State Finance Commission (Article 243I and 243Y)** is meant to fund that map.
- The **Union Finance Commission (Article 280)** and Centrally Sponsored Schemes still send money down; multi-level planning is the claim that each level will sequence works so that the same well is not dug twice.

Cost-effectiveness and unblocking: the promise

- **Local information cuts gold-plating:** a gram panchayat is more likely to know which hamlet lacks a handpump than a Union ministry line item.

- Convergence - for example MGNREGA labour with a PMGSY road approach or with a **Swachh Bharat** toilet pit - is cheaper than parallel missions.
- Implementation blockages in India are often land, last-mile staff, and mismatch of a Union guideline with a State field season. A district plan that sequences those constraints can unblock what a vertical scheme cannot.
- **NITI Aayog's Aspirational Districts Programme is a neo-liberal-era multi-level tool:** Union data, State administration, district collector competition, and some private and civil-society partners.

Why the expectation is only partly met

- **Many District Planning Committees** exist on paper; real plans are still scheme circulars from ministries. The **Punchhi Commission** on Centre-State relations and several **Finance Commissions** asked for genuine district consolidation.
- Centrally Sponsored Schemes remain siloed, with matching-grant politics that recreate blockages at the State finance department.
- Panchayat functionaries lack engineers and accountants; a multi-level plan without capacity is a meeting, not a cheaper operation.
- Neo-liberal contracting (PPP, outsourcing) can add a private blockage - delayed viability-gap funding, poorly written concessions - even as it removes a public works delay.
- Parallel bodies (societies, missions, smart-city special purpose vehicles) often bypass the constitutional local government that was supposed to be the lowest planning level.

Discussion

- **In a neo-liberal frame, multi-level planning is the right cost and blockage theory:** subsidiarity plus convergence.
- India's map still funds from above and implements through collectors and missions. Until **Article 243ZD** plans actually bind scheme money, the expectation will remain a syllabus sentence more than a budget fact.

Flow diagram

Neo-liberal planning -> Union State district panchayat
 Union State district panchayat -> Art 243ZD Art 243ZD DPC
 Art 243ZD DPC -> Convergence lower cost
 Centrally Sponsored silos -> Blockages remain
 Weak local capacity -> Blockages remain

Conclusion

Neo-liberal planning needs multi-level plans because the Union cannot cost-effectively micro-allocate every well and ward. **Articles 243ZD** and **243ZE**, **State Finance Commissions**, and district convergence are the constitutional tools. They remove blockages only when scheme money follows the district plan and when panchayats have staff; otherwise neo-liberal India still plans in silos and pays twice.

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Q17 · 15 marks

The need for cooperation among various service sector has been an inherent component of development discourse. Partnership bridges bring the gap among the sectors. It also sets in motion a culture of 'Collaboration' and 'team spirit'. In the light of statements above examine India's Development process.(15).

GS II · 2019 · India and its Neighbourhood

Revision summary

Development needs health, education, skills, finance and infrastructure services to work as one chain.

India's process used mixed economy, then 1991-era PPP, 73rd/74th local bodies, SHGs, CSR and multi-ministry missions as partnership bridges.

GST Council, Pulse Polio and disaster law show statutory collaboration.

Silos, unequal PPP risk and informal workers show that team spirit is incomplete.

The statement fits India's direction; it overstates how far the culture has arrived.

Introduction

- **Development is not one ministry's project:** health, education, skills, finance, digital identity, and infrastructure services have to work as one chain. Partnership - among Union and State, public and private, civil society and panchayat - is how India has tried to bridge those gaps since the mixed-economy years and especially after 1991. Collaboration and team spirit are the culture that the statement names; India's process shows both genuine bridges and contractual, unequal partnerships.

Body

Development discourse and cooperation among services

- Early Plans treated industry and agriculture as lead sectors; social services were residual. Human-development discourse (and later the Sustainable Development Goals) made health, education, water, and social protection co-equal services that fail if they do not cooperate.
- A patient without a road, a school without a toilet, or a skill certificate without a job is a service-sector gap. The statement's "various service sector" is best read as these development services, not only GDP "services" as a tertiary slice - though India's services-led growth is part of the same story.

Partnership bridges in India's process

- Mixed economy (Industrial Policy, public sector, and later 1991 liberalisation) already assumed a public-private division of labour. Public-private partnership in roads, ports, airports, and power became the post-reform bridge for physical services.
- The Seventy-third and Seventy-fourth Amendments asked panchayats and municipalities to deliver local services with State departments, which is inter-governmental partnership.
- Self-Help Groups, the National Rural Livelihoods Mission, and bank linkage (NABARD, priority-sector norms) bridge credit services and women's livelihoods.
- Corporate Social Responsibility under [Section 135](#) of the Companies Act, 2013, pulled company money into sanitation, education, and health - a statutory partnership, not only charity.

- **Flagship missions are multi-service by design:** **Swachh Bharat** (behaviour, local bodies, and departments), **Ayushman Bharat** (insurance plus health and wellness centres), **Digital India** and **Aadhaar** (identity as a service that other services ride), **Skill India** with Sector Skill Councils (employers plus trainers).
- **NITI Aayog's** Aspirational Districts and competitive federalism try to create team spirit among collectors, line departments, and partners with a public dashboard.

Where collaboration is real

- Pulse Polio, and later Mission Indradhanush, showed Union-State-WHO-ASHA cooperation as a service chain.
- The Goods and Services Tax Council is a fiscal partnership that affects every service market; it is cooperation as constitutional design (**Article 279A**), not a slogan.
- Disaster response under the **Disaster Management Act, 2005**, forces health, police, and local bodies into one incident command, which is team spirit under statute.

Where the culture remains weak

- Ministries still guard budgets; a school toilet can wait because it is "another department".
- **PPP can become risk dumped on the public:** stalled road concessions and poorly regulated private hospitals show partnership without a fair bridge.
- Civil-society space is uneven; partnership is easiest with contractor NGOs and hardest with adversarial rights groups, which thins the "team".
- Informal workers, who dominate Indian services employment, sit outside many partnership tables; development then collaborates among elites.

Examination of the process

- India's development process moved from a Centre-planned mixed economy to a scheme-and-mission State that must cooperate across services.
- Partnership bridges have expanded delivery (sanitation, digital payments, health insurance enrolment). They have not automatically produced equal team spirit: capacity, contract design, and federal money still decide whether the bridge holds.

Flow diagram

Development discourse -> Cooperation among services
 Cooperation among services -> Public-private partnership
 Cooperation among services -> Panchayat and SHG
 Cooperation among services -> Missions CSR Digital India
 Public-private partnership -> Delivery with gaps
 Panchayat and SHG -> Delivery with gaps
 Missions CSR Digital India -> Delivery with gaps

Conclusion

Cooperation among development services is inherent in India's later planning discourse, and partnership - PPP, panchayats, SHGs, CSR, and multi-ministry missions - has been the method. The process shows real bridges in immunisation, digital public infrastructure, and some livelihoods, and it shows gaps where silos, unequal contracts, and informal workers are left off the team. Collaboration is therefore a direction of the Indian development process, not yet its completed culture.

Open WRAP page — <https://wrapexams.com/upsc/mains-answers/gs-2/2019/the-need-for-cooperation-among-various-service-sector-has-been-an-inherent-component-of-development-discourse-partnership-bridges-bring-the-gap-among-the-sectors-it-also-sets-in-motion-a-culture-of-collaboration-and-team/>

WRAP Exams

Q18 · 15 marks

Performance of welfare schemes that are implemented for vulnerable sections is not so effective due to absence of their awareness and active involvement at all stages of policy process - Discuss.(15).

GS II · 2019 · Welfare Schemes for Vulnerable Sections

Revision summary

Articles 15(4), 16(4) and 46 frame welfare for vulnerable sections; performance depends on last-mile knowledge and voice.

Absence of awareness and of involvement in design, delivery and audit is a major cause of exclusion and leakage.

MGNREGA social audits and NFSA grievance systems are statutory models of involvement.

National Commissions and PESA gram sabhas are institutional voices that schemes often skip.

Funding, staff and digital exclusion also matter; the statement is the core diagnosis, not the only one.

Introduction

Welfare for Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes, women, persons with disability, minorities, and the income-poor is a constitutional duty (Articles 15(4), 16(4), 46, and the local-government chapters). Schemes fail most often at the last mile: the intended beneficiary does not know the entitlement, and is not in the room when the scheme is designed, budgeted, or audited. The statement names that gap correctly; money, targeting errors, and staff also matter.

Body

Why awareness and involvement decide performance

- **A scheme is a chain:** problem, design, law or guideline, budget, frontline delivery, grievance, and evaluation. If vulnerable groups enter only as names on a list at the end, exclusion errors and leakage follow.
- Illiteracy, remote hamlets, disability, and patriarchal households block information; a portal or a newspaper advertisement does not equal awareness.
- **Without involvement, officials guess demand:** toilets without water, hostels without food, scholarships that miss the girl who has already dropped out.

Evidence in major schemes

- **Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act, 2005**, built social audit and the gram sabha into the statute; where those forums are real, performance improves, and where they are captured, the same Act under-delivers. That is involvement as a legal design, not a slogan.
- The **National Food Security Act, 2013**, names entitlements and grievance structures; awareness of the ration scale and of the right to a food-security allowance is still uneven, which is why some States use strong local publicity and others do not.
- Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe sub-plans, hostels, and Post-Matric Scholarships fail when students do not know timelines and when parent groups are absent from review.

- The Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016, and the National Trust architecture need disabled persons' organisations in planning; UDID and accessible buildings stall where those organisations are not at the table.
- PESA, 1996, in Scheduled Areas requires gram sabha consent on some resources; skipping that involvement is both illegal and a performance failure of tribal welfare.

Absence at all stages of the policy process

- **Agenda setting:** vulnerable groups rarely write the Cabinet note; civil society and commissions (**National Commission** for Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes, Women, Backward Classes, and Minorities; **Chief Commissioner** for Persons with Disabilities) are the usual proxies, and they are unevenly heard.
- **Formulation:** guidelines are Union-drafted; pre-legislative consultation is thin.
- **Implementation:** frontline (anganwadi, ASHA, gram rozgar sevak) is the only daily contact; if that worker is overburdened or biased, involvement dies.
- **Evaluation:** dashboards without social audit become a collector's race, not a beneficiary's voice. The **Second Administrative Reforms Commission** on social capital and on local governance stressed participatory monitoring.

Other reasons performance lags (so the statement is not the whole story)

- Under-funding, delayed State share, and staff vacancies would weaken a perfectly aware community.
- Elite capture and middlemen can be worse when a scheme is known but the gram sabha is weak.
- Digital KYC and Aadhaar seeding can exclude the very groups the scheme names, even when they are "aware" of the benefit.

What involvement at all stages looks like

- Pre-legislative consultation and draft guidelines in regional languages.
- Gram sabha and ward sabha as statutory clearance for beneficiary lists (already in MGNREGA and NFSA practice in better States).
- Social audit units with independent facilitation, as Andhra Pradesh and some other States showed.
- Right to Information Act, 2005, and public hearings as default, not as activist extras.
- Representation of vulnerable groups on scheme advisory bodies, not only on national commissions after a scandal.

Flow diagram

Vulnerable sections -> Awareness of entitlement
 Vulnerable sections -> Involvement all stages
 Awareness of entitlement -> Better scheme performance
 Involvement all stages -> Better scheme performance
 MGNREGA social audit gram sabha -> Involvement all stages
 No voice digital exclusion -> Weak performance

Conclusion

Welfare schemes for vulnerable sections under-perform when those sections lack awareness and have no role in design, delivery and audit. MGNREGA social audits and NFSA entitlements show that involvement can be written into law; vacancies, capture and digital exclusion show that awareness is necessary, not sufficient. The statement should be accepted as the central last-mile diagnosis, and then completed with money, staff and honest lists.

Open WRAP page — <https://wrapexams.com/upsc/mains-answers/gs-2/2019/performance-of-welfare-schemes-that-are-implemented-for-vulnerable-sections-is-not-so-effective-due-to-absence-of-their-awareness-and-active-involvement-at-all-stages-of-policy-process-discuss-15/>

Q19 · 15 marks

"The long-sustained image of India as a leader of the oppressed and marginalised Nations has disappeared on account of its new found role in the emerging global order" Elaborate(15).

GS II · 2019 · Governance and Policy

Revision summary

NAM, G77 and South-South programmes built India's image as a leader of colonised and developing nations.

Post-1991 weight, nuclear diplomacy and Indo-Pacific partnerships created a major-power role.

The old image has thinned where India looks like a US-leaning security player and a market competitor.

ITEC, WTO developing-country coalitions and strategic autonomy show continuity.

Elaborate as layering and tension, not as a clean disappearance.

Introduction

From Bandung and the Non-Aligned Movement through the G77 and the demand for a New International Economic Order, India spoke as a large poor country that claimed to lead the colonised and the developing world. In the emerging order after the Cold War - and more sharply in the 2000s - India also seeks a permanent UN Security Council seat, a nuclear-normal identity, and a place among major powers. The old image has thinned; it has not cleanly disappeared.

Body

The long-sustained image

- Anti-colonial solidarity, NAM under **Nehru**, and later South-South rhetoric (ITEC, concessional lines of credit, UN peacekeeping) built the picture of India as a voice of the oppressed nations, not a camp follower of Washington or Moscow.
- India used that identity in WTO coalitions (G20 developing countries in agriculture, G33), in climate talks as a developing-country leader with China in BASIC, and in the Commonwealth and African forums.
- Moral language - decolonisation, anti-apartheid, disarmament - was the public face, even when realpolitik with neighbours was harder.

The emerging global order and the new role

- Economic weight after 1991, the India-US civil nuclear path (2008 NSG waiver politics), and later the Quad, 2+2 dialogues, and Indo-Pacific language placed India closer to a major-power table.
- **Aspirations:** permanent UNSC membership, NSG membership, a larger IMF-World Bank voice, and a role in setting digital and maritime rules.
- **Multi-alignment (BRICS, SCO, RIC, Quad at once) is the method:** India wants options, not a single camp. That is a different image from NAM chair of the weak.

Why the old image appears to have disappeared

- Voting and language at the United Nations on some Western-led resolutions, and a tighter US and Quad security conversation, are read in parts of the Global South as a shift away from automatic third-world solidarity.
- India's own rise makes it a competitor for African and Asian markets, not only a brother of the marginalised; lines of credit come with project politics.
- **Climate and trade:** as emissions and services exports grow, India is asked to take "major economy" burdens that poor island states do not see as leadership of the oppressed.
- Domestic development success stories sit beside inequality; partners may see a would-be great power, not a fellow victim of the old order.

Why "disappeared" is too strong

- India still runs a large ITEC and development-partnership programme; it still argues special and differential treatment in the WTO; it still speaks for African representation in global governance in BRICS and IBSA language.
- Vaccine diplomacy (later than this 2019 paper's core years, but in the same trajectory of South-South health) and peacekeeping continuity show the old register is usable.
- **Strategic autonomy remains official doctrine:** refusal of alliance, and continued Russia defence and energy ties, are not the behaviour of a country that has fully joined the established West.
- The emerging order is itself multi-polar; leadership of the marginalised and a seat among major powers are both Indian claims, in tension, not a completed substitution.

Elaboration

- **The statement captures a real rebranding:** from NAM tribune to multi-aligned major power.
- It overstates erasure. The image has been layered, not deleted. Friction appears when a Quad speech and a G77 speech must be given in the same week.

Flow diagram

NAM South-South image South-South image -> Tension
 Major-power role Quad UNSC bid -> Tension
 Tension -> Multi-alignment-alignment
 Multi-alignment -> Layered identity not full disappearance

Conclusion

India's long image as leader of oppressed nations has faded because the emerging order rewards major-power behaviour - UNSC bid, nuclear normalcy, Indo-Pacific partnerships. It has not disappeared: South-South cooperation, WTO developing-country coalitions, and strategic autonomy still use the older language. The new role sits on top of the old image and sometimes contradicts it.

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Q20 · 15 marks

"What introduces friction into the ties between India and the United States is that Washington is still unable to find for India a position in its global strategy, which would satisfy India's National self-esteem and ambitions" Explain with suitable examples.(15).

GS II · 2019 · Governance and Policy

Revision summary

India wants strategic autonomy and major-power status; the US organises the world through allies and sanctions.

That mismatch, not only personality, introduces friction.

- **Examples:** Pakistan-Afghanistan hyphenation, CAATSA and Russian arms, Iran oil sanctions, 2019 GSP withdrawal, H-1B, and incomplete nuclear-normalcy.

China and Indo-Pacific cooperation reduce friction without solving the role problem.

The practical path has been issue-based partnership, not a single grand-strategy slot.

Introduction

India-US ties have thickened through the civil nuclear understanding, defence logistics, and a shared China problem. Friction remains because the United States builds strategy around alliances and issue-hierarchies (Pakistan, China, Iran, Russia, trade), while India wants recognition as an autonomous pole - not a hyphenated junior partner. The quote is a good map of that mismatch; examples make it concrete.

Body

What India wants in the relationship

- **Strategic autonomy:** partnerships without a treaty that commands Indian votes, energy, or defence inventory.
- **Status:** a de facto major-power place - NSG membership, support for a permanent UN Security Council seat, and an end to technology-denial habits from the nuclear-sanctions era.
- **Self-esteem:** no hyphenation with Pakistan, no public lecture that treats India as a client on Kashmir or on Russia, and a trade terms-of-trade that is not only market access for US firms.

Where Washington's global strategy sits

- US strategy is still organised around alliances (NATO, treaty allies in Asia), extra-territorial sanctions, and, in South Asia for a long period, a Pakistan channel for Afghanistan.
- India is valuable as a China balancer and a large market, but it is not a US ally. Finding a "position" that is neither ally nor ordinary emerging market is the design problem the quote names.

Examples of friction

- **Pakistan hyphenation and Afghanistan:** US military aid and political use of Islamabad repeatedly collided with India's terror and Kashmir concerns; New Delhi read this as Washington ranking its Af-Pak war above India's self-image as the region's democracy.
- **Civil nuclear deal unfinished business:** NSG waiver politics and the nuclear-liability law showed status gain with residual technology and supplier caution - ambition met by a partial, not

full, place in the non-proliferation order.

- **CAATSA and Russian systems (including the S-400 decision):** US law treats major Russian arms as a sanctions trigger; India treats Russia as a historic defence partner. Washington's Russia strategy has no comfortable slot for Indian autonomy.
- **Iran:** US secondary sanctions after leaving the **Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action** squeezed India's oil and Chabahar diplomacy; India's West Asia equities were expected to follow US strategy.
- **Trade:** the 2019 withdrawal of India's Generalized System of Preferences benefits, disputes on medical devices, agriculture, and data, showed that "strategic partner" did not mean a trade identity that matched India's development-status claim.
- **Immigration and talent:** H-1B tightening hits Indian professional self-esteem and the services model, even while Quad speeches praise Indian human capital.
- Foundational defence agreements (LEMOA and, in the same era, COMCASA) increased trust and still left India refusing a NATO-like role - ambition for technology without alliance discipline.

Why a satisfying position is hard

- If the US offers an ally's privileges, India refuses the ally's obligations.
- If the US offers a normal trade-and-rights agenda, India hears a status demotion.
- China is the overlap that reduces friction (Malabar, Indo-Pacific); Pakistan, Iran, Russia, and trade are the files that reopen it.

Explanation

- **The quote is right:** friction is not only tariff lines; it is a missing role-definition that feeds Indian amour-propre and US alliance habits.
- The working substitute has been issue-based partnership - defence logistics, Indo-Pacific, people-to-people - without a grand strategy label that both capitals would sign.

Flow diagram

US alliance sanctions strategy alliance sanctions strategy -> No fitting chair for India
 Indian autonomy and status -> No fitting chair for India
 No fitting chair for India -> Friction
 Pakistan CAATSA Iran GSP -> Friction
 China overlap Quad defence -> Issue-based partnership

Conclusion

India-US friction persists because Washington's alliance-and-sanctions strategy has no ready chair that matches India's demand for autonomy and major-power esteem. Pakistan hyphenation, CAATSA and Russia, Iran oil, GSP withdrawal, and unfinished nuclear-normalcy are examples. The relationship advances where China and technology overlap, and it grinds where US global hierarchy expects India to behave like a partner-ally.

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Compiled answer key

Last pages of this pack. Each question links to the WRAP model answer on wrapexams.com.

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Q1 10 marks	Q2 10 marks	Q3 10 marks	Q4 10 marks
Q5 10 marks	Q6 10 marks	Q7 10 marks	Q8 10 marks
Q9 10 marks	Q10 10 marks	Q11 15 marks	Q12 15 marks
Q13 15 marks	Q14 15 marks	Q15 15 marks	Q16 15 marks
Q17 15 marks	Q18 15 marks	Q19 15 marks	Q20 15 marks

Question-wise key

Q1 · 10 marks Solution

Q2 · 10 marks Solution

Q3 · 10 marks Solution

Q4 · 10 marks Solution

Q5 · 10 marks Solution

Q6 · 10 marks Solution

Q7 · 10 marks Solution

Q8 · 10 marks Solution

Q9 · 10 marks Solution

Q10 · 10 marks Solution

Q11 · 15 marks Solution

Q12 · 15 marks Solution

Q13 · 15 marks Solution

Q14 · 15 marks Solution

Q15 · 15 marks Solution

Q16 · 15 marks Solution

Q17 · 15 marks Solution

Q18 · 15 marks Solution

Q19 · 15 marks Solution

Q20 · 15 marks Solution

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